Why should he tell me that, why else should he tell me of this calimity announced by Goering, except that Gisevius should know and should think it over before he made his statement?
I had no doubt that that was the purpose of Stahmer's information to me. to make this information known to Gisevius. As I said, if Stahmer had not said hereif I had been asked, I would have said bona fide that he had told me,"Tell it to Gisevius," but no, no, I will not say that he told me. At any rate, there cannot be any doubt that that was the conversation, and I believed I acted according to the intentions of Stahmer in telling it immediately to Gisevius. He was only five steps away from me, or less, and I believe I understood him correctly to have said that he heard parts of our conversation, so I also told him about the content of the conversation between Stahmer and me.
DR. STAHMER: May I still say the fallowing: Of course, I neither asked Dr. Dix to tell it to Gisevius, nor did I count upon it, but I just considered that Gisevius would be questioned this morning and that Dr. Dix would question the witness about the marriage relations of Blomberg. As far as I was informed of it before, Dr. Dix intended to put these questions to the witness. Therefore, I pointed out to Dr. Dix that then, when it came to it, he should abstain from such a question concerning the marriage relations of Blomberg.
That was not intended for the witness and I know with all certainty that I told Dr. Dix that for professional reasons as one colleague to another I gave him that information and he said, "I thank you very much, yes."
At any rate if he had told me, "I shall tell that to the witness", I would have said immediately, "Great God, that is only information which is intended for you personally."
I am very much surprised now that Dr. Dix has abused the confidence which I had in him in this manner.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, we have heard the facts and we do not think we need tear anything more about it beyond considering the question as to whether the witness is to go on with his evidence. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Witness, has the explanation which has been given by Dr. Stahmer and Dr. Dix sufficiently covered the matters with which you were proposing to deal with reference to Field Marshal von Blomberg? Is there anything further you need say about it?
A I beg your pardon. I believe I did not quite understand the question. but on the first occasion when the name Blomberg would be mentioned intended to say that according to these conditions I felt put under pressure such as I have experienced, because I was standing so closely that I had to hear what Dr. Stahmer said and the form, in which Dr. Dix told me about it, and I heard almost half of it and it could-not be understood differently than to mean that Dr. Dix in a very loyal manner informed me as a witness for Schacht with reference to a very important point, to be rather reticent with regard to my statements. Herr von Blomberg. It has to do with the part which the defendant Goering played and I know quite well why Goering does not want me to speak about that affair. It is the worst that Goering has done, according to my judgment, and I Goering is justusing the cloak of chivalry with which apparently he wants to I protect a dead man, but in fact wants to prevent me from testifying to an important point, that is as to the Fritsch crisis.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear the evidence then, whatever evidence you wish the witness to give.
THE WITNESS: I beg your pardon. What I have to say in this connection as to the case Blomberg is finished.
The first time when that name was mentioned I wanted to -
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, counsel mil continue his examination and you will give such evidence as is relevant when you are examined or cross-examined by Dr. Dix onbehalf of the defendant Schacht. BY DR. PANNENBECKER: of the Gestapo so strong that no measures against it could promise any results?
A I have to say no. The state police doubtlessly gained in power after the 30th of June but because of the many perpetrations committed on the 30th of June the opposition also, in the various ministries, against the Secret State Police had become so strong that in the case of a collective action the majority of ministries could have used that event of the 30th of June to eliminate the Secret State Police. I personally had tried to intervene in that direction repeatedly with the knowledge of the defendant Frick. repeatedly to use the large number of illegal murders as a reason for action against the Secret State Police. I also, personally, went to the Chief of the Armed Forces Office, von Reichenau, and told him the same thing. I know that my friend Oster had brought files in that connection to the knowledge of Blomberg and I wish to testify here that in spite of the perpetrations of the 30th of June it would have been possible quite easily, quite well possible, to return to law and order at that time. thereafter in order to get the Secret State Police into legal channels? at least to block the way of Himmler in the direction of the Reich Minister of the Interior. Shortly before Goering had ceded the Ministry of Interior to Frick he had made Himmler Chief of the Secret State Police in Prussia. Himmler had attempted from that station of power to assume the police power in other provinces. Frick had tried to prevent that by expressing the opinion that as Reich Minister of the Interior he also had a voice in appointing police commissars in the Reach. Likewise, we tried to prevent an increase in power of the Secret State Police by systematically denying all requests for increases in the number of officials for the Gestapo.
Unfortunately Himmler found a detour here also, as always. He went to the Finance Ministers of the provinces and told them that for the guard troops, the so-called Death Head Organization, he needed funds and he was determined that for every one innate five SS men were needed as guards. With these means Himmler financed his Secret State Police, since it was quite up to him as to how many men he wanted to activate. with all means possible, to block the way of the Gestapo but unfortunately despite the many requests we sent to the Gestapo, they remained unanswered. Again it was Goering who covered Himmler whenever Himmler refused to answer our inquiries. in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. We tried to paralyze the Secret State Police generally by introducing the right of supervision and complaint concerning prisoners in protective custody. If we would have achieved that we would have had the possibility of looking into the individual actions of the Gestapo. A law was formulated and this law first was submitted to the Ministerial Council of the largest of the provinces, namely Prussia. Again it was defendant Goering who, by all available means, opposed the passing of such a law. At the end of a very excited session of the cabinet as to that subject there remained only the demand that I should be eliminated from the Ministry of the Interior.
THE PRESIDENT: This will be a convenient time to break off.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal wish me to say that it anticipates that you will put any questions which you think necessary with relation to the alleged intimidation of the witness when you come to crossexamine.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, sir; thank you. BY DR. PANNENBECKER: by the Ministry of the Interior to fight against the wilful actions taken by the Gestapo, particularly with reference to the concentration camps, and stop them, I am, therefore, asking you to have a look at a memorandum which originates from, the Reich Prussion Ministry of the Interior, and which is document 775-PS, which has been mentioned this morning in connection with the documents for Frick as Exhibit Frick No. 9. It is number 34 in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: What number did you say it is?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Number 34. It is document number 775-PS; Frick Exhibit No. 9. BY DR. PANNENBECKER:
Q Witness, don't you know that memorandum?
A No, I don't. It appears that this memorandum was made after I had left the Ministry of the Interior, something which I gathered from the fact that the Reich Minister had already given up the fight when the memorandum was written. He writes that it was to be principally clarified as to who would be responsible and, if necessary, the responsibility would now -- and I quote -- "have to be borne in all its consequences by the Reichsfuehrer SS who, in fact had already taken over the leadership of the political police." ticularly to prevent Himmler from taking over the political police; it was this last possibility which we wanted to exclude. This is evidently a memorandum written about six months later, when matters had deteriorated still further.
Q Can you say anything about this? What is the Case Buender and the Case Esterwegen?
wegen. It is one of many. So far as I can recollect, an SA or local leader was arrested by the Gestapo because he had complained about the conditions in the concentration campsat Papenbruck, and this wasn't the first time either.
I don't know just how the defendant Frick came to take up this case particularly, but at any rate one day Daluege showed no one of those customary handwrit ten slips of paper(coning from Frick, stating what he had said to Himmler . here was a man, or same official of that type, who had unjustly been arrested, and that this man would have to be released at once. He said if Himmler did that sort of thing once again, he, Frick, would institute proceedings against Himmler for deprivation of liberty. ring the police conditions which existed at the time. It was peculiar that Himmler should be threatened by Frick with a penality, and Daluege made some cynical remarks regarding Frick's action.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date?
THE WITNESS: This must have happened in the spring of 1935, I should say, perhaps in larch or April. BY DR. PANNENBECKER:
Q Witness, do you know how Himmler reacted to that threat?
A. Yes; there was another case and that is this other matter which is mentioned here. He reacted similarly to both and that is why I first of all, why I first of all mentioned the matter Puender in this case. In connection with Puender, we were concerned with a Solicitor in Berlin, the very respected Solicitor, the legal advisor of the Swedish Embassy. The widow of the Ministerial Director Klausner, approached Puender. She wanted to sue so that . the life insurance companies would Day her her allowance, but since Klausner was supposedly committing suicide on had committed suicide that day, no chief of any insurance company dared to per the money to the widow; consequently, the Solicitor had to sue; but then the Nazis had issued a law according to which all such awkward cases -- awkward for the Nazis -- were not to be heard before any court, and that they were to be taken to a so-called chamber of intervention.
If I am correct in my recollection, then this law was called "the law for the mediation of civil claims;" these governors were never short of names at that time. This law forced the solicitor to submit his claim before the court. He was apprehensive, At that stage, the Minister of the Interior approached the Secretary of State and they said that if I comply with the law and if I sue then I shall be arrested. The Secretary of State and the Minister of the Interior forced him to sue; so the very wise solicitor went to see the Minister of Justice and talked to the Secretary of State Freisler and he told him that he didn't want to sue, since he would most certainly be arrested by the Gestapo. The Secretary of State and the Minister of Justice informed him that he would have to sue, whatever happened, and that nothing would happen, since the court had been instructed to pass the case on without commentary to the chamber of intervention. So, now, the lawyer sued and the Gestapo arrested him forthwith for libel because he had stated that the Ministerial Director Klausner had not lost his life through suicide. This was for us a classical example of where we in Germany were drifting when protective custody was intorduced. I had taken the liberty to take out this case from amongst hundreds, or I should say thousands of similar ones, and to suggest to Frick that this matter should be made the cause of a particular step, particular intervention not only with Goering but in this case even with Hitler.
At that time, I sat down and I wrote a letter or a report from Frick to Hitler, which went to the Ministry of Justice. There were more than five pages and from every possible aspect, I discussed the suicide of Klausner with the assistance of the SS and threw light upon the present suit which was coming up. This report to Hitler found its end when Frick wrote that now the time had come that the problem of protective custody should be examined by the Reich and from the point of view of its legal aspects.
And now I am coming to your question regarding what happened. You see, it was roughly the same time when Frick wrote to Himmler regarding the declaration of freedom. The two letters were taken to a meeting of Kreisleiters. They were the so-called ministers of the movement, and he put the question to them, whether it would be suitable that one Kreisleiter, that is to say, Frick, could write such letters to another Kreisleiter, that is to say, Himmler. The gentlemen present denied that and told him off. Then Himmler joined the meeting of the Prussian cabinet, during which the protective custody law, which I mentioned, was being discussed. a rare thing that Himmler was allowed to join a meeting of Prussian ministers because there was a time in Germany once -- and that lasted quite long -when Himmler was not the powerful man which he became later on because of the cowardice and the retreat of the middle-class ministers and the generals. Thus, it was a rare thing that Himmler could join a meeting of Prussian ministers at all and at the end of that meeting, came my release from, the Ministry of the Interior.
Q. Witness, I should like to quote to you from that memorandum which I have just shown to you; that is, 775-PS, and I shall read to you two sentence I should like you to tell me whether the facts are stated correctly. I quote "In this connection, I draw your attention to the case of the lawyer Puender, who was only taken into protective custody together with his colleague because after inquiries had been made at the Ministry of the Interior and our ministry, he had filed a suit in which he was forced by a law."
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And then the other sentence. I quote: I only quote the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter in Esterwegen, who was kept in protective custody for eight days.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, where is that sentence that you have just read?
DR. PANNENBECKER: In the document book Frick, under No. 34, second sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: Which page?
DR. PANNENBECKER: In my document book it is page 80.
THE INTERPRETER: It is page 70, my Lord, in the book the translator has
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of paragraph 3 on page 70?
DR. PANNENBECKER: No. Mr. President, I have just discovered that that sentence in particular has not been translated from that document. Perhaps I may read one more sentence which has been translated. It can be found under 3 of the same document. "I cite here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter in Esterwegen, who was kept in protective custody for eight days, because he had sent a correct report, as proved afterward, to his district councillor on abuses by the SS".
A. Yes, that corresponds with the facts.
Q Witness, did you personally have any support from Frick for your personal protection?
A Yes. At the time the secret state police suspected me to such an extent that a lot of nasty things werebeing planned against me. Frick gave an order, therefore, that I should be protected in my apartment by the police, of the district, and a direct telephone from my apartment to the police station was established. So that I had only to pick up my receiver if there were sudden visitors; and so that I could inform somebody. Furthermore, the Gestapo used their usual methods against roe by accusing me of having committed criminal acts. Apparently, the files were taken to Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, but Frick intervened and it was soon discovered that this was a namesake of mine. And Frick used an ordinary telephone, saying that the so and so's, as he putit, had once more lied to the Fuehrer. The Gestapo, who were, of course, listening to this telephone call, considered that the signal to no longer use such methods as this.
Then we went one step further. Heydrich was good enough to inform me by telephone that I probably had forgotten that lie would pursue his personal and political opponents to their graves. I made an official report of that threat to Frick and Frick, either personally or through Daluege, intervened with Heydrich, andno doubt, he has rendered me a considerable service in that manner because Heydrich never liked it when his murderous intentions were talked about openly. own personal safety if he tried to fight against the terror of Himmler and the Gestapo? after all, finished up in a concentration camp. But I must, also, say truthfully that we all asked ourselves just how quickly a minister, too, could be moved to a concentration camp. As far as Frick is concerned, as soon as 1934, be talked to me confidentially to tell no that the Reich Governor in Bavaria had given him reliable information, according to which he was going to be murdered on the occasion of a holiday in the country of Bavaria. And he asked me whether I couldn't find out the details. At that time my friend Nebe and I travelled together to Bavaria by car and we made a secret investigation which did, at any rate, prove so much that we knew that such plans had been discussed.
But, as I had said, Frick survived.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I have no further questions.
DR. DIX (Counsel for defendant Schacht): May I ask you to decide the following problem? I had called Gisevius, too. He is a witness called by me and this is, therefore, not a subsequent question which I am putting. I am examining him as my witness. I am of the opinion, therefore, that it would be right and suitable that I ought now follow the examination of my colleague Pannenbecker, and that my other colleagues, who also want, to pub questions, would follow me. Would the Tribunal be good enough to decide?
THE PRESIDENT: Are you the only other defendant's Counsel who asked for this witness to be called on behalf of your client?
DR. DIX: I had called him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but are you the only defendant's counsel who asked to call him?
DR. DIX: I believe I am the only one who has called him, sir, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may examine him next. BY DR. DIX:
Q Dr. Gisevius, lawyer Pannenbecker had already mentioned that you have published a book entitled "To the Bitter End." I have submitted quotations from that book to the Tribunal as evidence, and they have, therefore, been received as documentary evidence and accepted by the Tribunal, I now ask you for that reason: Are the contents of that book historically true and correct and did you write it only in accordance with your memory or isit based on notes you have made? the contents of the book are historically true. In Germany, as far as it was at all possible, I have currently made notes, and I have already said here that my dead friend Oster in the Ministry for war had a considerable collection of documents, to which I had access at any time I wanted. No important matter, in which I quoted friends from my opposition group, have been written down by me without that I had repeatedly talked to then about it. And, since 1938, I have currently paid visits, and later on had on occasion official duties in Switzerland where I could continue my notes. principle in 1941 and was submitted in 1942 to several friends of mine abroad.
THE PRESIDENT: If he says that the book is true, that is enough.
BY DR. DIX:
Q Since when do you know the defendant Schacht?
Q On what occasion and under what circumstances did you meet him? Interior and collected material against the Gestapo. I was being consulted by various parties, who had either had trouble with the Gestapo or were afraid of them. For instance, the former Minister for Economy in the Reich, Schacht, sent a man to me, his Plenipotentiary, Herbert Goering, in whom he trusted, and he asked me whether I would assist Schacht. He, Schacht, and for some time, felt that he was being persecuted by Himmler and the Gestapo and that he had lately had renewed and founded the suspicion that agents, or at least a microphone, had been planted in his own house. affirmative. I looked for an expert on microphones in the personnel administration, and the following morning I visited Schacht's Ministerial apartment. The microphone expert went from room to room with us and we didn't have to look for long. It had been done pretty badly at the time by the Gestapo. They had mounted the michrophone only too visibly and, over and above that, they engaged a domestic servant who should spy on Schacht and who had a listening device attached to the house telephone connected to her own bedroom that was easily attainable. And, consequently, we could uncover the whole thing. It was on that occasion that I first talked to Schacht.
Q And what was the subject of your conversation? Was it political? situation in which we met. Schacht knew that I was strongly opposing and fighting against the Gestapo and I, in turn, knew about Schacht; that be was known because of countless utterances against the SS and the Gestapo. Many citizens and middle-class people in Germany had hopes in him of the only strong minister who might, if possible, protect them and, particularly, the economists who were important at the time were hoping that he would help and they often found his support, and so that nothing was more obvious and that the Reich on the occasion of that first discussion said that I, in turn, should tell him everything that was troubling me.
The main problem at that time was the removal of the Gestapo and the removal of the Nazi regime. As far as that is concerned, our conversation was highly political, and Schacht listened to everything, making it possible to talk as openly as one could always talk to him.
Q And what did he say? that I had doubts whetherat the end of that present course there wouldn't be an inflation and, considering that, whether it wouldn't be better if he, himself, would bring about that inflation himself, since that would enable him to know the time for such a crisis beforehand; so that he could get in touch with the generals and the ministers in the Reich and consult with them regarding that crisis. I told him, "You should bring about that inflation; then you will have the power to act instead of having that taken away from you by others." He replied, "Look here; that's the difference which separates us. Youwant the catastrophe and I don't want it."
A pr 24-A-RT-21-1 believed that the catastrophe could be averted. Did he give you any reasons for those views?
A I think, first of all, the word "catastrophe" is too far reaching a concep tion. Schacht was thinking on the lines of established government relation, which temporarily had been altered by emergency laws and certain dictatorial measures. But as for as I could notice, and on the basis of all other conversations we have had, it seemed to me that he was still entirely adhering to the thoughts of a Reich government which met past revolutions and whore the majority of the ministers was politically central and where, at a time which might be considered sooner or later, a radical change might happen.
Q What was his attitude towards Hitler at that time? in good terms. I would almost like to say that at that time Hitler was an untouchable man for him.
THE PRESIDENT: What time are you speaking of?
THE WITNESS: I am now speaking of the period of our first meeting in 1934 and the beginning of 1935; end of 1934 and beginning of 1935.
Q What were you at that time? What was your occupation? Where did you work? time, but had been transferred to the Reich criminal department, which was in the process of being founded at that time. When we realized that the Gestapo Were extending their power, we needed some sort of police instrument apart from the Gestapo. We thought we could establish it. It would have to be the ordinary criminal police. My friend Nebe had been put in the position of the chief of the Reich criminal department, so that he could create a police instrument from the with which we might, if possible, resist the Gestapo. ment so as to make suggestions regarding its construction.
Q I now slowly approach the year of 1936--the year of the Olympic Games. Di you have a special task?
A Yes. Ai the beginning of 1936 Helldorf believed that I ought to be given the task of heading the police staff for the Olympic Games in Berlin. That was entirely non-political and technical affair. The former police president, Count Helldorf, thaought that because of my connections to the ministry of the interior and ministry of justice this would be suitable.
I assumed that post but Herr Reisen (?) discovered it and intervened.
Q Your book contains a letter from Heydrich, which I don't propose to read in its entirety. It is addressed to Count Helldorf. It explains just how you have always made every possible difficulty for the secret state police when you were active in the Reich and that the relationship had been a extremely unpleasant one. He continues: "I fear that his participation in the police preparations for the Olympic Games, even in the framework, would not be helpful for the cooperation with the secret state police, and it should therefore be considered whether Gisevius should not be replaced by another more suitable official. Heil Hitler. Your Heydrich."
Is that the letter which reached you?
A Yes. That was the reason why I was also dismissed from that job, and I only had to wait a few more weeks and Himmler became the chief of the police in the Reich, and on the very day when he became the police chief I was at once completely released from my police service.
Q And where did you go? government in Muenster, where I was attached to the price control office. continue your political work and could you make the necessary contacts?
A Yes. I had a considerable opportunity to make official journeys. I made thorough studies, not only as far as prices were concerned, but also as far as the political situations in the Rhineland and Westphalia were concerned. I came to Berlin practically every week so as to keep in touch with my friends.
Q Were you in touch with Schacht? were you in touch with them from Muenster in the sense of the work you were doing?
A Yes. One of the reasons why I went to Muenster was that the government president the Freiherr Luening, was a man of the old school--clean, correct, a professional civil servant-and politically a man who was keen on justice and order. He too ended on the gallows after the 20th of July. district of Dusseldorf, secretary of state Schmidt, and almost immediately upon arrival in Muenster I tried everything to got in touch with the commanding general there, the later Field Marshal von Kluge. In this I succeeded. There too I tried at once to continue my old political discussions.
I shall now ask you: At that time when you were working in Muenster, could you discover a change in Schacht's views regarding the regime, and in particular regarding Hitler--these views which you have mentioned as existing in 1934?
A Yes. It was a steady process which took Schacht farthe and farther away from the Nazis. If I am to show you the phases, then I would say at the beginning--that is to say, in 1935--he was of the opinion that only the Gestapo was evil and that Hitler was the man who was a statesman, or could at least became one, ant that Goering was the conservative strong man whose services one ought to use and could use to fight against the terror of the Gestapo and establish orderly conditions. views about the Defendant Goering. I warned him. I told him that in my opinion Goering was the worst, particularly because ho was hiding under the middle class and conservative cloak. I implored him not to make his economic policy with Goering, since this would take a bad end. ho is a good psychologist--denied this emphatically, and only when in the course of the years, in 1936, he had to See more and more that Goering was not supporting him against the Party, but that Goering was supporting the radical elements against him, only at that moment was there an increasing change in Schacht, which meant that from now on he would not only regard Himmler but Goering too, as a great danger, whereas Hitler was still the one man for him with when one could make a policy, if the majority of the cabinet would succeed in gaining him for the side of right and order. Schacht was handing over foreign currency matters to Goering?
A Yes. That was the moment when I earned him, and if I say that he became apprehensive about Goering, that he realized that Goering was not supporting him against the radical elements, then that is the case you are talking about. affairs to Goering, but if he was slowly gaining this now conviction, did he, even as early as that, have any positive thoughts regarding the bringing about of a change?
A Yes. He was entirely living in the same train of thoughts as so many people did, probably the majority of people in Germany, namely, that everything depended on a strengthening. of the middle class influence, and that it would be one of the prerequisites that the ministry for war, headed by von Blomberg, should be brought over to the side of the middle class ministers. So that if you want to put it like that, Schacht had the very constructive idea that one would have to concentrate on the fight for Blomberg. It was that very point in which I agreed with him--the same battle which I had fought in my own modest way together with my friend Oster.
Q Did he do anything to achieve that end at the time? I give you the clue of the step taken by the vice-president of the Reichsbank.
A Yes. First of all he tried to establish close contact with the expert in the ministry of war. He was later chief of the army economic staff, General Thomas. Thomas was a man who right from the beginning was sceptical about the National Socialists, or who in fact opposed them. By a miracle he left the concentration camp alive. Schacht at that time began to fight for Blomberg through Thomas. I did my share in that fight, because Schacht used me through Oster as an intermediary, and partly I was informed about channels through Herbert Goering and partly I learned of thorn from many discussion with Thomas. I can testify here that even at that time it was extraordinarily difficult to establish connections between Schacht and Blomberg, but I was naive enough to tell Schacht repeatedly to simply telephone Blomberg and ask him for an interview.
Schacht replied that Blomberg would certainly evade the issue and that the only possibility that existed was that the conference should previously be prepared through Thomas and Oster. This was done. I know bow much we expected from the repeated discussions Schacht was having with Blomberg.
ferences in great detail at the time, and I took notes and was most pleased when I found that these recollections of mine tallied absolutely with recollections of Thomas about which I have handwritten notes in my possession. him with such qualms on Schacht's part. He was told that Schacht was querulous, and that he, Thomas -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing): Is it necessary to go into all this detail, Dr. Dix?
DR. DIX: Well, I believe, your lordship, that it will be necessary, because this very development of a convinced follower of Hitler to an absolute opponent and reactionary and conspirator against him is of course so complicated a process that I believe that the details of that development should not and could not be saved the Tribunal. I shall certainly be economic in all other matters, but I should be grateful if I would be given permission that this witness will be rather free. He is the only witness I have.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal things that you can give the essence of the matter without giving it in this great detail. You must try, at any rate, to give as little unnecessary detail as possible.
DR. DIX: I am certainly wiling to do that. BY DR. DIX:
Q. Well, then, Dr. Gisevius, you have heard the wish of the Tribunal, and you will no doubt yourself be in a position only to stress the relevant facts. the end of that chapter?
A. No, I should then only give a brief description of the other channels which were used. I shall not do so, however, since the Tribunal does not wish it. But I will say that Schacht was trying to approach the supreme commander of the Army, Baron von Fritzsch, but since he he was difficult to approach, he sent his Reichsbank Vice President, Reise, to establish the contact. Likewise, he made one great attempt to approach Fritzsch and Blomberg through General von Kluge.