to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany.
At this point I offer in evidence Document 2246-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 67, a captured German document which is a report from von Papen to Hitler dated September 1, 1936.
This document is most interesting because it indicates von Papen's strategy after July 11, 1936, for destroying Austria's independence. Von Papen had taken a substantial step forward with the agreement of July 11.
It should be noted, incidentally, that after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to Ambassador. Now his tactics were developed in the following term; I quote the last three paragraphs of his letter of September 1, 1936, to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. Those three paragraphs are all joined as one paragraph in the English text.
"The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of Finances at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau of his intention to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding principle 'Marschroute' (that is the German word; that is the 'Route of March') I recommend on the tactical side continued, patient, psychological treatment with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the realisation of some of our projects. In discussion with Government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal party--Leopold and Schattenfroh--who conform completely with the agreement of July 11. (I think that should be a comma.) I am trying to direct the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the Fatherland front, but nevertheless refraining from putting National-Socialists in important positions for the time being. However, such positions are to be occupied only by personalities having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau."
Citing Papen. To recapitulate this report by von Papen to Hitler discloses the following plan:
(a) Obtaining a change in personnel in the Austrian Ministry of (b) Obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement (c) Not putting avowed National-Socialists in important (d) Using economic pressure and patient psychological treatment (MR. ALDERMAN SPEAKING) My next subject is "Germany's Diplomatic Preparations for the Conquest of Austria."
consisted of weakening that country externally and internally by removing its support from without as well as by penetrating within. This program was of the utmost significance, especially since, as the Court will remember, the events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were over-shadowed in the news of the day by the fact that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner Pass and poised there as a strong protector of his Northern neighbor, Austria. and steady increase in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to its aid. But the foreign policy program of the conspiracy for the weakening and isolation of Austria was integrated with their foreign policy program in Europe generally. for a moment from the presentation of evidence bearing on Austria alone and to consider with the Tribunal the general foreign policy program of the Nazis. It is not my intention to examine this subject in any detail. Historians and scholars exhausting the archives will have many years of exploring all the details and ramifications of European diplomacy during this fateful decade. highlights of the Nazi's diplomatic preparation for war. Document No. 2385 PS, a second affidavit of George S. Messersmith executed on 30 August 1945 at Mexico City. This has been made available to the defendants in German, as well as in English.
This is a different affidavit from Document No. 1760 PS which was executed August 28th. This second affidavit, which I offer as Exhibit U.S.A.68, consists of a presentation of the diplomatic portion of the program of the Nazi party. To a considerable extent it merely states facts of common knowledge, facts that many people who are generally well-informed already know. It also gives us facts which are common knowledge in the circle of diplomats or of students of foreign affairs. It consists of some 11 mimeographed pages, single-spaced. I read from the third paragraph in the affidavit, beginning with the third paragraph:
"As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary categories openly acknowledged Germany's ambitions to dominate Southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey. As they freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objectives in the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of Southeastern Europe, were political and economic control and they did not at that time speak so definitely of actual absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions, however, were not limited to Southeastern Europe. From the very beginnings of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power, important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that "it must be our granary" and that "even with Southeastern Europe under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater Germany". After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German designs in Southeastern Europe. In a conversation with von Papen shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in 1934, von Papen frankly stated to me that "Southeastern Europe to Turkey is Germany's Hinterland and I have been designated to carry through the task of bringing it within the fold.
Austria is the first on the program." As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, von Papen in Vienna and his colleague von Mackensen in Budapest, were openly propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935."
Then, skipping a short paragraph, I resume:
"Immediately after the Nazis came into power, they started a vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary immediate objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter of fact, the two immediate objectives of the Nazi regime, when it came into power, had to be, and were, according to their own statements frequently made to me, first, to bring about the complete and absolute establishment of their power over Germany and the German people, so that they would become in every respect willing and capable instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; and second, the establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in order that the political and economic program in South-eastern Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if necessary, but probably by a threat of force. It was characteristic that in carrying through this second aim, they emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering air force. Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time."
Skipping to the end of that paragraph, and resuming at the next:
"At the same time that this rearmament program was in progress, the Nazi regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany, for example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the throwing of hand grenades, etc. In this connection I wrote in an official communication in November 1933, from Berlin as follows.
. . . . 'Everything that is being done in the country today has for able to meet all comers.
The military spirit is constantly growing.
It cannot be otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire of complete compliance with German desires and ambitions.
Hitler and essential.
They are preparing their way so carefully that there is necessary means to carry through their objects . . .'" One further sentence following that I quote:
"Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled with diplomatic preparation designed to so disunite and isolate their intended victims as to render them defenceless against German aggression." field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the continent. She had a system of mutual assistance in the West and in the East. guaranteed the territorial status quo in the West. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania were allied in the Little Entente and each, in turn, was united with France by Mutual Assistance Pacts. Since 1922, France and Poland and likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had made plain her special interest in Austrian independence. existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the members of the Little Entente and the other Eastern European powers. economic gain for cooperating with Germany. To some of these countries she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards. She offered Corinthia to Austria, to Yugoslavia. She offered part of Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part to Poland.
She offered Yugoslav territory to Hungary, at the same time that she was offering land in Hungary to Yugoslavia.
As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit that is 2385-PS, at page 5:
"Austria and Csechoslovakia were the first on the German program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors of these countries with the promises of a share in the loot. To Yugolsavia in particular they offered Corinthia. Concerning the Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:
'. . The major factor in the internal situation in the last week refugees in Yugoslavia.
. . There is very little doubt but that power in Austria . . The Nazi seed sown in Yugoslavia had been suf who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25.
' "Germany made like promises of teritorial gains to Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the proposed simemberment of Czechoslovakia.
As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.
"The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate object. I recall the Yugolsav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or 1935, that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave me the same information.
"I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official dispatch to the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows:
'. . Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are "diplomats of the old school."
They are in fact servile instruments of the regime are able to work more effectively.
They are able to sow discord just the regime.
' In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these division and increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making these promises, men who on outward appearances, were merely conservative diplomats. It is true that Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of international obligations, as I shall show in a moment. It is true that the real trump in Germany's hand was its rearmament and more then that, its willingness to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various countries was not influenced by these considerations alone. always completely rational. We tend to believe what we want to believe. And if an apparently substantial and conservative person, like defendant Von Neurath, for example, is saying these things, one might be apt to believe them, or at least, to act upon that hypothesis. And it would be the more impressive if one were also under the impression that the person involved was not a Nazi and would not stoop to go along with the designs of the Nazis.
Germany's approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of limited expansion as the price of peace.
They a Locarno Air Pact.
In the case of both France and England, ly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's version:
"High ranking Nazis with when I had to maintain official undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's interest to do so.
Although these statements were openly make to me as expressed the same ideas publicly."
to counter Germany's moves.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon at 1640 hours the hearing of the Tribunal 1000 hours) (Whereupon at 1640 hours the hearing of the Tribunal 1000 hours) Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal:
Before I resume to the consideration of Mr. Messersmith's second affidavit, Document 2385-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 68, I should like to consider briefly the status of the evidence before this Tribunal, of the matter stated in the first Messersmith affidavit, introduced by the United States, Document 1760-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 57. You will recall that Mr. Messersmith, in that affidavit, made the following general statement: independence of Austria, in fact, it intended from the very beginning to conclude an Anschluss and that defendant Von Papen was working toward that end. have nothing to do with the Austrian Nazis, in fact they kept up contact with them and gave them support and instruction. force in Austria, if necessary, the Nazis were using quiet infiltrating tactics to weaken Austria internally, though the use of Christian-front personalities, who were not flagrantly Nazis, and could be called what they referred to as Nationalist opposition and through the device of developing new names for Nazi organizations, so that they could be brought into the Fatherland Front of Austria corporatively, that is as an entire group. in support of some of these general statements in the Messersmith affidavit. The excerpts I have already read out of the report from Rainer to Buerckel, enclosed in the letter to Seyss-Inquart, Document 812-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 61, showed first, that the Austrian Nazi groups kept up contacts with the Reich, although they did it secretly, in accordance with instructions from the Fuehrer.
as to be ready, in what they referred to, as an emergency. who had what they called good legal positions, but who could be trusted by the Nazis and that five days after the Pact of July 11, 1936, between Germany and Austria, a Pact which specifically pledged the German Government not to interfere, either directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of Austria, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, the Austrian Nazis met with Hitler at Obersalzburg and received new instructions, and finally, that Hitler then used Keppler, whose name we shall again meet in a short while in a significant manner, as his "contact man" with Austrian Nazis, with full authority to act for the Fuehrer in Austria, to work with the leaders of the Austrian Nazis.
Then we offered Document 2247-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 64, Von Papen's letter of July 27, 1935, which reviewed the situation one year after Dollfuss' death, and pointed out how National Socialism could be made to link for the Anschluss and how National Socialism could overcome the Austrian ideologies and in which he identified himself completely with the National Socialist goal.
We offered Document 2246-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 67, Von Papen's letter to Hitler of September 1, 1936, which showed how Von Papen advised using both economic and continuing psychological pressure, that he had conferences with leaders of the illegal Austrian Party; that he was trying to direct the next developments in such a way as to get corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front and that meanwhile he was not ready to urge that avowed National Socialists be put in prominent positions, but was quite satisfied with collaborators, like Glaise-Horsteneau.
I think that practically all of the statements in Mr. Messersmith's affidavits have been fully supported by these documents, German documents, which we have introduced. Certain parts of the affidavits cannot be corroborated by documents, in the very nature of things, and I refer specifically to Mr. Messersmith's conversation with the defendant Von Papen in 1934, which I read to the Tribunal yesterday.
But I think these matters are manifestly just as true and just as clear of the Defendant's guilt and complicity. Mr. Messersmith's second affidavit, 2385-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 68, relating to the diplomatic preparations for war. Prior to adjournment, I had read to the Tribunal excerpts, which established the following propositions: diplomatic agreements existing in 1983; first in the west, the Locarno Pact, supplemented by the French-Belgium agreement:
second, in the east, the Little Entente, including Czechoslovakia and Poland, and their respective mutual assistance pacts with France, the French-Polish Pact: third, as for Austria, the special concern of Italy for her independence, that is for Austrian independence. extravagant and sometimes inconsistent promises of territorial gain to countries in Southeastern Europe, including Hungary, and Poland.
In the third place, Mr. Messersmith wrote an official communication to the State Department, pointing out that persons like von Neurath and von Papen were able to work more effectively in making these promises and in doing their other work, just because they, and I quote, "propagated the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime." that Germany would honor her international obligations only so long as it suited her to do so. counter German moves, as I said yesterday. France made attempts to promote an East Locarno Pact and to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian powers. Italy's effort was to organize an economic block of Austria, Hungary, and Italy. But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling its policies of loot, by continuing its armament and by another very significant strategy, that is the Fifth Column strategy; that the Nazis stirred up internal dissension within neighboring countries to disunite and weaken their intended victims. Messersmith affidavit, Document 2385-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 68, the paragraph beginning in the middle of the page.
"At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal dissensions within these countries themselves and in Austria and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed to so weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro-Nazi and Fascist groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program.
Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over 6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein Party in the elections in the Spring of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria. It may be remarked here that this latter was one of the principal instruments and most effective ones which Nazi Germany used as the fear in Yugoslavia, in particular, of a restoration of the Hapsburgs was very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of Hungary to demand the recall of von Mackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in Poland she played on the fear of Communism and Communist Russia. In Rumania she aggravated the existing antisemitism, empha sizing the important role of the Jews in Rumanian industry and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also financed the Fascist Iron Guard through Codreneau.
"Such 'diplomatic' measures reinforced by Germany's vast rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary, and sufficient at least to deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to German designs, even if not enough to persuade them to actively ally themselves with Nazi Germany. Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would gain its ends and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was to play along with Germany." the detailed, official dispatches which Mr. Messersmith sent to the American State Department, showing that Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland were beginning to follow the German line.
As for Italy, Germany's initial objective was to sow discord between Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory, particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching an agreement with them and to block an East Locarno Pact. On that, I quote again from Document 2385-PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 68, the second Messersmith affidavit, on page 10, at the middle of the page in the English version:
"While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany's program in exchange for German support of Italy's plans in Abyssinia." German declaration or pact of 11 July, 1936.
Declaration or Pact of 11 July, 1936; and in the Fall of 1936, Germany extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy, in an alliance which they called the "Rome-Berlin Axis." This, together with Germany's alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on England, and greatly increased the relative strength of Germany. others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves, so that they could seriously consider plans for war, and begin to outline timetables, not binding timetables, and no specific ones, in terms of months and days, but still general timetables, in terms of the Germans, which were the necessary foundation for further aggressive planning, and a spur to more specific planning. That timetable was developed, as the Tribunal has already seen, in the conference of 5 November 1937, contained in our Document No. 386 PS, USA 25, the Hoszbach Minutes of that conference, which I adverted to in detail on Monday last. aggressive was in Europe, and to seize both Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in that order. shown first the purpose of the Nazi conspiracy, with respect to the absorption of Austria, and then the steps taken by them up to this period, that is, November 1937. preparations of the Nazi conspirators, with respect to their program in Europe, generally, and with respect to Austria, in particular. 5 November, 1937, in the light of this more-detailed background. It will be recalled that in that meeting, the Fuehrer insisted that Germany must have more space in Europe. He concluded that the space required must be taken by force; and three different possible cases were outlined for different eventualities, but all reaching the conclusion that the problem would certainly have to be solved before 1943 to 1945.