I would try to arrange for him to report to the Fuehrer personally so that these reports would reach him directly. him of our conversation , the conversation between Quisling and me, and I asked him to receive Quisling personally so that he might have a personal impression of Quisling. documents -- that in cases of this kind, one should have to be especially cautious, since one could not know to what degree such a political and party leader would try to further the interest of his party. Therefore, our investigations would have to be especially careful. And I again called the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that an attempt to occupy Norway or the Norwegian coast would bring with it a great risk as well as disadvantages for the subsequent situation. In other words, I pictured the case in both aspects, and I presented it in a neutral manner following days. These two gentlemen then obviously were in connection with Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him, and Mr. Rosenberg then sent me in the form of a letter a record of a meeting of a session which had been taken down by Quisling and Hageling. by the prosecution, it said specifically that Rosenberg know the political conditions, but that, of course, he was not familiar with the military judgment of the situation, that he would leave the military judgment up to me, since I was the commandant for the sector.
DR. SIEMERS: If it please the High Tribunal, in this connection I would like to submit Raeder Exhibit 67, to be found in my Document Book IV, Page 309. That is the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder dated the 13th of December, 1939, which was not mentioned by the prosecution. The prosecution merely mentioned the points contained in the letter -- that is, a note in the files by Rosenberg, under No. C-65, the same as BG-85. C-65 and Raeder Exhibit 67 belong together according to their contents.
THE PRESIDENT: You say there was another document besides Raeder 67 which you were referring to?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes; I am referring to Raeder 67.
THE PRESIDENT: I know about that. But you said some other document, as well.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the document submitted by the prosecution, C-65. And that belongs with these letters; the two things belong together. The latter document, C-65, is to be found in the document book of the British Delegation 10-A, Page 33. If these two documents are considered together, it may be seen that the political side is not mentioned in either document; and from that we may see that the witness said that he was not concerned with the political side of the picture, but only with the military side.
THE PRESIDENT: Doctor, I think it would be a good time to break off.
(A recess was taken).
MR. DOD D: Mr. President, with respect to the case of the defendant, SEYSS-INQUART, counsel for SEYSS-INQUART, and representatives of the Prosecution have been conferring with respect to his application for documents. We have agreed on a great number, but there are twenty upon which we are unable to agree.
THE PRESIDENT: Twenty?
MR. DODD: Twenty. I think we could do it in thirty minutes if the Tribunal will set some time aside, it might take a little more. Sir David has reminded me that the translators are waiting on us to go ahead with their translation work.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr.Dodd, I think the best time would be to take it tomorrow morning at teno'clock.
MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. It has been suggested also that the case of SEYSS-INQUART precede that of VON PAPEN. I understand that is the wish of the British counsel, and very satisfactory to us as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Norway drafted? had with the Fuehrer on the 14th of December in my presence the Fuehrer ordered that the O.K.W. should now deal with the matter and should study it. The Fuehrer then had two more conferences with Quisling on the 16th and 18th of December where I was not present, and the matterthen according to the directives was treated by the O.K.W., and at first a study was made from the Document C-21, which I have mentioned before, We concede that the Study North on the 13th of January was received by S.K.S., and then in the course of January and the date of the 27th of January has been mentioned, the draft of a directive for the case North was made, and that draft was made in the O.K.W, and as expert for the Navy Captain Krenke took part in it. the three branches of the armed forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports had been received which could be used as a basis for the draft of the directive.
These reports now besides coming from Captain Schreiber also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the Fuehrer, and they concerned the preparatory work which had been done by the English and the French. The Navy Attache Kamering? was mentioned in the preparations which had been made in Norwegian ports for the possibilities of landing, measurements of docks and the heighth of the bridges on Norvik and on the Swedish border for similar things. able time a landing was intended. Besides, also political reports reached us, and Hageling throu hg his connections in Norwegian circleshad received reports which in part came directly from the representative Hageling andmembers of the Government. and Russia played a certain role, and the danger was discussed and considered that England under pretense of aid for Finland would consider a cold-blooded occupation of Norway. That directive for the case of Norway, therefore, came one the 1 March, was issued on the 1st of March, and in the further course of the month of March more reports were received. In themeantime, the Altmark incident had occurred, and it was reported by Hageling that the attitude of the Norwegian Commander was such that one could say that the Norwegian Government in the case of the preparation by the English would only protest on paper. correct? The Prosecution from the Document 1809 quoted the order of the 5th of March. That is an entry in the diary of Jodl, 1500 conferences about the case with the three Commanders in Chief, Field Marshal Canaris who was more concerned before about it. How is it possible, Admiral, that Reich Marshal Goering had not been consulted at a time when the directive was issued?
A I cannot explain that at all. I can't understand it. I had no authority to speak about it and I can't say why he was not consulted. highest man in the Reich would not be in it from the beginning? Hasn't he ever spoken to you about that matter?
pecially around the Fuehrer, one could speak of a conspiracy. The Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during any one of the conferences or receptions of Quisling, and I had no authority to speak to him about these matters. on the 13th of March, in which he stated the Fuehrer had not given the order?
May-17-A-RT-19-1 "Q" Having it read in entirely,
A Yes. In the English translation as much as I remember he says "Looking for excuse;" but he had neither justification nor he needed neither justification nor excuse, because in the directive of the first of March -- that is to say, two weeks before that, in the first paragraph he has stated what circumstances made it necessary we receive permit to occupy Norway and Denmark, conduct operations in Scandinavia, secure provisions with Sweden and secure provisions for the Air Force against England.
DR, SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that is the Document C. 174; that is, G.B. 89, Document Book of the British Prosecution 10-A, page 113. That is the directive for the plan from the first March '40 which the witness has mentioned contains already the justification or the reasons for it. came through the information service of Captain Schreiber and so on, and that also, objectively, according to the facts I may be permitted to submit Several documents -- and that is Raeder Exhibit Number 75 from the White Book with the date of the 17 February 40, containing Mention of the landing of British Troops in Trondheim and Narvik, and several appendages to it, from which the considerations in force at that time can be seen concerning the Swedish ore; Document Raeder 77, Exhibit 77 -
THE PRESIDENT: This is 75, Pages 43 and 44?
DR SIEMERS: Beg your pardon. Not page, out Raeder Exhibit 75. It is page 340. Document Book 4.
Document 44, Page 352. I have seen in the English document book a mistake. On page 353 the heading is missing. That is to say, under page 354. And I may point out that this document has the date of the 23rd of February 1940. That is contained in the original document. The heading "Intervention in Scandinavia." It concerns the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports, and so on. It mentions again the question of the Swedish ore.
Then I come again to the document Raider Exhibit 78; page of the Document book,4, 357, an excerpt from the war diary of the war Navy Command of the 4th of march, in connection with the case of the Altmark. It is explained that its sending against British military action against Norway wasn't possible.
in-chief of the French army, General Gamelin. He also finds mistakes in the translation. The heading of the document was left out, was omitted. On page 360 I would be grateful to the Tribunal if it would note that the original Document has the date of the 10th of March 1940. It is top secret and is based on the fact that since 16th of January the general plan of armed intervention in Finland existed, and therefore as a matter of prc ution the ports and airports of the Norwegian coast should be occupied. the Scandinavian Commission of the Inter-Allied Study Commission of the 11th of March 1940, top secret, concerning landing at Narvik. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Then, Admiral, we are finished with Norway. I believe you said already that the reports increased in the month of March. When aid Hitler give the final order for the occupation?
A The end of March or beginning of April. I couldn't recall the exact date. that in February Quisling informed us that Mr. Halifax had told the Norwegian. ambassador in London that an operation on the part of the British for the acquisi tion of bases in Norway was intended for the near future, and that report at that time reached us. Needless to say, in addition to that I have emphasized before that in all conscience I always tried to show to the Fuehrer both sides of the picture because I was conscious of the responsibility that on the basis of the material presented by me. the Fuehrer would have to take or refuse that decision. But that does not mean to say that in any way I refused the responsibility for having pointed out to the supreme commander of the Armed Forces that particular danger, and therefore of course I am in some way responsible for the whole thing; because, after all, I have been accused that in a letter which has also been submitted here, C. 155, that I had expressed to my Officers Corps that I was proud of the execution of this extraordinary dangerous enterprise. I should like to confirm this, because I believe I should be proud that the Navy, with such limited means, carried out that operation in the face of the entire British fleet; and I remain of that position.
Q. In the month of March did messages come to the SKL about violations of the neutrality of Norway? That is incidents in Norwegian waters?
A. Yes. In the second half of the month of March statements about action of British planes against our merchant shipping repeatedly occurred, ships which brought the Swedish ores from Narvik.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection may I submit some more documents? Raeder Exhibit 81, Document Book 5, page, of the original, 372, War Diary of the Naval War Command, containing several entries according to which these incidents became more and more frequent, in which the Norwegian neutrality was violated by British ships and planes. Since that document is known I do not have to read anything from it. March, also concerning violations of neutrality. 6th session of the Supreme Council, dated 20 March, 1940, which has already been mentioned yesterday and where the justification concerning the vital interests with respect to international law is mentioned and the laying of mines from 5th day of April on. like the previous one, is a document from the White Book. May I only point out that it mentions that the first transport is to leave on the 5th of April; in other words, four days before the occupation by Germany. to take official notice, which reports the chartering of over ninety per cent of Norwegian tankers and merchant fleet by England. from C-151 and C-115. Those are documents GB-91 and GB-90, Document Book of the British delegation 10-A, on pages 106 and 162. The dates are 30 March of 1940 and 4 April, 1940. The documents show that the ships which would carry out the landing, for camouflage reasons, should carry the British flag, and from that the prosecution has concluded an accusation. BY D.R SIEMERS:
Q. What do you say about it?
A. That is quite a regular ruse of war, that warships carry a foreign flag. A requisite for the legality of that ruse, however, is that at the moment of an enemy action, the moment fire is opened, their own flag has to be opened in time. That has always been done in the German Navy, especially with our cruisers, which frequently sailed under a foreign flag to be taken as merchant ships, but who always have lowered that flag in time. That is a matter of honor. But it must be added that in this case, such as the War Diary shows on the 8th of September -
Q. 8th of April.
A. 8th of April, yes -- that on the 8th of April, on account of certain considerations, we rescinded that order because we had these reports that an English action was under way and we feared that complications would arise from that. So this order was not carried out in the long run. I believe the document can be found which contains that.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I submit, in that connection, Raeder Exhibit No. 89, Document Book 5, page 400, where we find, under the 8th of April, that the previous order is rescinded; the British flag is not to be used.
A. You also asked about Document C-115, which says that the blockade runners camouflaged as merchant ships should enter Oslo Fjord. That has always been a quite regular ruse of war against which, from the legal pointof view, no objection can be made. Likewise, concerning signals of identity if English names are given; there is nothing to be said against that.
I did not quite answer one question because I was interrupted. That was the question concerning the expression "justification" or "excuse" in the War Diary of Colonel-General Jodl. As I have shown, it was not a question of justification which Hitler had expressed a long time before that, but I believe that I can be quite sure that it was a question as to the diplomatic note which, at the moment of the execution of the enterprise, had to be presented, had to presented to the Norwegian and Danish government to give cause for his actions, that this note was not yet drafted, especially since he had not spoken to the Foreign Minister at that time at all. The Foreign Minister received the information, as he has said himself, only on the 3rd of April or -- yes, on the 3rd of April.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe with that we can conclude the question of the occupation of Norway. May I still submit the approved document, Raeder Exhibit 66, which was approved for the purpose of argument? Those are the files of Dr. Mosler and it can be found in volume 4, page 291, and in that connection, concerning the use of flags, may I specially emplasize Figure 70, page 304, from which we can see the legal reasoning behind it. and the series of documents as far as they are approved, Raeder Exhibit 91, Admiral Darlan to the French Minister Daladier on the 12th of April, 1940; Raeder Exhibit 92, page 412. This document contains the English-French note to the Norwegian government on the 8th of April, 1940. I have submitted that document because this note expresses the same legal point of view as the statement by Dr. Mosler. Raeder Exhibit No. 97 and Raeder Exhibit No. 98; No. 97 concerns the White Book and the planning of the 7th of February, 1940, concerning the bases of the Allies of Norway; and No. 98 is an excerpt from the War Diary concerning the orders which, at the time of the occupation of Norway, were found and from which it could be seen that an English landing had been imminent and the so-called plan under the camouflage name "Stratford Plan", which was prepared by the British Admiralty. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Concerning Norway, may I ask you the following: During and after the occupation did you intervene to see that the Norwegian population should be treated decently and what was your attitude with regard to the political question in Norway; what about the attitude of Germany to Norway?
A. From the very beginning I was for good treatment of the Norwegian population. I knew that Hitler had given Gauleiter Terboeven, -- whom he had unfortunately appointed Reichcommisser for Norway and charged with the civil administration on the occasion of his appointment -- had given him instructions that he, Terboeven, should bring the Norwegian people to him; that is to say, make them inclined to follow him, and that he had the intention in the end to maintain Norway as a sovereign nation in connection with the North German Empire.
The attitude of Terboeven was contrary to that. He treated the Norwegian population in a very unfriendly manner, and he sabotaged, indeed, the aims and purposes of Hitler by his treatment. Naval Commander in Norway and who had taken Captain Schreiber, the former Attache, into his staff as a liaison officer to the Norwegian population, to counteract these intentions of Terboven. On the basis of the reports of Admiral Boehm I repeatedly approached the Fuehrer indicating to him that with Terboeven there he would never reach his goal. The Fuehrer designated Quisling Chief of the Government. He became Prime Minister but Terboeven also committed sabotage against Quisling in his activities by making it extremely difficult for him and even discredited him among the population. Gauleiter of Norway. All our attempts, endeavors, were unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that Admiral Boehm tried hard to carry out, on the part of the Navy with the population, that which Hitler had expected, that is, to bring about the sympathy of the Norwegian people.
I didn't understand how on the one side one could gain the sympathy of the Norwegians and on the other hand sabotage them. in which he explained that it could not go on like that and that Hitler's intentions would never be carried out. I presented that report to Hitler, but since that did not bring about any change, late in the Fall of 1942 this failure of mine became one of the reasons whichfinally led to my retirement.
Q Did you ask Hitler specifically to dismiss Terboeven?
A Several times. And I suggested that he should appoint General Admiral Boehm as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces for Norway and to give him greater powers so that he could carry out his -- Hitler's -- aims. I suggested that the Fuehrer as soon as possible should conclude the peace with Norway, because only in that way could he bring about that cooperation between Norway and Germany and the population turn to him so that there would be less sabotage and attacks by Norwegian immigrants, and that possibly the Norwegians who were leaning toward England at that time could be brought to return, because they would be afraid that they would lose the contact, also in the economic field.
The defense of Norway would be considerably relieved if that state of peace could be brought about. known to the Tribunal by Schreiber under Roman Numeral II. There Schreiber mentioned in detail the endeavors of the Navy to prevent the regrettable terror regime of Terboeven and explained that Raeder in 1942 for the last time tried energetically to achieve from Hitler the conclusion of the peace between Norway and Germany. I believe that the prestige of Boehm was a good one in Norway; that I can assume this is historically known without having to prove it. I had asked for a witness in that connection but the witness was not approved. a letter from Raeder to General Admiral Boehm of the 23rd of October, 1942. Raeder writes:
"To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your personal information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to Prime Minister Quisling." can be seen that -- and I quote only one sentence:
"The Fuehrer, therefore, asks you to discuss allpolitical questions concerning Norway, which necessitates a discussion with the Reich, exclusively with the Reich Commissioner as the sole responsible representative of the Fuehrer in the civil sector of Norway, and also to convey through the Reich Commissioner only all requests which you wish to submit to the Fuehrer personally." destroyed all his plans and endeavors against Terboeven. be very brief. May I merely ask you, did you attempt at any time to influence the political relations between Germany and France?
defense, improvement of the condition of defense of our country, but also for humane reasons. In France I was frequently at naval bases and on the occasion of my trip there I got some knowledge of conditions in France; and I saw that in 1940 and still in 1941 the population lived just as if it were peace, completely undisturbed. Consequently, I believed, since the Fuehrer had proved so much moderation on the occasion of the Armistice, that there would be a basis upon which France -- which had a government of collaboration -- could be attracted more closely to us. cooperation between France and Germany could guarantee a lasting peace in Europe for the future. Therefore, I suggested to him whether he himself could not try to do something in that direction. He did not intend to do so and I referred to it again whom I heard that Admiral Darlan had the desire to get into closer cooperation with our Admiral Schulze, the Naval Commander in France. It was first in the field of information, when his services were very useful to us. to me once. Admiral Schulze's reported that to me andI reported it to Hitler and recommended such a conversation because I thought it would do some good.
Q You could do what? of his attitude. The conference took place near Paris on the occasion of an official trip which I made to a French base the end of January or beginning of February, 1942. I had the impression that the conference was very satisfactory, inasmuch asDarlan was of the opinion that a peace would be of advantage to both nations and that, also, otherwise he seemed inclined to cooperation. He stressed, however, that the entire political regulation had to take place before peace could be concluded. I still had further negotiations withthe Armistice Commission with respect to heavy armament for major French ships. I reported to the Fuehrer about the result of the conference but also in this case the Fuehrer was again hesitant and did not want to make a decision.
He said first he had to see how the war would take its further course before he would decide upon his final position toward France. Besides, that would be a precedent which would have an effect on other nations.
So that also was a failure -- the alleviation of the defense of France did not result from it and so in that case of France, the failure which I had was the second reason which contributed later, that I asked for my dismissal because I could not carry my plans through.
Q. Now, I come to the next subject, where accusations are made against you and that is Russia. When did you hear for the first time that Hitler intended to wage war against Russia, although he had concluded a non-aggression pact with Russia?
A. May I first remind you that in the summer of 1940, that is to say, July, August, and Spetember, we in the navy were very much concerned about preparations for a landing in England; therefore, as far as we were concerned, we did not even think that there could be any plans for action to another side, in another direction. In August I heard through somebody from the army -- in August, I heard from some army officer that it could be, that it was the commander-in-chief, that considerable troop transports were going to the East. I asked Hitler thereupon what that meant and he told me it was a magnificent camouflage of his landing intentions in England. He knew that I would be against it right away if he would speak about an enterprise against Russia. In December -- and I cannot recall the date exactly -- it did come to it, however, that he admitted to me that he had certain intentions against Russia. In December, I held at least two lectures -- the more important one was on the 26th of September, in which report I tried to convince him against any undertaking against Russia and at the occasion of the report which I made in the presence of Keitel and Jodl. I emphasized particularly the strategic military side; first, because I could do that in all clarity and also in the presence of other people and then because I assumed that such military reasons -- what the possibility of failure of an operation against Russia is, at the same time one is in the struggle against England, that this should make an impression on him and would be designed to change his mind about that plan. Just on the 26th of September, I requested, after the official report, a personal conference alone with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl can testify that I always did that when I wanted to discuss something particularly important with the Fuehrer, where I had to go beyond the conventional framework which I could only do if nobody else was present.
One could tell Hitler a lot of things if he was alone with him but one could not make any such statements in a larger group. Fieldmarshal Keitel and ColonelGeneral Jodl know that very well, particularly well, just because they were the ones who in such cases had to leave the room. In that case, I gave detailed explanations to Hitler that, first, one could impossibly break the pact with Russia; that it would not be moral, it would not beoppertune, because it guaranteed great advantages for us and therefore was a basis for a sound police later for Germany and than I told him that under no circumstances he could start a two-front war, where he was the one who had always emphasized that he could not understand and would not repeat the stupidity of the government of 1914 and that, in my opinion, one could never take the responsibility for it. Then I put to him again the relations, the proportion of power, the absolute necessity for the navy to concentrate on the war against England and just in that moment where all means were strained to the utmost so that the landing could be carried out. On that very day, I gained the impression that Hitler was inclined to listen to my argument, because later or on the next day, the naval adjutant, Captain von Potkammer, reported to me that Hitler had spoken very much in the sense that I had spoken to him and had confirmed my argument and that went on for several months, and I presented such reports repeatedly and came also with the same arguments, and I believed again in November that had been successful. To my utter suprise, however, on the 18th of December, Directive No. 21 came out (Barbarossa) in which the case of a war with the Soviet Union, before the termination of the war against England, was anticipa however, that, of course, was a directive for an eventuality. It is the document 446-PS, US-31, of the 18th of December 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, that is in thedocument book 10-A, page 247; that is the document book 10-A of the British prosecution. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Admiral, the prosecution asserted that the navy and you participate in a draft of the directive. Is that correct?
A. That is in no way correct. Such directives were drafted after the Fuehrer had taken his political decision in the OKW, in the Fuehrungestab, the leadership staff, and in that staff there was also one army officer, several air force officers, and a navy officer, who drafted under the chief of the staff the matters of navy, air force, and army.
That directive then went to the commanders-in-chief of the branches and they were ordered, from their part, to present suggestions for the execution of the order for the Fuehrer but on the directive itself they had no influence, they did not get to see it before. May I say one more thing about that? I have been accused by the prosecution that I used my influence on the Fuehrer, not for only ethical reasons, but that I had tried in a cynical way, first, to take care of the trouble against England and then to jump into Russia. I have said before already that I told all my reasons to the Fuehrer whenever I had the chance but that I could do that neither in a public meeting in the presence of other people nor that I could write that into my war diary, because the eventual harsh words which were in there should not become known to other people through this entry into the war diary but beyond that, I would like to say and I want to point to document C-170, US-136, which is dated the 25th of August 1936 until the 22nd of June 1940, and is a list, a compilation of many excerpts from the war diary of the naval war command, SKL and from my minutes of conferences with Hitler, in which the Russian question was dealt with, this is not a literal reporduction of my statements or an accurate excerpt word for word in the war diary but a summary of a large excerpt by Assmann (?). I should not like to read details from these many entries but I should only like to point out that just this document, C-170 shows in a large number of entries contained therein, that since the beginning of the war, in 1939, I continuously used my influence on the Fuehrer and in that direction, that a good relation to Russia should be achieved, for the reasons which I have previously mentioned. It would lead us too far if I would start quoting several entries here by the document, I would like to emphasize, that is quite convincing.
Q The directive 21, which is signed by Hitler, Keitel and Jodl, you had nothing to do with that, did you?
preparations.
A Yes. We had the first conference in January, as can be seen from one of these entries in C-170, and we had reported to the Fuehrer on the 4th of February about our intentions. The Navy then in March began with certain preparations. major operations but only with the cutting off of the Gulf of Finland. I don't know whether that is in directive 21 or in some other place. Upon my urgent request the Fuehrer had ordered that the center of gravity of the navalwarfare should be in the direction of England. Consequently, we could use only small forces, relatively small forces, for the war against Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, perhaps we had better adjourn. The Tribunal rather understood that you hoped to finish by mid-day today. We realize that you had two hours of today taken up with your documents, but when do you think you will be able to finish now?
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that I will need only about three quarters of an hour, between one half hour and an hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow at 10-00 o'clock we shall deal with the documents of Seyss-Inquart, and we are told that will only last 30 minutes.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 18 May 1946, at 1000 hours.)
MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the application for documents of defendant Seyss-Inquart, 87 documents all together have been submitted to the Prosecution, and we have gone over them in the German. After numerous conferences with counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart, we find we are unable to agree on 17 of these documents. As of yesterday the number was 20, as I so stated, but we have now reduced it to 17.
Document Number 5 in the defendant's list is a copy of a resolution of the German National Assembly on the 21st of February 1919, advocating Anschluss between Austia and Germany and immaterial. It is a resolution of a German parliamentary body, and it doesn't seem to us to make any difference what they were thinking of Anschluss in 1919. in October 1945 and written by a man named Walford Selby. It is a critical article criticizing the Treaty of St. German for not avoiding the obliteration of the Austro-Hungarian economic entity, and it discusses what it describes as the mistakes of 1919, and so on. the economic background of the Anschluss movement. Whatever may be said for that type of proof, there are at least five other documents on the same basis., and we made no objection to them. But we did feel that somewhere this sort of thing, even if relevant, certainly became cumulative. Documents 7, 12, 26 and 33 are all on the same subject, the economic background of Anschluss, and this is a long one. Therefore, we feel that it certainly is not necessary and doesn't add very much and merely creates a lot of paper work, and is cumulative.
Document Number 11 is a speech delivered by a Dr. Schober, giving the area and population of the Republic of Austria. We haven't any very serious objection to this type of thing excepting that there probably are better sources if the defendant wishes to establish the area and population of Austria in 1921 judicial knowledge of the area and population of Austria as of that date from reliable Austria in 1922 to the effect that Austria belongs to Germany. document, because there are at least three other documents with almost identical statements, by Dr. Renner to which we have made no objection. Kleinschmied, and the extract purports to show that a number of politicians lived or prospered on the Anschluss movement in Austria, That doesn't seem to us to be very important here or likely to help the Tribunal very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, what exactly does "lived from the propaganda" mean? That they made their liveing by means of propaganda, or what?
MR. DODD: Yes. It purports to show that they made it a vehicle for carrying on political activities, and made an issue of it and sustained themselves politically.
Number 21 is an extract from Kunschak's book, "Austria 1918-1934," and it give the increase in the National Socialist votes in Austria from 1930 to 1932. That didn't seem to us to be very material or very helpful or likely to be helpful to the Tribunal. We objected to it on the grounds that it is irrelevant and immaterial.
Document Number 22 is an extract from an article in the "Neue Freie Presse" of August 1932, opposing the League of Nations loan. Anschluss movement. There is at least one other document, Number 23, which purports to establish the same principle or the same kind of proof.