The attitude of Terboeven was contrary to that. He treated the Norwegian population in a very unfriendly manner, and he sabotaged, indeed, the aims and purposes of Hitler by his treatment. Naval Commander in Norway and who had taken Captain Schreiber, the former Attache, into his staff as a liaison officer to the Norwegian population, to counteract these intentions of Terboven. On the basis of the reports of Admiral Boehm I repeatedly approached the Fuehrer indicating to him that with Terboeven there he would never reach his goal. The Fuehrer designated Quisling Chief of the Government. He became Prime Minister but Terboeven also committed sabotage against Quisling in his activities by making it extremely difficult for him and even discredited him among the population. Gauleiter of Norway. All our attempts, endeavors, were unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that Admiral Boehm tried hard to carry out, on the part of the Navy with the population, that which Hitler had expected, that is, to bring about the sympathy of the Norwegian people.
I didn't understand how on the one side one could gain the sympathy of the Norwegians and on the other hand sabotage them. in which he explained that it could not go on like that and that Hitler's intentions would never be carried out. I presented that report to Hitler, but since that did not bring about any change, late in the Fall of 1942 this failure of mine became one of the reasons whichfinally led to my retirement.
Q Did you ask Hitler specifically to dismiss Terboeven?
A Several times. And I suggested that he should appoint General Admiral Boehm as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces for Norway and to give him greater powers so that he could carry out his -- Hitler's -- aims. I suggested that the Fuehrer as soon as possible should conclude the peace with Norway, because only in that way could he bring about that cooperation between Norway and Germany and the population turn to him so that there would be less sabotage and attacks by Norwegian immigrants, and that possibly the Norwegians who were leaning toward England at that time could be brought to return, because they would be afraid that they would lose the contact, also in the economic field.
The defense of Norway would be considerably relieved if that state of peace could be brought about. known to the Tribunal by Schreiber under Roman Numeral II. There Schreiber mentioned in detail the endeavors of the Navy to prevent the regrettable terror regime of Terboeven and explained that Raeder in 1942 for the last time tried energetically to achieve from Hitler the conclusion of the peace between Norway and Germany. I believe that the prestige of Boehm was a good one in Norway; that I can assume this is historically known without having to prove it. I had asked for a witness in that connection but the witness was not approved. a letter from Raeder to General Admiral Boehm of the 23rd of October, 1942. Raeder writes:
"To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your personal information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to Prime Minister Quisling." can be seen that -- and I quote only one sentence:
"The Fuehrer, therefore, asks you to discuss allpolitical questions concerning Norway, which necessitates a discussion with the Reich, exclusively with the Reich Commissioner as the sole responsible representative of the Fuehrer in the civil sector of Norway, and also to convey through the Reich Commissioner only all requests which you wish to submit to the Fuehrer personally." destroyed all his plans and endeavors against Terboeven. be very brief. May I merely ask you, did you attempt at any time to influence the political relations between Germany and France?
defense, improvement of the condition of defense of our country, but also for humane reasons. In France I was frequently at naval bases and on the occasion of my trip there I got some knowledge of conditions in France; and I saw that in 1940 and still in 1941 the population lived just as if it were peace, completely undisturbed. Consequently, I believed, since the Fuehrer had proved so much moderation on the occasion of the Armistice, that there would be a basis upon which France -- which had a government of collaboration -- could be attracted more closely to us. cooperation between France and Germany could guarantee a lasting peace in Europe for the future. Therefore, I suggested to him whether he himself could not try to do something in that direction. He did not intend to do so and I referred to it again whom I heard that Admiral Darlan had the desire to get into closer cooperation with our Admiral Schulze, the Naval Commander in France. It was first in the field of information, when his services were very useful to us. to me once. Admiral Schulze's reported that to me andI reported it to Hitler and recommended such a conversation because I thought it would do some good.
Q You could do what? of his attitude. The conference took place near Paris on the occasion of an official trip which I made to a French base the end of January or beginning of February, 1942. I had the impression that the conference was very satisfactory, inasmuch asDarlan was of the opinion that a peace would be of advantage to both nations and that, also, otherwise he seemed inclined to cooperation. He stressed, however, that the entire political regulation had to take place before peace could be concluded. I still had further negotiations withthe Armistice Commission with respect to heavy armament for major French ships. I reported to the Fuehrer about the result of the conference but also in this case the Fuehrer was again hesitant and did not want to make a decision.
He said first he had to see how the war would take its further course before he would decide upon his final position toward France. Besides, that would be a precedent which would have an effect on other nations.
So that also was a failure -- the alleviation of the defense of France did not result from it and so in that case of France, the failure which I had was the second reason which contributed later, that I asked for my dismissal because I could not carry my plans through.
Q. Now, I come to the next subject, where accusations are made against you and that is Russia. When did you hear for the first time that Hitler intended to wage war against Russia, although he had concluded a non-aggression pact with Russia?
A. May I first remind you that in the summer of 1940, that is to say, July, August, and Spetember, we in the navy were very much concerned about preparations for a landing in England; therefore, as far as we were concerned, we did not even think that there could be any plans for action to another side, in another direction. In August I heard through somebody from the army -- in August, I heard from some army officer that it could be, that it was the commander-in-chief, that considerable troop transports were going to the East. I asked Hitler thereupon what that meant and he told me it was a magnificent camouflage of his landing intentions in England. He knew that I would be against it right away if he would speak about an enterprise against Russia. In December -- and I cannot recall the date exactly -- it did come to it, however, that he admitted to me that he had certain intentions against Russia. In December, I held at least two lectures -- the more important one was on the 26th of September, in which report I tried to convince him against any undertaking against Russia and at the occasion of the report which I made in the presence of Keitel and Jodl. I emphasized particularly the strategic military side; first, because I could do that in all clarity and also in the presence of other people and then because I assumed that such military reasons -- what the possibility of failure of an operation against Russia is, at the same time one is in the struggle against England, that this should make an impression on him and would be designed to change his mind about that plan. Just on the 26th of September, I requested, after the official report, a personal conference alone with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl can testify that I always did that when I wanted to discuss something particularly important with the Fuehrer, where I had to go beyond the conventional framework which I could only do if nobody else was present.
One could tell Hitler a lot of things if he was alone with him but one could not make any such statements in a larger group. Fieldmarshal Keitel and ColonelGeneral Jodl know that very well, particularly well, just because they were the ones who in such cases had to leave the room. In that case, I gave detailed explanations to Hitler that, first, one could impossibly break the pact with Russia; that it would not be moral, it would not beoppertune, because it guaranteed great advantages for us and therefore was a basis for a sound police later for Germany and than I told him that under no circumstances he could start a two-front war, where he was the one who had always emphasized that he could not understand and would not repeat the stupidity of the government of 1914 and that, in my opinion, one could never take the responsibility for it. Then I put to him again the relations, the proportion of power, the absolute necessity for the navy to concentrate on the war against England and just in that moment where all means were strained to the utmost so that the landing could be carried out. On that very day, I gained the impression that Hitler was inclined to listen to my argument, because later or on the next day, the naval adjutant, Captain von Potkammer, reported to me that Hitler had spoken very much in the sense that I had spoken to him and had confirmed my argument and that went on for several months, and I presented such reports repeatedly and came also with the same arguments, and I believed again in November that had been successful. To my utter suprise, however, on the 18th of December, Directive No. 21 came out (Barbarossa) in which the case of a war with the Soviet Union, before the termination of the war against England, was anticipa however, that, of course, was a directive for an eventuality. It is the document 446-PS, US-31, of the 18th of December 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, that is in thedocument book 10-A, page 247; that is the document book 10-A of the British prosecution. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Admiral, the prosecution asserted that the navy and you participate in a draft of the directive. Is that correct?
A. That is in no way correct. Such directives were drafted after the Fuehrer had taken his political decision in the OKW, in the Fuehrungestab, the leadership staff, and in that staff there was also one army officer, several air force officers, and a navy officer, who drafted under the chief of the staff the matters of navy, air force, and army.
That directive then went to the commanders-in-chief of the branches and they were ordered, from their part, to present suggestions for the execution of the order for the Fuehrer but on the directive itself they had no influence, they did not get to see it before. May I say one more thing about that? I have been accused by the prosecution that I used my influence on the Fuehrer, not for only ethical reasons, but that I had tried in a cynical way, first, to take care of the trouble against England and then to jump into Russia. I have said before already that I told all my reasons to the Fuehrer whenever I had the chance but that I could do that neither in a public meeting in the presence of other people nor that I could write that into my war diary, because the eventual harsh words which were in there should not become known to other people through this entry into the war diary but beyond that, I would like to say and I want to point to document C-170, US-136, which is dated the 25th of August 1936 until the 22nd of June 1940, and is a list, a compilation of many excerpts from the war diary of the naval war command, SKL and from my minutes of conferences with Hitler, in which the Russian question was dealt with, this is not a literal reporduction of my statements or an accurate excerpt word for word in the war diary but a summary of a large excerpt by Assmann (?). I should not like to read details from these many entries but I should only like to point out that just this document, C-170 shows in a large number of entries contained therein, that since the beginning of the war, in 1939, I continuously used my influence on the Fuehrer and in that direction, that a good relation to Russia should be achieved, for the reasons which I have previously mentioned. It would lead us too far if I would start quoting several entries here by the document, I would like to emphasize, that is quite convincing.
Q The directive 21, which is signed by Hitler, Keitel and Jodl, you had nothing to do with that, did you?
preparations.
A Yes. We had the first conference in January, as can be seen from one of these entries in C-170, and we had reported to the Fuehrer on the 4th of February about our intentions. The Navy then in March began with certain preparations. major operations but only with the cutting off of the Gulf of Finland. I don't know whether that is in directive 21 or in some other place. Upon my urgent request the Fuehrer had ordered that the center of gravity of the navalwarfare should be in the direction of England. Consequently, we could use only small forces, relatively small forces, for the war against Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, perhaps we had better adjourn. The Tribunal rather understood that you hoped to finish by mid-day today. We realize that you had two hours of today taken up with your documents, but when do you think you will be able to finish now?
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that I will need only about three quarters of an hour, between one half hour and an hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow at 10-00 o'clock we shall deal with the documents of Seyss-Inquart, and we are told that will only last 30 minutes.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 18 May 1946, at 1000 hours.)
MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the application for documents of defendant Seyss-Inquart, 87 documents all together have been submitted to the Prosecution, and we have gone over them in the German. After numerous conferences with counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart, we find we are unable to agree on 17 of these documents. As of yesterday the number was 20, as I so stated, but we have now reduced it to 17.
Document Number 5 in the defendant's list is a copy of a resolution of the German National Assembly on the 21st of February 1919, advocating Anschluss between Austia and Germany and immaterial. It is a resolution of a German parliamentary body, and it doesn't seem to us to make any difference what they were thinking of Anschluss in 1919. in October 1945 and written by a man named Walford Selby. It is a critical article criticizing the Treaty of St. German for not avoiding the obliteration of the Austro-Hungarian economic entity, and it discusses what it describes as the mistakes of 1919, and so on. the economic background of the Anschluss movement. Whatever may be said for that type of proof, there are at least five other documents on the same basis., and we made no objection to them. But we did feel that somewhere this sort of thing, even if relevant, certainly became cumulative. Documents 7, 12, 26 and 33 are all on the same subject, the economic background of Anschluss, and this is a long one. Therefore, we feel that it certainly is not necessary and doesn't add very much and merely creates a lot of paper work, and is cumulative.
Document Number 11 is a speech delivered by a Dr. Schober, giving the area and population of the Republic of Austria. We haven't any very serious objection to this type of thing excepting that there probably are better sources if the defendant wishes to establish the area and population of Austria in 1921 judicial knowledge of the area and population of Austria as of that date from reliable Austria in 1922 to the effect that Austria belongs to Germany. document, because there are at least three other documents with almost identical statements, by Dr. Renner to which we have made no objection. Kleinschmied, and the extract purports to show that a number of politicians lived or prospered on the Anschluss movement in Austria, That doesn't seem to us to be very important here or likely to help the Tribunal very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, what exactly does "lived from the propaganda" mean? That they made their liveing by means of propaganda, or what?
MR. DODD: Yes. It purports to show that they made it a vehicle for carrying on political activities, and made an issue of it and sustained themselves politically.
Number 21 is an extract from Kunschak's book, "Austria 1918-1934," and it give the increase in the National Socialist votes in Austria from 1930 to 1932. That didn't seem to us to be very material or very helpful or likely to be helpful to the Tribunal. We objected to it on the grounds that it is irrelevant and immaterial.
Document Number 22 is an extract from an article in the "Neue Freie Presse" of August 1932, opposing the League of Nations loan. Anschluss movement. There is at least one other document, Number 23, which purports to establish the same principle or the same kind of proof.
"Un Pacte avec Hitler," and it discusses the Yugoslav policy with respect to Anschluss between Germany and Austria.
Again that doesn't seem to the Prosecution to have any direct bearing or any helpful bearing upon the issues here, whatever the Yugosalvs thought about it.
Number 31 is an extract from the "Neue Zeitung" of the 11th of January 1946, where Gordon walker states that the celebration in Austria after the Anschluss was genuine.
Well, that is Mr. Walker's opinion, and there is some other substantial opinion on the other side. We doubt very much that his opinion is material here or competent.
THE PRESIDENTL Who is he?
MR. DODD: I understand he is a member of the Labor Party in Great Britain, and a writer.
Number 39 is an extract from the Archiv of 1938. This sets forth a statement made by Senator Borah, of the United States, that the Anschluss was a natural and inevitable affair and had nothing to do with the Unites States. This was not a speech made by the late Senator Borah in the Senate; it was his own opinion, and it does not seem to us that it would be very helpful. Some later opinions of Senator Borah were not so helpful, and this doesn't seem to be very likely to be helpful to the Tribunal with respect to this issue.
Number 47 is an extract from Zernatto's book, "The Truth about Austria". Zernatto was one of the State Undersecretaries of Austria, as the Tribunal knows. He left the country after the Anschluss and went to the United States, and wrote this book. He makes a number of statements, I might say, about the defendant Seyss-Inquart. documents 48, 50, 54, 55, 60, and 61 are all extracts from the same book, that would have bearing and relevancy before the Court; but where he expresses his opinion, we have more doubt about its relevancy.
This one statement, number 47, seems to be his opinion. He doesn't cite any conversation or anything other than what appears to be his impression that Seyss-Inquart disassociated himself from Leopold's efforts. originally though we would object, on reviewing them they appeared to set out actual conversations between Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart, and it might be helpful to the Tribunal. Therefore, we do not object to the next three.
However, 55, again, is a statement in Zernatto's book that, in Zernatto's opinion, Seyss-Inquart was a figure on the chess board and was double-crossed by the Nazi or new Party leadership. We object to that for the reason that I have stated, it is the author's opinion. He is deceased, by the way, and is certainly not available. In any event, we do not think his opinion can be very helpful.
Number 60 is also a statement from Zernatto's book, which sets out a conversation with an unnamed Austrian Nazi. We felt that was altogether too vague and would not be of value or helpful. Inquart was afraid of Shouldering responsibility.
I don't want to stress our objections too heavily to these extracts. I don't think they are very harmful, certainly, but I rather object because we would like to cut down some of this printing, and I do not think they will be very helpful to Seyss-Inquart. from the publication entitled, "The Elements of National Socialism", by Bishop Alois Hudal. It explains anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, and it goes on to discuss matters that the Tribunal has heard very much about through other defendants, the disproportionate position of the Jewish population in Germany, and so on. We object to it as not being helpful and not material.
Again, 69 is another extract from Zernatto's book on the causes, as some of these people see it, of anti-Semitism. It is his opinion and does not seem to be helpful or material here.
Number 71 is on the Slovak question. I doubt that there has been any serious claim made anywhere in this case that at various times the Slovaks have not claimed autonomy. This extract from the Archiv of 1938, in so far as we can discover, seems to establish that they did want autonomy. Well, we don't think that is very important here, and it will not be helpful to the Tribunal or to Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a document of State?
MR. DODD: Well, it is a document from the Archives, and in that sense it is a public document.
THE PRESIDENT: After Slovakia had been taken over by the Reich?
MR. DODD: No, not afterwards, in 1938, and it preceded the taking over.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes.
MR. DODD: Those are our objections, Mr. President. I do think we have tried to be rather -
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, Mr. Dodd, we are only considering now the question of objections to publication, or rather, to translation. We are not considering the question of admissibility, nor are we binding you not to object to them after they have been translated.
MR. DODD: Yes, I am aware of that, Mr. President. We tried to be, I think, fairly generous about this list. The excerpts, or most of them, are not too long. We did think we would have to call a halt somewhere, and I do not think our 17 objections out of the 87 listed are very strict or are pinching, really, the defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for defendant Seyss-Inquart): Your Lordship, High Military Tribunal. I know that you value my small country, Austria, not only because of its ancient culture, and not only because of its scenic beauty, but also for the reason that it was the first country which lost its freedom through Hitler.
cannot expect of you that, as representatives of the larger powers, you know the history of my country to the last detail. it is of the utmost importance, in fact-- that you understand fully out of what background and out of what motive this man acted the way he did. in 1918, ran like a red thread, up until the year 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, will you come to the actual documents as soon as possible, because, you will remember, we are only discussing the question of whether they should be translated or not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. Party. my documents. the Weimar Assembly, and I am of the conviction that it is important in judging that the Anschluss was not only a wish of the Austrian population, but of the entire German people, and I request that this document be granted me. who lived in Vienna and who was a friend of our country. He knows the economic background and economic conditions in Austria, conditions which led to the Anschluss. That was the reason for my including this document.
Chancellor Dr. Schober, who had world reknown and who, in this speech, referred to the difficulties and the burdens which were imposed on Austria, which were tremendous and almost impossible of being shouldered by Austria. Karl Renner, from a speech which was delivered in 1922.
At that time Dr. Seipel went again and, with great difficulty, put through a loan which was of great importance to us because, at the same time, it was demanded o f Austria, that we should forego independence for ten years' duration. That meant that we would not take any steps to change the demands for an Anschluss. document 33, I only described the economic situation as it obtained in the year 1938. the strong political propaganda for the Anschluss.
No. 21 is irrelevant. I consider it extemely important, since this new, young party, which arose on the fertile soil of economic disunity in the years 1931 and 1932, grew tenfold, and in that way it was widespread and active political opposition to the existing regime.
The next document, No. 22, is an extract from an article which again shows the economic situation at a period of time which was very important to history, when Chancellor Dollfuss traveled to Lausanne in order to receive another loan from the League of Nations, and we again were restricted to refuse thoughts of an Anschluss for another ten years.
This document, No. 22, as well as No. 23, is not cumulative, since one shows the plitical and the other the economic position of the members of Parliament with respect to the League of Nations' loan in the year 1932. various surrounding states of Austria in relation to the Anschluss. I selected only Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia was the country that was most strongly in favor of the Anschluss. addition to the remarks made by the Prosecution, that Gordon Walker is not only a member of the Labor Party, but -- and this point is much more important -- during the entire war years he was head of the British Radio Division Austria, and in the year 1938 he was in Austria personally and personally lived through and experienced the Anschluss. His opinion and his judgment, therefore, are of extraordinary importance, since they are the opinion and judgment of a prominent foreigner. made by the American Senator Borah, who for 25 years was the head of the Committee of Foreign Affairs. His opinion seems of great importance and should be listened to. Dr. Zernatto. I should like to add that Dr. Zernatto was Austrian Minister, General Secretary of the Home Front, as well as being the right hand of Schuschnigg during the period of the Anschluss. He was one of the spiritual fathers of the Schuschnigg plebescite.
I am sorry to say that he died abroad in emigration in 1940, and I cannot produce him as a witness here, but his book is a document and reproduces, infact, those thoughts and those experiences which he lived through in those critical days. be granted me.
The next two documents concern anti-Semitism. I only decided with regret to submit them, since I want to avoid any accusation of anti-Semitic propaganda. I did include them because in the trial brief my client is accused of being a member of an anti-Semitic group. This accusation is unjustifiable since these societies were very insignificant and they should not be considered more important than they actually were. If this matter is not emphasized by the prosecution, I will not put any particular stress on it myself.
The last document which is being objected to, No. 71, contains an agreement whichwas concluded between Massaryk and Klinka, the Slovak leader, at which occasion Massaryk solemnly promised autonomy to the Slovaks, a promise which was not kept according to the letter of the agreement. A strong movement for autonomy resulted, and this movement was supported by Hitler. For the reasons just mentioned, I ask that I be granted this document as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal will consider the question of these documents.
Yes, Dr. Siemers.
DR. SIEMERS: If it please the Tribunal, yesterday in connection with the Norwegian problem, on one occasion I mentioned Documents 81, 82, 83, 84, 85 and 86, and submitted those documents. I beg your Lordship's pardon, this omission.
The document has already been granted me. It is Raeder Exhibit No. 88, which I would like to submit at this point, a document which is an extract from the White Book.
It may be found in my Document Book V, on page 392. This document shows the British order of April 1940, regarding the plans for the occupation of Swedish ore fields, to be taken from the base of Narvik. necessary for me to read from it. BY DR. SIEMERS: had stopped with that. I had put a question about the directive No. 8421-PS. You had answered that question to the effect that the Navy did not participate and collaborate in thesetting up of this directive. You further stated that the Navy, in January, curried out those preparations according to command and order. I believe you made a mistake when you said that this directive was signed by Hitler, Keitel and Jodl. Hitler signed it, but Keitel and Jodl only initialed it. That is, we are not concerned with the signature of the other two gentlemen since when these directives were issued they were signed only by Hitler, and the others could only countersign. straight on this matter.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to ask the Tribunal to refer to Document C-35, US-132. This document is found in the document book of the British Delegation, No. 10A, on page 16. It is an extract from the War Diary with the date of the 30th of January 1941. It deals with the preparations on the part of the Navy in accordance with the Hitler decree of the 18th of December, where Hitler, under No. IV of the directive, decreed that precautionary measures were to be taken in case Russia should alter her present position toward Germany, that is, only in case Russia should change her attitude toward Germany. BY DR. SIEMERS: situation, the Prosecution has mentioned Document C-66, and has submitted this document, GB-81.
This is your report of January 10, 1944 to Admiral Assmann for the historical archives of the Navy.
DR. SIEMERS : Thesdocument will be found in the document book of the British Delegation, No. 10, page 13. There you will find the basic position taken by Raeder with respect to the Case Barbarossa, and this is set forth under "a" of the document. Book 10A, on page 35.