Q When did he find out about it?
A I don't know.
Q What was the attitude of the then Marshal Goering to the war? the occupation of the Rhineland, he was worried that Hitler's policies would lead to war. In my opinion, he was against the war.
against Russia? in the spring of 1941. May I look in my notebook? On the 13th of January, the Reichsmarshal told me that Hitler expected an attack from the Russian side against Germany; then at first, I did not hear anything further about it. The Reichsmarshal did not mention anything, did not say what his opinion was, his attitude was. At any rate, in the following weeks and months, I did not hear any more about it. Then,however, at that time, I was not very much in Berlin, not at all at the headquarters but I was at the various stations. When I returned -- and I do not remember whether it was in March or April -- one of my subordinates had the impression of surprise; he reported to me and he asked me the question whether we needed winter clothing in the war against Russia. I was very much surprised about that question because I had not been previously informed, I could only say that if there should come a war against Russia, then, of course, we need clothing for more than one winter, and I told him what I would think of winter clothing.
Q Did you speak a second time to Fieldmarshal Goering about the war?
Q When was that?
A On the 22 May. I returned from one of my trips for the first time after sometime and I came into contact with the commander in chief again. That was in Feldstein, where Goering was at that time. There we discussed the question and I told him that, in my opinion, it is a great historical task for him to avoid war since this war could only end with the absolute annihilation of Germany. I reminded him that we should not start a two-front war on our own and the Reichsmarshal told me that he also had submitted all these arguments but that it was quite impossible to dissuade Hitler from this war, from the idea of this war. My offer that I would try to speak to Hitler against war once more was rejected by the Reichsmarshal as absolutely hopeless. One could not do anything. From these words, I can speak clearly and it can clearly be seen that he was against this war and that under no circumstances he wanted that war, but that also for him in his position, there was no possibility at all to dissuade Hitler from his plans.
Q Could it be construed from his words also that he had told Hitler about his objections?
front war.
Q That he had presented that to Hitler also?
A He told me, but it was hopeless. I would like to say some more about the 23rdof May, about that conversation. After this conversation -- and based on the fact that the German Air Force hardly had any reserves and bombers, even bombs -- I made the suggestion that bombs should be manufactured. Hitler had, up to that time, considered it unnecessary and superfluous. In that question, there was a shortage of iron and after this conversation, I was under the impression that there would be conflict, and I had pointed out to him that the air force with its bomber fleet, that the air force with its fleet of bombers was not ready for action. The suggestion was rejected by Hitler again after the 23rd of May. He would say If and when we would need bombs, when he pointed out to me that the manufacture of bombs would take several months, he declared that there would be plenty of time for that later. From that I drew the conclusion -- and you knew I could not talk to anybody about it -- that Hitler's words on the 23rd of May were not meant as seriously as they had sounded to me. bombs? because I knew about the conditions. I have again later during the summer; the latter part of the summer, I have pointed it out again but it was rejected again. The order to manufacture bombs was given by Hitler, although we had pointed that deficiency out before, that order was given on the 12th October 1939. Hitler said, if I remember correctly, as far as I remember, "My attempts after the campaign against Poland to come to peace with the West have failed. The war continues. Mow we can and must manufacture bombs." to remain and to live in peace with the West?
A Yes. I was very short when we mentioned the visits. When I came back from France, I was with Hitler two hours on the Obersalzberg, to report to him about the visit to France.
Likewise, after the visit in England; about fourteen days, two weeks later, I also had to make a report of several hours to Hitler.
He was very much interested and after the second report, that is to say, after the English visit, he declared "My policies are such and such; my actions will be such and such, but you can be assured, you can rest assured that I will always go with England. I have the tendency to go with England at all times." This conversation took place on the 2nd of November.
Q What year?
Q You talked about two conversations? about the visit in England. Hitler, who did not know foreign countries, was very interested to hear something from a soldier about the country and the arms and so forth.
Q What were the relations between Reichsmarshal Goering and Himmler?
A It was not always very clear to me. I had the impression that there was a rivalry on the side of Himmler. The relation was always very correct and very friendly but how they really stood, I could not say. and the SS Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff?
Q About medical experiments on inmates of the Camp of Dachau? Could you tell us anything about that? memory -- and I do not remember it any more. According to my memory, Wolff was adjutant to Himmler at that time; there was a letter from Wolff to me and the answer which I had given -- these letters were presented to me -- the question was about experiments, cooling; these letters were addressed to me only because he did not know Himmler, since he was of the Luftwaffe. The letters were sent to the Sanitaetsinspektion. It was not under my orders. The Sanitaetsinspektion has written in answer and presented it to me. I modified it a little and sent it out. I have not read a report which Himmler had sent. He also offered a system. I have not seen that. The Inspector, whom I asked what it was all about, told me that the air force was quite informed about both problems and that is the experiments about altitude chambers and they had been made by our own young doctors who volunteered for that.
Likewise, the under-cooling could not bring us any results for the air force. We were both clear about it. We saw it clearly that we did not want to have anything to do with that. I asked what it was all about, these experiments, and he told me that criminals were submitted to these experiments. I asked in which way. He said in the same way as our young doctors and we must submit ourselves to these experiments. Then we sent him a letter which was very polite -- and you could not write any different to these people -- but we do not want to have anything to do with that thing. In this letter from Himmler, I had been asked to report to the Reichsmarshal about that question also.
these experiments, and I told the Reichsmarshal during another report to other questions, that I remembered that thing briefly, because I could expect that one day he would be told about it by Himmler, one day, and then he would not do anything about that whole complex. The Reichsmarshal asked me when I told him such and such experiments were made, what does it mean, and I replied with the answer which I had received from the medical inspector. I told him we did not want to hare anything to do with it, and he absolutely rejected it. He said he was exactly of the same opinion, and I should be very careful, that I should not treat these people badly, meaning the inspector. What it was all about, what was the experiment there about I do not know, neither do I know what had been done to these people; it is not clear to me.
Q Did the Reichsmarshal know?
Q Did Dr. Rascher leave you sooner or later, and go to the SS?
A I could not say. I do not know Dr. Rascher, and that question of leaving our ranks and going to the SS, I had nothing to do with it. Dr. Rascher was not under me, nor the chief inspector, nor was the personnel office. under his command, which said that the sabotage groups should be annihilated, or that carrier-flyers should be captured, and should be turned over to the SD for trial?
Q Did you ever hear about it? were captured, generally?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we have been very liberal. I think we have been very literal in allowing all kinds of statements here, but it does seem to me this passes anything that is reasonable as to evidence. This witness has indicated that he has no knowledge of the subject; did not know of orders which are in evidence, and he assumes to state the attitude of the Reichsmarshal.
I have no objection to his making any statement as to any facts from which this Tribunal may be informed on the attitude of the Reichsmarshal, but I think that for one witness to state the state of mind of another person without any facts whatever passes the bounds of what he can possibly go into here as to evidence. It does not help to solve the problem and I respectively object to the question and answer as not constituting credible and relevant evidence on any subject before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think you should confine yourself to any facts and observations of the defendant Goering, as the witness just said that he never heard of any action against the enemy flyers at all. I don't think that you can give evidence as to the attitude of Goering about it.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I should like to formulate my question as follows:
Q Did the Reichsmarshal Goering speak to you, Mr. Witness, as to how enemy flyers should be treated?
Q I have one more question. Did he speak to you about the fact that opposed any cruelty in the treating of the enemy; did he speak about the fact that he opposed in principle any cruelty against enemies? in remembering the first World War.
Q What did he say about it?
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions to put to the witness. I place him at the disposal of the defense or the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of you wish to ask this witness any questions? BY DR. HANS LATERNSER: Mr. President, Dr. Laternser, counsel for the General Staff and OKW.
Q Mr. Witness, as you know the prosecution has considered, or has declared to a certain circle of people, that is, the leaders, as criminal.
You probably know that circle? offices; was that ever in existence even? has been grouped in order to form that group; had they ever existed even before in the German Wehrmacht? leaders who were grouped by their supreme commander.
to develop military questions, or problems under orders of Hitler, or, did they on their own initiative develop the plans to present them to Hitler to have him educated? superior, that is, the general air force on the orders of the supreme commander of the airforce, who got his orders from the supreme commander of the Wehrmacht, that was Hitler, and before him, Hindenburg. Staff and the OKW, as they are called now, if they ever had met collectively? action there, those army leaders and navy commanders, were called by Hitler; they were called by Hitler, only that part which was to go into action in the West in the Spring, and the same was done before the attack in Russia.
Q Were you personally present at such discussions? should like to have one point clarified, that is, whether the higher military leaders had such conversations, or had an opportunity to make any suggestions, or counter suggestions? in Obersalzberg, and on the Wehrmacht, and a commander of the Army. Hitler sat before the desk, and the Generals sat in chairs next to each other, and he made a speech concerning the reasons of political precedent as he usually put it, and of his intentions. In this discussion any suggestions in the discussion on the side of the Generals was impossible. Whether there was any other conversations in their discussion about this, I could not say. I only knew of the speech of Hitler's. Then before the attack on Russia, there was another method used. He sat around the large table, and one after another of the leaders of the Army groups of the Army had to state their intents and methods of executing their orders, which they had received, and had to show it on a map, so that Hitler afterwards could declare his agreement, or say that he negatives it, or, in a case of differences he would suggest stronger, or less stronger action, and those were likely remarks.
Q Did these discussions have more a character of a briefing? General Staff, and of the OKW, were there any members who made any suggestion to deviate from the International Law?
A I don't know anything a bout that. group had frequently been in touch with office of the high party members?
A In my opinion, no. I would like to say that for the majority of these Generals, it is clear that the supreme commanders of th Army centers, or of the chief of the OKW, had frequent conferences with the office, but the general commander of the high Fleet unit, or the Army had no opportunity to. Navy or Airforce, had there been discussions among those?
A It is dependant upon co-operation. That is to say, the Army of the Fleet. Of course, there had been conferences, but the relations were as if with the neighboring units it was issued, and then with the next one there was none. entire task?
Q Within the Air Force, it is so that this group, this circle com-
prises the officers who had the position of chief of staff of the Air Force or commander-in-chief of the Air Force or of an air fleet during a certain time. I have a list here of those generals who belonged on the part of the Air Force to that group, and I should like to ask you concerning a few of them as to which rank and position these generals had had when the war started What was the rank of General Korten?
A I cannot be very sure about that; either colonel or lieutenant colonel, in my recollection.
Q Do you know what position he had? of the Air Force. What was he when the war started?
Q Do you know what position he had?
A No, I could not say that at this moment. It may be that he was chief of staff of an air corps of the Air Force.
Q And what rank would he have had as chief of a unit of that kind?
A Between major and colonel; that depends. What was he when the war started?
Q Then I have only a few more names. Do you know which rank and position Colonel-General Dessloch had at the beginning of the war?
A I do not remember that; it may be major or general or colonelgeneral.
Q And General Pflugbeil?
Q General Seidel? the war.
Q And which position did he have at that time?
A Well, it was about the commander of an army corps. As general quartermaster, you mean?
Q Yes. I still have a few questions concerning the Air Force and the highest military leaders. From your statement we could conclude that in 1939 the Air Force was not ready for war. To this point, could you possibly give me the reasons for this unpreparedness of the Air Force for war? power--until 1939, it would have been impossible for any country to build up an Air Force which would have been big enough for the tasks which presented themselves after 1939, That is impossible. And it is neither possible to establish the units nor the schools and furnish the teaching staffs, nor is it possible to build the planes themselves which are necessary, and to develop the models and to build them. It is neither possible in that short period to train personnel with respect to the high technical standards which are necessary. Likewise, it is impossible in such a short time to develop the ground crews and to put them at the disposition of the Air Force and the industry.
THE PRESIDENT: A little slower please, witness. He says that it is impossible. That is sufficient. It should not be necessary to go into this detail on this subject.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions.
Q Did the Air Force expect resistance when it marched into Austria?
A No. We knew definitely there would be no resistance. We didn't even take any arms with us.
Q How was the reception there?
A So friendly it couldn't be friendlier in our own country. previously that a declaration of war to the United States was to be made? and their leaders on account of cruelties committed. Isn't it so that every soldier was instructed and informed about international law and the regulations?
A Yes. Each soldier had a so-called "Soldbuch", and on the first page there were all these regulations.
Q Can you give me examples for that?
The points which were on this page?
A Yes. For instance, that no soldier, no prisoner, should be shot; that no looting should be permitted. I have my book here. I can read it. Treatment of prisoners of war; Red Cross; the village should not be touched; the threat of punishment if these regulations should not be heeded. the civilians, was it so, as far as you know, that the commanders used all severe punishment against the soldiers? far as the death penalty. stances discipline of troops had to be maintained?
A Yes. I can give a particular example. A general of the Air Force had taken jewelry which belonged to a foreigner. He was convicted and executed. I think it was in 1943 or 1944. to Goering. Have you heard through him about a large, extensive plan for a large war? they have to hear more?
A No. All measures which were taken came like the occupation of the Rhineland came, very suddenly, sometimes after preparation of hours only. That applies to Austria; that applies to Czechoslovakia; and that applies to Prague. The only time that anything had been told us before was the affair with Poland, where we had a discussion on the 23rd of May. was a surprise?
Q Then I have one more question: How was it about the possibility of resignation for high military lenders during the war?
one could not submit an application to resign. It was said if anyone of us had to leave we would be told to do so. In an authoritarian state the citizen and the subordinate had no right to go by himself, neither a soldier nor a civilian.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until Monday morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 11 March 1946 at 1000 hours.)
Official transcript of the International
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Laternser, had you finished your examination?
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the OKW and General Staff): I have only a few more questions to ask the witness. BY DR. LATERNSER: preparation for war of the Luftwaffe in the year 1939, to what extent they were not prepared for war. In this connection I should like to ask whether the collaboration of the Luftwaffe with the OKW, Army and Navy did not exist in 1939? scale war nor were the others. They had reached no agreements with the other parts of the armed forces. I know nothing of any such preparations. existent, then you would have known of them? that time that that is so. pretty close in the year 1937? sonnel office. They all worked more or less separately, each for itself.
Q You just mentioned the General Staff. What do you understand by the German General Staff of the Luftwaffe? higher officers with special training who advised the commanders of the groups and assisted them.
Q Of what did the Luftwaffe of the General Staff consist?
who was at the disposal of the General Staff, also those officers who, as outside General Staff officers, were at the disposal of the Navy and the individual squadrons.
Q What were the conditions for promotions? outbreak of the war. We wanted to set up a larger air force at the time that should be completed six to eight years hence.
Q When would this limit have been reached? When would it have been finished?
THE PRESIDENT: Not only is there some technical fault, we are getting two translations at once, but both the witness and the counsel are going too fast.
Q In the year 1939 was there an organization of day and night raiders?
Q Was there an organization for bombing warfare? aggression.
Q To what extent were at that time air field organizations ready?
A Through the air fields there were thousand-meter long runways. These runways sufficed for fighters but not for loaded bombers.
Q What was the Intelligence situation?
A The leadership network was not present. It had to be improvised later during the war.
Q How was the Aircraft Observation Service? that originally in the first years large bomber types, four-motor bombers, which were designed for use at night--steps in that direction were undertaken. These bombers, however, I believe in the year 1937 were abandoned, although they were technically in order. It was believed that the expenditures involved in building such large bombers could be spared since no one was counting on a war at that time. This was at the time when Fieldmarshal Milch was Chief of the General Staff. This was submitted to the Reichsmarshal for decision, and he decided that these large bombers should be eliminated from the armaments program.
Q At which time was this?
A Just a moment; I will look it up. On the 29th of April 1937, the Reichsmarshal on the commission of the General Staff stopped the production of these large bombers. In this way it came about that in 1939 bombers designed for night bombing were not available, bombers which might have been compared with the English type, such as Lancaster bombers.
Q What was the personnel of the Air Force? personnel reserve. In this personnel reserve there were great difficulties. The question of the timing depended upon the personnel. It would have been possible to build airplanes quicker, but it would not have been possible to expand the development of the personnel. of when the program would be finished. It would have had a purpose to build up the personnel. Half trained people are less use than none.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I don't want to interrupt your cross examination, but we have been sitting here for nearly 20 minutes now, and all I have got from it is that the Luftwaffe wasn't ready for war in 1939.
It seems to me too much time is being taken up with detail. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q I have simply one more question in this matter. Were there reserves of aluminum and magnesium available, or were there other possibilities of acquiring these materials?
Q Then one last question. Witness, during your testimony on Friday, you mentioned Basic Order Number 1. You also gave us the content of this order. Now, in regard to this order I have this question. Was this order strictly observed or not?
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any ofthe other defendants' counsel wish to ask the witness any questions?
DR. FLAECHSNER (Counsel for Speer): I'd like to ask the witness a few questions. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: the building of factories to build bombers? attacks in the year 1943 on. of April, 1944, and do you remember what was said then regarding the difficulties in construction, what was told Hitler about these matters and what Hitler ordered?
A Yes. At that time the Fuehrer had, I believe, asked for factories, six of them, 100,000 square meters in floor space each, and protected from air raids. Speer also at a subsequent time -- in April he was not there; he was sick--but later Speer raised objections to this. He considered the extent of this construction work was much too large and also much too belated. Later he pressed through the order that all buildings that weren't usable in July 1944, that those that could not be put into practical use should from that time on be abandoned.
Q As regards the worker question, in this discussion at the Obersalzberg, did the Fuehrer point out where we could find the working force to build these factories that he wanted?
A Yes. I believe I recall that on the objection of one of the people there, he would take care of the working forces to build those factories.
Q You said, Mr. Witness, that Speer was against this construction. How did things develop from then on? Speer was not present then?
Q Can you tell us briefly just what took place? other sides that this construction should be separated from Speer's function. Difficulties arose, since theoretically this construction was under Speer's command and could not be withdrawn from his purview altogether. He had himself no further influence.
Then the construction department of the O.T. was associated directly with the Fuehrer, and Speer was subsequently eliminated. One was speaking at that time a great deal of large scale construction, that there was no working force available for such construction. Speer's connection with this? also was sent to Speer. I recall rather vaguely that Speer once showed me such an order.
Q Onelast question on this matter. According to that, then, Herr Dorsch took over the responsibility for these construction works that wereimmediately ordered by the Fuehrer. point of view of the available German working forces available and the possibilities of signing up this work? Was there any such decision? raw material and also to bring a certain order into all questions of transportation, independent of the shortage of the war materials.
On the question of the availability of working forces it had nocommand authority. Also, the distribution of workers was influenced in part by the Central Planning Board, since the armaments industry could see what was necessary in each regard. But great difficulties arose so that practically this work had to be abandoned by the Central Planning Committee.
Q So decisions were not reached. We have heard affidavits stating that there were workers problems in the Central Planning. interest in this. There were other questions also, the question of accommodations, as well as other matters.
Q One last question on this point. Was the General Plenipotentiary for Labor for the Arbeitseinsatz in any way definitive in the entire planning of the distribution of the working forces?
Q Were there in the years 1943 or 1944 available work reserves? When did Speer demand these reserve work forces, or did he?
A Yes; Speer was very anxious that the available German work reserves should be included in the whole economic structure, if possible female workers, women from professions, who, other than their household duties had nothing to do.