THE PRESIDENT: Are there any of the other Defendants' Counsel who wish to ask questions of this witness? BY DR. SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank): his political aims and the program of the new Government? took his words. One of the details I remember at this meeting is that the Fuehrer talked first of all about the stopping of unemployment, something which would have to be achieved. Secondly, he spoke about the fact that an economic recovery of Germany would have to be arranged. And thirdly, he talked in detail about what he thought would be achieved if a revision of the Versailles Treaty were to be accomplished, and that it would be necessary to put an end to the defamation which was contained against Germany in the Versailles Treaty, and that it would be necessary for Germany to bring her on an equal footing with the ether nations. Government declaration. I also recollect that in that declaration there was mentioned the protection of Christendom. I can't remember any more details. But that, I an convinced, are the main points which we were concerned with. to keep the matters secret. And what was discussed was in the main contained in the Government declaration which was published in the press. alter the system of government and that he was going to establish a dictatorship? a failure -
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q You arc speaking about a meeting. What was the date of the meeting you are referring to?
DR. SEIDL: That is the first Cabinet meeting -about. I think the first Cabinet meeting was on the 30th of January, 1933. That is the day of the seizure of power. been a failure. Furthermore, he said that the result of that failure had been that the President of the Reich had been obliged to declare a state of emergency, according to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution and that he had created an emergency Government, and that it would now be necessary to create a stable Reich Government, a Government which would be in power for many years, and that how one could create such a Government would be something which he would have to discuss with the President and the Reichstag, the German Parliament. arranging for a preferential position of power for the N.S.D.A.P.?
A He said that the N.S.D.A.P., the Nazi Party, was of course the strongest party and would as such have to be given due influence in the German Government. But he said nothing regarding the other parties that still existed and were represented, such as the German Nationalist, such as that he would remove them or want he was going to do. Hitler did not say that. and did he say in particular that Germany would finally have to be freed of the shackles of the Versailles Treaty and would have to have an equal footing in the community of peoples?
A Yes. I answered that question in the affirmative before. Those were the foreign political aims -- complete revision of the Versailles Treaty. foreign political aims one would consider another war as a possibility, if necessary -- a preventive war?
A As far as I know and as far as I remember, a war was not men-
tioned. At any rate, not a preventative war or an aggressive war. during any other meeting, when all ministers or members were present state his plan for the achievement of his foreign political aims?
AA general, main, plan, no. Nothering over and above the general points I have mentioned. Neither during that meeting nor during any other meeting did he develop his plans, just as in my opinion he never did discuss in detail his general plans, his long-term plans. Party and to make him a minister? of the Reich, could no longer take care of the business of the Party, in other words, for the technical command of the Party, he had to have another man, and he appointed him a minister because he wanted a man in the cabinet who was in a position to communicate the wishes and conceptions of the Party to the cabinet. Maybe he was visualizing in that connection something which became a law later on, a unity between the Party and the State. what was their attitude towards the leaders of the Party? generals did not exist as such. That could only have been in certain individual cases between certain members of the Party and some -- very few-generals. when the Fuehrer --that was, I think at the beginning of February 1933 -met the supreme commanders of the armed forces and had them introduced to him, and I had the impression that the Fuehrer had met only a few of these men previously. They were all introduced to him, and I stood by his side. It was my Impression that he knew some -- very few -- of these men and had met them previously. the leaders of the Party and the generals became closer, since the Party was included into the State to a considerable extent, but what I would like to say is that relations, general relations between the Party--that is to say, theReich leaders of the Party and the political leaders of the staff of the Party on one side, and the leading generals on the other, and even the generals of a slightly junior rank were at no time going beyond the purely formal or so-called social relations.
I would almost like to say that they were duty social contacts when one met at celebrations or demonstrations and very occasionally. I feel that the overall relations between the leadership staff of the Party on one side and the generals on the other did at no tine become any closer than that. change after Hitler became the leader, the head of the State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces? nothing in principle changed, since the generals regarded the Fuehrer as not being the leader of the Party but as the head of the state, and they considered him as the supreme commander of all the armed forces. Consequently, they did not believe that any particularly close relations to the generals ought to be established. between the Reich government, the Reich leaders of the Party, and the high generals?
A Such joint meetings are out of the question. They never took place. That would have been impossible because of the large number of people involved. staff of the government and the leading generals in a position, as far as important questions referring to the nation were concerned, and particularly referring to war or peace, to define their attitude when they talked to Hitler?
they could not voice their opinions. They were not interrelated. Every individual one of these leader staff of the Party, the government and the generals, could, as such, not define their views either, particularly since they knew little about the Fuehrer's political and economic aim.
They knew nothing about them, so how could they define their attitude?
They knew because they were executing these matters and because they saw the facts, but they were surprised by them quite frequently, and any lter reaction would have meant a stab in the back against the Fuehrer's policy.
So that a political main plan of Hitler's in which these chief groups were included, did not exist at all, and, therefore, on could not talk about a conspiracy?
and that is the loading majority of ministers knew nothing of any such general plan. They never had any knowledge of it. Just how far the Fuehrer informed individual persons of such a general plan, I do not know. I was not present, but probably--or possibly--the Fuehrer may have told one or the other person, perhaps the Party or the government or the generals, perhaps he did tell them of some plans, but just what they said, what was mentioned, that of course I do not know, and whether they agreed with the Fuehrer in such case or whether they disagreed, that I cannot say either, just as I do not know whether shortly before the execution of any large scale political plans, such as for instance the march into Czechoslovakia or any such matter, whether shortly previously they did consult with the Fuehrer and advise him, whether they agreed, whether they contradicted him, or whether they merely took their orders from him which they had to execute. decisions of any magnitude were taken by Hitler alone? him alone, possibly after consultation and participation of a few persons, but never with the participation of the Reich government, because, if I should mention it then I should say that when we left the League of Nations, that was the last time that Hitler informed the Reich government of an action. Then came the important action of the march into the Rhineland. speak a little more slowly.
A More slowly? Certainly,
A More slowly? Certainly. Nations; they were informed previously. Government; only after the march had taken place did the Fuehrer inform the Reich Cabinet as far as the march into Austria was concerned, or the march into the Sudetenland. The march into Prague and the outbreak of the Polish war had the beginning of all the other campaigns against Norway, France, Russia and so on, and so forth. In all these cases the Fuehrer neither informed the Reich Cabinet first, nor were they informed afterwards. since these large plans which had certain significance to the Administration had not been communicated to them, that they were put before the accomplished facts. the Fuehrer alone, and of course, how much he consulted individual persons is something I made a statement about earlier, saying that I didn't know. not informed about any of these actions. They were only generally informed, like every reader of the newspapers and every radio listener, one or the other, as, for instance, I had heard perhaps a few hours before the event when things were made known to the press. But as to any previous consultations or information of the Fuehrer, so far as that is concerned, that never took place. powers could be transferred entirely to the Fuehrer? of habit. powers through the law which had been published in the Reichstag; they had been given the power to alter the German Constitution. These powers were made use of by the Reich Government by means of extraordinary laws, but, of course, they were also used by means of silent suffering, of habit, and the formation of governmental habits such as appeared to be recognized in all countries.
Particularly during the first years, and of course all during the later years, the law of usage and habit developed, which meant that the Fuehrer acted more independently than should have been the case according to the Weimar Constitution. Largely, political questions were all removed from the jurisdiction of the Cabinet by the Fuehrer. that time the Fuehrer did not wish that general political questions be raised in the Cabinet by any minister. I have repeatedly had to inform ministers that they were to refrain from bringing up questions which did not belong in their immediate sphere of influence and discuss them in the cabinet. men who wanted to discuss church policy. I had been forbidden to put any general political questions on the agenda of such a Cabinet meeting. If, in spite of that, a minister raised a political question during a meeting of the Cabinet, then the Fuehrer used to speak himself and deal with that individual person, or order him to report personally.
Then the period developed when, after Hindenburg's death, the Fuehrer became both the head of the State and the leader, and then such debates in the Cabinet, as long as there were Cabinet meetings, were stopped altogether. Nothing could be debated. The ministers were not allowed to feel that they were political ministers. I had to communicate these facts to them repeatedly, by order of the Fuehrer, and tell them to refrain from raising any particular questions during Cabinet meetings. large-scale political actions took place, and no Cabinet meetings took place at all. The Fuehrer acted independently and alone, and all statements were made on behalf of the Reich Government. He himself made these declarations, alone and without consulting anybody first. nevertheless failed to perpetually resist that custom.
"government" such as is laid down in Anglo-Saxon law under "Government", then there was no longer any Reich Government after 1936 in its proper entirety, consisting of minister. That form of government ceased to exist in 1936. The Fuehrer was the Reich Government, and those powers had slipped into his hands. but it wasn't a crime. It was a political development such as has happened repeatedly in history. the powers and had all powers, in that connection there was a gradual -
THE PRESIDENT: When you see two lights in front of you, you are
THE WITNESS: Very well. BY DR. SEIDL:
The Senate had all powers, and extraordinary laws, leading to -
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly keep silent when the Tribunal wishes to speak?
THE WITNESS: Yes, but, of course, I don't know when they do.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal really doesn't want to hear a history
THE WITNESS: Very well. BY DR. SEIDL: powers slipped into Hitler's hands.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had quite enough. We quite understand that debate at all.
It is perfectly clear that he said so.
DR. SEIDL: Yes. BY DR. SEIDL:
Q Witness, will you please tell me one more thing? And this is my last question in this connection. Please tell me whether you, as Minister of the Reich and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, considered the development you have just described as legal. point of view of the legalist, and I have discussed these questions repeatedly with Hitler, and I consider it perfectly legal and, if it is necessary, I can quote you my reasons in detail. Particularly, I consider that development legal because of the well-known Enabling Act and later laws which gave plenipotentiary powers to the Government. Therefore, the Government, in turn, was in a position to detach some of those powers to the Fuehrer and to pass some of them on. In that manner the Reich Government, as such -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal isn't really interested in whether or not it was legal.
What the Tribunal is interested in is whether crimes against other nations were committed.
We certainly don't want to hear this in such great detail.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the main point in the indictment is Point I,
THE PRESIDENT: The main point in the indictment is not whether powers of his government.
There was no such point made in the BY DR. SEIDL: defendant Dr. Frank.
Since when do you know Dr. Frank and what were his activities up to the outbreak of the war?
A I met Frank during the year 1932. If I understand you rightly, you want to know his activities from the outbreak of the war? Party. Then, for the Party point of view, he became Chief of the National Socialist Union of Lawyers, which, later on, he came the Union of Legalism. Then he became a member of the Government, and upon seizure of power in 1933 he became Minister of Justice in Bavaria. At the same time he became Commissar for Legal Reforms.
Later on--and I can't tell you the exact year--he became Minister Without Portfolio, and he was the President of the Academy of Law. He finally became Governor General.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had the defendant Frank's posts proved to us already.
I should think, probably more than once. We don't require them from Dr. Lammers.
DR. SEIDL: In that case, I want to put another question to the BY DR. SEIDL:
Q Witness, what was the relationship between Frank and Hitler? to say, good, but not particularly close. At any rate, during the whole time he did not belong to those who could to called the closest consultants of the Fuehrer.
Q What was Frank's attitude towards the police state and the question of concentration camps?
for or talking in favor of a legal state, though probably not very strongly. He confined his views to being opposed to internment in concentration camps, since such detention was without a legal basis. These speeches made by Frank were frequently the cause of a severe blame from Hitler, so that in the end the Fuehrer instructed me to order him to remain silent, even in the publishing of these speeches. Finally, the result of these activities of Frank's, when he was working for the legal state, wasthat he was removed from his office as the Reich chief of the legal section of the NSDAP--the Party.
Q Wasn't he made to resign as president of the academy of law?
A Yes, that happened at the same time; and, at the same time, the union of lawyers.
Q Another questions: Did Frank as Governor General have considerable powers, or was it not ratherthe case that his position was very unstable? You can certainly say that in many ways his powers had been damaged.
A There are a number of arguments: One was caused by the armed forces. That didn't affect him so much, because commissars in occupied territories were never army chiefs. But then Reichsmarshal Goering, as plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, had considerable powers to issue orders to both the Party and the state in all occupied territories, therefore including the Government General, so that he therefore could give orders to the Governor General, and he could in fact work against the orders of the Governor General and cancel them.
Certainly, Frank's powers as Governor General were considerably limited through the police, since Himmler as chief of the German police had legal powers as police chief which he was to coordinate, nevertheless, with the Governor General, which wasn't always done. power through the fact that Himmler became Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of German national qualities, and as such had to reorganize resettlement, and in fact did do so without asking the Governor General first.
These were further limitations in favor of Minister Speer in favor of rearmament, and there were further limitations on behalf of the postal services, railroad services, and so on; but these are the chief infringements or losses of power in the case Frank.
Q What, according to your observations, was Frank's principal attitude towards the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, and what was the policy he tried to achieve? to create an atmosphere in favor of Germany inside Poland, but he didn't alwaysachieve that, and particularly were his failures due to the fact that the powers of the police and Himmler's powers were so predominant in the sphere ofresettlement that his measures and his intentions were disturbed and suffered setbacks. He found it difficult to assert himself. true that he opposed Himmler's policy as commissioner for the saving of German national characteristics and that he opposed them wherever possible?
A I wouldn't have thought that Frank would be silly enough to have Germanizing intentions or intend to make the Poles into Germans, but maybe he tried to win the people of German origin in Poland for the German case. But he had difficulties regarding this resettlement scheme, since he hadn't been asked previously, and since by means of resettlement people had been pushed into the Government General. In that respect he and I agreed perfectly. I have repeatedly told the Fuehrer about this and reported to him that these mass resettlements couldn't be done all at once and without the agreement of the Governor General and that he couldn't govern if these resettlement measures weren't communicated to him first -- if he had no influence upon these measures. and the SD in the Government General were under the immediate jurisdiction of Himmler and the chief of the German police. Did Governor General Frank not try to work against the policy of force of these two men? Did he not try to object and to rectify the matter?
A On this point he has raised repeated complaints addressed to me.
They had the aim that I should take them to the Fuehrer, which, however, I only succeeded in doing in part. In one point, however, we did want to help. In the Government General there was established a secretariat of state for the security system. This was under the Higher SS police leader Krueger. This, however, only functioned for, four to six weeks and then the differences of opinion borke out once more. The secretary of state Krueger stated, "I am receiving my orders from Himmler." If the Governor General would complain, then Himmler would say, "These are all unimportant matters. I have to be able to rule on them directly."
And the Governor General said, "But to me they aren't unimportant. To me these things are important indeed." General were not being observed, and it is therefore perfectly obvious that he had a very difficult position because of this police system. bally and in writing, stated what he objected to, and what were the reasons?
flicts which he had, in particular with Himmler, and because in the case of these conflicts he was never told that he was right. Himmler usually was the winner with the Fuehrer, and there were repeated offers to resign which were brough to me and which I wasn't even allowed to submit to the Fue Fuehrer. But, of course, I informed the Fuehrer of the intentions to resign from the Government G eneral. The Fuehrer repeatedly, several times, refused Frank's offer to resign. wards having Frank removed? of Frank's. There is cause for me to gather from certain statements made by Himmler with regard to Frank that Himmler would have liked it a great deal if Frank had been removed from his position; and pulling the same string was Reichsleiter Bormann, who wasn't very well disposed towards the personality of Frank either. centration camps and who was responsible for their installments? the administration and organization were departments under Himmler's control. There was the economy department, I believe, attached to the SS, which was responsible for administration; but concentration camps as such were under Himmler's jurisdiction. called Jewish policy in the Gov ernment G eneral? ception was handled by Himmler, who was directing it, but of course, the G overnor G eneral was also in touch with measures directed against Jews-for instance, combatting of spotted fever, and, I think, the in branding-that is to say, police measures which were applied by the police in the Government G eneral. But the principal policy in Jewish questions, as I learned afterwards, of course was entirely handled by Himmler alone, who had been given these powers by the Fuehrer.
Q Is it true that the Governor General, as early as 1940, con-
tinuously raised complaints regarding the activities of the army police and the police leaders?
A I can confirm that. I can confirm that that has happened several times. In particular were these complaints directed against the fact that the SS and police courts were assuming powers in the Government G eneral which they didn't actually have. Consequently, the activities of these courts were withdrawn from the appropriate sources. There were, for instance, shootings of hostages, and he has repeatedly complained about that. I want to state that all complaints which came to me weren't, of course, complaints against me; they were merely said to me so that I would pass them on to the Fuehrer.
about the exploitation of the Government General by the Reich, particularly regarding grain and sugar supplies? him were increased. He has, I must say, mostly fulfilled them, which must have been extremely difficult for him. art treasures by Himmler's organization?
A That, I have only a very faint recollection of. It is possible that he has complained about the removal of art treasures but I can't remember any details in that connection.
Q And now the last question. Is it true that the Governor General in many documents, as early as 1940, made proposals regarding the improvement of living conditions of the population to the Fuehrer and not until much later did the Fuehrer consider the policy which had been advocated by Frank as correct?
A Frank has often objected to a policy of exploitation. He wanted a constructive policy; that is to say, even a cultural policy of reconstruction. He had suggested, for instance, that the departments attached to the administration should have advisory Polish committees but that had been refused. He had spoken in favor of the creation of schools and high schools and various other such cultural aims, all of which had been refused.
On one occasion he had submitted a long memorandum. This referred to a Polish organization which called itself,"the Plough and Sword," which had offered to cooperate with the Germans, and Frank submitted detailed proposals in a large memorandum, saying that these Poles could be won over to cooperate with them when met on proper terms. All these suggestions, coming from Frank, were turned down by Hitler. It isn't right what you are saying, that it wasn't until the last moment that the Fuehrer agreed to these suggestions. All I can say is that they were all turned down without exception.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
DR. THOMA: Dr. Thoma, counsel for Rosenberg.
BY DR. THOMA: Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Would you please tell the Tribunal very briefly, by means of which decree that his authority was limited? before. The same limitations which applied to the Governor General also apply to him, these limitations which I have just quoted, but I have to add one thing to that. The position of Minister Rosenberg was made particularly difficult through the fact that the differences of opinion which existed between him and the Minister Goebbels on the subject of propaganda, were making things particularly difficult for him.
It had been the Fuehrer's order that Rosenberg was to make the Eastern Policy and Goebbels was to make propaganda, but these two things couldn't always be coordinated. There were considerable differeces of opinion between Rosenberg and Goebbels which could only be settled after lengthy negotiations but which in their result produced nothing more than a very small result, because the differences of opinion whichhad only just been settled, occurred again during the subsequent weeks and there was a further limitation which is different from the case of the Government General and which was that Rosenberg had two commissars for the Occupied Eastern Territories; one was Kommissar Lohse and the other one, I am coming to that later. been a leader conference--I mean, the day before July 16, during which right from the beginning, Rosenberg complained, that his ministry had no police powers but that the entire police authority was to be transferred to Himmler? in Shimmer. He did object but without success. Police matters in other occupied territories had already been so arranged as in this case. The Fuehrer would hot depart from his views.
there is a passage where it says that the higher SS and police leaderwould be subordinate directly under the Reich Commissar. Did this mean that the police leader or rather that the Reich Commissar even in matters of police topics could give instructions?
A No, No; the final word had been retained with Himmler but the higher police leader had instructions to get in touch with the Reich Commissioner and, of course, to consider the political decisions, not so much the others. concepts which Rosenberg had from the beginning until the end with reference to the treatment of the Eastern populations? policy. No doubt, he was opposed to a policy of extermination and to a policy of deportation, which had frequently been preached, and he was anxious to put the agriculture into order through corresponding degrees, to put the school system in order, to look after the churches, the universities and the schools but he found it difficult to succeed since one of the two Reich Commissioners, namely Koch, in the Ukraine, opposed Rosenberg's measures, but I should even like to say he merely disregarded Rosenberg's orders. scale conceptions; has he ever talked to you about that, that he was imagining a situation where the Eastern peoples were to be given autonomy? the right of self-determination, that this should be extended to the Occupied Eastern Territories? respectively but at any rate, he was in favor of establishing a certain independence.
Q Do you mean "autonomy"? And was he interested, therefore, in looking after these peoples of the East in the cultural way?
A Yes. He was particularly interested in that. I know that because he took an interest in the schooling system, the church and the universities. Commissioner Koch?
A That and many other things, yes. He, Koch, was an opponent of the new agricultural arrangement that had been considered particularly favorable by Rosenberg and in the furtherance of his aims, and it has been sabotaged by Koch.
Q Can you quote any other spheres.where Koch made difficulties for the Minister f or the East?
A I can't at the moment recollect any. given the order, in collaboration with Bormann, to conduct negotiations between the two, and can you remember that Rosenberg refused and demanded that the matter should be brought before the Fuehrer? numerous. They filled volumes and volumes of files. The Fuehrer had given the order that Bormann and I should investigate these matters. Many weeks passed but after the investigation had been completed, there was never a decision from the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer always postponed the making of a decision, and on one occasion--perhaps that was the case which you, Doctor, are thinking of-- and on one occasion the differences were particularly keen and the Fuehrer sent for Rosenberg and Koch but instead of deciding upon these differences of opinion and instead of a pertinent decision, came to the decision that these two gentlemen should meet once every month and cooperate. That was a matter of course which to Rosenberg, as far as the Minister was concerned, was insufferable, that he should collaborate with the commissioner who was under his jurisdiction, who was the junior, and apart from that, it was practically impossible to carry out in practice, and these two gentlemen only met no more than once or twice and when they did meet, then no agreement was reached. And lastly, the Fuehrer considered Koch right.