Those are essentially the leaders, whom I knew as members of Canaris' circle. its spiritual leader; namely, those people in the Amt Ausland's Abwehr who, as early as 1938; could clearly foresee the years 1939 and 1940 and the subsequent consequenced, and who, consequently, took active measures with plans and actions to prevent the conception of this catastrophe by doing away with Hitler by force.
Q What was the purpose of the group to which you belonged; that is, Canaris' inner circle?
AAs regards the political motives or aims, I was not oriented. I can only reiterate the train of thought that is best known to me because I was one of Canaris' most intimate confidants. He determined the basic attitude, his inner attitude, which determined the actions not only of myself but of the other people whom I mentioned, an attitude which was known and which is as follows:
We did not succeed in preventing this war of aggression. The war signifies the end of Germany and our own end, and as such it was a misfortune and a catastrophe of the greatest proportions. However, a misfortune that would have been even greater than this catastrophe would have been a triumph of Hitler. possible, to prohibit and prevent such a triumph. I am speaking.
Q. Now, did this group of which you and Canaris were members meet frequently? as an organization in the technical sense, or any sort of conspirators' club.
That would have been a basic contradiction of Canaris' essential nature. It was, rather, a spiritual organization of people of the same convictions, of people who were perspicuous, of people who understood and who acted but who maintained, each for himself, his complete inner individuality. beginning. Each individual did not demand the same thing; rather, Canaris turned, at any one time, to the person whom he knew from his personal knowledge of the character of that person, to be the person most fit to carry out such and such a task. Canaris expressed his views with respect to the use of force in Poland, for example? in our circle. They were, as a matter of course, repudiated. its commencement? broken, and informed us of the fact that the situation had become serious, although it had appeared theretofore that the situation might be saved. He told us that this was the end. your group with respect to eliminating Nazis from your staff? I received instructions from Canaris to admit into his office in Berlin absolutely no National Socialists. I was also instructed, in my section, whenever it might be possible, to admit no Party members or Party sympathetic officers -- that is, to admit them to high positions. Thus the actual organization -
Q Did Canaris keep a diary? of the war -- a diary to which I personally contributed many portions.
Q Was it part of your duties to make entries in that diary? out as a matter of course that, as regards those conferences which I attended as Canaris' representative, or at which I was present, I recorded such conferences in his diary.
Q And did you keep copies of the entries which you made in Canaris' diary?
A Yes, I kept copies, with Canaris' complete knowledge and approbation.
Q. You have the original of some of those copies with you here today?
A. I do not have them on my person, but they are here at one's disposal.
Q. And you have refreshed your recollection in reference to those entries?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the purpose of Canaris in keeping such a diary?
A. If I answer the question I must, in the interests of truth, repeat the words that Canaris addressed to me on this subject. Others know also what I am saying now.
The purpose of his diary--and it is Canaris' voice speaking now through me--the purpose of his diary was to inform Germany and the world, once and for all, how those people were guilty who were guiding the fate of this people at this time.
Q. Now, do you recall attending conferences with Canaris at the Fuehrer's headquarters just prior to the fall of Warsaw?
A. I and Canaris took part in a conference which did not take place in the Fuehrer's headquarters, but in the so-called Fuehrer's train, and which took place shortly before the fall of Warsaw.
Q. And having refreshed your recollection from reference to the entries in Canaris' diary, can you tell the Tribunal the date of those conferences?
A. According to the notes at my disposal--that is to say, according to Canaris' diary--it was the 12th of September, 1939.
Q. Did each of these conferences take place on the same day?
A. The conferences in the Fuehrer's train took place on September 12.
Q. And was there more than one conference on that day? Were they split into several conferences?
A. I cannot call them sessions; they were discussions, conversations, of some duration, but not actually conferences.
Q. And who was present on this occasion?
A. Present, depending on time and space, were the following: Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop; Keitel, the Chief, at that time, of the OKW; Chief, at that time, of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab, Jodl; Canaris; and myself.
Q. Do you see Ribbentrop in this court room?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you indicate for the record where he is sitting?
A. Over there--(indicating)--in the first row, third from the left.
Q. Do you also see Keitel in the court room?
A. Yes; he is next to Ribbentrop.
Q. Do you also see Jodl in the court room?
A. Yes; he is in the second row, next to Herr von Papen.
Q. Now, to the best of your knowledge and recollection, will you please explain, in as much detail as possible, to the Tribunal, exactly what was said and what took place at this conference in the Fuehrer's train?
Ribbentrop, particularly as regards the Poland regions. These political aims came up in the following conference at that time of the OKW. He explained them. In fact, as established by the notes I took on Admiral Canaris' commission immediately after the conference, while we were still in the train of the Chief at that time of the OKW, Canaris expressed serious scruples regarding the bombardment of Warsaw. Canaris pointed out the devastating foreign political repercussions of such a bombardment. The Chief at that time of the OKW, Keitel, answered that these measures had been agreed on and established directly between Goering and Hitler and that he, Keitel had had no influence on these decisions. He said at that time -- and this I can repeat only after having read my notes -- the Fuehrer and Goering telephoned frequently back and forth; sometimes I also found out something about what was said, but not always. namely Canaris, had found, out about to wit: the projected shooting and extermination measures that were being directed particularly against the Polish intelligentsia, nobility and clergy, as well as all elements that could be regarded as embodiments of the national resistance movement. Canaris said at that time, more or less verbatim, the world will at some time make the armed forces under whose eyes these events have occurred also responsible for these events. to say is based on my notes - that those things had already been determined by the Fuehrer and that the Fuehrer, the Commander in Chief of the army, had made it known that if the armed forces did not want to have any part in those things, it would have to satisfy itself with the fact that the SS and the SIPO and such organizations should appear at the same time on the field with it and that those organizations would then carry out these measures. Thus, all military commanders would be given a corresponding civilian official. That is to say, on the extermination measures and the policy of shooting.
Q Was anything said about a so-called political house-cleaning?
expression which, at any rate, had its origin in Hitler and which characterized these measures as "political house-cleaning". This expression remains very clearly in my recollection without the aid of my notes. measures did Keitel say had already been agreed upon. agreed upon as regards the bombardment of Warsaw and as regards the shooting of those categories of people who I characterized before.
Q And what were they? course, the Jews.
Q What, if anything, was said about cooperation with a Ukrainian group? of a directive that apparently he had received from Ribbentrop in connection with the political intentions of the Foreign Minister. He explained them in connection with the Foreign Ministry. Keitel explained that in the Ukraine a resistance movement was to be called forth that should have as its goal the extermination of Poles and Jews.
Q At what point did Hitler and Jodl enter the meeting? took place, or just at the conclusion of this discussion, and Canaris had already begun his report on the situation in the West: that is to say, the news that had cone in in the meantime regarding the attitude of the French army at the West Wall.
Q And what further discussions then took place? of the OKW, Canaris left the train and had a short talk with Ribbentrop, who, returning to the scene of the Ukraine, told him once more that the uprising or the resistance movement must be so arranged -- and what I say now is well known to me and well recollected -- should be so arranged that all houses and all dwellings of the Poles should be consumed by fire.
Q Who said that? Canaris. I was standing next to him.
Q Is there any slightest doubt in your mind about that?
A No. I am not in the slightest doubt about that. I remember it with particular clarity. I remember it in particular because of the formulation that all dwellings should go up in flames because previously the talk had been of such things as liquidation.
Q Was there any note in Canaris' diary which helped to refresh your recollection on that point also?
Q What, if anything, was said on the subject of France? of the OKW' s train. Canaris presented the matter in this way; namely according to this information, a great attack in the region of Saarbruecken was being prepared by the French. In this conversation, Hitler, who had entered the room in the meantime, took over the conversation and expressed an- opinion different from that which Canaris had just expressed, giving arguments which, as I look back on it now, I must recognize as factually correct. Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews? of the Chief of the OKW, Ribbentrop was not present. conferences Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews? the train, no. have referred to the Chief of the OKW, you were referring to Keitel?
campaign?
Q Did that undertaking have any special name? this undertaking that took place just before the Polish campaign, was given the name Himmler. required? the most mysterious actions which took place in the atmosphere of the Abwehr office. Sometime -- I believe it was the middle of August -- the precise date can be found in the diary of the section, the Abwehr Section, as well as my section, Abwehr Section 2, was charged with the job of turning over Polish uniforms and equipment, as well as identification cards and so on, to turn over such things to Himmler or to make them available to him. As the diary which I kept -- or the diary which I did not keep, my representative Canaris received it from the Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab or from the Landesverteidigun -- National Defense.
Q Do you know where this request originated?
A Whence the request originated I cannot say. I can only say again it reached us in the form of an order. It was, to be sure, an order on which we, those chiefs of sections who came into the question, had our own notions, without knowing what in the last analysis it was about, but the name Himmler was eloquent enough. In the notes and diary of the section, expression is given to the fact that I asked the question why Mr. Himmler was to receive uniforms from us.
Q To whom was the Polish material to be furnished by the Abwehr? some man from the SS or the SD -- the name is on the official diary of the War Department -- fetched them.
was to be used? was concealed from us. We at that time had a very understandable suspicion that something crocked was afoot, particularly because of the name of the undertaking.
Q Did you subsequently find out from Canaris what in fact had happened?
A The actual course of events was the following: When the first bulletin came that spoke of the attack of Polish units on German territory, Pieckenbrock, who had the report in his hand, observed that it was the uniforms that we had provided that appeared in this action. Whether it was on the same day or a few days later, I can not say at this time, but at any rate Canaris discovered that it was these uniforms in which people from concentration camps had been disguised and had pretended to make a military attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. to know the details of this action; that is, to know where it occurred and what happened in detail, as a matter of fact, we could imagine it, but we did not know for sure. tration camps that were the Polish uniforms and created the incident? I spoke about these matters in the hospital in which I was confined with the SS Hauptsturmfuehrer who was there then, and I asked him how events had actually taken place. The man--his name was Birckel--told me, "It is peculiar but even we in our circles only found out about these matters much, much later, and then what we did find out was only by implication. So far as I knew, all members of the SD who took part in that action were put out of the way; that is to say, were killed." That is the last that I heard of this matter. Weygand was under discussion?
cussion took place? or December. I have the precise date in my personal notes; also, with Canaris' knowledge.
Q To the best of your knowledge and recollection, who was present? which took place at the camp, the three chiefs of sections and the Chief of the Ausland Section, Admiral or Captain Buerckner.
Q What were you told at this meeting by Canaris? put under pressure by Keitel to execute an action that would lead to the elimination of the French Marshall Weygand. I--that is to ssy, my section, was charged with the execution of this task.
Q When you say "elimination", what do you mean?
Q What was Weygand doing at this time?
Q What was the reason given for attempting to kill Weygand? French army in North Africa might find in Weygand a point of crystalization. That, of course, is only the main outline of what I still remember today. It may be that there are other reasons that contributed. this meeting? of the armed forces was heard with abomination by all those present and repudiated. I, myself, as the person in question, stated that I should not permit that my department should be commissioned with this task. I reacted quite naturally and said that it did not even occur to me to carry out this order, that my section and my officers are fighters but they are not a murderers' organization or murderers.
Q What then did Canaris say?
A Canaris said roughly, "Calm down. We'll talk it over later."
Q Did you then talk it over later with Canaris? Canaris. Canaris told me immediately, "It is a matter of course that this order will not only not be carried out; it will not even be communicated further," and that is also what happened. out this order? was present, I was spoken to by the Chief of the OKW, at that time Keitel, on this subject. He asked me what had happened or what had been undertaken so far as this matter was concerned. The date of this event is recorded in my notes, with Canaris' knowledge and with his commission.
Q What reply did you make to Keitel? thing is certain; I certainly did not answer that I had no intention of carrying out this order. I didn't do it and could not do it; otherwise, I should not be sitting here today. Probably, as in many similar cases, I gave the answer that it was very difficult but whatever was possible would be done, or something of that sort. Naturally, I can not recall my precise words.
Canaris group who is still alive today? Possibly Pepenkof is still alive; perhaps, Benteveni, who, however, did not belong to the inner circle. Most of the others fell as a result of the events of July 20.
COLONEL AMEN: I have another subject to take up now. I don't know if you want me to start in before recess.
THE PRESIDENT: We will continue until 12:45.
(Further examination of the witness by Colonel Amen.) General Reinecke was present?
Q Who was General Reinecke? General Army Office; that is to say, a member of the OKW.
Q Do you recall the approximate date of that meeting ? soon after the beginning of the Russian campaign. Perhaps July. you state exactly who was present at that conference? notes taken for Canaris, in which I participated as his representative, the following were present: General Reinecke as the presiding officer, Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller of the SD, Colonel Breuer representing the office in charge of prisoners of war, and I as a representative of Canaris.
at this meeting? Reichsecurity and took part in the session because he was responsible for the execution of the measures regarding the treatment of the Russian prisoners. why he was there? war. I do not know in which precise department. He took care of questions rewarding prisoners of war.
Q What was the purpose of this conference? the command that had been given regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and also to give some foundation to these commands. conference what the substance of those orders under discussion was? of measures that were to be taken. First of all was the killing of Russian commissars. Second was the killing of all those elements among the Russian prisoners of war who, according to a special treatment, could be identified as Bolshevists or as active representatives of the Bolshevistic attitude toward life. basis for these orders? General Reinecke in its essential features as this: That the war between Germany and Russia was not a war between two states or two armies but between two attitudes toward the world, namely, the National Socialist and the Bolshevistic.
The Red Army soldier was not to be looked upon as a soldier in the ordinary sense of the word such as our western opponents but as an ideological enemy. That is, as an enemy-to-the-death of National Socialism, and he was to be treated accordingly. to go to this conference? this action, although he was himself present in Berlin. First, he wanted to avoid a personal contact or touch with Reinecke, whom he regarded as the prototype of the National Socialist generals and to whom he was personally very antipathetic. Secondly, he told me and ordered me that it was to be my guiding principle to attempt through factual argument--that is to say, through appeals to reason--to set myself against this brutal and senseless order or at least to mitigate its evil effects so far as that might be possible. He as section chief could by no means be as daring as I, who, thanks to my subordinate position, could use much stronger language.
prisoners of war. This fact is also clearly recorded.
a particular name for Reinecke?
he was called the "small" or the "other Keitel".
make any other comment on these orders?
I don't know that, but at any rate, Buerckner communicated
Q When you say "protested through Buerckner", what do you mean?
Q Will you repeat that?
of international law. The export in t at section was Oster's inner circle.
After July 20 he was executed.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
COLONEL AMEN: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Until 2.00 o'clock.
(Whereupon the Tribunal recessed) Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Amen.
(Erwin Lahousen resumed the stand and testified further as follows:)
BY COLONEL AMEN: about a conference in 1941 with Reinecke and others. Prior to that conference did Canaris tell you what kind of appeal to make to those present at the meeting? already said, that I should use arguments in order to reduce the consequence of the case and also that I should not use arguments of a humanitarian nature. the best of your recollection, exactly what happened and what was said in the course of that conference? and he explained these orders in the manner in which I described them before the recess. He said that those measures were necessary, and said it was particularly necessary that this idea should also be made clear to the Wehrmacht, and particularly to the officers as they apparently were still having ideas which belonged to the Ice Age.
Q What views did you present at this conference? Ausland's Abwehr and as representative of Canaris, and in the main I pointed out, first of all, the most unfavorable effect of such measures on the troops, particularly on the Front troops, that they would never understand such orders, particularly not the simple soldier.
Besides, we had reports that the executions were sometimes carried out before their eyes. office in regard to activities which referred to the office itself, the effect of these measures on the enemy, that is, practically speaking, the hindering of deserters, to prevent Russians from deserting, and who were surrendering without any opposition; and then the great difficulties which the Abwehr Division had in fighting agents, that is, people who for any reason had voluntarily kept themselves prepared to help. because I think there was quite a bit of confusion in the translation, I want to point up one or two of those arguments again. What did you say at this conference about the effect of the execution of these orders on Russian soldiers? orders some elements among the Russian soldiers were inclined to surrender and were prevented from doing so. Secondly, that people who for any reason had offered their services to the Abwehr would also be prevented by these measures. And that, taking it all together, above all, the opposite effect would be attained from that which they had desired, and that the resistance of the Russians would be increased to the utmost. what did you say about the effect of the execution of those orders on the German troops?
we had that the effect on the morale and on the discipline of the troops was terrible, devastating. Law at this conference?
A No. In this connection there was no discussion of International Law. The manner of selection of the prisoners of war was particularly stressed. It was completely arbitrary, apart from the order in itself, the general order itself.
Q We will get to that in a moment. Were your views accepted at this conference? I was representing, and were opposed in the sharpest possible manner by Mueller, who with the usual cliches rejected the arguments that I had produced, and who made the solo concession that the executions, in order to consider the feelings of the troops, should not take place in the face of the troops but at a secret place. He also made a few concessions in the question of the selection, which was completely arbitrary and was just left to the commander of whatever detail it was. whether an order was issued with respect to having these killings take place outside the sight of the German troops?
A Except for Mueller's acceptance, which I have just reported, I heard nothing more about it; not till now in an order that was shown to me have I seen the result of this statement. the manner in which these orders for the killings were being executed?