number 3:
"At this conversation did Goering tell you:
"Any German government would consider the following questions:
"a. The Anschluss of Austria and the Sudetenland to Germany;
"b. The return of Danzig to Germany with a reasonable solution of the as an integral part of its policy?
"A Yes.
"Question 4. Did you reply to that, 'But, I trust, without a war'?
"A I said that His Majesty's government desires the peaceful solution of the questions pertaining to Germany and its neighbors. Otherwise I did not discuss those questions.
"Question 5. Has Goering replied to that:
"'That depends very much on Britain. England could contribute much to the peaceful solution of this question. Goering does not want a war on account of that matter, but these questions must be solved under all circumstances.'
"A Yes."
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Does that purport to be a verbatim account of what the defendant Goering said? Dod he refer to himself in the third person, "Goering does not want a war", meaning, "I do not want a war"?
DR. STAHMER: He, too, did not want a war. England could contribute much to the solution of this question. He, too, did not wish a war. That means he, Goering. "He" -- Goering -- "does not wish a war, but these questions must be solved under all circumstances."
This is an indirect speech. It means, "I, Goering, do not wish a war but the question must be solved under all circumstances." as far as I can see. It is the question put to Halifax:
"Did you got the impression that Goering's efforts to prevent a war were sincere?"
The answer of Halifax is:
"I have no doubt that Goering would have preferred it, if he could have done it."
At the end of June or July '38, the defendant made a speech at Karinhall to the Gauleiters, which was distinctly a speech for peace. I am referring to a statement from Dr. Ueberreiter of the 27th of February 1946, which I am offering in its original as Exhibit No. 38, and it appears in Document Book No. 2 on page 37.
THE PRESIDENT: You are putting in these originals, are you?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, indeed.
In that statement from Dr. Ueberreiter, dated 27 February 1946, at page 38 in Document Book No. 2, Your Honor, it says:
"On 25 May 1938 -- that is, after the plebiscite concerning the reunion of Austria with Germany which had taken place on 10 April 1938 -- I" -Dr. Ueberreiter -- "was appointed Gauleiter of the Styrian Region, Gau Steiermar* "A few weeks later -- it may have been towards the end of June or the beginning of July 1933 -- the former Field Marshal Hermann Goering called together all Gauleiters of the German Reich at Karinhall.
"He then delivered a fairly long address to the Gauleiters, describing the political situ ation as it presented itself at the time, and discussing in detail the a m and significance of the Four Year Plan.
"Field Marshal Goering first pointed out that foreigners were not very sympathetic toward political developments in Germany, and that because of this there was the danger of Germany being encircled. Directing German foreign policy was therefore a difficult task. For that reason, we had to endeavor to strengthen Germany from the economic and military point of view, thus reducing the danger that Germany might be attacked by a foreign power. At the same time, this would result in Germany again exercising an increasingly important influence in European politics, after she had again become strong.
"After that, Field Marshal Goering discussed the Four Year Flan. In this connection, he remarked:
"By and large, Germany was cut off from the raw material sources of the world.
"She therefore had to open up her own raw material sources in her own territory by dint of increased efficiency. But the only reason for that was to make Germany independent of foreign countries and was not by any means the preliminary preparation to aggressive war.
"He then stressed, with great emphasis, that Germany's foreign policy would have to be conducted in such a way that there could not be a war under any circumstances. The present generation was still feeling the effects of a lost World War; the outbreak of war would stagger the German people. Furthermore, it was his opinion that a new war would spread widely,and even the outcome of a war against France alone would be questionable.
"In conclusion, he summarized his address by saying that we had to do our utmost to make the Four-Year Plan a success, and that all hardships brought on the people by it would have to be borne, and were justified, because success could prevent war.
"May I say that I am remembering all details of this speech so accurately because this was the first time that I had been informed of these conditions, which were so important for Germany, by a leading personality, and because, therefore, up until the beginning of the war I did not believe that war would come about." action of Germany. It was the result of the response to the desires of the greater part of the Austrian population for the Anschluss. The defendant' opinion on this problem can be seen from a telephone conversation held between the then Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on the 13th of March 1938. The record of this conversation has already been produced on No. 2949-PS. I shall quote from this conversation some passages which have not yet been read into the record and which are contained in Document Book No. 1, pages 55-56. I only propose to quote the following passages:
"I want to say one thing: If it is said"--this is Goering's conversation--"if it is said here that we have overpowered the independence of the Austrian people under pressure, it couldonly be said that one thing infinitely small government.
The Austrian people is only now free. I would simply suggest to Halifax or to a few really important people whom he trusts that he just send then over here so they can look the situation over. They should travel through the country. Then they can see everything."
"Which state in the whole world will be harmed by our union? Are we taking something from any state?"
Then a little later on it says, I think two sentences later on:
"All people are German. All people speak German. Thus there is not a single state involved." only wish to maintain peace abroad; he also applied himself for the preservation of peace at home. I am referring to a speech he made on the 9th of April 1933 at the Berlin Sports Palace. It appears in the book "Hermann Goering: Speeches and Essays," and is document book No. 1, page 35. I am offering it as Exhibit No. 13. I quote the first sentence:
"Volksgenessen (compatriots), on the other hand, however, we also want to be generous. We do not wish to practice petty revenge. After all, we are the victors. Therefore, let us be generous. Let us realise that we, too, thought differently at one time."
And then a little further down:
"...the stronger and freer we feel ourselves as such, the more generously, the more freely are we able to overlook what belongs to the past and really sincerely extend our hand in reconciliation." March 1938, document book No. 1, page 37. This is another quotation from "Hermann Goering: Speeches and Essays." The exhibit number is 14. I quote only one sentence;
"...You were great when you suffered, you were great when you fought, and new you must show that you are also great in kindness, and especially so towards the many who had been misled."
THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Stahmer, can't you give the exhibit number?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, I think it was No. 13. I am going to have a look. It was No. 14. in a number of speeches. For instance, on the 26th of October 1935 he made the following statement. I am quoting from "Hermann Goering: Speeches and Essays," document book 1, page 39, Exhibit No. 15:
I am quoting the sentences as follows:
"It is up to the Church alone whether it wishes to have peace. The Government and the State have never attacked the Church, we have promised the Church protection and we assure them that they have this protection today to the fullest extent. Therefore, it is not a matter about which any kind of reproach could be made." contained in Hermann Goering's "Speeches and Essays", document book one, page 41, Exhibit 16, and I quote the first And second sentences:
"We do not wish to destroy any Church and we do not wish to abolish any belief or religion. All we want is to bring about a clear separation. The Church has its definite, very important and very necessary tasks and the State and the Movement (political movement) have other, just as important and just as decisive tasks." June, 1945, addressed to this Tribunal, which is contained in document book number one, page 44 to 46, and this is Exhibit?
"Hermann Goering himself had an answer given to me through his chief adjutant relative to a petition on behalf of the introduction of an official spiritual service especially for the Luftwaffe; that he could not at the moment do anything because Adolf Hitler had not yet made a final decision concerning the religious question. However, he wished full freedom of religion in the Luftwaffe, including all Christian denominations, and every member of the Luftwaffe could choose for himself whichever chaplain or civilian pastor he desired."
The affidavit from Gauleiter Dr. Veberreiter, dated 27 February, 1946, which I mentioned earlier and which is contained in document book number 1, page 39 -- page 37, under figure 2, refers to the events of the night of the 9th to the 10th of November 1938 and it says:
"A few weeks after the events against the Jews on the night of the 9th to the 10th November, 1938, towards the end of November or the beginning of December, 1938, Field Marshal Goering again called all Gauleiters to Berlin.
He criticized the action in harsh words during this meeting and stated that it had not been in keeping with the dignity of the nation. Further, it had also heavily damaged our prestige abroad. If one interpreted the murder of Consul von Rath an an attack of Jewry against the Reich, then the German Reich had ways of countering such an attack that did not include appealing to the baser instincts. In an orderly state no irregular mob action could be tolerated under any circumstances," And in the last paragraph, unnder number two it says:
"In conclusion, he asks the Gauleiters to use their entire influence to see to it that such incidents which injured Germany would not recur in the future." on that has already been given. becomes apparent from an affidavit of Dr. Lehmann o f the 21st of February, 1946. This is in document bock number one, page 106, Exhibit Number 27. I quote from figure II and it states:
"The opinion I have of him is the following:
"The Reichsmarshal originally took a negative attitude toward lawyers. He was evidently influenced by the Fuehrer. The more he occupied himself with legal matters of the Air Force the more his attitude was changed. Toward the end of the war the Reichsmarshal was one of the high commanders who liked to consult lawyers. He took special interest in the legal matters of the Air Force and attached great importance to them. He assigned to its legal department intricate cases for investigation and he was sceptical of the reports of other offices."
And then in the following:
"In matters where I had contact with the Reichsmarshal he had me thoroughl informed. He took an unusual amount of time in these matters. The conference when there was a difference of opinion, took a quiet and objective course."
Then under Figure III:
"Concerning the administration of justice within the Air Force the Reichsmarshal reserved for himself many cases for his own confirmation of the sentence, including all death-sentences.
"In passing judgment on individual cases, in spite of the harshness of the Fuehrer demanded of all judges, he was still inclined to show occasional leniency. In cases of treason and especially in moral crimes he showed relentless severity. I know from the records that in severe cases of rape he would often quash a sentence because he considered a death sentence as mandatory. It did not matter whether the woman involved was from Germany or from the occupied territories. I believe to remember at least one case in the records where he even changed the manner of execution and ordered that the soldier be hanged in the Russian village in which he had committed the rape.
"When presiding at a trial the Reichsmarshal was very lively but benevolent; also in his recommendations for mercy to the Fuehrer.
"In his own decision the Reichsmarshal, no doubt, often acted intentianally contrary to the thoughts and demands of the Fuehrer, especially in political matters which he judged so much more mildly and in cases of transgression against inhabitants which he judged much more harshly than the Fuehrer.
"I have often discussed the personality of the Reichsmarshal with his legal adviser, a very experienced, quiet and conscientious lawyer as well as the Chief Military Prosecutor (Oberreichskriegsanwalt) who was distinguished by the same qualities and was often with him. We were of one opinion about the Reichsmarshal." so-called "Green Folder", which was submitted under Number 1743-PS. This is not, as the Prosecution maintains, a regulation for the spoliation and destruction of the population. influencing of industry, economy and the regular use of supplies, traffic installations in the territories to be occupied through military operations with special consideration of that fact that Russia had no individual economy but only a state economy, strictly regulated by the state. have to to expected. Nowhere does it contain an order or directive which burdens certain groups of the population with anything beyond the necessities caused by the war.
From that "Green Folder" I have quoted a number of passages which are to prove my statements. I do not want to refer to them in detail but I should like to draw your attention to one very characteristic ruling, where it says, and this is page 94 of this "Green Folder", second paragraph:
"Between the population and the troops particularly good relationship is to be established."
"Good relationship to the population must be aimed at, that in particular with good cultural workers."
"The German Armed Forces entered the war fully respecting international agreements."
THE PRESIDENT: Where is this part?
DR. STAHMER: Page twenty-three, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Which volume?
DR. STAHMER: In the trial brief.
THE PRESIDENT: We seem only to have twenty-two pages in our trial brief. Are there two volumes?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, there are two volumes to that. That was divided because of translating. May I continue?
"The German Wehrmacht entered upon the campaign while fully adhering to international agreements. No extensive encroachments by German soldiers were noted. Individual lapses were severely punished. Announcements and reports of atrocities committed against German soldiers followed immediately on the beginning of hostilities. These reports were carefully investigated. The result was laid down by the Foreign Office, German Foreign Office, in "White Papers", which were sent to Geneva. In this way the "White Paper" came into being which deals with the crimes against the laws of war and humanity committed by Russian soldiers."
GENERAL RUDENKO: Your Honors, defense counsel for Goering, Dr. Stahmer, intends to submit to the Tribunal and to read into the record excerpts from the so-called "White Book" which was published by the Hitler Government in 1941 in accordance with some of the violations which took place regarding the German prisoners of war. I think that these excerpts can not be submitted and read into the record here because of the following reasons: are relevant to this case; there can be submitted to theTribunal only documents which refer to the crimes which were perpetrated by the major German criminals.
The "White Book" is a series of documents of invented data regarding violations which were perpetrated not by the Fascist Germans but by other countries.
Therefore the data contained in the "White Book" can not serve asevidence in this case.
This conclusion is very well founded, because the "White Book" is a publication which served the purpose of Fascist propaganda and which was fed by inventions and falsifications in order to hide crimes which were perpetrated by the Fascists. Therefore I should request the Tribunal to refuse the reading into the record or submitting to the Tribunal excerpts from the so-called "White Book."
THE PRESIDENT: On what theory do you justify the presentation of this evidence, Dr. Stahmer?
DR. STAHMER: The request, whether it is possible and admissible that these "White Books" should be referred to during this trial as evidence, has been discussed repeatedly. In particular it was the subject of the statement when we were concerned with the question of whether I would be allowed to refer to this book as evidence.
So far as I know this has been admitted as evidence, and it was pointed out during that discussion which arose because of an objection which was raised at the time, so far as this part of the evidence is concerned, where it is of importance for establishing the value of evidence. At the time I pointed out certain actions which were taken against German prisoners of war so as to make it possible to understand what measures were taken on the part of Germany. One can not understand the deeds committed by these men who carried out these actions; one can not understand their inner attitude if you do not look at the facts and conditions under which these actions took place, and if you do not investigate the motives which caused them to take these actions. And because of the importance of the motive, and so as to understand the accusations which were raised against the Germans, it seems to me that reference to this document is most important.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we are here to try the major war criminals; we are not here to try any of the signatory powers. Therefore you must justify the introduction of evidence against the signatory powers in some legal way.
DR. STAHMER: The presentation, if I may repeat that, is due to the following arguments and reasons: members of foreign armed forces crimes were committed which are against the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, it is tried to make it understandable that if such excesses and perpetrations took place on the part of the Germans they were caused by the fact that similarly the other side committed similar perpetrations, and that for that reason those deeds must be judged more mildly than if the opponents had conducted themselves correctly. It is a question of the motive, and this is important in connection with these facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you attemtping to justify the introduction of this evidence on the ground of reprisals?
DR. STAHMER: Not only on the strength of reprisals but also on the basis of the motive.
THE PRESIDENT: You are asking us to admit a document a German governmental document. Now, under the Charter we are bound to admit documents, governmental documents, and reports of the United Nations, but it is no where said that they were at liberty to admit documents issued by the German Government. We can't tell whether those documents contained facts truly stated or not.
DR. STAHMER: We are here concerned with and these documents are records of legal proceedings. These proceedings or investigations must in my opinion have some value as evidence just as have official documents. They were legal documents, records, of court proceedings.
GENERAL RUDENKO. I should like Your Honors to emphasize one thing here. Defense counsel Stahmer tries to submit these documents in order to, as he says, to submit his reasons which would explain the crimes of the Germans. I should like to state here that in those documents, which have already been submitted by the prosecution and were introduced here and submitted to the defendant G oering, state that the documents regarding the crimes were prepared before the beginning of the war.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what are the dates of those documents that you are asking us to admit?
DR. STAHMER: I have them here, individually.
(A short pause).
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I suggest, your Honor that I support fully the objection made by General Rudenko. I had supposed the one thing that Counsel on both sides were agreed upon, when the matter was under discussion before, was that no reprisals against prisoners of war are tolerated. Even my learned adversary, Dr. Exner, agreed that that is the law. be excused. For what crimes are these the motives? Counsel says they are barren of motives. What is the notive in shooting American or British fliers, that there were some violations on the part of the Russians as they claim? The only way, it seems to me, that evidence of this character is admissible would be to bring it under the doctrine of reprisal very strictly by taking specific offenses and saying. This offense we admit but we committed it in reprisal for certain other specified offenses." prisoners of war are admittedly inadmissible and carry us far afield in the trial of this case.
DR. STAHMER; May I point out one fact: For instance, I have here a telegram originating with the representative of the Foreign Office with the OKH, Supreme Command of the Army. It is directed to the Foreign Office, August, 1941. In other words, this is an official document. Until now, the Prosecution has submitted official documents to a considerable degree and they have been used as evidence against the Defendants. In other words, here when we have an official document for a presentation which is in favor of the Defendant then it seems to me that this should be admitted, too, provided that this is legally possible. Formally, it seems to me that we are here concerned with a telegram coming from a representative of the Foreign Office with the Army Command, addressed to the Foreign Office, dated August 1941. It says, in the operational report No. 11, which was captured -- it was found that a division
THE PRESIDENT: You must not read it, as we are discussing its admissibility.
DR. STAHMER: I see. I beg your pardon. I had misunderstood you.
Mr. President, you asked me what document -
THE PRESIDENT: The date of the White Book.
DR. STAHMER: The date of the White Book. I see. I beg your pardon. I misunderstood. It is Berlin, 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not a date. That is a year.
DR. STAHMER: Yes, sir. It says, "Crimes against the laws of war and humanity, contained in documents compiled by the Foreign Office, first volume, Berlin, 1941." That is what it says. Adn the date of its publication is not apparent from the book itself. After that, follow the individual documents and investigations which are contained in this book, and then follow a number of records which have individual dates.
THE PRESIDENT: Then there is nothing to show when that document was communicated, either to the soviet Government or as to when it was communicated
DR. STAHMER: It has been communicated to Geneva. It was handed to the Red Cross in Geneva.
THE PRESIDENT: When?
DR. STAHMER: In 1941. I had applied to have these books sent over from Geneva and to make inquiries in Geneva at the Red Cross. issued by the Foreign Office? It is a collection of a number of reports contained in an official document.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not the real point that the Tribunal is considering. The question is, How can you justify on a trial of the major war criminals of Germany, evidence against Great Britain or against the United States of America or against France? If you are going to try the actions of all those four signatory powers, apart from other considerations, there would be no end to the trial at all, and their conduct has got no relevance to the guilt of the major war criminals of Germany unless it can be justified by reference to the doctrine of reprisal, and that cannot be justified in any way.
And therefor the Tribunal considers the document is irrelevant.
DR.STAHMER: Furthermore, on the subject of the aerial war, I am drawing your attention to page 25 of my trial brief, that the question of guilt is influenced by the question of whether the German Air Force went into the attack upon other countries after the British Air Force carried out a number of attacks against the civillian population -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFFE: My Lord, I object to this evidence I wasn't quite sure whether Dr. Stahmer had passed dealing with this evidence with regard to the air war or whether he was illustrating his argument. I want to make it quite clear that I object to the first part of it as being too remote, that is, the evidence about the various conferences which took place with regard to the regulation of aerial warfare. the documents which purport to show that Great Britain attacked non-military targets. Where I have been able to check the allegations, I find there is a complete dispute as to whether the targets were military or non-military targets, and therefore I cannot accept the German official reports as being evidence of any purported value on their part, and I respectfully submit that unless the Tribunal had authority from the Charter they ought to take the same line.
I make these two additional points to the points raised by my learned friends, General Rudenko and Justice Jackson, on the general question.
I do not want to take up more time with the argument by developing that point. I will be pleased to help with any aspect of it.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me, Dr. Stahmer, that this matter stands upon exactly the same footing as the matter upon which we have just ruled.
DR. STAHMER: That is right. aerial warfare -- that is quoted at page 27. This is a statement from a French General, which is concerned with the fact that the German Air Force in Poland adhered to the laws of warfare and only attacked military targets. I believe that against the reading of that quotation there would not be any objection. That is page 27.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 27 of the trial brief?
DR. STAHMER: There I mention a quotation from General Armengaud, the French Air Attache of Warsaw on September 14, 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: There it is said that after the outbreak of war the German Air Force under its Commander in Chief, Goering, did not, by order of Hitler, attack any open cities in Poland. This is confirmed by the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Butler, on September 6, 1939. The letter of General Armengaud said the following:
"I must emphasize that the German Air Force acted according to the laws of war; it only attacked military targets and, if civilians were often killed and injured, this happened because they were near these military targets. It is important that this should be known in France and in England, so that no reprisals will be taken, so that there is no cause for reprisals, and so that total air warfare will not be let loose by us."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what is the origin of that?
DR. STAHMER: It is contained in the document concerning the bombing war, Number 16. It says, "Report of the French Air Attache at Warsaw, General Armengaud." It is dated September 14, 1939, and then comes the report, from which I have just quoted an extract.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: I am offering that.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: And now I am proceeding to page 30 of the trial brief. It says under Figure 10, where I am referring to the creation of the Secret State Police by the defendant Goering, a quotation is statedthere from the words of the book, "Hermann Goering, the Man and the Work", Document Book 2, page 53 to 54, which I submit as exhibit number 44. I quote the following passage:
"It can be seen from the Stettin trial and also from ethers, Goering took drastic measures against men who acted on their own authority against his instructions.
"The Ministerpresident gave an insight into the supervision of political prisoners to hundreds.
He did not wait until asked; the offer came from him.
"--On the occasion of the Christmas ammesty of 1933, he ordered the release of nearly 5,000 prisoners from the concentration camps. 'Even they must be given a chance. ' It would have been only too understandable if those released had everywhere found doors and gates closed to them whichever way they turned. That, however, was not in keeping with the spirit of this act of mercy. Nobody was to think himself shut out. Therefore, Goering, in a clearly worded decree, ordered that no difficulties were to be placed in the way of those released, by the authorities or the public. If this action were to have any point, all attempts were to be made to receive these people, who had sinned against the state, into the community again as full fellow Germans."
And from the last paragraph, I am reading the second sentence:
"In September 1934 he ordered the release of a further 2,000 prisoners in a second ammesty." a few days ago, and I request that it be admitted into evidence. It is an unsolicited telegram originating from a certain Hermann Winter, Berlin W 20, Eisenach Street 118. It has been included in the document book.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If we are to examine unsolicitied correspondence or telegrams, if it is to become evidence. I have a washbasket full of it in my office that, if that kind of material could be used as evidence in this case without any verification, I could bring hare in rebuttal. It does seem to me that we should know something about this, more than just a wire has come in from some unknown person who may not even have been the signer; maybe it is an assumed name. I think that we are entitled to a little better foundation than that.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, have you any other basis?
DR. STAHMER: I have no other basis, and I beg to have your decision whether this is admissible as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do not think we could admit it simply as a telegram which has been received by you from an unknown person.