Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A Mr. Fenstermacher, if this had been a member of an English Commando unit this would have been mentioned.
Q Did you assume because the attackers in that case were Greeks that the attackers on the other occasions were not Commandos?
A In the case of these sabotage acts I assumed that only Greeks were concerned.
Q You didn't know that Commandos were not concerned though, did you, at the time you ordered the execution of the hostages? The perpetrators, at that tims, were still unknown.
A Because of the Commando Order I knew that such commando troops were about, but I had no evidence that in my territory such Commando units were actually active.
Q If you wanted to prevent attacks upon the Island of Salamis why didn't you take all the hostages from Salamis? Why did you take most of them from Athens?
A The hostages came from the Island of Salamis, as I have already said. I think it also becomes apparent from the report.
Q Where were the hostages executed?
A May I draw your attention to Roman Numeral III? It says "Salamis" there.
Q It says, under Paragraph III, that 15 hostages were executed in Athens, and 3 hostages on Salamis, but it does not say where the hostages all came from. Where were they taken from?
A That, I can hardly tell you today in detail. So much as I recollect this case, I really don't know where the hostages came from.
Q Was there a hostage camp from which you might have taken them?
A I cannot remember having had a hostage camp there.
Q Well, if you wanted to prevent attacks on Salamis why didn't you execute all the hostages on the Island instead of executing some of them in Athens and just a few on the Island?
A This is very simple to answer, Mr. Fenstermacher. The attacks on the Island of Salamis were only one part of an enemy act. The very Court No. V, Case No. VII.
dangerous sabotage acts on both of the ships constituted the other part, and these sabotage acts took place on the Piraeus territory. That is why these two measures were separated.
Q Do you happen to know when these hostages were taken into custody? How long before the execution?
A I can no longer tell you that today. I really don't know, Mr. Fenstermacher.
Q General, did you post notices saying that 18 hostages had been seized and that unless the attacks upon the Island of Salamis were discontinued these 18 hostages (listing their names) would be executed? Was that the procedure you used?
A I cannot remember having issued that specific announcement beforehand. It could have happened. I do know, however, that a few months before posters were distributed where it said that sabotage acts would be punished. That was generally known, and that should have sufficed.
Q You didn't use notices listing the names of these 18 individuals and saying that these 18 would be executed unless the attacks ceased?
A That I cannot remember.
Q What was the theory you were operating on, General, when you executed these 18 hostages? Was it that the real perpetrators would be so dismayed at the thought that innocent people were suffering for the perpetrators' acts that they would, therefore, discontinue these acts? Was that your theory?
A The theory was the following, and that also holds true of the practice mainly: As I have already said during my direct-examination, I tried everything possible to get the guilty ones. Only after I could not succeed in doing that I had to take reprisal action. The sense and the theory of reprisal actions is that non-guilty ones have to be seized when guilty ones are not to be obtained. The purpose of such reprisal actions is very clear and has repeatedly been discussed.
Q And then the guilty persons would be so alarmed at the thought Court No. V, Case No. VII.
of a non-guilty parson's being executed for what they, the guilty, had done that the attacks would cease? Is that the theory?
A I really did not work out any theory about this matter, but I complied with the given order on the basis of the circumstances given and for purposes of expediency. The fact that such measures were successful in practice I have already mentioned during my directexamination because for a long time thereafter there occurred no sabotage acts against ships anymore.
Q You said, I believe in your direct examination, that there were dead and wounded as a result of these attacks. Is that what you said? Did I understand you correctly?
A I don't know whether I said that in connection with this particular case. Anyway I do remember that in connection with preceding attacks there were dead and wounded.
Q There were no dead in connection with these particular attacks of sabotage on the Island of Salamis though, were there?
A No mention of a dead is made in this report.
Q You didn't feel, General, that the execution of 18 hostages in retaliation for no German losses and no German damage was an acceptive retaliation?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, it is very difficult to find a suitable ratio for the retaliation of such cases of sabotage. These concepts are very relative. I think that in this case I have made myself very clear in saying that these sabotage acts against ships in connection with attacks against naval bases were of such paramount importance in view of the general situation, seeing everything from a relative angle, that the measure to be taken could not be expressed in a ratio but really had the purpose to prevent the necessity of further similar measures in the future.
Q I take it, General, that you assume full responsibility for the death of these 18 hostages?
A Yes, certainly. I don't think I left any doubt about that Court No. V, Case No. VII.
during my direct examination.
Q Would you look now at Document Book XXIV, at Page 161 in the German and Page 211 in the English? This is your report, as Commander Southern Greece, for the 4th of June 1943, and on Page 162 of the German and Page 313 of the English, Sub-paragraph "b", there is mention of a sit-down strike in a chemical plant in Piraeus in May 1943, and mention also that the District Headquarters Piraeus had 10 hostages seized from among the workers and ordered the resumption of work. Were you consulted before those 10 hostages were seized by the Commander of the District Headquarters Piraeus?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A I beg your pardon, I cannot find this passage in my document book -- or rather it is not under "C".
Q Under "B" I said, General.
A "B" like Bertha - and what section? I see, I have found it. Won't you please repeat the question, Mr. Fenstermacher?
Q There is mention there about a sit-down strike and the fact that ten hostages had been seized from amongst the workers by the district headquarters of Piraeus. Were you consulted before those hostages were seized?
A I really can no longer remember this individual case.
Q Do you consider that a perfectly permissible method of going about breaking a strike -- that is by the seizure of hostages and I take it the threat to kill the hostages unless work is resumed?
A I have no misgivings in this case because beforehand a very severely worded decree had been issued to the effect that every strike would be considered as directed against the occupational power, and it was also mentioned that severe measures would be taken against such strikes, i.e. the workers had been warned. If hostages have been taken in that case and if a pressure has been exercised, the report shows that this measure had fulfilled its purpose. The threatened shooting, however, was not executed anyway.
Q Would you have had any misgivings about shooting these ten hostages if work had not been resumed?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, today I really cannot answer a hypothetical question like that, what I would have done then.
Q The intention, however, at the time the hostages were seized was in fact to execute the hostages if work had not been resumed, was it not?
A I hardly believe that that was the intention. This was merely a means of pressure. Whether an intention to actually put that into effect existed cannot be reconstructed now anymore.
Q Later on, several months later, hostages were in fact executed Court No. V, Case No. VII.
when work had not been resumed following a strike, had they not?
A No.
Q We will come to that incident a little later. In this same Document Book, No. 24, on page 171 of the German and page 229 of the English, there is reference to the attack upon the Italian ship Citta di Savona in the Harbor of Piraeus. In reprisal for that mine attack, mine explosion, ten hostages were executed on the German side and nine on the Italian side.
Would you look at the casualties, General -- 69 horses were drowned. There was no loss of human life, was there?
A If you try to connect this loss of horses with the execution of human beings, I would rather like to forego an answer to this question.
Q The most important part was the leak in the ship. That was what brought on the execution of the 19 hostages.
A. That is true, that is true. I have already stated during direct examination why such shipping losses were very important. The decisive factor was the loss of the ship in that case.
Q There is mention there of a possibility that the mine was put in at the port of Patras some days prior to the explosion. Was an investigation conducted at Patras before the hostages were shot?
A I don't know, of course, what the details of this investigation were, but I can say that all such investigations were carried out as carefully as possible. During direct examination, I have already stated that I gave these people charged with the investigation a very long time in order to be able to proceed most carefully. It was always my endeavor to get the guilty parties and only if all means had failed to get the guilty parties, retaliation measures should be taken. I remember having said in this case that five days were at the disposal of the investigating committee and I also remember having disapproved of immediate, hurried retaliation measures.
Q How long does it take a ship to travel from Patras to Athens?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A That depends upon the size and the speed of the ship.
Q Well, let's take the Citta di Savona. How long would that have taken?
A I am not a seaman but I imagine 4 or 5 hours.
Q Now, General, these hostages were executed while the investigations were still under way, were they not? If you will look at the report, it says "Investigations still under way; as a counter-measure, ten hostages were shot on the German side and nine on the Italian side." Why did you shoot the hostages before the investigations had been completed? Perhaps you might have found the perpetrators.
A Mr. Fenstermacher, if you carefully read this passage, you will find that the first part of the report says that on the 12th, the act was committed. Then it reads "investigations still under way" and then it says that on the 17th the hostages were shot. Here we are not concerned with a daily report but this is a combined report. Therefore, it would be wrong to connect these two paragraphs.
Q Well, what is the meaning of the sentence "Investigations still under way" which immediately precedes the reference to the execution of the hostages?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, this report dates back to the 5th of July. It can hardly be assumed that investigations were still under way at that time. It seems to me to be merely a negligence on the part of the author of this report who merely copied a report and transcribed it into this report here.
Q You are quite sure that the hostages were not executed prior to the completion of the investigations?
A I can only remember that I gave them as much time as possible for such investigations and that I only decided to carry out retaliation measures when I became convinced that such investigations had failed. I do remember that, but naturally I no longer remember details.
Q If, in fact, the mine had been put on the ship at Patras, how did you expect that the execution of hostages at Athens would deter Court No. V, Case No. VII.
perpetrators from putting on more mines at the port of Patras?
A Well, I no longer know what the result of the investigations was.
Q General, were notices published saying that ten hostages, listing their names, had been seized and would be executed in retaliation for the placing of this mine on the Citta di Savona? Do you recall the procedure you used before you executed these men?
A If I remember correctly, these executions were carried out with a reason given and with the publication of the names of those shot.
Q These hostages were shot after the attack had taken place-that is, they were not first seized and an announcement made to the population stating that if attacks by way of mines take place on ships, these hostages will be executed. That was not done, was it?
A In this special case, no previous notice was given. There was only a general warning against sabotage acts which I already mentioned before.
Q You don't believe that reprisals may be taken only for specific incidents--that is to say you believe that a general announcement can be made and then after specific attacks occur, hostages might be executed?
A That was my opinion at the time. I thought that I was doing the right thing if I considered that the general notice sufficed. The population and everybody there was warned with that general publication and everybody knew what the consequences of such sabotage acts would be. I think that is the sense of any such warning.
Q I take it you assume full responsibility for the death of these ten hostages?
A Yes, I take full responsibility.
Q Now following the execution of those hostages on the 17th of June, 1943, a general strike in protest against those executions occurred on the 25th of June, did it not?
A Yes.
Q Now on page 168 of the German volume and page 225 of the English, Court No. V, Case No. VII.
there is a reference to a decree issued by the Commanding General and Commander of Southern Greece on the 27th of June, 1943, which threatened particularly severe procedure in case of strikes in the area of German sovereignty. You apparently issued that decree, General Speidel. Can you recall the contents of it?
A Would you please repeat the page number? I haven't found the passage yet. Is it in the same volume?
Q On page 168 of Document Book 24.
A May I ask you to repeat the question?
Q I was wondering if you recall the contents of your decree of 27 June 1943 which apparently threatened particularly severe procedure in case of strikes?
A No, I cannot remember it. It was not annexed to the document.
Q You threatened the execution of hostages in case of strikes, didn't you, General?
A I believe, yes.
Q Did you use a ratio?
A No.
Q You said on direct examination, I believe, that the Italians were generally more severe than the Germans in the course of their occupation of Greece. Did I understand you correctly?
A No, you misunderstood me. I cannot remember having said that.
Q As a matter of fact, the Germans were much more severe in their occupation policy that the Italians, were they not?
A I can hardly judge that. If, for instance, I take into consideration a shooting in the streets of Athens which I mentioned, I can tell you that we did not do such a thing, whereas Italians shot into the crowds from their tanks.
Q Will you look on page 168 of the German and page 224 of the English. You mention there that the reputation of the occupying powers was greatly impaired because the Italians in Athens did not apply the same severe measures as was the case in the area of German sovereignty. Was that an exception or was it generally true that the Germans were more severe than the Italians?
A I cannot answer your question in that form. I think in this case a special decree was available which brought us to that conclusion?
Q You spoke in direct examination about the Greek government that cooperated with the Germans, and I believe you said that you did not consider it a puppet government of the Germans?
A I have said that it depends entirely on what you understand by a puppet government. If, for instance, you consider the present south German Governments of the American zones puppet governments because they have to comply with the orders of the occupational power, then in the same sense the Greek Government was also a puppet government. But if you consider the facts as they are, namely that the government of a country which is occupied by the enemy is bound by directives of the occupying powers, then that is a fact with which you have to deal. That applied to the Greeks then, it applies to us today and under such circumstances, you have no right to speak of a puppet government. You certainly cannot do that if you take into consideration that this government was with its people and was in authority as far as it could be in authority.
I continued to state that I could not consider the government of Minister President Rhallis a puppet government figure, but I saw in him a personality who tried, to do the best for his country within the framework of what was possible.
Q The Greek people were almost unanimously opposed to the various governments which were in charge in Greece from the Greek standpoint, were they not?
AAs far as I can judge the situation, the Greek people are basically opposed to every government which happens to be in power. At the time, of course, this government had its outspoken enemies, especially in the communist camp, but as far as I am informed, this government supported itself upon the democratic liberal circles of the country. It had a certain basis, even if this basis was not too strong.
Q Will you look on page 166 of the German and page 222 of the English -- in your report you say that 90 per cent of the Greeks today are unanimously hostile towards the axis powers and are ready for open revolt. The Rhallis government was apparently not on very firm footing with its own people, General, if 90 per cent were opposed to it.
Q Mr. Fenstermacher, you are confusing two concepts. It says here that the population is 90 per cent hostile against the Axis powers. It does not say, however, that the population was hostile with a 90 per cent proportion against the government of Rhallis. You have to differentiate there. A Greek could very well be behind his government and at the same time have a hostile attitude against the Germans. After all, the Greek government did not love us. They would rather have had us outside their country. I was not in any doubt about that, but they did try to save as much as possible for their country, and they tried to do that with the help of the occupational power, just in the same way as it is true of Germany today.
Q Look on page 172 of the German, on page 233 of the English, you state there in your report that the Rhallis government was unable to maintain itself among the population and that without effective support by the occupying power, its days seem numbered. That government could not have remained in power without German support, could it, General?
A The foundation of a government always fluctuates and you see today, if you read the papers, that the foundation of the French government is very shaky. I think it held true at the same time in Greece. I think that at the time this report was compiled, such an impression prevailed. This report was not signed by me but it originates from my chief. What situation he took into consideration at the time, I cannot judge; but it is a fact that the government to a certain extent was dependent upon the support of the occupation power. That, after all, is a matter of course and that is always the case in occupied territory. I don't see any incriminating facts in this situation, either for the Greek government nor for the German occupational power.
Q There is no doubt, is there, that these Greek volunteer units which were organized were organized solely at the instigation of the Germans?
A I didn't quite get your question, I beg your pardon.
Q Is there any doubt, General, that if it had not been for the German occupation authority, the Greeks would never have organized volunteer units, the Evzones, I mean?
A No, the contrary is true, Mr. Fenstermacher. The Greek government at first approached the German occupational power with the desire to set up units of Greek nationality in order to have their own authority and in order to be able to maintain peace and order in the country. They did that in order not to be a puppet government only, but in order to actually have the possibility to exercise authority.
Q On page 172 of the German, page 233 of the English, you state in your report, General, that if the German Wehrmacht is not to suffer heavy losses in Greece, the bandits must be opposed forcibly and with the employment of strong forces and that the political and economic situation, in the last analysis, is dependent upon the result of the battle against the bandits. I take it that you felt that the only solution to the problem of the pacification and security of Greece was in a purely tactical and military sphere and that German military units had to defeat the various bandit military units?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, first of all let me draw your attention to what I have said before already, namely that this report does not originate from me but from my commander; but I would add that I am entirely in agreement with him if I consider the situation in retrospect However, you must not forget to take into consideration that the military judgment of the situation--and this is with what we are concerned -- was preceded by the partisan amnesty and this is a very decisive factor. During direct examination I have stated that from the German side it was endeavored to do away with the entire partisan question by this amnesty. Amnesty to everybody. This amnesty has failed not because we were at fault but because there was bad will on the part of the enemy. Since this pacification had failed by no fault of our own, we could not but proceed with military means to finish such partisan activities and this is the sense of this factually correct report here.
Q You didn't seriously think that the bandits as you call them would accept the amnesty? Why should they have trusted the German statement that if they had turned in their weapons nothing would have happened to them?
A If our intention had not been serious, the partisan amnesty had not been decreed. I have stated that I did not decree that personally but that it was a large-scale action which was decreed by the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E the Commander-in-Chiof of the 11th Italian Army and the Greek government after mutual agreement had been reached.
I think that you can expect the Highest German and Italian Commanders to have meant such an offer very seriously.
Q Now General, in view of the various announcements which the German government made and assurances to Czechoslovakia, to Poland, to Holland, to Belgium, to France, to Greece and Yugoslavia, wasn't it rather naive for you to believe that the bandits would trust any amnesty which the Germans proposed to them?
A Measures with respect to politics could not be judged by us. We thought that as honest soldiers we made an honest offer. At any rate, I personally had no doubt at all that this offer was meant honestly. I should ask you to supply evidence to the fact that it was not honest.
Q We will return once more to this statement of yours on page 172 of the German and page 233 of the English. Do you mean there that you yourself felt that only by a military victory over the insurgents pacification and security could come to Greece?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, it was not up to me to decide that. At that time, I was still Commander-in-Chief of Southern Greece. Such decisions were made at a much higher level. The entire situation within the Greek territory could only be judged by Army Group E.
It was my duty as the little man in the South to evaluate the situation as I saw it upon the basis of my knowledge of things, and upon reports which I received; in order to evaluate the situation from a military point of view it is necessary to draw these consequences and then make proposals. Whether this proposal could be executed on a large scale -- whether it was expedient, whether it was militarily possible --- that after all was not for me to decide but for the OKW or Army Group E.
Q. I am simply trying to get at your personal opinion, General, you felt according to your reports that the answer to Greek pacification was a military victory?
A. It was my opinion that the partisan activities could only be broken with military powers after all other means had failed.
Q. If the only method of achieving pacification in Greece was a military victory in your opinion, then you must have known that by executing hostages you were only taking at best a stop gap measure at pacification.
A. I don't know why you are connecting the execution of hostages with the general pacification of the entire country.
Q. Well, as I understand your opinion as mentioned in your reports you felt that only by defeating the bands you could pacify Greece and if that was your opinion did you not then appreciate that your method of executing hostages could not achieve pacification?
A. The pacification of the country by means of fighting the partisans could only have been achieved in places where partisans were to be found i.e. by the use of military force, but there were parts of the country where there were no banfs and there for purposes of pacification we had to resort to retaliation measures as ordered from higher up.
Q. Would you look now, General Speidel, at Document Book 17 at page 80 in the German and page 110 in the English. This is your report dated 18 March 1944. You had previously issued a decree regarding the strikes on 27 June 1943 had you not?
A. Yes.
Q. Now on page 81 of the German and page 111 of the English, you discussed strikes in your report and you state that at the beginning of March strikes were surpressed by energetic military measures. Fifty communists were shot immediately while others were awaiting their sentence. Was that done in accordance with your order of 27 of June 1943?
A. With respect to this report, I can only say that firstly this report comprises a period of time during which I was not in Greece. Secondly, that such retaliation measures were carried out in my absence and were probably ordered by my representative. Thirdly, I must say that this case is listed in my document book 3 as one of those cases, which do not concern me personally since they happened in my absence.
Q. When did you return from your leave?
A. As I have stated in direct examination, I returned on 17 March 1943 and I took over business on the 18th in the morning.
Q. This report is dated 18 March 1944, General, you must have been familiar with it when you returned to your headquarters the day before?
A. It was signed on the very day I returned by my chief of staff and as it can be seen from the heading it comprises the period from the 16th of February until 15 March. I cannot say anything about that period.
Q. Weren't you interested enough to know, after returning from leave, what happened in your absence, especially during the preceding month?
A. Naturally I was interested, but you must try to vizualize the situation. Having been away 54 days I returned and the situation was an onslaught on me, everything of my importance was reported to me, which had happened during this period. The details of what was reported to me then I can no longer remember and in the same way I cannot remember this particular case, try as I may, but I do think it was reported to me.
Q. Would the execution of fifty hostages in order to break a strike have been of enough importance for you to have a detailed discussion with either your chief of staff or the man who was acting as your deputy during your absence?
A. I could only reply to this question if I could remember how I learned of these matters, whether I learned of these matters at all what the measures were which led to them, what the situation was which prevailed at the time. I really cannot remember that matter so I cannot define my attitude toward it.
Q. General, we heard from General Felmy that a deputy does not make basic changes in the policy of the man for whom he is acting as deputy. Then it follows then that the man who was serving as your deputy here in executing the 50 Communists was only acting in accordance with the basic policy, which you had previously laid down and about which you had previously instructed your chief of staff?
A. I cannot say what motive made my deputy proceed like that in this particular case. My own policy was firm and I am convinced that my deputy upon the basis of orders given and upon his personal conceptions took those decisions which he deemed necessary. If I understood your question correctly, I would say that he would have done something basically new and deviated from my policy if he had given an order saying "From now on retaliation measures stop and I order another ratio 1,000 to 1 or 100 to 1." That would have been a deviation of my policy. If in my absence he was acting within the frame-work of given orders, he was still acting upon his own responsibility.
Q. The execution of these 5- Communists was a continuation of your previous policy, was it not?
A. No. Can you tell me where I should have executed 50 Communists?
Q. Haven't you ordered on 27 June 1943 that in the case of future strikes hostages will be executed and severe measures will be taken?
A. You mean the strike decree?
Q. Yes, I mean the strike decree....
A. The contents of this I no longer remember as I don't have it before me.
Q. You mean, General, that these fifty Communists were executed as something new in your area of command. Was this the deputy laying down some new policy in the area of the Military Commander Greece?
A. He did not start a new policy, inasmuch as strikes were already threatened by punishment. The only question which was before him was to what extent such punishment was to be carried out and whether in the individual cases punishment was necessary at all. That of course was left to his own discretion. Furthermore any such decree primarily has to have a moral deterrent effect in order to prevents similar incidents occurring. Whether and to what extent the threatening punishments are being executed in left to the discretion of the Military Commander and always depends on individual circumstances.
Q. Your deputy probably asked your chief what General Speidel would do in a case like this before he executed those 50 Communists, don't you think?
A. In that case the chief of staff would not have been able to give him the proper answer. He possibly could not know what I would have done under the circumstances. This was a question I decided exclusively on my own and in such I was responsible to my own conscience.
Q. Well the deputy chief, however, could have inferred to your decree of 27 June 1943 as a guide in this matter, could he not?
A. There is a possibility, but let me ask you whether in this strike decree retaliation quotas had been laid down?
Q. I believe you stated that no retaliation quotas were laid down in your decree, but that hostages would be executed in retaliation for strikes.
A. I ask you that in order to confirm my testimony, because probably you have this strike decree before you.
Q. I am afraid we did not find it, General Speidel and are completely depending on your testimony regarding the contents.
A. Very well, I stated clearly that no quota was contained, I only threatened severe countermeasures.
Q. I would like to turn now to a discussion of the period from September, 1943 until the time you left Greece in May, 1944, with particular regard to the relationship between you and the Higher SS and Police leader. Should it be said, General, that reprisal measures are a device of achieving security and pacification and that they have two aspects; first, a tactical aspect and secondly a police operations, if they take reprisal measures, the reprisal measures could be referred to as a tactical device, but in the case of reprisal measures taken in a completely pacified area one may speak of reprisal measures as being a police device?
A. Reprisal measures of every kind have always the purpose to reestablish order and quiet, because they are directed against excesses which are threatening to disturb such order and quiet. In other words, in every case the purpose is the same whether the troops are carrying out such reprisals or whether it is done on territory which has already been pacified.
Q. The aim is always to achieve security and pacification whether the reprisal measures are taken by tactical units or by police units?
A. Yes, that is always the purpose.
Q. Now when an SS unit is tactically employed in a given area, one could say that reprisal measures then are matters of tactics?
A. If they are carried out in the frame-work of combat, actions ordered by the tactical commander can be considered tactical measures. With that I want to give you a formal definition now, they are reprisal measures which are necessary to reestablish order and which are carried out within the frame-work of tactical actions.
Q. If an SS unit is tactically subordinate to a Wehrmacht commander, can the Wehrmacht commander give that SS unit orders either to take reprisal measures or orders not to take reprisal measures, that of course presupposes in that case that reprisal measures are of a tactical nature?
A. We have already heard in this trial that SS units could be tactically subordinated to commanders of the Wehrmacht. In other words, they were bound by the tactical orders of the Wehrmacht and if any reprisal measures were carried out within the frame-work of this organization, they took part in the combat actions.
Q. The Wehrmacht commander in that case would be responsible for reprisal measures which any SS unit carried out in the course of this tactical operation?