Germany's approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of limited expansion as the price of peace.
They a Locarno Air Pact.
In the case of both France and England, ly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's version:
"High ranking Nazis with when I had to maintain official undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's interest to do so.
Although these statements were openly make to me as expressed the same ideas publicly."
to counter Germany's moves.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon at 1640 hours the hearing of the Tribunal 1000 hours) (Whereupon at 1640 hours the hearing of the Tribunal 1000 hours) Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal:
Before I resume to the consideration of Mr. Messersmith's second affidavit, Document 2385-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 68, I should like to consider briefly the status of the evidence before this Tribunal, of the matter stated in the first Messersmith affidavit, introduced by the United States, Document 1760-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 57. You will recall that Mr. Messersmith, in that affidavit, made the following general statement: independence of Austria, in fact, it intended from the very beginning to conclude an Anschluss and that defendant Von Papen was working toward that end. have nothing to do with the Austrian Nazis, in fact they kept up contact with them and gave them support and instruction. force in Austria, if necessary, the Nazis were using quiet infiltrating tactics to weaken Austria internally, though the use of Christian-front personalities, who were not flagrantly Nazis, and could be called what they referred to as Nationalist opposition and through the device of developing new names for Nazi organizations, so that they could be brought into the Fatherland Front of Austria corporatively, that is as an entire group. in support of some of these general statements in the Messersmith affidavit. The excerpts I have already read out of the report from Rainer to Buerckel, enclosed in the letter to Seyss-Inquart, Document 812-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 61, showed first, that the Austrian Nazi groups kept up contacts with the Reich, although they did it secretly, in accordance with instructions from the Fuehrer.
as to be ready, in what they referred to, as an emergency. who had what they called good legal positions, but who could be trusted by the Nazis and that five days after the Pact of July 11, 1936, between Germany and Austria, a Pact which specifically pledged the German Government not to interfere, either directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of Austria, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, the Austrian Nazis met with Hitler at Obersalzburg and received new instructions, and finally, that Hitler then used Keppler, whose name we shall again meet in a short while in a significant manner, as his "contact man" with Austrian Nazis, with full authority to act for the Fuehrer in Austria, to work with the leaders of the Austrian Nazis.
Then we offered Document 2247-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 64, Von Papen's letter of July 27, 1935, which reviewed the situation one year after Dollfuss' death, and pointed out how National Socialism could be made to link for the Anschluss and how National Socialism could overcome the Austrian ideologies and in which he identified himself completely with the National Socialist goal.
We offered Document 2246-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 67, Von Papen's letter to Hitler of September 1, 1936, which showed how Von Papen advised using both economic and continuing psychological pressure, that he had conferences with leaders of the illegal Austrian Party; that he was trying to direct the next developments in such a way as to get corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front and that meanwhile he was not ready to urge that avowed National Socialists be put in prominent positions, but was quite satisfied with collaborators, like Glaise-Horsteneau.
I think that practically all of the statements in Mr. Messersmith's affidavits have been fully supported by these documents, German documents, which we have introduced. Certain parts of the affidavits cannot be corroborated by documents, in the very nature of things, and I refer specifically to Mr. Messersmith's conversation with the defendant Von Papen in 1934, which I read to the Tribunal yesterday.
But I think these matters are manifestly just as true and just as clear of the Defendant's guilt and complicity. Mr. Messersmith's second affidavit, 2385-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 68, relating to the diplomatic preparations for war. Prior to adjournment, I had read to the Tribunal excerpts, which established the following propositions: diplomatic agreements existing in 1983; first in the west, the Locarno Pact, supplemented by the French-Belgium agreement:
second, in the east, the Little Entente, including Czechoslovakia and Poland, and their respective mutual assistance pacts with France, the French-Polish Pact: third, as for Austria, the special concern of Italy for her independence, that is for Austrian independence. extravagant and sometimes inconsistent promises of territorial gain to countries in Southeastern Europe, including Hungary, and Poland.
In the third place, Mr. Messersmith wrote an official communication to the State Department, pointing out that persons like von Neurath and von Papen were able to work more effectively in making these promises and in doing their other work, just because they, and I quote, "propagated the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime." that Germany would honor her international obligations only so long as it suited her to do so. counter German moves, as I said yesterday. France made attempts to promote an East Locarno Pact and to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian powers. Italy's effort was to organize an economic block of Austria, Hungary, and Italy. But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling its policies of loot, by continuing its armament and by another very significant strategy, that is the Fifth Column strategy; that the Nazis stirred up internal dissension within neighboring countries to disunite and weaken their intended victims. Messersmith affidavit, Document 2385-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 68, the paragraph beginning in the middle of the page.
"At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal dissensions within these countries themselves and in Austria and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed to so weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro-Nazi and Fascist groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program.
Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over 6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein Party in the elections in the Spring of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria. It may be remarked here that this latter was one of the principal instruments and most effective ones which Nazi Germany used as the fear in Yugoslavia, in particular, of a restoration of the Hapsburgs was very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of Hungary to demand the recall of von Mackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in Poland she played on the fear of Communism and Communist Russia. In Rumania she aggravated the existing antisemitism, empha sizing the important role of the Jews in Rumanian industry and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also financed the Fascist Iron Guard through Codreneau.
"Such 'diplomatic' measures reinforced by Germany's vast rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary, and sufficient at least to deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to German designs, even if not enough to persuade them to actively ally themselves with Nazi Germany. Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would gain its ends and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was to play along with Germany." the detailed, official dispatches which Mr. Messersmith sent to the American State Department, showing that Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland were beginning to follow the German line.
As for Italy, Germany's initial objective was to sow discord between Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory, particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching an agreement with them and to block an East Locarno Pact. On that, I quote again from Document 2385-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 68, the second Messersmith affidavit, on page 10, at the middle of the page in the English version:
"While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany's program in exchange for German support of Italy's plans in Abyssinia." German declaration or pact of 11 July, 1936.
Declaration or Pact of 11 July, 1936; and in the Fall of 1936, Germany extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy, in an alliance which they called the "Rome-Berlin Axis." This, together with Germany's alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on England, and greatly increased the relative strength of Germany. others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves, so that they could seriously consider plans for war, and begin to outline timetables, not binding timetables, and no specific ones, in terms of months and days, but still general timetables, in terms of the Germans, which were the necessary foundation for further aggressive planning, and a spur to more specific planning. That timetable was developed, as the Tribunal has already seen, in the conference of 5 November 1937, contained in our Document No. 386 PS, USA 25, the Hoszbach Minutes of that conference, which I adverted to in detail on Monday last. aggressive was in Europe, and to seize both Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in that order. shown first the purpose of the Nazi conspiracy, with respect to the absorption of Austria, and then the steps taken by them up to this period, that is, November 1937. preparations of the Nazi conspirators, with respect to their program in Europe, generally, and with respect to Austria, in particular. 5 November, 1937, in the light of this more-detailed background. It will be recalled that in that meeting, the Fuehrer insisted that Germany must have more space in Europe. He concluded that the space required must be taken by force; and three different possible cases were outlined for different eventualities, but all reaching the conclusion that the problem would certainly have to be solved before 1943 to 1945.
specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that for the improvement of Germany's military and political positions, it must be the first aim of the Nazis, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks, incase of a possible advance westward. and Austria, would constitute the conquest of food for from five to six million people, including the assumption that the comprehensive forced emigration of one million people from Austria could be carried out. both militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable relief, since they would provide shorter and better frontiers; would free fighting personnel for other purposes; and would make possible the reconstitution of a large new German Army. in the policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to acquire Austria. At the outset, a revolutionary putsch was attempted, but that failed. The next period was one of surface recognition of the independence of Austria, and the use of devious means to strengthen the position of the Nazis, internally, in Austria. in the light of the larger aggressive purposes of the Nazi conspirators, was sufficiently great to warrant the use of force, in order to obtain Austria with the speed that was designed. In fact, as we shall see later, the Nazis were actually able to secure Austria, after having weakened it internally, and removed from it the support of other nations, merely by setting the German military machine into motion, and making a threat of force. without the necessity of firing a shot. Their careful planning for war, and their readiness to use war as an instrument of political action, made it possible in the end for them to pluck this plum without having to fight a blow for it.
against Austria. It, again, is "Top Secret", with the added legend in German "Chefsache Nur Durch Offizier," "Chief Matter only to be delivered to an Officer." For War, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General von Blomberg. The importance of this Top Secret directive is indicated by the fact that the carbon copy, received by the Commander in Chief of the Navy, was one of only four copies, establishing the directive for a unified preparation for war of all the armed forces. political situation indicates that Germany need not consider an attack from any side, and also states that Germany does not intend to unleash an European war, it then states in Part 1, and I quote from Page 2 of the English text, which, I believe, is Page 4, Third paragraph of the German text:
"The intention to unleash a European War is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces.
"a) to counter attacks at any time.
"b) to enable the military exploitation of they occur."
preparations of a general nature for war. I quote the first two portions of Paragraph 2, on Page 2 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text:
"2). The preparations of a general nature include:
"a). The permanent preparedness for "b). The further working on 'Mobilization without public announcement' in order to both as regards strength and time."
be special preparations for war against Austria. I quote from Part 3, which is on Page 4 of the English text, and Page 19 of the German text:
"I). Special Case 'Otto.'" "Case Otto," as you will repeatedly see, was the standing code name for aggressive war against Austria.
I quote:
"'Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the Monarchy.
"The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to give up a restoration.
"Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian people, the march in will be made in the general direction of Vienna, and will break any resistance." tions, held by United States Ambassador Bullitt with the defendants, Schacht and Goering, in November 1937.
DR. FRANZ EXNER: I am Prof. Exner, defending Colonel-General Jodl. I should like to state my objection to the manner in which Document C-175 has been treated. This document repeats a document of the General Staff, which prepares for all kinds of possibilities of war. The possibility has even been that you have in this document that Germany might have had to have a war with Spain. part relating to Austria; and in that way, the appearance was created as if it were planned to march against Austria, whereas it actually says the German Reich had no intention to attack at that time, but was merely preparing for all eventualities. document should be supplemented by the reading at least of the paragraphs of this document which come after it. If these paragraphs of the document are placed before the court, it will be seen that this was not a plan to march against Austria, but simply a document preparing for all possible eventualities.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, your objection does not appear to be to the admissibility of the document, but to the weight of the document. The Tribunal has already informed defendants Keitel and Jodl that they will have the opportunity at the appropriate time, when they come to prepare their defense, to refer to any document, parts of which have been put in by the prosecution, and to read such parts as they think necessary then, and to make what criticism they think necessary then.
does not go to the admissibility of the document. It simply indicates a wish that more of it shall be read. You will have an opportunity later to read any parts of the document which you wish.
MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose, if the Tribunal please, that the fundamental basis of the objection just stated by distinguished counsel, must have been his theory that Germany never made any plans to invade Austria, and if so, it would seem to follow that Germany never invaded Austria, and perhaps history is mistaken. States Ambassador Bullitt with the defendants Schacht and Goering, in November 1937. L-151, offered as EXHIBIT USA 70.
It is a dispatch from Mr. Bullitt, American Ambassador in Paris, to the American Secretary of State, on 23 November, 1937. embarrassed, because that document is not in the document book before the members of the Tribunal. It has been furnished in German translation to the Defense Counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: We have got it in German, apparently.
MR. ALDERMAN: I expect you have, yes; you have the German version. original exhibit. On top, is a letter from Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of State, November 23, 1937, stating that he visited Warsaw, stopped in Berlin on route, where he had conversations with Schacht and Goering, among others.
of the report:
"Schacht said that in his opinion, the best way to begin to deal with Hitler, was not through political discussion, but through economic discussion. Hitler was not in the least interested in economic matters. He regarded money as filth. It was therefore possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic domain without arousing his emotional antipathy; and it might be possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into arrangements in the political and military field, in which he was intensely interested.
Hiter was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment, he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor inasmuch as -- and that is Schacht's opinion -- it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia, and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor, uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany."
And for the defendant, Goering's statements to Ambassador Bullitt, I read from the second memorandum, "Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Goering," on Page 2 of that document, the second page, following a part of a sentence which is underlined, just below the middle of the page:
"The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital national necessities.
"If France, instead of accepting collaboration with Germany, should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her legitimate aims, it was obvious that there would be conflict between France and Germany.
"I asked Goering what aims especially he had in mind. He replied: 'We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who are contiguous on the Reich and are divided from the great body of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.'
"I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government, at the present time, was not pressing this matter, because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy. But Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich.
"He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject. He said, 'There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit.
Such a solution is absolutely unacceptable to us, anf for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli.'" Goering used the Latin expression "casus belli"; it is not a translation from the German, in which that conversation was carried on.
"I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question. The Sudetan Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich." accredited representative of the United States in the regular course of business. They carry with them the guarantee of truthfulness of a report made by a responsible official to his own government, recording contemporaneous conversations and events.
My next subject is: Pressure and Threats Resulting in Further Concessions by Austria; a meeting at Berchtesgaden, 12 February, 1938. great difficulties imposed by its neighbor. There was economic pressure, including the curtailment of the important tourist trade; and there was what the defendant von Papen called slowly intensified psychological pressure.
There were increasing demonstrations, plots and conspiracies. Demands were being presented by Captain Leopold, and approval of the Nazis was being espoused by the defendant Seyss-Inquart, the new Councillor of State of Austria. In this situation, Chancellor Schuschnigg decided to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden.
The official communique of this conference is quite calm; I invite the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is document 2461-PS, the official German communique of the meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg, 12 February, 1938, taken from the official Dokumente Der Deutschen Politik, Vol. 6, 1, page 124, number 21-a. the mutual desire to clarify, by personal conversations, the questions relating to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria. Foreign Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and the defendant von Papen. quote: "Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the peaceful development of the European situation." was a very unusual and a very harsh one. Great concessions were obtained by the German Government from Austria. The principal concessions are contained in the official Austrian communique of the reorganization of the Cabinet and the general political amnesty, dated 16 February 1939. Politik, Vol. 6, page 125, number 21-b, is translated in our document 2464-PS. I invite the Court's judicial notice of that communique. Cabinet, including, most significantly, the appointment of the defendant Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and Interior, where he would have control of the police.
In addition, announcement was made of a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crime.
I invite the Court's judicial notice to our Document 2469-PS, a translation of the official German and Austrian communique concerning the so-called equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in Austria, 18 February, 1938, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Vol. 6, 1, page 128, number 21-d. conference, the Austrian Nazi Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland Front, the single, legal political party of Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell us what exhibit numbers those two documents were?
MR. ALDERMAN: I am sorry, sir; Document 2469-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't had that yet. We have had 2461-PS, which is Exhibit what?
MR. ALDERMAN: I hadn't read it in. I was asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this as an official communique.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to give it an exhibit number?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Nor 2469?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, sir. Berchtesgaden. The fact that pressure was exerted, and pressure of a military nature involving the threat of the use of troops, can be sufficiently established from captured German documents. I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-71.