DR. WEISGERBER: If the Tribunal please, may I point out here that the affiant does not refer to the announcement poster merely from hearsay. He states that this announcement was posted publicly in Reutlingen. He himself read it with his own eyes; and in this affidavit he gives us the contents of this announcement verbatim. I myself have included the contents of that proclamation in my next document and the announcement contained in Document No. 70 coincides verbatim word by word with what the affiant says in his affidavits. In other words, the prosecution are attempting to say that the witness merely says something which he has heard from hearsay. No. It is the original text of the announcement; It begins "First French Army Military Command" and ends with the signature of the commandant. This in other words is the original version of the announcement such as the witness has seen himself and which he puts down in writing here.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Dr. Weisgerber intends to introduce as an original document a copy of the announcement of the French Army Military Command which the affiant mentions in his affidavit, I will of course withdraw my objection on that ground. I maintain, however, that the whole matter of this affidavit and any alleged announcement by the French Army Military Command are completely irrelevant and immaterial. I don't know whether Dr. Weisgerber is attempting to maintain that because the French Army allegedly shot hostages that that is a defense for his client or any of the other defendants in this case for having executed hostages in Greece and Yugoslavia.
THE PRESIDENT: That part of the affidavit which is based on hearsay -and a portion if not a goodly portion of it is based on hearsay--will be sustained, and that which refers to this proclamation particularly seems to be based on hearsay. The Tribunal has the desire to be liberal in its rulings on evidence, particularly in this type of a case; but on the other hand, we must necessarily follow general rules which would be followed in any court in any country and that being true, the objection as to portions of this document being hearsay will he sustained.
The motion as to the proclamation will he sustained. As to the objection that it is immaterial, that portion of it will he overruled. It seems to me it goes to the question as to whether there is a settled rule on the question of hostages and reprisals. You nay proceed with that ruling.
DR. WEISGERBER: If the Tribunal please, may I make a very brief remark in this connection. I am bound to assume that what I have said just before the ruling of the Court was perhaps misunderstood. The Tribunal has taken the view that the affiant quotes this announcement from hearsay only, but I said that the affiant has read tho poster himself and therefore knows this poster from his own personal observation and not from hearsay, and therefore included it in his affidavit.
Nothing else can be construed from this affidavit to tho effect that the affiant knows the announcement only from hearsay. I should like to ask the Court whether perhaps was misunderstood just before the Court's ruling.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you were misunderstood. This is not the best evidence of what this proclamation, what it may be. This ruling of the Tribunal will be followed.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q General, I shall now come to another question which has played a not unimportant part in this trial. In this trial the term of military obedience has played a part or rather question whether there are limits of military obedience and where these lines of debarkation start and where do they end. What is your own opinion particularly in regard to O.K.W. orders for the southeast?
A With regard to tho problem of obeying an order I should like to state that every army is based on obedience, every army without exception. Orders and obedience to these orders is the basic condition for discipline and leadership. If you doubt your leaders, if you refuse to follow orders, if you criticize measures taken by higher quarters, thus create a criterion for discipline. In any army there will be doubts, which will be voiced from lower down to higher up, but where does the line begin, or to express it more concretely, where does the duty begin to oppose orders? Let us take a British or an American regimental commander who in war time refuses to obey because he disagrees with an order which came down from his divisional commander.
Can anyone higher up do the same? Because if a higher officer is disobedient that entails that the lower officers are also disobedient. In wartime to refuse orders is a crime against your own troops.
Q Did your not have the possibility to evade the carrying out of orders which you thought went too far, by the manner in which you had them carried out?
A What one could do was to interpret orders according to their meaning and apply them as such. That is to say one could modify them where it was possible, or adjust them to the actual conditions. But there one came across a limit. Tho line was where disobedience became the end of discipline -- if an order was extended not because of consequences to ones own person, but for reasons of discipline.
Q Apart from military deliberations were there any legal possibilities for disobeying orders?
A What you call legal discipline is feasible and justified on the basis of paragraph 47 of the German Military Penal Code, which has been mentioned here before. This legal disobedience, as I am inclined to call it, however, presupposes the realization that the order intends a crime, that realization I never had nor do I believe that anybody else did. Even if that realization had materialized, legal disobedience would lead to the elimination of the General concerned, but it would not have eliminated the order given. That was a consequence of dictatorship.
Q These deliberations of your show me that a military leader in the southeastern area, and not only there but all over the Third Reich, had no alternative but to obey the orders.
A I would say that time and again it is the tragedy of a German general that he faces this dilemma in his mind. If he disobeys the order, then he faces his own court martial, if he obeys the order then he is sitting in Nurnberg today, what he did it was wrong because in the final analysis we were not concerned with confidence or mistrust in the highest leadership, we were concerned with the survival of the German people.
We did not wage this war for Herr Hitler, we waged it for the nation, to resuce it from a situation, which we soldiers of all people certainly did not wish.
Q This obedience towards orders from higher quarters led to those measures, which are at the bottom of the indictment. In this case was obedience a problem in itself or were any other ethical motives connected with it?
A What I have to say about this could perhaps be understood only by a soldier. To obey all orders, and in this specific here, to obey reprisal orders did not have a negative purpose, that is to say the purpose of extinguishing the population of the occupied areas, it had the only purpose of protecting our own soldiers. It is every military leaders most noble duty to do everything in his power for his soldiers, that was the motive behind our actions. Our soldiers were loyal behind us and we generals protected them, that was our moral duty, and also our fate.
Q If the Tribunal please, this brings me to the end of the direct examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other defense counsel who wish to interrogate the defendant?
We will take up the cross-examination then in the morning. The Tribunal will be in recess at this time.
(A recess was taken until 0930 hours, 16 December, 1947.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 16 December 1947, 0930, Justice Burke, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom with the exception of Defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may cross-examine, Mr. Fenstermacher.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Thank you, Your Honor.
WILHELM SPEIDEL - Resumed CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Speidel, during your period in Greece you were a Lieutenant General?
A When I went to Greece, I was a General of the Air Force.
Q In the American Army I believe that corresponds to a threestar General?
A Yes.
Q That is to say, there were only two ranks above you--the rank of "Generaleberst" which General Rendulic held, and then the rank of "Field Marshal?"
A Yes.
Q I would like, first, to discuss with you the period during which you were Commanding General of Southern Greece-that is to say, Court No. V, Case No. VII.
during the period of September 1942 until August or the beginning of September 1943. Would you look, first, at Document Book IX, at Page 81 in the German and Page 74 in the English? That is a report written by General Foertsch on the 15th of December 1942; and at the end, in Paragraph "g" he talks about the employment of the civilian population. In the preceding Paragraph "f" he talked about the employment of the civilian population for the security and patrolling of railroad tracks.
Was that done during the time you were Commanding General of Southern Greece, in the area under your command?
A Yes, that happened during the time when I was Commander Southern Greece, but I have explained here for what territory in Southern Greece I was responsible. The territory of Gorgopotamus bridge does not fall into this territory.
Q Well, I'm wondering whether you used civilians to patrol railroad lines in the area under your command.
A Pardon, I didn't quite get the transmission.
Q Did you use civilians to patrol the railroad lines which were under your control?
A In that connection I can only say that I had nothing to do with the repair of any of the railroad tracks on that bridge, and I was really not concerned with the securing of railroad tracks at all.
Q My question is a little broader than this report. This report speaks of the railroad lines near the Gorgopotamus bridge, but I'm wondering whether you used civilians to patrol the railroad lines which were under your area of command, as Commander of Southern Greece.
A I cannot remember that civilians were employed for the patrolling of the railroads in Southern Greece. The guarding of the railroad system in Southern Greece was a matter of the Italians at the time.
Q How about the railroad lines in and about Piraeus, the Port of Athens? Did you use civilians to guard those tracks?
A I really cannot recall that the line Athens-Piraeus was guarded at all. I cannot remember that the civilians were employed Court No. V, Case No. VII.
for that purpose.
Q If they had been employed would you have remembered that?
A I really cannot say. That is a conditional question, and I really can't answer it.
Q Now, would you look at your own Document Book No. III, at Page 58? This is your report, as Commander of Southern Greece, dated the 10th of January 1943. You referred at some length to this during your direct-examination because, as appears on Page 61, you yourself ordered the execution of fifteen hostages in Athens and three further hostages on the Island of Salamis in reprisal for attempts at sabotage. Isn't it true, General Speidel that in spite of the four or five attempts at sabotage, in reprisal for which you ordered the execution of these eighteen hostages, no damage whatever was done as a result of those attacks?
A There is mention made here of quite a number of sabotage acts, and I don't know to which you are referring.
Q Well, let's go over each one of them, beginning on Page 58. On the 30th of December 1942 there was an attack, and as appears from the fifth line, no damage was done. Under Paragraph 2 there was an attack on the night of the 30-31 of December 1942; the attempt failed. The next page, there was an attack on the 31st of December; an attempt to sabotage, the attackers fled. There is no report there of any damage having been done. Under Paragraph 4 there was an attack on the 4th of January; no damage was done. On the 6th of January there was another attack; no damage was done. Under Paragraph 6 an attack on 3 January-rather a magnetic mine discovered on 3 January. If the mine had been discovered I take it no damage was done. Under Paragraph 7 there was a leak in a ship, and the perpetrators had not been caught. I take it there might have been some damage done. As a matter of fact there probably was some damage done, but that particular attack had nothing to do with the attack on the search light, for which the hostages were executed, did it? In all the mention made here of the attack upon the Court No. V, Case No. VII.
light house at Salamis, in reprisal for which the 18 hostages were executed, there appears to have been no damage accomplished.
A First of all, you cannot take these individual acts here separately, but you have to consider them as an entity--as a general plan. I have already said that during my direct-examination. As to Salamis itself from these individual notes it does not become apparent that damage was done; however, I have already said that this only constituted the continuation of preceding sabotage acts, during which sentries were shot at. In other words, these were a number of sabotage acts committed for a certain purpose, and they were in an inner connection with these sabotages on sea. The reason why sabotage on sea was particularly dangerous I have already explained in detail during my direct-examination.
Q If these attempts at sabotage were all part of a general plan, why didn't you mention that fact in your report?
A Why, at that time, in this report, I did not make mention of that fact, I cannot say today. In this report I did not make any judgment on the situation, but I merely reported on the facts.
Q It would have been a rather important fact for your superior officer to know, would it not, if such had been the case?
A I really did not have to report these matters to my superior agency as something new. The situation at that time was such that every attack on navy bases had to be considered as being in connection with English operations. All these symptoms were, at that time, within the framework of our judgment on the situation. It constituted nothing new at all.
Q If you wanted to protect the light house on the Island of Salamis from attack and damage why didn't you use more guards instead of executing hostages?
A We were not concerned with a light house, but we were concerned with search lights of the troops. The troops were attacked, their equipment and their defense installations. The occupation of the Island of Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Salamis was quite sufficient for guarding it. But even if it was sufficiently protected cunning sabotage units would always undertake surprise raids, be it with or without success.
Q For all you knew, these raids were carried out by British Commando units in full uniform and entitled to make any attacks whatever upon your troops. Isn't that so?
A No, these raids were made by Greek citizens. This becomes apparent from one entry where one of the attackers was injured and died. This was the boatsman. The boatsman in that case could hardly have been a member of the English Commando unit.
Q Well, I think you're referring there to the attack mentioned on Page 59 in Paragraph 5.
A Yes.
Q That doesn't say what nationality the boatsman had, does it?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A Mr. Fenstermacher, if this had been a member of an English Commando unit this would have been mentioned.
Q Did you assume because the attackers in that case were Greeks that the attackers on the other occasions were not Commandos?
A In the case of these sabotage acts I assumed that only Greeks were concerned.
Q You didn't know that Commandos were not concerned though, did you, at the time you ordered the execution of the hostages? The perpetrators, at that tims, were still unknown.
A Because of the Commando Order I knew that such commando troops were about, but I had no evidence that in my territory such Commando units were actually active.
Q If you wanted to prevent attacks upon the Island of Salamis why didn't you take all the hostages from Salamis? Why did you take most of them from Athens?
A The hostages came from the Island of Salamis, as I have already said. I think it also becomes apparent from the report.
Q Where were the hostages executed?
A May I draw your attention to Roman Numeral III? It says "Salamis" there.
Q It says, under Paragraph III, that 15 hostages were executed in Athens, and 3 hostages on Salamis, but it does not say where the hostages all came from. Where were they taken from?
A That, I can hardly tell you today in detail. So much as I recollect this case, I really don't know where the hostages came from.
Q Was there a hostage camp from which you might have taken them?
A I cannot remember having had a hostage camp there.
Q Well, if you wanted to prevent attacks on Salamis why didn't you execute all the hostages on the Island instead of executing some of them in Athens and just a few on the Island?
A This is very simple to answer, Mr. Fenstermacher. The attacks on the Island of Salamis were only one part of an enemy act. The very Court No. V, Case No. VII.
dangerous sabotage acts on both of the ships constituted the other part, and these sabotage acts took place on the Piraeus territory. That is why these two measures were separated.
Q Do you happen to know when these hostages were taken into custody? How long before the execution?
A I can no longer tell you that today. I really don't know, Mr. Fenstermacher.
Q General, did you post notices saying that 18 hostages had been seized and that unless the attacks upon the Island of Salamis were discontinued these 18 hostages (listing their names) would be executed? Was that the procedure you used?
A I cannot remember having issued that specific announcement beforehand. It could have happened. I do know, however, that a few months before posters were distributed where it said that sabotage acts would be punished. That was generally known, and that should have sufficed.
Q You didn't use notices listing the names of these 18 individuals and saying that these 18 would be executed unless the attacks ceased?
A That I cannot remember.
Q What was the theory you were operating on, General, when you executed these 18 hostages? Was it that the real perpetrators would be so dismayed at the thought that innocent people were suffering for the perpetrators' acts that they would, therefore, discontinue these acts? Was that your theory?
A The theory was the following, and that also holds true of the practice mainly: As I have already said during my direct-examination, I tried everything possible to get the guilty ones. Only after I could not succeed in doing that I had to take reprisal action. The sense and the theory of reprisal actions is that non-guilty ones have to be seized when guilty ones are not to be obtained. The purpose of such reprisal actions is very clear and has repeatedly been discussed.
Q And then the guilty persons would be so alarmed at the thought Court No. V, Case No. VII.
of a non-guilty parson's being executed for what they, the guilty, had done that the attacks would cease? Is that the theory?
A I really did not work out any theory about this matter, but I complied with the given order on the basis of the circumstances given and for purposes of expediency. The fact that such measures were successful in practice I have already mentioned during my directexamination because for a long time thereafter there occurred no sabotage acts against ships anymore.
Q You said, I believe in your direct examination, that there were dead and wounded as a result of these attacks. Is that what you said? Did I understand you correctly?
A I don't know whether I said that in connection with this particular case. Anyway I do remember that in connection with preceding attacks there were dead and wounded.
Q There were no dead in connection with these particular attacks of sabotage on the Island of Salamis though, were there?
A No mention of a dead is made in this report.
Q You didn't feel, General, that the execution of 18 hostages in retaliation for no German losses and no German damage was an acceptive retaliation?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, it is very difficult to find a suitable ratio for the retaliation of such cases of sabotage. These concepts are very relative. I think that in this case I have made myself very clear in saying that these sabotage acts against ships in connection with attacks against naval bases were of such paramount importance in view of the general situation, seeing everything from a relative angle, that the measure to be taken could not be expressed in a ratio but really had the purpose to prevent the necessity of further similar measures in the future.
Q I take it, General, that you assume full responsibility for the death of these 18 hostages?
A Yes, certainly. I don't think I left any doubt about that Court No. V, Case No. VII.
during my direct examination.
Q Would you look now at Document Book XXIV, at Page 161 in the German and Page 211 in the English? This is your report, as Commander Southern Greece, for the 4th of June 1943, and on Page 162 of the German and Page 313 of the English, Sub-paragraph "b", there is mention of a sit-down strike in a chemical plant in Piraeus in May 1943, and mention also that the District Headquarters Piraeus had 10 hostages seized from among the workers and ordered the resumption of work. Were you consulted before those 10 hostages were seized by the Commander of the District Headquarters Piraeus?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A I beg your pardon, I cannot find this passage in my document book -- or rather it is not under "C".
Q Under "B" I said, General.
A "B" like Bertha - and what section? I see, I have found it. Won't you please repeat the question, Mr. Fenstermacher?
Q There is mention there about a sit-down strike and the fact that ten hostages had been seized from amongst the workers by the district headquarters of Piraeus. Were you consulted before those hostages were seized?
A I really can no longer remember this individual case.
Q Do you consider that a perfectly permissible method of going about breaking a strike -- that is by the seizure of hostages and I take it the threat to kill the hostages unless work is resumed?
A I have no misgivings in this case because beforehand a very severely worded decree had been issued to the effect that every strike would be considered as directed against the occupational power, and it was also mentioned that severe measures would be taken against such strikes, i.e. the workers had been warned. If hostages have been taken in that case and if a pressure has been exercised, the report shows that this measure had fulfilled its purpose. The threatened shooting, however, was not executed anyway.
Q Would you have had any misgivings about shooting these ten hostages if work had not been resumed?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, today I really cannot answer a hypothetical question like that, what I would have done then.
Q The intention, however, at the time the hostages were seized was in fact to execute the hostages if work had not been resumed, was it not?
A I hardly believe that that was the intention. This was merely a means of pressure. Whether an intention to actually put that into effect existed cannot be reconstructed now anymore.
Q Later on, several months later, hostages were in fact executed Court No. V, Case No. VII.
when work had not been resumed following a strike, had they not?
A No.
Q We will come to that incident a little later. In this same Document Book, No. 24, on page 171 of the German and page 229 of the English, there is reference to the attack upon the Italian ship Citta di Savona in the Harbor of Piraeus. In reprisal for that mine attack, mine explosion, ten hostages were executed on the German side and nine on the Italian side.
Would you look at the casualties, General -- 69 horses were drowned. There was no loss of human life, was there?
A If you try to connect this loss of horses with the execution of human beings, I would rather like to forego an answer to this question.
Q The most important part was the leak in the ship. That was what brought on the execution of the 19 hostages.
A. That is true, that is true. I have already stated during direct examination why such shipping losses were very important. The decisive factor was the loss of the ship in that case.
Q There is mention there of a possibility that the mine was put in at the port of Patras some days prior to the explosion. Was an investigation conducted at Patras before the hostages were shot?
A I don't know, of course, what the details of this investigation were, but I can say that all such investigations were carried out as carefully as possible. During direct examination, I have already stated that I gave these people charged with the investigation a very long time in order to be able to proceed most carefully. It was always my endeavor to get the guilty parties and only if all means had failed to get the guilty parties, retaliation measures should be taken. I remember having said in this case that five days were at the disposal of the investigating committee and I also remember having disapproved of immediate, hurried retaliation measures.
Q How long does it take a ship to travel from Patras to Athens?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A That depends upon the size and the speed of the ship.
Q Well, let's take the Citta di Savona. How long would that have taken?
A I am not a seaman but I imagine 4 or 5 hours.
Q Now, General, these hostages were executed while the investigations were still under way, were they not? If you will look at the report, it says "Investigations still under way; as a counter-measure, ten hostages were shot on the German side and nine on the Italian side." Why did you shoot the hostages before the investigations had been completed? Perhaps you might have found the perpetrators.
A Mr. Fenstermacher, if you carefully read this passage, you will find that the first part of the report says that on the 12th, the act was committed. Then it reads "investigations still under way" and then it says that on the 17th the hostages were shot. Here we are not concerned with a daily report but this is a combined report. Therefore, it would be wrong to connect these two paragraphs.
Q Well, what is the meaning of the sentence "Investigations still under way" which immediately precedes the reference to the execution of the hostages?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, this report dates back to the 5th of July. It can hardly be assumed that investigations were still under way at that time. It seems to me to be merely a negligence on the part of the author of this report who merely copied a report and transcribed it into this report here.
Q You are quite sure that the hostages were not executed prior to the completion of the investigations?
A I can only remember that I gave them as much time as possible for such investigations and that I only decided to carry out retaliation measures when I became convinced that such investigations had failed. I do remember that, but naturally I no longer remember details.
Q If, in fact, the mine had been put on the ship at Patras, how did you expect that the execution of hostages at Athens would deter Court No. V, Case No. VII.
perpetrators from putting on more mines at the port of Patras?
A Well, I no longer know what the result of the investigations was.
Q General, were notices published saying that ten hostages, listing their names, had been seized and would be executed in retaliation for the placing of this mine on the Citta di Savona? Do you recall the procedure you used before you executed these men?
A If I remember correctly, these executions were carried out with a reason given and with the publication of the names of those shot.
Q These hostages were shot after the attack had taken place-that is, they were not first seized and an announcement made to the population stating that if attacks by way of mines take place on ships, these hostages will be executed. That was not done, was it?
A In this special case, no previous notice was given. There was only a general warning against sabotage acts which I already mentioned before.
Q You don't believe that reprisals may be taken only for specific incidents--that is to say you believe that a general announcement can be made and then after specific attacks occur, hostages might be executed?
A That was my opinion at the time. I thought that I was doing the right thing if I considered that the general notice sufficed. The population and everybody there was warned with that general publication and everybody knew what the consequences of such sabotage acts would be. I think that is the sense of any such warning.
Q I take it you assume full responsibility for the death of these ten hostages?
A Yes, I take full responsibility.
Q Now following the execution of those hostages on the 17th of June, 1943, a general strike in protest against those executions occurred on the 25th of June, did it not?
A Yes.
Q Now on page 168 of the German volume and page 225 of the English, Court No. V, Case No. VII.
there is a reference to a decree issued by the Commanding General and Commander of Southern Greece on the 27th of June, 1943, which threatened particularly severe procedure in case of strikes in the area of German sovereignty. You apparently issued that decree, General Speidel. Can you recall the contents of it?
A Would you please repeat the page number? I haven't found the passage yet. Is it in the same volume?
Q On page 168 of Document Book 24.
A May I ask you to repeat the question?
Q I was wondering if you recall the contents of your decree of 27 June 1943 which apparently threatened particularly severe procedure in case of strikes?
A No, I cannot remember it. It was not annexed to the document.
Q You threatened the execution of hostages in case of strikes, didn't you, General?
A I believe, yes.
Q Did you use a ratio?
A No.
Q You said on direct examination, I believe, that the Italians were generally more severe than the Germans in the course of their occupation of Greece. Did I understand you correctly?
A No, you misunderstood me. I cannot remember having said that.
Q As a matter of fact, the Germans were much more severe in their occupation policy that the Italians, were they not?
A I can hardly judge that. If, for instance, I take into consideration a shooting in the streets of Athens which I mentioned, I can tell you that we did not do such a thing, whereas Italians shot into the crowds from their tanks.
Q Will you look on page 168 of the German and page 224 of the English. You mention there that the reputation of the occupying powers was greatly impaired because the Italians in Athens did not apply the same severe measures as was the case in the area of German sovereignty. Was that an exception or was it generally true that the Germans were more severe than the Italians?
A I cannot answer your question in that form. I think in this case a special decree was available which brought us to that conclusion?
Q You spoke in direct examination about the Greek government that cooperated with the Germans, and I believe you said that you did not consider it a puppet government of the Germans?
A I have said that it depends entirely on what you understand by a puppet government. If, for instance, you consider the present south German Governments of the American zones puppet governments because they have to comply with the orders of the occupational power, then in the same sense the Greek Government was also a puppet government. But if you consider the facts as they are, namely that the government of a country which is occupied by the enemy is bound by directives of the occupying powers, then that is a fact with which you have to deal. That applied to the Greeks then, it applies to us today and under such circumstances, you have no right to speak of a puppet government. You certainly cannot do that if you take into consideration that this government was with its people and was in authority as far as it could be in authority.