I continued to state that I could not consider the government of Minister President Rhallis a puppet government figure, but I saw in him a personality who tried, to do the best for his country within the framework of what was possible.
Q The Greek people were almost unanimously opposed to the various governments which were in charge in Greece from the Greek standpoint, were they not?
AAs far as I can judge the situation, the Greek people are basically opposed to every government which happens to be in power. At the time, of course, this government had its outspoken enemies, especially in the communist camp, but as far as I am informed, this government supported itself upon the democratic liberal circles of the country. It had a certain basis, even if this basis was not too strong.
Q Will you look on page 166 of the German and page 222 of the English -- in your report you say that 90 per cent of the Greeks today are unanimously hostile towards the axis powers and are ready for open revolt. The Rhallis government was apparently not on very firm footing with its own people, General, if 90 per cent were opposed to it.
Q Mr. Fenstermacher, you are confusing two concepts. It says here that the population is 90 per cent hostile against the Axis powers. It does not say, however, that the population was hostile with a 90 per cent proportion against the government of Rhallis. You have to differentiate there. A Greek could very well be behind his government and at the same time have a hostile attitude against the Germans. After all, the Greek government did not love us. They would rather have had us outside their country. I was not in any doubt about that, but they did try to save as much as possible for their country, and they tried to do that with the help of the occupational power, just in the same way as it is true of Germany today.
Q Look on page 172 of the German, on page 233 of the English, you state there in your report that the Rhallis government was unable to maintain itself among the population and that without effective support by the occupying power, its days seem numbered. That government could not have remained in power without German support, could it, General?
A The foundation of a government always fluctuates and you see today, if you read the papers, that the foundation of the French government is very shaky. I think it held true at the same time in Greece. I think that at the time this report was compiled, such an impression prevailed. This report was not signed by me but it originates from my chief. What situation he took into consideration at the time, I cannot judge; but it is a fact that the government to a certain extent was dependent upon the support of the occupation power. That, after all, is a matter of course and that is always the case in occupied territory. I don't see any incriminating facts in this situation, either for the Greek government nor for the German occupational power.
Q There is no doubt, is there, that these Greek volunteer units which were organized were organized solely at the instigation of the Germans?
A I didn't quite get your question, I beg your pardon.
Q Is there any doubt, General, that if it had not been for the German occupation authority, the Greeks would never have organized volunteer units, the Evzones, I mean?
A No, the contrary is true, Mr. Fenstermacher. The Greek government at first approached the German occupational power with the desire to set up units of Greek nationality in order to have their own authority and in order to be able to maintain peace and order in the country. They did that in order not to be a puppet government only, but in order to actually have the possibility to exercise authority.
Q On page 172 of the German, page 233 of the English, you state in your report, General, that if the German Wehrmacht is not to suffer heavy losses in Greece, the bandits must be opposed forcibly and with the employment of strong forces and that the political and economic situation, in the last analysis, is dependent upon the result of the battle against the bandits. I take it that you felt that the only solution to the problem of the pacification and security of Greece was in a purely tactical and military sphere and that German military units had to defeat the various bandit military units?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, first of all let me draw your attention to what I have said before already, namely that this report does not originate from me but from my commander; but I would add that I am entirely in agreement with him if I consider the situation in retrospect However, you must not forget to take into consideration that the military judgment of the situation--and this is with what we are concerned -- was preceded by the partisan amnesty and this is a very decisive factor. During direct examination I have stated that from the German side it was endeavored to do away with the entire partisan question by this amnesty. Amnesty to everybody. This amnesty has failed not because we were at fault but because there was bad will on the part of the enemy. Since this pacification had failed by no fault of our own, we could not but proceed with military means to finish such partisan activities and this is the sense of this factually correct report here.
Q You didn't seriously think that the bandits as you call them would accept the amnesty? Why should they have trusted the German statement that if they had turned in their weapons nothing would have happened to them?
A If our intention had not been serious, the partisan amnesty had not been decreed. I have stated that I did not decree that personally but that it was a large-scale action which was decreed by the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E the Commander-in-Chiof of the 11th Italian Army and the Greek government after mutual agreement had been reached.
I think that you can expect the Highest German and Italian Commanders to have meant such an offer very seriously.
Q Now General, in view of the various announcements which the German government made and assurances to Czechoslovakia, to Poland, to Holland, to Belgium, to France, to Greece and Yugoslavia, wasn't it rather naive for you to believe that the bandits would trust any amnesty which the Germans proposed to them?
A Measures with respect to politics could not be judged by us. We thought that as honest soldiers we made an honest offer. At any rate, I personally had no doubt at all that this offer was meant honestly. I should ask you to supply evidence to the fact that it was not honest.
Q We will return once more to this statement of yours on page 172 of the German and page 233 of the English. Do you mean there that you yourself felt that only by a military victory over the insurgents pacification and security could come to Greece?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, it was not up to me to decide that. At that time, I was still Commander-in-Chief of Southern Greece. Such decisions were made at a much higher level. The entire situation within the Greek territory could only be judged by Army Group E.
It was my duty as the little man in the South to evaluate the situation as I saw it upon the basis of my knowledge of things, and upon reports which I received; in order to evaluate the situation from a military point of view it is necessary to draw these consequences and then make proposals. Whether this proposal could be executed on a large scale -- whether it was expedient, whether it was militarily possible --- that after all was not for me to decide but for the OKW or Army Group E.
Q. I am simply trying to get at your personal opinion, General, you felt according to your reports that the answer to Greek pacification was a military victory?
A. It was my opinion that the partisan activities could only be broken with military powers after all other means had failed.
Q. If the only method of achieving pacification in Greece was a military victory in your opinion, then you must have known that by executing hostages you were only taking at best a stop gap measure at pacification.
A. I don't know why you are connecting the execution of hostages with the general pacification of the entire country.
Q. Well, as I understand your opinion as mentioned in your reports you felt that only by defeating the bands you could pacify Greece and if that was your opinion did you not then appreciate that your method of executing hostages could not achieve pacification?
A. The pacification of the country by means of fighting the partisans could only have been achieved in places where partisans were to be found i.e. by the use of military force, but there were parts of the country where there were no banfs and there for purposes of pacification we had to resort to retaliation measures as ordered from higher up.
Q. Would you look now, General Speidel, at Document Book 17 at page 80 in the German and page 110 in the English. This is your report dated 18 March 1944. You had previously issued a decree regarding the strikes on 27 June 1943 had you not?
A. Yes.
Q. Now on page 81 of the German and page 111 of the English, you discussed strikes in your report and you state that at the beginning of March strikes were surpressed by energetic military measures. Fifty communists were shot immediately while others were awaiting their sentence. Was that done in accordance with your order of 27 of June 1943?
A. With respect to this report, I can only say that firstly this report comprises a period of time during which I was not in Greece. Secondly, that such retaliation measures were carried out in my absence and were probably ordered by my representative. Thirdly, I must say that this case is listed in my document book 3 as one of those cases, which do not concern me personally since they happened in my absence.
Q. When did you return from your leave?
A. As I have stated in direct examination, I returned on 17 March 1943 and I took over business on the 18th in the morning.
Q. This report is dated 18 March 1944, General, you must have been familiar with it when you returned to your headquarters the day before?
A. It was signed on the very day I returned by my chief of staff and as it can be seen from the heading it comprises the period from the 16th of February until 15 March. I cannot say anything about that period.
Q. Weren't you interested enough to know, after returning from leave, what happened in your absence, especially during the preceding month?
A. Naturally I was interested, but you must try to vizualize the situation. Having been away 54 days I returned and the situation was an onslaught on me, everything of my importance was reported to me, which had happened during this period. The details of what was reported to me then I can no longer remember and in the same way I cannot remember this particular case, try as I may, but I do think it was reported to me.
Q. Would the execution of fifty hostages in order to break a strike have been of enough importance for you to have a detailed discussion with either your chief of staff or the man who was acting as your deputy during your absence?
A. I could only reply to this question if I could remember how I learned of these matters, whether I learned of these matters at all what the measures were which led to them, what the situation was which prevailed at the time. I really cannot remember that matter so I cannot define my attitude toward it.
Q. General, we heard from General Felmy that a deputy does not make basic changes in the policy of the man for whom he is acting as deputy. Then it follows then that the man who was serving as your deputy here in executing the 50 Communists was only acting in accordance with the basic policy, which you had previously laid down and about which you had previously instructed your chief of staff?
A. I cannot say what motive made my deputy proceed like that in this particular case. My own policy was firm and I am convinced that my deputy upon the basis of orders given and upon his personal conceptions took those decisions which he deemed necessary. If I understood your question correctly, I would say that he would have done something basically new and deviated from my policy if he had given an order saying "From now on retaliation measures stop and I order another ratio 1,000 to 1 or 100 to 1." That would have been a deviation of my policy. If in my absence he was acting within the frame-work of given orders, he was still acting upon his own responsibility.
Q. The execution of these 5- Communists was a continuation of your previous policy, was it not?
A. No. Can you tell me where I should have executed 50 Communists?
Q. Haven't you ordered on 27 June 1943 that in the case of future strikes hostages will be executed and severe measures will be taken?
A. You mean the strike decree?
Q. Yes, I mean the strike decree....
A. The contents of this I no longer remember as I don't have it before me.
Q. You mean, General, that these fifty Communists were executed as something new in your area of command. Was this the deputy laying down some new policy in the area of the Military Commander Greece?
A. He did not start a new policy, inasmuch as strikes were already threatened by punishment. The only question which was before him was to what extent such punishment was to be carried out and whether in the individual cases punishment was necessary at all. That of course was left to his own discretion. Furthermore any such decree primarily has to have a moral deterrent effect in order to prevents similar incidents occurring. Whether and to what extent the threatening punishments are being executed in left to the discretion of the Military Commander and always depends on individual circumstances.
Q. Your deputy probably asked your chief what General Speidel would do in a case like this before he executed those 50 Communists, don't you think?
A. In that case the chief of staff would not have been able to give him the proper answer. He possibly could not know what I would have done under the circumstances. This was a question I decided exclusively on my own and in such I was responsible to my own conscience.
Q. Well the deputy chief, however, could have inferred to your decree of 27 June 1943 as a guide in this matter, could he not?
A. There is a possibility, but let me ask you whether in this strike decree retaliation quotas had been laid down?
Q. I believe you stated that no retaliation quotas were laid down in your decree, but that hostages would be executed in retaliation for strikes.
A. I ask you that in order to confirm my testimony, because probably you have this strike decree before you.
Q. I am afraid we did not find it, General Speidel and are completely depending on your testimony regarding the contents.
A. Very well, I stated clearly that no quota was contained, I only threatened severe countermeasures.
Q. I would like to turn now to a discussion of the period from September, 1943 until the time you left Greece in May, 1944, with particular regard to the relationship between you and the Higher SS and Police leader. Should it be said, General, that reprisal measures are a device of achieving security and pacification and that they have two aspects; first, a tactical aspect and secondly a police operations, if they take reprisal measures, the reprisal measures could be referred to as a tactical device, but in the case of reprisal measures taken in a completely pacified area one may speak of reprisal measures as being a police device?
A. Reprisal measures of every kind have always the purpose to reestablish order and quiet, because they are directed against excesses which are threatening to disturb such order and quiet. In other words, in every case the purpose is the same whether the troops are carrying out such reprisals or whether it is done on territory which has already been pacified.
Q. The aim is always to achieve security and pacification whether the reprisal measures are taken by tactical units or by police units?
A. Yes, that is always the purpose.
Q. Now when an SS unit is tactically employed in a given area, one could say that reprisal measures then are matters of tactics?
A. If they are carried out in the frame-work of combat, actions ordered by the tactical commander can be considered tactical measures. With that I want to give you a formal definition now, they are reprisal measures which are necessary to reestablish order and which are carried out within the frame-work of tactical actions.
Q. If an SS unit is tactically subordinate to a Wehrmacht commander, can the Wehrmacht commander give that SS unit orders either to take reprisal measures or orders not to take reprisal measures, that of course presupposes in that case that reprisal measures are of a tactical nature?
A. We have already heard in this trial that SS units could be tactically subordinated to commanders of the Wehrmacht. In other words, they were bound by the tactical orders of the Wehrmacht and if any reprisal measures were carried out within the frame-work of this organization, they took part in the combat actions.
Q. The Wehrmacht commander in that case would be responsible for reprisal measures which any SS unit carried out in the course of this tactical operation?
A. Here you have to make the following differentiation, Mr. Fenstermacher. On direct examination I have stated that the SS, or let us say the Police Regiment XVIII was responsible to me for security tasks, not partisan but security tasks, from the time they came at the end of August 1943 until approximately, I said, the beginning of November and they were responsible to me for the security of the streets from north to south. Starting with that time, all the police forces, as I said, were committed in the partisan area Boeotia. They had been assigned by the Higher SS and Police leader and, as I have already stated, basing myself upon the directive, they did carry out combat tasks. This particular assignment had no longer anything to do with the Military Commander, who was merely the intermediate agency.
Q. I understand your attitude regarding the tactical subordination of the 18th SS and Police Regiment to you, General Speidel. I wonder if you would try to answer my general question; if an SS unit is tactically subordinate to a Wehrmacht commander and is the Wehrmacht commander responsible for those reprisal measures committed by the SS unit in the course of a tactical operation?
A. It must always be the pre-requisite that this SS unit is tactically subordinate to the Military Commander. Another pre-requisite is that the Military Commander has the tactical task and that the reprisals are necessary within the frame-work of the situation. The same holds true in the case of every commitment within the Army.
Q. Now, we will turn to the police functions of the Higher SS and Police Leader. What was the strength of the XVIII SS Police Mountain Regiment, which was subordinate to the Higher SS and Police Leader.
A. I cannot tell you that exactly, Mr. Fenstermacher, it was an infantry regiment and I suppose it was just as strong as an ordinary infantry regiment. I could see from the documents that it was a so-called reinforced infantry regiment, because I read something about artillery. If you want me to give figures, it is difficult and I would rather not give figures. It was a reinforced infantry regiment.
Q. But to give the Tribunal some idea, would you say around 3,000 men?
A. That is a little too much. I think 2,000 would be much closer.
Q. And some of these 2,000 men were sometimes committed for police functions in Athens and other times committed for tactical operations in the area of Boeotia?
A. The main thing was that the regiment was in Boeotia as a tactical unit. I have seen from orders that the Higher SS and Police Leader from time to time used Italians from there for the vicinity of Athens, but the main thing was that the entire Regiment was in Boeotia and what parts of the regiment he may have had in Athens, it could only have been small parts, but I don't know.
Q. So for the most part the XVIII SS and Police Mountain Regiment was in the tactical area of General Felmy's LXVIII Corps?
A. One part of your statement is true, the other part is not, Mr. Fenstermacher; the regiment was located in Boeotia predominately and the territory Boeotia was also assigned to the Higher SS and Police Leader. But, it was not true that this was the territory of General Felmy in the sense that a subordination relation to General Felmy could be construed. The Higher SS and Police Leader here had his own independant war there as I might say and naturally he had loose contact with other tactical units.
Q. You said in the course of direct examination that the Higher SS and Police Leader in Athens had the right to commit Evzone units and he therefore had the right to order any retaliation for the losses suffered by any Evzone units. I take it that you mean the order to commit a unit included the right to retaliate for losses suffered by the units?
A. In order to put that straight, you will have to tell me what commitments you mean. Are you referring to the commitment in Boeotia? If you are, I think I have already clarified the matter you are talking about. The military commitment for partisan fighting in Boeotia, I think that subject has already been clarified. Now this here is merely a police commitment, in which case he was subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS and had to act according to his directives as I have already spoken about these two commitments, in direct examination.
Q. My question was somewhat more general, General Speidel, I am asking if a Wehrmacht unit or a commander has the right to commit a unit in a tactical area for tactical operations, does that Wehrmacht commander also have the right to order reprisal measures for any losses suffered in the course of those tactical operations; that is simply a general question.
A. The divisional commander according to general directives, and I recall exhibit 306, was always acting independently in decreeing reprisal actions?
Q. I would like now, General Speidel, to take up in some detail the subordination of the Higher SS and Police Leader to you with respect to the order of procedure for the SS Leader. In Document Book 17, page 105 in the English and page 75 in the German.
On page 75 of the German and page 105 of the English, there is given the Standard Order of procedure for the Senior SS Leader and Police in Greece.
The first paragraph implies there has been an agreement between Keitel and Himmler for the appointment of this Higher SS and Police Leader, whom I believe you stated was General Schimana.
Paragraph 2 states quite clearly that this Higher SS and Police Leader General Schimana is to be subordinated to you for the period of his employment in Greece.
Paragraph 3 seems to be the one on which you spent most time on direct examination. Isn't it clear from paragraph 3, General Speidel, that all that is mentioned there is simply a description of the type and functions of duty that General Schimana was to carry out in Greece under your subordination, as stated in paragraph 2?
A. No, Mr. Fenstermacher, an interpretation of such an order after four years have passed cannot be undertaken from a theoretical point of view. The decisive thing is how the directive was at that time laid down, interpreted and executed. I have stated in great detail during my direct examination how I understood this directive at that time. I have expected that you would take out some passages and then say that they were subordinated to the Military Commander. This subordination is contrary to the ordinary type of subordination of police leader. We have heard in Serbia that the subordination of the Higher SS and Police Leader was a very loose one and no mention at that time was made of a directive, while here we have a directive and I am very glad that there is one from my point of view.
THE PRESIDENT: At this time we will take our morning recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until 11:15 o'clock.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue.
Q. (By Mr. Fenstermacher) General Speidel, we were looking at the order of procedure for the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece on page 75 of the German Document Book XVII and page 105 of the English.
Before we get into a discussion regarding what actually was the situation by your contention in Greece regarding this particular subordination, I would like to first discuss with you and perhaps reach an agreement with you as to what the order itself provides.
Would you agree that paragraph 3 by using the words, "embraces all duties emcumbant upon the Reichfuehrer of the German Police in the Reich," is simply a description of the type of duties which the Higher SS and Police Leader for Greece is supposed to perform; that is to say, that paragraph 3 does not concern any subordination of the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece to the Reichfuehrer SS in Germany but is simply a description of the type of things which the Higher SS and Police Leader for Greece is going to carry out.
A. First of all, I would like to ask you, Mr. Fenstermacher, to make your questions a little shorter and not to ask so many questions at the same time because it is difficult for me to answer them as I would like to answer them and as it would be proper for them to be answered.
As to this paragraph 3 which you referred to, I would like to say that I don't share your opinion but that this is the fixing of a task for the Higher SS and Police Leader in the framework of his duties, this for the following reason:
It says here: "The Higher SS and Police Leader embraces all duties which are encumbant on the Reichfuehrer SS in the Reich."
In other words, one has to start from considering what the tasks of the Reichfuehrer SS were and they were pure police tasks in Germany. In this capacity he was not subordinate to any Military Commander.
The parallel idea to paragraph 3 is then that the same police tasks were in a smaller area -- namely, in Greece -- encumbant on the Reichfuehrer i.e., here on the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece, and he again is parallel to the Reichfuehrer SS not to any subordinate military commander.
If I am saying this in this form today, it might sound incomprehensible for you but one has always to take into consideration the conditions of power and the spheres of competency in the Third Reich.
Q. There is nothing in paragraph 3, is there General, that states that in performing these police duties General Schimana will be subordinate to Himmler in the performance of those police duties? Isn't the subordination character of Schimana with respect to these duties already taken care of by paragraph 2?
A. We first of all have to discuss this basic paragraph 2. In this connection, I would like to anticipate the following.
When we received the documents we read many things which were unpleasant or, I would like to say, they were, almost all of them, things which were unpleasant; but there was one document here, Exhibit 419, which pleased me and this for the following reason:
My conceptions of my opinions at the time which had in the meantime become a little value were almost literally confirmed in this document and in this connection I would like to repeat some thing which I said before the morning recess.
It is not correct to take apart this order theoretically after a time period of four years. One has to understand it from the situation of that time and from the tasks which existed at that time, also from the power conditions which existed at the time, and if one thus regards this order then one cannot deduct from the word "subordinated" a total subordination because there was no such thing. The Reichfuehrer SS would have never permitted that one of his agencies was totally subordinated to a Wehrmacht unit.
Q. It might be granted, General, that perhaps regarding discipline, for example, as an officer of the Reichfuehrer SS Schimana would be responsible for discipline or for the appointment of persons subordinate to him to Himmler, but regarding the duties which he is to perform in Greece, isn't it clear from paragraph 2 that in performing those police duties he is subordinate to you? What other meaning could be given to the subordination which is referred to in paragraph 2?
A. Mr. Fenstermacher, may I add something? You interrupted me before when I talked about subordination. This subordination provided in paragraph 2 is the description of a general establishment but no detailed reasons are given. Everything which follow in according to my opinion of today and of that time the outlining of those spheres of duties in which the Higher SS and Police Leader was not subordinate to me. After all, I could not have any police tasks in the meaning of a police technical task. That was up to the Reichfuehrer SS and the Higher SS and Police Leader who was subordinate to him. I would assume that the prosecution holds the same point of view if I may repeat a quotation from General Taylor which I mentioned during my direct examination.
It was quite generally said in the indictment that the Higher SS and Police leaders remained personally responsible to Himmler, but for tactical tasks they were subordinated to the ranking military commander in the area where they were employed. If the prosecution had been of a different opinion at the time they would certainly have said "they were subordinate for police tasks."
Therefore, concerning this paragraph 3 which we are discussing, I can only say that there was not the slightest doubt where I was concerned that the Higher SS and Police Leader was independent concerning his police tasks.
Q. Paragraph 4 makes it clear, General Speidel, that regarding combat tasks you were only to serve as a conduit between Army Group E and Schimana. If you were simply to be a conduit in that respect, one certainly can't speak of any subordination of Schimana to you in a tactical sphere unless Schimana is subordinate to you in police tasks. Paragraph 2 which refers to his subordination to you must be completely devoid of meaning.
A. Of course paragraph 2 has some meaning because it is a service regulation for Higher SS and Police leaders and through this service regulation he receives his tasks as they are laid down in paragraph 3. It is not my service regulation but that of the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q. When you received a copy of this regulation on the list of October, 1943, and you read in paragraph 2 that Schimana was going to be subordinate to you, what did you think? In what sphere did you think would he be subordinate to you, for what tasks, what duties?
A. At the time I studied the service regulation very thoroughly, and I talked about it a lot. I beg your pardon, which was the paragraph you asked me about?
Q. Paragraph 2, in which Schimana was made subordinate to you?
A. I see. Paragraph 2. After that I read the subsequent paragraphs which are instructions for the execution, and refer to this one sentence in paragraph 2. In the following pages, from paragraph 3 onwards, it is stated in great detail what his tasks were, and to what extent he was subordinated to me. I would like to emphasize that it is not a combination which I have made today on the basis of this service regulation, but the situation is that this service regulation is an absolute confirmation of the opinion which I held at the time. I interpreted it this way at the time, and I adhered to it in this manner at the time.
Q. Let's continue with the analysis of the regulation. In paragraph 5 it makes it clear that Schimana is going to be the supreme authority of the SS and Police forces in Greece. I take it that means the SD, the Gestapo and any other units of Himmler in Greece will be subordinate to Schimana.
A. In my opinion everything that belonged to the Police was subordinated to Schimana apart from the Waffen, which were tactical troops and these in my opinion, were not subordinated to him.
Q. In paragraph 6 you are authorized to give Schimana directives which take precedence over any other directives, and in paragraph 7 you are authorized to give him restrictive directives.