DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the main point in the indictment is Point I,
THE PRESIDENT: The main point in the indictment is not whether powers of his government.
There was no such point made in the BY DR. SEIDL: defendant Dr. Frank.
Since when do you know Dr. Frank and what were his activities up to the outbreak of the war?
A I met Frank during the year 1932. If I understand you rightly, you want to know his activities from the outbreak of the war? Party. Then, for the Party point of view, he became Chief of the National Socialist Union of Lawyers, which, later on, he came the Union of Legalism. Then he became a member of the Government, and upon seizure of power in 1933 he became Minister of Justice in Bavaria. At the same time he became Commissar for Legal Reforms.
Later on--and I can't tell you the exact year--he became Minister Without Portfolio, and he was the President of the Academy of Law. He finally became Governor General.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had the defendant Frank's posts proved to us already.
I should think, probably more than once. We don't require them from Dr. Lammers.
DR. SEIDL: In that case, I want to put another question to the BY DR. SEIDL:
Q Witness, what was the relationship between Frank and Hitler? to say, good, but not particularly close. At any rate, during the whole time he did not belong to those who could to called the closest consultants of the Fuehrer.
Q What was Frank's attitude towards the police state and the question of concentration camps?
for or talking in favor of a legal state, though probably not very strongly. He confined his views to being opposed to internment in concentration camps, since such detention was without a legal basis. These speeches made by Frank were frequently the cause of a severe blame from Hitler, so that in the end the Fuehrer instructed me to order him to remain silent, even in the publishing of these speeches. Finally, the result of these activities of Frank's, when he was working for the legal state, wasthat he was removed from his office as the Reich chief of the legal section of the NSDAP--the Party.
Q Wasn't he made to resign as president of the academy of law?
A Yes, that happened at the same time; and, at the same time, the union of lawyers.
Q Another questions: Did Frank as Governor General have considerable powers, or was it not ratherthe case that his position was very unstable? You can certainly say that in many ways his powers had been damaged.
A There are a number of arguments: One was caused by the armed forces. That didn't affect him so much, because commissars in occupied territories were never army chiefs. But then Reichsmarshal Goering, as plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, had considerable powers to issue orders to both the Party and the state in all occupied territories, therefore including the Government General, so that he therefore could give orders to the Governor General, and he could in fact work against the orders of the Governor General and cancel them.
Certainly, Frank's powers as Governor General were considerably limited through the police, since Himmler as chief of the German police had legal powers as police chief which he was to coordinate, nevertheless, with the Governor General, which wasn't always done. power through the fact that Himmler became Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of German national qualities, and as such had to reorganize resettlement, and in fact did do so without asking the Governor General first.
These were further limitations in favor of Minister Speer in favor of rearmament, and there were further limitations on behalf of the postal services, railroad services, and so on; but these are the chief infringements or losses of power in the case Frank.
Q What, according to your observations, was Frank's principal attitude towards the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, and what was the policy he tried to achieve? to create an atmosphere in favor of Germany inside Poland, but he didn't alwaysachieve that, and particularly were his failures due to the fact that the powers of the police and Himmler's powers were so predominant in the sphere ofresettlement that his measures and his intentions were disturbed and suffered setbacks. He found it difficult to assert himself. true that he opposed Himmler's policy as commissioner for the saving of German national characteristics and that he opposed them wherever possible?
A I wouldn't have thought that Frank would be silly enough to have Germanizing intentions or intend to make the Poles into Germans, but maybe he tried to win the people of German origin in Poland for the German case. But he had difficulties regarding this resettlement scheme, since he hadn't been asked previously, and since by means of resettlement people had been pushed into the Government General. In that respect he and I agreed perfectly. I have repeatedly told the Fuehrer about this and reported to him that these mass resettlements couldn't be done all at once and without the agreement of the Governor General and that he couldn't govern if these resettlement measures weren't communicated to him first -- if he had no influence upon these measures. and the SD in the Government General were under the immediate jurisdiction of Himmler and the chief of the German police. Did Governor General Frank not try to work against the policy of force of these two men? Did he not try to object and to rectify the matter?
A On this point he has raised repeated complaints addressed to me.
They had the aim that I should take them to the Fuehrer, which, however, I only succeeded in doing in part. In one point, however, we did want to help. In the Government General there was established a secretariat of state for the security system. This was under the Higher SS police leader Krueger. This, however, only functioned for, four to six weeks and then the differences of opinion borke out once more. The secretary of state Krueger stated, "I am receiving my orders from Himmler." If the Governor General would complain, then Himmler would say, "These are all unimportant matters. I have to be able to rule on them directly."
And the Governor General said, "But to me they aren't unimportant. To me these things are important indeed." General were not being observed, and it is therefore perfectly obvious that he had a very difficult position because of this police system. bally and in writing, stated what he objected to, and what were the reasons?
flicts which he had, in particular with Himmler, and because in the case of these conflicts he was never told that he was right. Himmler usually was the winner with the Fuehrer, and there were repeated offers to resign which were brough to me and which I wasn't even allowed to submit to the Fue Fuehrer. But, of course, I informed the Fuehrer of the intentions to resign from the Government G eneral. The Fuehrer repeatedly, several times, refused Frank's offer to resign. wards having Frank removed? of Frank's. There is cause for me to gather from certain statements made by Himmler with regard to Frank that Himmler would have liked it a great deal if Frank had been removed from his position; and pulling the same string was Reichsleiter Bormann, who wasn't very well disposed towards the personality of Frank either. centration camps and who was responsible for their installments? the administration and organization were departments under Himmler's control. There was the economy department, I believe, attached to the SS, which was responsible for administration; but concentration camps as such were under Himmler's jurisdiction. called Jewish policy in the Gov ernment G eneral? ception was handled by Himmler, who was directing it, but of course, the G overnor G eneral was also in touch with measures directed against Jews-for instance, combatting of spotted fever, and, I think, the in branding-that is to say, police measures which were applied by the police in the Government G eneral. But the principal policy in Jewish questions, as I learned afterwards, of course was entirely handled by Himmler alone, who had been given these powers by the Fuehrer.
Q Is it true that the Governor General, as early as 1940, con-
tinuously raised complaints regarding the activities of the army police and the police leaders?
A I can confirm that. I can confirm that that has happened several times. In particular were these complaints directed against the fact that the SS and police courts were assuming powers in the Government G eneral which they didn't actually have. Consequently, the activities of these courts were withdrawn from the appropriate sources. There were, for instance, shootings of hostages, and he has repeatedly complained about that. I want to state that all complaints which came to me weren't, of course, complaints against me; they were merely said to me so that I would pass them on to the Fuehrer.
about the exploitation of the Government General by the Reich, particularly regarding grain and sugar supplies? him were increased. He has, I must say, mostly fulfilled them, which must have been extremely difficult for him. art treasures by Himmler's organization?
A That, I have only a very faint recollection of. It is possible that he has complained about the removal of art treasures but I can't remember any details in that connection.
Q And now the last question. Is it true that the Governor General in many documents, as early as 1940, made proposals regarding the improvement of living conditions of the population to the Fuehrer and not until much later did the Fuehrer consider the policy which had been advocated by Frank as correct?
A Frank has often objected to a policy of exploitation. He wanted a constructive policy; that is to say, even a cultural policy of reconstruction. He had suggested, for instance, that the departments attached to the administration should have advisory Polish committees but that had been refused. He had spoken in favor of the creation of schools and high schools and various other such cultural aims, all of which had been refused.
On one occasion he had submitted a long memorandum. This referred to a Polish organization which called itself,"the Plough and Sword," which had offered to cooperate with the Germans, and Frank submitted detailed proposals in a large memorandum, saying that these Poles could be won over to cooperate with them when met on proper terms. All these suggestions, coming from Frank, were turned down by Hitler. It isn't right what you are saying, that it wasn't until the last moment that the Fuehrer agreed to these suggestions. All I can say is that they were all turned down without exception.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
DR. THOMA: Dr. Thoma, counsel for Rosenberg.
BY DR. THOMA: Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Would you please tell the Tribunal very briefly, by means of which decree that his authority was limited? before. The same limitations which applied to the Governor General also apply to him, these limitations which I have just quoted, but I have to add one thing to that. The position of Minister Rosenberg was made particularly difficult through the fact that the differences of opinion which existed between him and the Minister Goebbels on the subject of propaganda, were making things particularly difficult for him.
It had been the Fuehrer's order that Rosenberg was to make the Eastern Policy and Goebbels was to make propaganda, but these two things couldn't always be coordinated. There were considerable differeces of opinion between Rosenberg and Goebbels which could only be settled after lengthy negotiations but which in their result produced nothing more than a very small result, because the differences of opinion whichhad only just been settled, occurred again during the subsequent weeks and there was a further limitation which is different from the case of the Government General and which was that Rosenberg had two commissars for the Occupied Eastern Territories; one was Kommissar Lohse and the other one, I am coming to that later. been a leader conference--I mean, the day before July 16, during which right from the beginning, Rosenberg complained, that his ministry had no police powers but that the entire police authority was to be transferred to Himmler? in Shimmer. He did object but without success. Police matters in other occupied territories had already been so arranged as in this case. The Fuehrer would hot depart from his views.
there is a passage where it says that the higher SS and police leaderwould be subordinate directly under the Reich Commissar. Did this mean that the police leader or rather that the Reich Commissar even in matters of police topics could give instructions?
A No, No; the final word had been retained with Himmler but the higher police leader had instructions to get in touch with the Reich Commissioner and, of course, to consider the political decisions, not so much the others. concepts which Rosenberg had from the beginning until the end with reference to the treatment of the Eastern populations? policy. No doubt, he was opposed to a policy of extermination and to a policy of deportation, which had frequently been preached, and he was anxious to put the agriculture into order through corresponding degrees, to put the school system in order, to look after the churches, the universities and the schools but he found it difficult to succeed since one of the two Reich Commissioners, namely Koch, in the Ukraine, opposed Rosenberg's measures, but I should even like to say he merely disregarded Rosenberg's orders. scale conceptions; has he ever talked to you about that, that he was imagining a situation where the Eastern peoples were to be given autonomy? the right of self-determination, that this should be extended to the Occupied Eastern Territories? respectively but at any rate, he was in favor of establishing a certain independence.
Q Do you mean "autonomy"? And was he interested, therefore, in looking after these peoples of the East in the cultural way?
A Yes. He was particularly interested in that. I know that because he took an interest in the schooling system, the church and the universities. Commissioner Koch?
A That and many other things, yes. He, Koch, was an opponent of the new agricultural arrangement that had been considered particularly favorable by Rosenberg and in the furtherance of his aims, and it has been sabotaged by Koch.
Q Can you quote any other spheres.where Koch made difficulties for the Minister f or the East?
A I can't at the moment recollect any. given the order, in collaboration with Bormann, to conduct negotiations between the two, and can you remember that Rosenberg refused and demanded that the matter should be brought before the Fuehrer? numerous. They filled volumes and volumes of files. The Fuehrer had given the order that Bormann and I should investigate these matters. Many weeks passed but after the investigation had been completed, there was never a decision from the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer always postponed the making of a decision, and on one occasion--perhaps that was the case which you, Doctor, are thinking of-- and on one occasion the differences were particularly keen and the Fuehrer sent for Rosenberg and Koch but instead of deciding upon these differences of opinion and instead of a pertinent decision, came to the decision that these two gentlemen should meet once every month and cooperate. That was a matter of course which to Rosenberg, as far as the Minister was concerned, was insufferable, that he should collaborate with the commissioner who was under his jurisdiction, who was the junior, and apart from that, it was practically impossible to carry out in practice, and these two gentlemen only met no more than once or twice and when they did meet, then no agreement was reached. And lastly, the Fuehrer considered Koch right.
Q How did that express itself? How did the fact that the Fuehrer thought Koch was right, find its expression? which, in my opinion, were justified and did not make a decision, just meant considering the fact that Koch was given the right. the order to confine himself to the administrative matters in the East? Is that right?
A Roughly, I think that was the Fuehrer's decree on that occasion, on the occasion when he also told the two to cooperate.
Q How was Rosenberg's relationship to the Fuehrer, and when was Rosenberg's last visit to the Fuehrer? end of 1943, and before that, he had considerable difficulties to get to see the Fuehrer. He didn't see him very often.
Q Didn't this tension have the result that Rosenberg at the end of 1940 or in the autumn of 1940, offered his resignation?
A It wasn't actually an application to resign, since the Fuehrer had prohibited such applications, but he did say that if he couldn't conduct the business properly and to the Fuehrer's satisfaction, then he would like to be relieved. The result really was an application to resign, yes.
Q Can you tell the Tribunal anything about Rosenberg's relation to the population and his influence on the population in the Eastern territory. Is it correct particularly to say that a number of leaders of the churches in the Occupied Eastern Territories thanked Rosenberg because of his tolerant attitude and because he allowed them to carry out their religious culture freely?. and merely superficially. I think he merely told me something like that, yes
Q I have yet one more question. It has repeatedly appeared during this trial that Hitler's military entourage considered him a military genius. What was the situation in the administrative sphere? Hitler was the supreme legislature at the end. He was the supreme chief of the government and the head of the State.
Did his administrative entourage encourage him in the thought that all his decisions were correct, were right, and that he was doing something superb, or who did strenghthen his views? quickly and his judgment was almost always right. He was in a position to decide upon about the principles which he desired for legislation and administration. He often used that and one of the executive officers, the administrator in question--sometimes it was my task--had the task to carry out what the Fuehrer decided on the strength of his tendencies and his basic thoughts, and we had to formulate it appropriately. If any objections did arise in such connection, then it was perfectly possible to bring such objections to the Fuehrer, unless, of course, they infringed on the principle: in other words, on any increase or decrease in such measures or any new version it was perfectly feasible to bring it to him, but not if any of his basic tendencies were affected. That, of course, was very difficult. make the pertinent decisions or did he in any way find that certain aims he had in mind were interfering?
A Nothing much has come to my notice. Normally, during the recent years, I only made a report every six or eight weeks; in other words, I saw Hitler two or three times per annum or ten times at the most and, of course, on problems we could not discuss. Generally speaking, the Fuehrer left it to his administrators regarding the administration.
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard it over and over again about Hitler.
BY DR. THOMA:
Q I have one more question. Did you know anything regarding the fact that Hitler had decided to achieve a final solution regarding the Jewish question, that is the destruction of Jews?
A Yes, much is known to me about that. The final solution of the Jewish question became known to me for the first time in 1942, that is when I had heard that the Fuehrer supposedly, through Goering, had given the order to the Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS, Heydrich, to achieve a final solution of the Jewish question. The exact contents of that order did not reach me and consequently, since th s did net come into my sphere of activity, I first of all refused to concern myself with it but when I wanted to know some details later on I did, of course, contact Himmler. I had to contact him to start with and I asked him what the final solution of the Jewish question meant. Himmler replied that he bad received the order from the Fuehrer to bring about the final solution of the Jewish problem or respectively Heydrich and his successor, had that order and that it was the main point of the order that then Jews were to be evacuated from Germany. With that statement I felt satisfied and I adopted the attitude of waiting, since this did not fall into my sphere of activ ity and I first of all wanted to hear something more from either Heydrich or his successor, Kaltenbrunner. matter and in 1942 I announced my intentions to call on the Fuehrer, whereupon the Fuehrer told me that yes, it was true. He had given Himmler the order to evacuate but that he did not want any further statements on the Jewish question during the war. Shortly afterwards, and this is the beginning of 1943, the R.H.S.A. sent out inventions to attend a meeting which had an item on the agenda, "Final Solution of the Jewish Questions." I had previously sent out an order to my officials that I was not defining my attitude in this connection since I wanted to present it to the Fuehrer and I had ordered if invitations for a meeting went out then one of my officials would have to go there more or less as a listener.
A meeting did actually take place but no result was reached. A protocol was supposed to be sent out and the various departments were supposed to reply to it.
When I received these minutes I found that it contained nothing vital and for a second time I forbid my staff from defining their attitude and I myself refused to and I remember very well indeed that a letter which I had received had first of all been signed by a very small man indeed and who in my mind had no right to sign and he had written me and asked my why I had not commented. Secondly, the tone of the inquiry was very unkind, saying that everybody had commented upon it except me. I ordered that the reply should be that I had refused to define my views or attitude since I washed to first of all take the matter before the Fuehrer.
In the meantime I once more addressed myself to Herr Himmler. I told him that it was necessary to discuss these questions since a number of problems would have to be solved, particularly since the intention to achieve a final solution of the Jewish question would probably extend to persons of mixed blood, first grade, and would also extend to the so-called privileged marriages, that is to say marriages where only one party was Aryan whereas the other part was Jewish. The Fuehrer stated once more that he did not wish to have a report on it but that he had no objections against consulting upon the problems. That actual evacuations had taken place had become known to me. At that time, however, no mention had been made of principal evacuations. I only knew that there were individual cases and I always addressed myself to Himmler and these individual cases were always treated favorably by Himmler, these cases which had reached me by means of complaints. killed. I had no jurisdiction over this sphere except that occasionally I would receive complaints. On the basis of these complaints I investigated the rumours but as far as I am concerned all I could find out was that there were rumours. One said he had heard it from the other and nobody wanted to make a definite statement and I am in fact of the opinion that these rumours were due to listening in on foreign broadcast stations and these people just did not want to say where they had gotten the information from.
That caused me once more to write an attack on this matter. First of all, since I myself could not investigate matters which came under Himmler's jurisdiction, I addressed myself to Himmler once again. Himmler denied any killings and told me with reference to the order from the Fuehrer that he had the duty to evacuate the Jews and during such evacuations there cases of death of old people which did occur, there were accidents, there were attacks by enemy aircraft.
In fact, he added that there were revolts, which, of course, would have to be suppressed with a great loss of blood so as to deter these people. Apart from that these people would be accommodated in camps in the East and he brought out a lot of pictures in albums and he showed me the work that was being done in these camps by the Jews and how they worked for the requirements of war, that there were tailor shops. He told me:
"This is the order of the Fuehrer and if you believe that you should attack that position then you had better tell the Fuehrer or you had better tell, me the people who have made these reports to you." named, and secondly, they only knew these things by heresay so that in fact I could not have given him any material at all. that occasion he gave me practically the same reply which I had been given by Himmler and he said:
"I shall later on decide where these Jews will be taken and in the meantime they are accommodated there." upon me that Himmler had told the Fuehrer--Lammers is about to come and see you and he will probably raise the point with you. and I was determined to bring it up once again with the Fuehrer. I only succeeded in doing so on the occasion of some particularly severe cases, cases which were such that the Fuehrer had to let me talk to him about it. I must quote as an example a most outstanding case. If a Jew was married to a German then the marriage was considered privileged, that is to say, he was not evacuated. But if the wife died, then the marriage would no longer be considered privileged.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I should rather like to ask the witness myself to be as brief as possible but I would ask you to admit one question. In my opinion the witness is trying to describe how the entire solution of the Jews came about and that it was done with the deception of the entire entourage of Hitler and that is why I ask that the witness be allowed to talk since these are decisive questions regarding the entire organization.
BY DR. THOMA: you. Did Hitler tell you at any time that the final solution of the Jewish problems should be exterminating them?
A That was never mentioned. No, we only talked about evacuations.
Q He only talked about evacuations, did he? I see. that Jews, these five million Jews were being exterminated? only very few persons knew of it? anybody and he formed his commandos in such a way that nobody know about it. Of course, there must have been a number of people who must have known about it.
Q What number of people must have known about it? about it, apart from those who carried out these exterminations? Who, apart from those, must have known about it? people and certain leading officials must have known.
Q And apart from that? orders down to other leading officials and it went down to the commandos and the whole lot of them must havekept it completely secret.
DR. THOMA: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: We wall adjourn now.
(A recess was taken.)
BY DR. PANNENBECKER (Counsel for defendant Frick):
are of importance for the defense of defendant Frick, since he has been a member of the Reich Cabinet. Can you tell me on the strength of what position you are particularly suited to give such answers? I repeat, how is it that you on the strength of your position, can answer these questions?
A You mean my own? the intermediary between the Fuehrer and the Reich Minister, with two exceptions: Either, if the Fuehrer decided to go a direct way to these gentlemen, or if these men in question chose another way to the Fuehrer, not through me. There were a numberof things which didn't go through my hands, whenever these ministers submitted them to the Fuehrer directly. These were all matters referring to a large scale foreign policy, particularly. Only in 1937, on the occasion of certain alterations of the cabinet, did I receive the title "Reich Minister", but my tasks did not change. In particular, I had no fear of influence nor jurisdiction. took place? but, on the other hand, in 1938, at the beginning of February, there was one more so-called "information conference" between ministers, during which the Fuehrer announced the alterations which were being made in the Government, which were referring to von Blomberg and von Neurath. The last cabinet meeting, however, when actual consultations took place and when a penal code was being drafted, took place in November 1997. to get the ministers together? tration of the Reich Cabinet. I would like to say, I wanted reactivation. This was continously refused by the Fuehrer. I had even prepared a draft, a draft for a decree, according to which ministers would at least have the possibility to consult with each other, say once or twice a month, and under the chairmanship of Reichsmarshal Goering, or, if he were prevented from attending, under my formal chairmanship.
All I was aiming at was a meeting of ministers for information and reporting, but that, too, was turned down by the Fuehrer. Nevertheless, the ministers had the urgent wish to meet. So, I made a further suggestion, namely that once or twice a month the ministers should have a social evening, drinking beer, so that they could get together and talk. To that the Fuehrer replied, "Mr. Lammers, this isn't your business; it'smy business. The next time I go to Berlin, I'll do so." And again this didn't take place.
THE PRESIDENT: What are all these details about beer drinking? If they did not meet and he applied to the Fuehrer, asking them to meet and they never did, that is sufficient. What is the good of going into detail? BY DR. PANNENBECKER: had to work on their own, but that a Reich Cabinet as such, which decided upon political questions and was informed and discussed them, did not exist at all? supreme administrative chiefs in their sphere. They no longer acted in the cabinet as political ministers. I have been trying to describe that earlier on no further meetings took place. In fact, they were even forbidden. So, how could it have been possible that they could exchange views? he considered the cabinet as a defeatist club? bring about certain meetings, the Fuehrer told me that this would have to be stopped since an atmosphere could be created which he wouldn't like very much. He didn't use the word "defeatist club" before me, but Reichsleiter Bormann told me that he had said, "Ministers shouldn't meet since this could become a defeatist club."
Minister on his own couldn't resign. Do you know whether Frick made an attempt to resign?
wish to be relieved of his office if he no longer enjoyed the Fuehrer's full confidence and if the Fuehrer wouldn't receive him any more. He was told me that frequently; but an application to resign in writing I cannot recollect: Frick's wishes regarding his resignation were, of course, passed on to the Fuehrer by me in every case, although such transmissions were always severely turned down by the Fuehrer. the Interior. Do you know any details about what he said in that connection, personally?
AAt that time he himself told me, "I am glad to leave my position as Minister for the Interior, but, please, see to it that the Fuehrer does not make me Reich Protector of Bohemia or Moravia, as he is intending to do. I don't want that job. I want to retire." And I told that to the Fuehrer.
So, the Fuehrer ordered Frick to come to his headquarters. Before Frick went to see the Fuehrer alone, he told me that he did not under any circumstances want to accept the position of Reich protector, but, when he left the Fuehrer, he had, nevertheless, changed his mind and he had accepted the job. If I am right, this must have been in August, 1943. tion. Do you know anything abut that office? tiary for the Administration, the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Churches, and Department for Reallocation of Space, He coordinated them under his command and represented them in the Administerial Counsel for Reich Defense, which came into being in 1939 with the outbreak of war. Plenipotentiary for Administration?
A The Plenipotentiary for Reich Defense Laws I cannot recollect.
The draft of that law, which was not published, the Reich Defense Law of 1938, allocates to the Plenipotentiary for administration, a number of tasks which he did, in fact, never take over. He has only taken ever the task of coordinating these various departments, which I have just mentioned. Actual powers as general Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration were never exercise to that degree, which had been allocated to him in that Reich Defense Law.