But, as I had said, Frick survived.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I have no further questions.
DR. DIX (Counsel for defendant Schacht): May I ask you to decide the following problem? I had called Gisevius, too. He is a witness called by me and this is, therefore, not a subsequent question which I am putting. I am examining him as my witness. I am of the opinion, therefore, that it would be right and suitable that I ought now follow the examination of my colleague Pannenbecker, and that my other colleagues, who also want, to pub questions, would follow me. Would the Tribunal be good enough to decide?
THE PRESIDENT: Are you the only other defendant's Counsel who asked for this witness to be called on behalf of your client?
DR. DIX: I had called him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but are you the only defendant's counsel who asked to call him?
DR. DIX: I believe I am the only one who has called him, sir, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may examine him next. BY DR. DIX:
Q Dr. Gisevius, lawyer Pannenbecker had already mentioned that you have published a book entitled "To the Bitter End." I have submitted quotations from that book to the Tribunal as evidence, and they have, therefore, been received as documentary evidence and accepted by the Tribunal, I now ask you for that reason: Are the contents of that book historically true and correct and did you write it only in accordance with your memory or isit based on notes you have made? the contents of the book are historically true. In Germany, as far as it was at all possible, I have currently made notes, and I have already said here that my dead friend Oster in the Ministry for war had a considerable collection of documents, to which I had access at any time I wanted. No important matter, in which I quoted friends from my opposition group, have been written down by me without that I had repeatedly talked to then about it. And, since 1938, I have currently paid visits, and later on had on occasion official duties in Switzerland where I could continue my notes. principle in 1941 and was submitted in 1942 to several friends of mine abroad.
THE PRESIDENT: If he says that the book is true, that is enough.
BY DR. DIX:
Q Since when do you know the defendant Schacht?
Q On what occasion and under what circumstances did you meet him? Interior and collected material against the Gestapo. I was being consulted by various parties, who had either had trouble with the Gestapo or were afraid of them. For instance, the former Minister for Economy in the Reich, Schacht, sent a man to me, his Plenipotentiary, Herbert Goering, in whom he trusted, and he asked me whether I would assist Schacht. He, Schacht, and for some time, felt that he was being persecuted by Himmler and the Gestapo and that he had lately had renewed and founded the suspicion that agents, or at least a microphone, had been planted in his own house. affirmative. I looked for an expert on microphones in the personnel administration, and the following morning I visited Schacht's Ministerial apartment. The microphone expert went from room to room with us and we didn't have to look for long. It had been done pretty badly at the time by the Gestapo. They had mounted the michrophone only too visibly and, over and above that, they engaged a domestic servant who should spy on Schacht and who had a listening device attached to the house telephone connected to her own bedroom that was easily attainable. And, consequently, we could uncover the whole thing. It was on that occasion that I first talked to Schacht.
Q And what was the subject of your conversation? Was it political? situation in which we met. Schacht knew that I was strongly opposing and fighting against the Gestapo and I, in turn, knew about Schacht; that be was known because of countless utterances against the SS and the Gestapo. Many citizens and middle-class people in Germany had hopes in him of the only strong minister who might, if possible, protect them and, particularly, the economists who were important at the time were hoping that he would help and they often found his support, and so that nothing was more obvious and that the Reich on the occasion of that first discussion said that I, in turn, should tell him everything that was troubling me.
The main problem at that time was the removal of the Gestapo and the removal of the Nazi regime. As far as that is concerned, our conversation was highly political, and Schacht listened to everything, making it possible to talk as openly as one could always talk to him.
Q And what did he say? that I had doubts whetherat the end of that present course there wouldn't be an inflation and, considering that, whether it wouldn't be better if he, himself, would bring about that inflation himself, since that would enable him to know the time for such a crisis beforehand; so that he could get in touch with the generals and the ministers in the Reich and consult with them regarding that crisis. I told him, "You should bring about that inflation; then you will have the power to act instead of having that taken away from you by others." He replied, "Look here; that's the difference which separates us. Youwant the catastrophe and I don't want it."
A pr 24-A-RT-21-1 believed that the catastrophe could be averted. Did he give you any reasons for those views?
A I think, first of all, the word "catastrophe" is too far reaching a concep tion. Schacht was thinking on the lines of established government relation, which temporarily had been altered by emergency laws and certain dictatorial measures. But as for as I could notice, and on the basis of all other conversations we have had, it seemed to me that he was still entirely adhering to the thoughts of a Reich government which met past revolutions and whore the majority of the ministers was politically central and where, at a time which might be considered sooner or later, a radical change might happen.
Q What was his attitude towards Hitler at that time? in good terms. I would almost like to say that at that time Hitler was an untouchable man for him.
THE PRESIDENT: What time are you speaking of?
THE WITNESS: I am now speaking of the period of our first meeting in 1934 and the beginning of 1935; end of 1934 and beginning of 1935.
Q What were you at that time? What was your occupation? Where did you work? time, but had been transferred to the Reich criminal department, which was in the process of being founded at that time. When we realized that the Gestapo Were extending their power, we needed some sort of police instrument apart from the Gestapo. We thought we could establish it. It would have to be the ordinary criminal police. My friend Nebe had been put in the position of the chief of the Reich criminal department, so that he could create a police instrument from the with which we might, if possible, resist the Gestapo. ment so as to make suggestions regarding its construction.
Q I now slowly approach the year of 1936--the year of the Olympic Games. Di you have a special task?
A Yes. Ai the beginning of 1936 Helldorf believed that I ought to be given the task of heading the police staff for the Olympic Games in Berlin. That was entirely non-political and technical affair. The former police president, Count Helldorf, thaought that because of my connections to the ministry of the interior and ministry of justice this would be suitable.
I assumed that post but Herr Reisen (?) discovered it and intervened.
Q Your book contains a letter from Heydrich, which I don't propose to read in its entirety. It is addressed to Count Helldorf. It explains just how you have always made every possible difficulty for the secret state police when you were active in the Reich and that the relationship had been a extremely unpleasant one. He continues: "I fear that his participation in the police preparations for the Olympic Games, even in the framework, would not be helpful for the cooperation with the secret state police, and it should therefore be considered whether Gisevius should not be replaced by another more suitable official. Heil Hitler. Your Heydrich."
Is that the letter which reached you?
A Yes. That was the reason why I was also dismissed from that job, and I only had to wait a few more weeks and Himmler became the chief of the police in the Reich, and on the very day when he became the police chief I was at once completely released from my police service.
Q And where did you go? government in Muenster, where I was attached to the price control office. continue your political work and could you make the necessary contacts?
A Yes. I had a considerable opportunity to make official journeys. I made thorough studies, not only as far as prices were concerned, but also as far as the political situations in the Rhineland and Westphalia were concerned. I came to Berlin practically every week so as to keep in touch with my friends.
Q Were you in touch with Schacht? were you in touch with them from Muenster in the sense of the work you were doing?
A Yes. One of the reasons why I went to Muenster was that the government president the Freiherr Luening, was a man of the old school--clean, correct, a professional civil servant-and politically a man who was keen on justice and order. He too ended on the gallows after the 20th of July. district of Dusseldorf, secretary of state Schmidt, and almost immediately upon arrival in Muenster I tried everything to got in touch with the commanding general there, the later Field Marshal von Kluge. In this I succeeded. There too I tried at once to continue my old political discussions.
I shall now ask you: At that time when you were working in Muenster, could you discover a change in Schacht's views regarding the regime, and in particular regarding Hitler--these views which you have mentioned as existing in 1934?
A Yes. It was a steady process which took Schacht farthe and farther away from the Nazis. If I am to show you the phases, then I would say at the beginning--that is to say, in 1935--he was of the opinion that only the Gestapo was evil and that Hitler was the man who was a statesman, or could at least became one, ant that Goering was the conservative strong man whose services one ought to use and could use to fight against the terror of the Gestapo and establish orderly conditions. views about the Defendant Goering. I warned him. I told him that in my opinion Goering was the worst, particularly because ho was hiding under the middle class and conservative cloak. I implored him not to make his economic policy with Goering, since this would take a bad end. ho is a good psychologist--denied this emphatically, and only when in the course of the years, in 1936, he had to See more and more that Goering was not supporting him against the Party, but that Goering was supporting the radical elements against him, only at that moment was there an increasing change in Schacht, which meant that from now on he would not only regard Himmler but Goering too, as a great danger, whereas Hitler was still the one man for him with when one could make a policy, if the majority of the cabinet would succeed in gaining him for the side of right and order. Schacht was handing over foreign currency matters to Goering?
A Yes. That was the moment when I earned him, and if I say that he became apprehensive about Goering, that he realized that Goering was not supporting him against the radical elements, then that is the case you are talking about. affairs to Goering, but if he was slowly gaining this now conviction, did he, even as early as that, have any positive thoughts regarding the bringing about of a change?
A Yes. He was entirely living in the same train of thoughts as so many people did, probably the majority of people in Germany, namely, that everything depended on a strengthening. of the middle class influence, and that it would be one of the prerequisites that the ministry for war, headed by von Blomberg, should be brought over to the side of the middle class ministers. So that if you want to put it like that, Schacht had the very constructive idea that one would have to concentrate on the fight for Blomberg. It was that very point in which I agreed with him--the same battle which I had fought in my own modest way together with my friend Oster.
Q Did he do anything to achieve that end at the time? I give you the clue of the step taken by the vice-president of the Reichsbank.
A Yes. First of all he tried to establish close contact with the expert in the ministry of war. He was later chief of the army economic staff, General Thomas. Thomas was a man who right from the beginning was sceptical about the National Socialists, or who in fact opposed them. By a miracle he left the concentration camp alive. Schacht at that time began to fight for Blomberg through Thomas. I did my share in that fight, because Schacht used me through Oster as an intermediary, and partly I was informed about channels through Herbert Goering and partly I learned of thorn from many discussion with Thomas. I can testify here that even at that time it was extraordinarily difficult to establish connections between Schacht and Blomberg, but I was naive enough to tell Schacht repeatedly to simply telephone Blomberg and ask him for an interview.
Schacht replied that Blomberg would certainly evade the issue and that the only possibility that existed was that the conference should previously be prepared through Thomas and Oster. This was done. I know bow much we expected from the repeated discussions Schacht was having with Blomberg.
ferences in great detail at the time, and I took notes and was most pleased when I found that these recollections of mine tallied absolutely with recollections of Thomas about which I have handwritten notes in my possession. him with such qualms on Schacht's part. He was told that Schacht was querulous, and that he, Thomas -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing): Is it necessary to go into all this detail, Dr. Dix?
DR. DIX: Well, I believe, your lordship, that it will be necessary, because this very development of a convinced follower of Hitler to an absolute opponent and reactionary and conspirator against him is of course so complicated a process that I believe that the details of that development should not and could not be saved the Tribunal. I shall certainly be economic in all other matters, but I should be grateful if I would be given permission that this witness will be rather free. He is the only witness I have.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal things that you can give the essence of the matter without giving it in this great detail. You must try, at any rate, to give as little unnecessary detail as possible.
DR. DIX: I am certainly wiling to do that. BY DR. DIX:
Q. Well, then, Dr. Gisevius, you have heard the wish of the Tribunal, and you will no doubt yourself be in a position only to stress the relevant facts. the end of that chapter?
A. No, I should then only give a brief description of the other channels which were used. I shall not do so, however, since the Tribunal does not wish it. But I will say that Schacht was trying to approach the supreme commander of the Army, Baron von Fritzsch, but since he he was difficult to approach, he sent his Reichsbank Vice President, Reise, to establish the contact. Likewise, he made one great attempt to approach Fritzsch and Blomberg through General von Kluge.
Q. And, briefly, what was the goal, what was the aim of that action? What were the Generals supposed to do?
A. It was the aim of the action to make it clear to Blomberg that the course was steering towards the radical, and that matters, as far as economic affairs were concerned, were deteriorating and also that the Gestapo terror must be stopped.
Q. So that at the time there were economic considerations and the consideration of terror, no danger of war.
A. No, only the radicalism.
Q. We now turn to 1937. You know that that was the year of Schacht's dismissal as Minister of Economy in the Reich. Did Schacht talk to you and tell you why he remained in office as Reichsbank President?
A. Yes. I have heard in detail and experienced, the fact about his release as Minister for Economy. On the one side there was an attempt of his to be released from the Ministry, and I think I am right in saying that this didn't happen very smoothly. Schacht told Lammers one day that if he didn't find himself in the possession of the official statement of his dismissal up to a certain date, he would in turn consider himself dismissed and inform the press accordingly. resign. Just like always before, whenever a man in an important office wanted to resign, the question cropped up whether the successor might not steer an even more radical course. Schacht was implored not to leave since the radical would then gain momentum in the economic field, and I only mention the name of Ley as the head of the labor front. hoping that he, as Reichsbank President, as he expressed it, could keep one foot in. He meant by that that he was imagining that he would still be able to have a general picture of the economic situation, and that from the Reichsbank he would be able to introduce certain economic, political measures.
members of the opposition, who implored him to adopt that very attitude and to keep that one foot in.
Q. Was that decision of his not influenced by his attitude and his judgment about some of the Generals, particularly Colonel General Fritzsch?
A. Yes, that is quite right. One of the greatest disasters was the fact that so many people in Germany were imagining that Fritzsch was a strong man. I had experienced it again and again, that high ranking officers, but also high ministerial officials, told me that we could remain quite satisfied; Fritzsch was watching out; Fritzsch was only waiting for the right moment; Fritzsch would one fine day cause a revolt and end the terror. close friend of Fritzsch, so we all lived in the completely wrong atmosphere where we imagined that one day the armed forces would revolt against the SS, instead of which the exact opposite occurred, namely, the bloodless revolt of the SS, which is the fanour Fritzsch crisis, at the end of which not only Fritzsch was relieved of his post but his entire armed forces leadership staff were beheaded, politically speaking, which meant -
Q. (Interposing): Forgive me if I interrupt you, but we shall come to the Fritzsch crisis later. At this moment -- this is of course 1938 -
A. Yes.
Q. At this moment, I should like to talk about Schacht's action in 1937 and exhaust it. It is mentioned in your book -- didn't some unsuccessful attempt and some journey to visit Kluge and a journey to Muenster, didn't that all play a part?
A. Yes, I had thought that I was supposed to be brief about that.
Q. Yes, please be brief.
A. There was a great effort on the part of Schacht to get in touch with Fritzsch. It wasn't possible to have a conversation in Berlin. It couldn't be arranged, and secretive steps were taken. It was arranged for Muenster, since General von Kluge was too scared to meet Schacht publicly at the time. There was a depressing to and fro, and the end result was that the two gentlemen couldn't find each other since it wasn't possible to bring together a minister in the Reich and a commanding general.
Q Where were you at the time? What were you doing? Were you still at Muenster, or was there a change?
Schacht wanted me to return to Berlin. You see, the more and more he found himself disappointed, the more he was inclined to listen to my warnings against an increasing radicalism and a revolt by the SS. that every man amongst the opposition felt that nasty things were being prepared. We, at that time, thought that there would be another bloody 30th of June, and we were trying to protect ourselves. It was Schacht who got in touch with Canaris through Oster, to express the wish that I should be brought to Berlin one way or another. No official department, however, could be found whach at that time would offer me a post, and I had no other choice but to go on leave as a civil servant, stating that I was carrying out economic studies.
Schacht acted with Canaris' and Oster's agreement, and arranged that I should be given such a post in a factory in Bremen, but I wasn't allowed to show myself there, and so I came to Berlin to join exclusively those of my friends who were there, to be at their disposal.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we are now corning to January 1938, the Fritszch crisis. I do not think that it would be useful to interrupt that part of the witness' evidence, and if I may, I would suggest that your Lordship now interrupt the session, or we should have to have at least another half-hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we'll adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 25 April 1946 at 1000 hours).
BY DR. DIX:
Q Yesterday we came to January 1938. At that time you had gone to Berlin, and you had returned to a position which Schacht had constructed for you. You were now in continuous contact with your political friends, Schacht, Oster, Canaris and Nebe. Then, at the end, you testified that at that time, within your circle, you all had the impression that something was going to happen. the decisive, inner-political last step before the war. Will you please describe the entire course and the background of that crisis, especially in consideration of the fact that during the history of that crisis the march into Austria was made, and tell us everything in consideration of the position and the actions of Schacht, which are most important in that connection.
A First, I shall describe the course of the crisis as such; and it is correct that all my friends considered it the decisive last step before the outbreak of the war.
I shall, as briefly as possible, give you the facts. I consider it right, in order not to confuse the picture, that at first I shall leave out the personality of Schacht from the description, because the facts as such are complicated enough. In my description, at first, I will not point out where the information came from, but I shall wait until I am asked for that. report that the then Reich War Minister, Field Marshal von Blomberg, got married. Details about his wife, or pictures, were not given. A few days later the only picture appeared, which was a photo of the Marshal and his wife in front of the monkey cage at the Leipzig Zoo. A number of rumors started in the capital about the past of the Marshal's wife, indicating bad things.
appeared a thick file from which the following could be seen: Marshal von Blomberg's wife had been a prostitute who had been registered in the files of seven large German cities; she was in the Berlin Rogue's Gallery. I myself had seen the fingerprints and the pictures. Finally, she had been punished for distributing pornographic pictures. through channels, to the Chief of Police Himmler.
Q Excuse me, but who was the police President at that time in Berlin? Count Helldorf recognized that the passing on of that material to the Reichsfuehrer SS would put the armed forces in an impossible position, because then Himmler would have that material in his possession, which he could use for the moral finishing-off of Blomberg and for a coup against the leadership of the armed forces. Blomberg, the Chief of the Armed Forces Keitel, who, at that time, was related, through the marriage of both children, to Marshal Blomberg. Marshal, or Colonel-General Keitel at that time, looked carefully through these files and put the demand to Helldorf to cover up the entire scandal and to keep quiet about these files.
Q Excuse me, Dr. Gisevius. Please tell the Tribunal where you know that from. me, and through Oberregierungsrat, and later Reich Criminal Director, Nebe, who was still in Berlin at that time.
the consequences. He also refused to inform the Chief of the General Staff, Beck and the Chief of the Army, General Fritsch. He sent Count Heldorf off with the files to Goering. Heldorf submitted to defendant Goering the entire file. Goering asserted to know nothing about the pictures in the Rogues Gallery and the previous convictions of Blomberg's wife but already in that first conversation and during later conversations he admitted that he had known the following: first, that Marshal Blomberg several months age had already asked Goering whether it was admissible that he have an affair with a commoner. Shortly thereafter Blomberg had asked Goering whether he, Goering, would help him to obtain a dispensation to marry that lady, as he expressed himself, "with a past." his heart unfortunately still had another lover and he had to ask Goering to help him, Blomberg, to get rid of that lover.
Q Excuse me please. Goering told that to Heldorf and you found it out from Heldorf? found it out from other sources too. Goering thereafter sent that lover away by giving him foreign currency and shipping him to South America. In spite of that Goering did not inform Hitler about that prelude. Moreover, together with Hitler, he went as best man to the wedding on the 12th of January, the wedding of Marshal Blomberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal would wish to know how you suggest that these matters which appear to be personal are relevant to the charges and in what way they affect defendant Schacht or the defendant Goering or the defendant Frick?
DR. DIX: I am here only to serve the interests of the defendant Schacht. to conceive what revolutionary consequenceit had and what influence it had on Schacht and his circle with respect to the regime. I have said once before the thing in the career of Schacht that turned him from an admirer of Hitler to an enemy was the Fritsch crisis.
Tribunal could not get the same impression which Schacht had at that time. Indeed, in no way do I desire here to wash dirty laundry. I put these questions only with the purpose of having described the Fritsch crisis in all details and that must be done in understanding the further development of Schacht and the impression of the Fritsch crisis on the circle Canaris. Perhaps if one does not understand the entire atrocious extent of that crisis and thought it may be disagreeable, one has to decide to accept these things, partly personal things, and to take notice of them. It is absolutely necessary and important point of my defense.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please: line of testimony if it is to be considered whether admissible or not now. upon cross-examination upon several aspects. One is it shows the background of the incident of yesterday, which I think is important in appraising the truthfulness of testimony in this case.
The other thing is it bears upon the conspiracy to seize power. There were certain men in Germany that these conspirators had to get rid of. Some of then they could kill safely. Some of them, as we see from the Roehm purge when they went to killing they aroused some opposition, they had to strike down by other means and the means they used against Fritsch and Blomberg show the conspiracy to seize power and to get rid of the men who might stand in the way of aggressive warfare. of the German people in allowing those Nazis to get as far as they did, believi that here at least were two men who would guard their interests and the method by which those men were stricken dorm and removed from the scene we would consider an important part of the conspiracy story and I would ask to go into it on cross-examination. proceed now.
DR. DIX: May I say one more thing, please?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix.
The Tribunal thinks, in view of what you have said and what Mr. Justice Jackson has said, that your examination must continue andyou will no doubt try to confine it as much as you can to the political aspects of the matter.
DR. DIX: Of course, indeed, sir. But the personal matters are here of such political importance that it cannot be quite left out. BY DR. DIX:
Q Dr. Gisevius, you understand the difficulties of the situation. We want here only to bring up the material as far as it is necessary to understand the truth. We do not want anything concessional but where it is necessary to explain the development to the Tribunal and I ask you to speak quite frankly.
A I ask the Tribunal to realize also my difficulties. I myself do not realty like to speak about these things. that was that institution which carried out all the wire-tapping in the Third Reich. That Research Institute was not satisfied as has been described here to only tap telephone conversations and to decode messages but it had its own information service all the way down to their own employees who could make investigations. It was, therefore, quite possible also to get confidential information about Marshal von Blomberg's wife. give these files, to turn thorn over to Hitler. Hitler suffered a nervous breakdown and decided to dismiss Marshal Blomberg immediately. Hitler told the generals later in a public meeting his first thought was to appoint as successor for Blomberg Colonel General Fritsch. The moment he expressed that decision Goering and Himmler reminded him that that was not possible since Fritsch, by a file from the year 1935, was badly incriminated.
Q Excuse me, Doctor. What is your understanding, your impression of that conversation between Hitler and the generals?
A Several generals who took part in that meeting told me about it. I have said already that in the course of events which I will have to describe Hitler had made many personal statements and we also had in our possession original documents of the Reich War Court.
referred to the fact that the Gestapo in 1934 among other enemies of the state had come to the idea to consider also homosexuals as criminals and to prosecute them as such.
The Gestapo had gone into a search for material, from convicted inmates, about homosexuals. In the course of that, one of the inmates gave a terrible story, which was so atrocious that I will not repeat it here. May it suffice that that inmate said the man in question had been a Mr. Fritsch. The inmate could not remember the correct name.
The Gestapo then turned over these files to Hitler in 1935. Hitler was indignant about the contents. He expressed himself to the generals that of such a schweinerei he did not want to know anything. Hitler gave the order that these files should be burned immediately. files, and it was up to Heydrich still to produce these files which allegedly had been burned in 1935 and to submit them to Hitler, supplemented in the meantime by extensive investigation material. which he had had from Blomberg he beleived that he could expect all sorts of bad things from Fritsch also. of the prison from the prison to the Reich Chancellory. Goering threatened that inmate first in Karinhall to have him killed unless he would repeat his statements.
Q How do you know that?
A That was mentioned in the Reich war court. Then Fritsch was asked to come to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler pointed out what accusations had been made against him. Fritsch, a man of honor had received a confidential warning from Hitler's adjutant, but it had been so incomplete that Fritsch became quite shocked in the Reich Chancellery. He did not understand what Hitler intended to do. Indignantly he disputed and denied what allegedly he had done, in the presence of Goering. He gave Hitler his word of honor that all accusations ware false. But Hitler went to the nearest door, opened it, and that prisoner entered, raised his arm, pointed to Fritsch, and said, "That is he."
Fritsch was speechless. He could only demand that a court investigation be made. Hitler demanded his immediate resignation, under the condition that Fritsch should go silently and he would leave the matter be.