In addition, I think I remember that on hand of this report the question which had already been referred to about the recognition of the Tito unit was again taken up by me.
Q. Now, did the Commander in Chief Southeast or did you yourself think that the news distributed by Tito was binding?
A. No, I don't know of any case in which a German headquarters office took orders on the strength of enemy news or radio. These could not be binding.
Q. And did you yourself make any attempts about the recognition of Tito as a belligerent force with the OKW?
A. Yes, I think I remember that at that time after reporting orally to General Field Marshal Loehr who was deputizing for Weichs, I spoke again with Warlimont or Buttlar about these things in the OKW
Q. And was it your view that now the Tito units were really belligerent forces in the sense of the laws of war?
A. No, absolutely not. But this question should be taken up again on hand of this report.
Q. On former occasions in your testimony you have already stated that the attempts to get the Tito bands recognized as a belligerent power were mostly based on reasons of expediency.
A. Yes.
Q. Not considerations which had anything to do with the laws of war?
A. No.
Q. And what in this case was the sense of the expediency consideration?
A. Exactly the same as before.
Q. And that was what?
A. That was the attempt or the hope that in this way perhaps the methods of the Tito bands would be freed of their brutality. It was the hope, that the treatment of the German soldiers who were captured by the bands would be better and, as I have already said, it was always an egoistic idea.
We thought that in some kind of recognition, also for reasons of expediency, our own fighting in the eyes of Hitler and the OKW would be esteemed much higher and that therefore the desire of the Commander in Chief Southeast for more troops would find more willing ears. This would also have the effect on, for instance, the question of the distribution of war decorations for the divisions which were also all the time behind the other theaters of war. All in all pure reasons of expediency.
Q. And what was the result of this request to the OKW?
A. It had no success at all. Everything remained as it was.
Q. Witness, Exhibit 477, page 85 of the German and page 121 of the English document book, contains daily reports from the period of the 8th to the 27th of February 1944. Did you know these reports?
A. I probably knew them.
Q. And then the daily reports in Exhibit 478.
A. I knew the first two pages of these.
Q. The report of the 12th of February and the 24th of February -those are the two?
A. Yes.
Q. And why didn't you know the later ones?
A. Because I was no longer active in the Southeast then.
Q. Witness, now please, Document Book No. XXII of the prosecution. Out of this document book, according to your total list, you only knew Exhibit 490. The other documents all occurred during the period in which you had left the Commander in Chief Southeast. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And what reports do you know in Exhibit 490? This is on page 68 of the German and page 78 of the English Document book.
A. The reports on the first page of this document book I didn't know because it doesn't concern the Southeast at all but only France and Italy.
The reports on the second page I probably knew.
Q. And the rest?
A. The others fall within a period after my activity in the Southeast.
Q. And now the last prosecution document on which I have questions to put; Document Books XXII and XXIII do not concern the defendant Foertsch. XXIV has already been discussed. XXV doesn't concern him at all.
A. XXV concerns me but wasn't known to me.
Q. Yes, wasn't known to you, so that now I have only to deal with Exhibit No. 553. This is an exhibit which was handed in separately to Document Book XXIV, Exhibit No. 553, NOKW-1639.
Q. These are the minutes of an interrogation made on the 12th of March 1947 in the court martial for the town of Belgrade by the organ of the State Commission for the Establishment of War Crimes of the occupier and his accomplices. It is an interrogation of Col. Joseph Sellmayer who is described here as Ia of the operational departments of the staff of Army Group F.
Witness, I submit to you the original. First of all a preliminary question. From the original, can you see whether this is a sworn testimony? There is nothing mentioned about this in the document book.
A. No. It cannot be recognized from the original that the testimony was sworn to.
Q. Witness, I have a question with regard to Page 3 of this interrogation which is on Page 13 of the original in the last four paragraphs. According to this, Sellmayer stated, according to basic order of Hitler from 1941, "Partisans fighting behind the German lines," must not be designated by the "honorable name," "de juro". That is, they were to be described as bandits and to be treated as bandits. And then I skip a sentence and then it goes on: "de jure, The People's Army of Liberation also falls under this, since according to Hitler, they are not to be recognized as a belligerent power. De facto, from the first day of my activity in the Southeast inside the Staff of Army Group F, there was no doubt that the People's Army of Liberation in its bulk now, corresponded to the provisions of International Law."
Can you explain how Sellmayer could make this assertion?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, that's inadmissible. I don't think General Foertsch would know the reasons upon which General Sellmayer bases his conclusions.
THE PRESIDENT: Sustained.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. Witness, is this testimony of Sellmayer's correct?
A. It's correct, that Hitler forbade the description "partisans."
But I think that it wasn't as early as 1941, but in 1942. I am not sure of the date. Also correct is the fact that "De jure," the so-called People's Army of Liberation was not recognized as a belligerent power. It is not correct that in the staff of Army Group F the so-called People's Army of Liberation was regarded as corresponding to the provisions of International Law. I can only refer again to my repeated statements on this question. Correct is that the orders of the Commander in Chief Southeast envisaged a warfare such as took place in other theaters of war. This is valid for the military handling of the fighting, but not for the treatment and consideration of the Tito bands as belligerent powers.
Q. Your Honors, and this finishes the questions I have put to my client with regard to the Prosecution document books. And now I will deal with the two document books -- II and III -- of the Defense, and in connection with this I have a few questions to put to the Defendant.
I begin with Document Book II of the Defense, with Document No. 17. This is the second document in the document book which receives the Exhibit No. 16. This affidavit of Wilhelm Hammer is submitted by me as evidence that the Commissar Order was not valid in the Southeast. The affidavit which is on Page 4 of the document book, Document Foertsch No. 17, is offered as Exhibit No. 16, and it runs as follows:
"In September 1941, I, as a Captain in reserve, was ordered to go to Athens as a Field Intelligence Staff Officer (Ic) of the commander for Southern Greece; I stayed there until September 1942.
I learned about the so-called Commissar order only from hearsay, that is to say, from reports of some men who had been on the Eastern front. This order was not issued in the South Eastern area. Up to the present, I supposed it to have been valid only for the Eastern front. If this order had also been issued in the South Eastern area to the subordinate units, I - in my capacity as Ic of the commander Southern Greece - would have read it. This is not the case, as mentioned before."
This affidavit was taken here and certified by me. During the time when the English document book was copied and the stencil made under the date of 27th of August 1947, my name was not included. I think this is what the Prosecutor wanted to mention, but he saw it in the original. The second affidavit which I submit is Foertsch Document No. 18. This is on Page 6 of my Document Book II, and I submit it as Exhibit Foertsch No. 17. This is an affidavit....
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I have a question on the certification at the end of this document, which is on Page 6-A of Foertsch Document Book II. It appears from this that Dr. Rauschenbach has compared the signature on the affidavit with the signature of the affiant, von Harling, on von Harling's identification card. And on the basis of that comparison Dr. Rauschenbach it seems to me is certifying that signature. I believe that's entirely improper because I don't know if Dr. Rauschenbach is enough of a handwriting expert to tell from comparing the signature on the affidavit with that on the identification card.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honors, the Witness was there himself. I certified the signature in his present, and I can't imagine how one can establish the identify of a persons in any other way than by seeing his identification card. This sentence was taken here only in this affidavit. It wasn't prescribed at all in the provisions of the Military Tribunals that one must prove how the affiant of the affidavit was identified. And I think even more was laid down here than was necessary.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I will accept Dr. Rauschenbach's statement. I was confused by the language used in the statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Under the circumstances the objection is withdrawn?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; proceed.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. This affidavit of Franz von Harling refers to the relation of the Commander in Chief Southeast and also of the Defendant Foertsch to the SD. It runs as follows, on Page 6 of the English:
"At the end of May 1943 I was transferred to the staff of the High Command Southeast. I held the office of the third General Staff Officer (1c). In this capacity I was directly subordinated to General Foertsch.
On the basis of this function I can make the following testimony: With regard to the relationship between the High Command Southeast on the one hand, and the Security Service on the other hand, I must state that, during the period I was a member of this staff, the Security Service was subordinated to the Higher SS - and Police Chief in question, and, beyond that, received instructions from the Reich Security Main Office directly.
It is furthermore of interest in this connection that the Higher SS and Police Chief and not the Supreme Commander South-East had the executive power over the civilian population in the district South-East.
The Supreme Commander for South-East had no influence whatsoever as far as the operational area and the operational tasks of the Security Service within the sphere of command was concerned.
A constant content between the High Command South-East and the Security Service existed only to the extent that the written results of the counter-intelligence against the Mihailovic and Tito resistance movements were put at the disposal of the Security Service Commands in Belgrade and Zagreb."
Q I submit as the next exhibit, Exhibit Foertsch No. 19. This is an excerpt certified by me from the Pay Book of the Defendant Foertsch in reference to part of his leave. The Exhibit runs as follows:
"Excerpt from the M i l i t a r y P a y B o o k also serving as identity card No. 2 for the Colonel in the General Staff ....................................Hermann F o e r t s c h ....................................--------------------Page 23 Leaves of over 5 days 1. From 3 September 1941 till 23 September 1941 to Babelsberg near Potsdam (21 days) Reason:
Recreation leave.
3 September 1941 Seal Signature Colonel and Adjutant"
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I think we must have the original Pay Book of Foertsch rather than a sheet of paper signed by Dr. Rauschenbach. If he saw the book himself and it's available, I think it should be produced.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honors, I have adhered to the custom which was usual up to now in the Tribunals. For instance, if one quotes from a book of law or some other extensive document some for which one, for special reasons, cannot leave with the Secretary General because it is needed and one cannot have it all the time, up to now the Tribunal have allowed that the Defense Counsel get a certified excerpt of such and submits it as the original.
But I am quite willing to show the Prosecutor the original itself, which I have here, for reasons of comparison, if that is sufficient. And, on the other hand, he can have a photostat copy.
(RECEPTION POOR DURING PROSECUTION AND TRIBUNAL TALKS)
MR. FENSTERMACHER: That will satisfy my objection on that grounds, Your Honors. I have another objection. Your Honors will recall Exhibit 14 which was submitted into evidence on the 10th of October. It was a survey information sheet. There were two of them you will remember. This was "for information I" and concerned the days of absence from the Headquarters of the Defendant Foertsch. The first entry on that Exhibit was 1941, to the effect that Foertsch was absent from 31 August to 27 September, and the proof which is indicated will be offered to sustain that. And it stated to be Military Pay Book, Document Book II of Foertsch.
(MIKE NOT TURNED ON FOR ABOVE)
This is the Military Pay Book, in Document II of Foertsch, and it says that Foertsch was on leave from 3 September 1941 to the 23rd September 1941 and not from the 31st of August to the 27th of September. I ask your Honors that Dr. Rauschenback be asked to explain the discrepancy.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that.that is a matter which you can handle in cross-examination. And in the light of Dr. Rauschenbachs statement that you might make use of the Pay Book you can take care of it in the cross-examination, if you should so desire.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Yes, Your Honor, this gives extra weight to a previously admitted document.
THE PRESIDENT: And it will be so considered in your crossexamination if you so desire to comment upon.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honor, I was just on the point of putting a question to the Defendant, and I would like to mention again that the survey the Prosecution mentioned before was not intended by me to be submitted as an exhibit but only for information purposes, and I only gave it an exhibit number at the suggestion of the Tribunal so that this statement about the leave was not supposed to have the weight of an exhibit.
I wanted to ask the defendant supplementary questions about it.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q Witness, with regard to this, I ask you the following. You have just heard that the statements which you made in your list, Exhibit 14, about the period of your absence in September 1941 is not in agreement with the contents of the Pay Book. How can it be explained that you were away for a longer time from your office than it says in your Pay Book?
A The entry of my leaves in the Pay Book did not contain the days taken for the journey but only the days which officially were to be counted as leave. From the Southeastern area, in general, two to three days were reckoned for the journey at the beginning of the leave and at the end of the leave, and I remember quite definitely that on the 31st of August I left Athens and at the end of my leave I was at the OKW to report orally to Keitel and from a Prosecution document which has been dealt with here it can be seen that during the 27th of September I came back via Belgrade.
Q Witness, and are there notes in the hand of other persons which can prove how long you were absent?
A Yes. My personal orderly officer, Rittmeister Graf Schmettow; while he served with me for 16 months, he made brief notes of a personal nature in his diary and told me that the days when I was absent were set down there.
Q Your Honors, I will call the orderly officer Graf Schmettow as a witness here, which request has already been approved by the Tribunal.-- and then back again to Exhibit No. 19. The second entry shows a leave from the 19th of March till the 4th of April. Which year was that, Witness?
A In 1943.
Q "To Babelsberg/Potsdam, (17 days), Reason: Recreation leave, stamp, 15 March 1943, Signed: Loehr, General." And this entry too does not contain the complete number of days of your actual absence. And does the statement you made with regard to Figure 1 apply here too?
A Yes, and in addition there is the fact that General Loehr called me up towards the end of this leave and suggested or offered me an extension of the leave. I very thankfully accepted this offer and therefore came back later.
Q And the third entry is "Recreation leave from the 21st of November until the 9th and/or 10th of December 1941: Reason: Recreation leave." Is this entry complete?
A With regard to the leave days to be reckoned, yes, but on the journey back I went away two days earlier because, as far as I remember, I came back already on the 10th. At that time my family was living in Babelsberg, and because of the everlasting air attacks, I sent them off again earlier than planned and I came back myself much earlier.
Q The next document is Document Foertsch No. 20 on Page 9 of the Document Book, which I submit as Exhibit No. 19, This is an affidavit of the former Chief of the General Staff of the German Army Halder, from whom, in my Document Book I, I submitted this expert opinion about the official position of the Chief of the General Staff. Halders's states the following:
"Former General Hermann Foertsch has been personally well known to me for at least 10 years. I did not have any direct official contact with him. On the other hand, in my capacity as Chief of the General Staff of the Army, I came to know of the opinion held by his official superiors and his regard within the General Staff."
I will now skip the next paragraphs and continue on page two in the second paragraph. Formerly Halder had given a general characterization of Foertsch and then he continued:
"I base this general opinion on official information which I received from others and on occasional impressions of my own. I remember such a case that Foertsch, at that time a colonel and Chief of the General Staff of the 12th army, had reported to me about the situation in the SouthEast during the second half of September 1941 in the Headquarters of the OKH. It is true that this theatre of was was taken from the authority of the OKH as a so-called army theatre of war. In spite of this, Foertsch requested aid from the OKH on orders from his supreme commander Generalfeldmarschall List, because the men in charge of this theatre of war saw themselves faced with insoluble tasks. Especially in question in this case was Serbai where the menace to railroad-and highway communications through insurgents became increasingly threatening and only 4 German divisions, in addition to a few regional rifle units, wore available in the vast and highly mountainous territory. These divisions, on account of their composition (2 weak infantry regiments, 1 artillery unit) the over all age of the men, their armament and equipment and because of their very low rate of mobility, were completely unsuitable for the tasks in question. These tasks could have only been solved, according to military principles, through the use of highly skilled and highly mobile units. The request submitted by Foertsch was therefore completely justified. The orders given by the OKW to the Army High Commander South-East were in gross misproportion to the means made available.
This was nothing now to me in view of the fact that, because of similar problems, I had a daily fight with the OKW and its methods of military leadership, For Foertsch who perhaps had this experience for the first time in his official sphere of responsibility," "it was a bitter perception which shook his confidence, He has expressed this to me in such a clear and open man-to-man language that I can clearly remember it. Beginning with this conversation I have considered Foertsch as one of those men whom I could rely upon when the day would come for settlement of the differences, existing between the army leadership and Hitler. In view of the impression this strong, true and unselfish person had made on me, the thought is inconceivable that this man on his own initiative has ever agreed to, or even proposed something which is in violation of the conception of decent German soldiership and rules of war.
At that time I was in no position to give Foertsch material help. The situation in the Russian theatre of war and the plans pending at that time (preparations for the battle of Vjasma - Briansk) had made it impossible to spare any troops for the South-East or to hold prospects for making them available in due course.
During the aforementioned conversation, Foertsch also mentioned the great difficulties in the transportation situation and the supply of the population depending on it, he furthermore mentioned currency questions and other points in connection with the welfare of the occupied territories. His brief statements give proof of the great sense of responsibility which Foertsch and his Supreme Commander, Generalfeldmarschall List felt towards the population in the occupied territories, in the same way, however, also his disappointment, even exasperation about the small support which he had found at the OKW.
In this respect too, his views were conforming with those of the OKH. Here too, where the decision alone rests with the OKW, I had to be satisfied with promising him any support possible within the sphere of activity of the Quartermaster General."
From this exhibit, there can be seen the contrast and contradictions which Foertsch stood towards the OKW and his attempts to strengthen the military occupation and in this way by military moans and in addition with economic means to provide the necessary means for the population to maintain peace in the Balkans.
The next document, Document Foertsch No. 21, is offered as Exhibit No. 20. This is a letter from Foertsch of 8 Oct 47' to his wife.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I object to the admission of this document in evidence. It consists of a sheet of paper with some handwriting on it which is nut identified. It is not addressed to anyone. The signature is an initial "H" which is completely unidentified. Finally, I object on the ground it is completely irrelevant and immaterial and has nothing to do with this case.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: With regard to the first objection, I will submit the original document. That is the whole letter of the defendant and will show it to him, and will ask him--did you send this letter at that time, that is on the 8th of October, 1941?
GENERAL FOERTSCH: Yes, I wrote this letter at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. Witness, in connection with this letter which I have submitted to you, I have one question.
Was there a censorship in the German Wehrmacht of the Army letters which the German soldiers sent home--the letters from the front?
A. Yes, there was a regular army censorship through so-called army post checking centers.
Q. And from what points of view did those army post checking centers work? For instance, what did they look for in such army letters?
A. The army censorship had to look for absolute violations of discipline and any kind of suspicions with regard to offenses or crimes. For instance, plundering, theft etc. and then they had to check any kind of political statements by reason of the laws which I can't describe exactly but in general would fall under the term "undermining the morale of the Wehrmacht" or something like that.
Q. Witness, I am going to submit further numbers of army letters. Did you send your letters through the usual army post channels?
A. Yes, it is possible that individual letters for a certain sector were taken by a courier--that is, for instance from Athens to Belgrade, but they went through army channels.
Q. Was it admissible in army letters written by the soldiers home to criticize superiors or even the OKW or even to criticize them adversely?
A. Of course it was not allowed.
Q. And if such a letter had been stopped by the censorship and for instance submitted to the OKW, what happened then?
A. Then the writer of the letter was called to account for it or at any rate he had to risk the danger that he would be called to account for it.
Q. Your Honor, and now I will read one sentence in this letter which the witness wrote on the 8th of October, 1941, to his wife and which contains clearly his criticism. It states: "Yesterday and today there was no mail, instead I received silly teletypes from higher up."
And the last sentence as quoted in the document book: "One looks on powerless because there is no defense and, above all, one has to take stupid phrases from above."
The next document, Document Foertsch No. 22, Exhibit No. 21 is again such an excerpt from an army post setter and should help to prove that Foertsch was no war monger but thought very independently and not as the prosecution maintains took part in a brutal plan. Essential is only the last sentence.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I object to the admission of this document on two grounds: one, that it is a self-serving declaration and, two, that it is an attempt on the part of the defendant to bolster up his previous testimony by showing that he has previously made statements in the same tenor. Prior statements of that kind, I submit, are inadmissible. It is hearsay declaration of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: As is true with some material that was presented by the prosecution, this will re received for such consideration and evaluation as the Tribunal deems it merits.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. The last sentence of this letter -- I will submit to you first of all the complete letter, and please tell me whether you actually wrote it like this at that time.
A. Yes, I wrote this letter.
Q. And I will just read the last sentence which is contained in the document book. It runs as follows: "And this again enrages me against everything that cannot be changed and against all those whose names have brought about these times."
The next document -- witness, the following has just been pointed out to me. I asked you if you wrote the letter at that time and you only answered, "Yes, I wrote it."
A. Yes, I wrote the letter at that time under that date.
Q. And now, as next document, I submit Document Foertsch No. 24. I submit it as Exhibit No. 22. No. 23 I omit. Foertsch No. 24 on page 16 -- this stresses the statement which the defendant has already made in the witness stand about the attitude of the OKW towards the general staff and will also show how little influence the general staff had. It is only a short sentence and it runs: "To the Fuehrer the General Staff is just a 'Lodge' for which there is no need. One does all that by oneself. It's no use to get angry about it."
Witness, I submit you this letter as well, the complete letter dated the 27th of December, 1941. Did you write this letter on that day?
A. Yes, I wrote this letter at that time on the 27th of December 1841.
Q. And on the same subject, in order to prove that the members of the general staff actually had no decisive influence I offer Document Foertsch No. 25 as Exhibit No. 23 on page 17. I will read a sentence from the second paragraph of the document. "The new Supreme Commander of the Army makes his presence feld." Supreme Commander -- witness, who is meant by this?
A. Hitler who at that time took over the supreme command himself.
Q. "Many changes in places higher up seem to be imminent. Because an order arrived prohibiting those so dismissed to hold 'Demonstrations' in the form of farewell-edicts. I don't understand all this and consider the start of the new year as disappointing. Non-consideration of the General Staff on the independent promotional list means more than meets the eye. Well then they might just as well dissolve us and let this work be done by the NSV (National Socialist Welfare League.)" The next document which I submit is Foertsch No. 26, Exhibit No. 24.
It is on page 18 of the English. Witness, have I already asked you if you wrote this letter yourself -- the last letter?
A. No.
Q. Then I submit it to you. Witness, one question which concerns all these letters -- to whom is the letter written?
A. These letters are all written to my wife and also this letter of the 28th of December, 1841, which I wrote myself on this day.
Q. And what does the signature mean which is formulated differently. On some letters, for instance, there is only an "H".
A. That is the abbreviation of my Christian name Hermann and in this letter the signature runs "Big Boy" -- that is an expression used by my wife i.e. I often use it when signing my letters to my wife but I also recognize my handwriting.
Q. The next document, Document Foertsch No. 26 I submit as Exhibit No. 24 -- this is an affidavit by Freiherr von Buttlar, sworn to in the Neustadt Camp on 22 August, 1947, and it is certified by the competent American officer. I submit this affidavit by Freiherr von Buttlar who, himself, was chief of the operational department in the operational staff of the OKW, I submit this as proof that the defendant Foertsch tried everything possible in opposition to the attitude of the OKW to find a peaceful solution of the Balkan problems. The statement runs at the beginning, on page 18 of the document, as follows:
"From the 1st of January 1942 until the 16th of November 1944, I was Chief of the Operational Department in the Operational Staff of the Army High Command. In this capacity, General Foertsch as Chief of the General Staff in the Southeast became known to me and due to the official correspondence kept with the Army-group E or F respectively which was directly subordinate to the Army High Command and employed in the SouthEast, and long-distance calls and also personally because of the occasional visits to Fuehrer-Headquarters."
I skip the next paragraph and then it continued:
"General Foertsch favored rather decidedly the same opinion I did, that is, that the solution of problems operative in the Balkans depended largely on a successful solution of the political problem and that the road taken by the political leadership of the Reich was the wrong one and one of the main reasons for the steadily mounting formation of Partisan-bands and for the struggles of nationalities raging in the Balkans.
"General Foertsch considered the foremost task of the occupation army the preliminary defense preparations for an invasion by the enemy powers and established time and again in petitions and reports that this task could only be solved with the available army if it became possible to bring to an end the partisan and party fighting in the South-East area.
"He as well as I and the majority of the military commanders in the south-east saw this possibility in contrast to Hitler, who demanded the enforcement of the political aims by military action, in a fundamental change of these political aims. He voiced this opinion several times by demanding interference of the military command for operational reasons against the course taken by the Ustascha in Croatia as well as measures for political and economical pacification in the South-East.
"Of these suggestions I remember best of all:"
And then skip the next paragraph "a" and continue on page 20 at "b", page 20, paragraph "b".
"b) Suggestions as to getting in touch with different Commanders of the insurgent groups in order to bring them at least from the point of view of space and time to a limited suspension of their fighting among each other and against the occupation army, thereby preventing an increase of the civilian population's losses and favoring a development of the economic conditions.
"c) Reservation of a certain amount of trains for the import of economic goods to Greece in order to keep the economic conditions going there which at times were very much susceptible to a crisis. This proposal was made despite the fact that the very inefficient railroad to Greece was incapable of even carrying the necessary transports for the Occupation-Army.
"d) Increase of the Occupation-Forces in the entire South-Eastern area in order to bring about appeasement of the population by more closely stationed troop contingents and by their protection against the partisans' terror and to gain a better working of the economy.
"Stress was put on the fact by the Army-group and General Foertsch in almost every one of their reports and long-distance calls on the question that a peaceful, well supplied, and constructively working population whose sense of security was strengthened would be the best guaranty of a positive solution for the combat tasks of the Army-groups on the coasts, that they would therefore support all political and economic measures which would aim to bring this end any nearer."
Skip the next paragraph and then the next paragraph but one on page 20a:
"I remember that Hitler once or twice in connection with the situation of the commanders due to some setbacks in the fights against the partisans remarked, that the partisan - fights in the South-East would have been settled long ago if the Generals could finally decide to learn from Tito and act decidedly with the same lack of consideration as the leaders of the insurgent troops did."