COL. STOREY: I think about 250 copies of each one, about 200 or 250 mimeographed copies.
(Laughter among defendants and counsel.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the defendants' counsel should have copies of these documents before any of them are handed to the press. I mean to say that in preference to gentlemen of the press, the defendants' counsel should have the documents.
COL. STOREY: Your Honor, if it pleases the court, I understand that these gentlemen had the ten documents on Saturday morning or Sunday morning. It had them for 24 hours, copies of the originals of these documents that have been read today, down in the information center.
THE PRESIDENT: I stated, in accordance with the provisional arrangements which was made, and which was made upon your representation, that ten copies of the trial briefs and five copies of the volumes of documents should be given to the defendants' counsel.
COL. STOREY: Sir, I had the receipts that they were deposited at the room.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am pointing out to you, Colonel Storey, that if 250 copies of the documents can be given to the press, then the defendants' counsel should not be limited to five copies.
COL. STOREY: If your honor please, the 250 copies are the mimeographed copies in English when they are introduced in evidence. I hold in my hands or in my briefcase here a receipt that the document books and the briefs were delivered 24 hours in advance.
THE PRESIDENT: You don't seem to understand what I am putting to you, which is this: that if you can afford to give 250 copies of the documents in English to the press, you can afford to give more than five copies of the defendants' counsel -- one each.
COL. STOREY: I see your point, your Honor-
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we needn't discuss it further. In the future that will be done.
DR. DIX: May I make the point that of the evidence documents, every defense counsel shall receive one copy and not simply one for several members of the defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: The aggressive war having been initiated in September, 1939, and Poland having been totally defeated shortly after the initial assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war into a general war of aggression extending into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into the Balkans. Under the division of the case between the four chief prosecutors, this aspect of the matter is left to presentation by the British chief prosecutor.
mention is that following the opening statement by the British chief prosecutor on Count 2, we expect to resume the detailed handling of the latter phases of the aggressive war phase of the case. The British instead of the Americans will deal with the details of the aggression against Poland. Then with this expansion of the war in Europe and as a joint part of the American case under Count 1 and the British case under Count 2, I shall take up the aggression against Russia and the Japanese aggression in detail. So that the remaining two subjects with which I shall ultimately deal in more detail, namely by presentation of significant documents, is the case of the attack on the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on the 22nd of June 1941, and the case on collaboration between Italy and Japan and Germany and the resulting attack on the United States on the 7th of December, 1941. this point, present two documents. The first of these two documents establishes the premeditation and deliberation which preceded the attack. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had a code name for the secret operation "Case Green", so in the case of aggression in the Soviet Union, they had a code name "Case Barbarossa".
THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that?
MR. ALDERMAN : B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a- after Barbarossa of Kaiser Friederich. From the files of the OKW at Flensburg we have a secret directive, Number 21, issued from the Fuehrer's Headquarters on 18 December 1940, relating to Case Barbarossa. This directive is more than six months in advance of the attack. Other evidence will show that the planning occurred even earlier. The document is signed by Hitler and is initialled by the defendant Jodl and the defendant Keitel. This secret order was issued in nine copies. The captured document is the fourth of these nine copies. It is Numbered Document 446 P-S, in our numbered series.
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 31.
the first page of that directive. The first page of the English translation. The paging may be different on the German original.
It is headed "The Fuehrer and commander-in-chief of the German Armed Forces" with a number of initials, the meaning of which I do not know, except OKW. It seems to be indicated to go to GK Chiefs, which I suppose to be General Kommando Chiefs. "The Fuehrer's Headquarters, 18 December 1940. Secret. Only through Officer. Nine copies. 4th copy. Directive Number 21, case Barbarossa.
"The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa) the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks. forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down. against England also during an Eastern campaign. against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations. been done - to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941. not be recognized. basis: I. General Purpose:
In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the the general line Volga-Archangelsk.
In case of necessity, the last through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps that would be a convenient time to adjourn for ten minutes.
(The court then, at 3:41 p.m. took a recess)
MR. ALDERMAN: If it please the Tribunal, another secret document captured from the OKW files, we think, establishes the motive for the attack on the Soviet Union. It also establishes the full awareness of the Nazi conspirators of the crimes against humanity which would result from their attack. The document is a memorandum of 2 May, 1941, concerning the results of a discussion on that day with the State Secretaries concerning the Barbarossa. The document will be an issue by a member of the Soviet Staff, about General Thomas, set up to handle the economic exploitation of the territory occupied by the Germans during the course of the aggression against Russia. The document is numbered 2718-PS, and our numbered series of documents are offered in evidence as Exhibit USA 32. the introductory matter:
"Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files la." ing attack on the United States on 7 December, 1941. With the unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet Union in June, 1941, the Nazi conspirators and, in particular, the Defendant Ribbentrop, called upon the Eastern co-architect of the New Order, Japan, to attack in the rear.
Our evidence will show that they incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result In an attack on the United States.
For a time, they maintained their purpose with the preference that the United States not be involved in the conflict, realizing the military implication of an entry of the United States into the War. However, their incitement did result in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and long prior to that attack, they had assured the Japanese that they would declare War on the United States should a United States-Japanese conflict occur. It was in reliance on those assurances that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor. I shall offer only one document to prove this point. The document was captured from the files of the German Foreign Office. It consists of notes dated 4 April 1941, signed by "Schmidt," regarding discussions between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop. The document is numbered 1881-PS in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 33. In the original, it is in very large typewritten form In German. I shall read what I deem to be the pertinent parts of this document, beginning with the four paragraphs, first reading the heading being, "***second copy to General Schubert, Key 2, 1941.
Memorandum; About the result of to-day discussion with "1) The war can only be continued if al 1 armed "2.) There is no doubt that as a result many take out of the country the things necessary for us."
from in Mr. Justice Jackson's opening statement. The staggering implications of that document are hard to realize.
In the words of the document, the motive for the attack was that the War which the Nazi conspirators had launched in September, 1939, can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by Russia in the third year of the War. Perhaps there never was a more sinister sentence written than the sentence in this document which reads:
"There is no doubt that as a result many millions the country the things necessary for us."
* * * * "MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, that the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission.
Japan inventions."
the German original.
"Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States.
In case that the country should decide Great Britain.
He (Matsuoka) personally believed, Britain.
Army and Navy had, however, to count on the out in the South Sea.
For this reason the German greatest value to Japan.
It was a question how "To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese these developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.
"The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowance for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contribution depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so, that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldier naturally ranks high above the American.
"In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would got involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first got involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently. Therefore Germany would strike,as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.
"Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at thedisposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.
"As regards Japanese - American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America?
Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.
"The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces. He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.
"Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.
"The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
"The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.
give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear pisture of the real at*ude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign minister regarding his plans. This would **use him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule to always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have a study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.
"Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of convistion, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.
"On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.
"Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.
"The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.
"Matsouka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.
"The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.
"Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.
"signed; SCHMIDT."
This completes the presentation of what I have called the "handful of selected documents," offered not as a detailed treatment of any of these wars of aggression but merely to prove the deliberate planning, the deliberate premeditation with which each of these aggressions was carried out. the various stages of the aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until ten o'clock tomorrow.
(Whereupon, at 1645 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 27 November 1945, at 1000 hours.)
Military Tribunal, in the matter of; The
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States. Mr Alderman, before you begin, I think it would be better, for the purpose of the Tribunal, in citing documents if you would refer to them not only by the United States Exhibit Number and the Peer Exhibit Number, but also by the document book identification. Each document book, as I understand it, has either a letter or a number.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Court please, I am not familiar with the identification numbers of the document book. I suppose the clerk can give them to me.
THE PRESIDENT: They are numbered alphabetically, I think.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: If that is not done, when we have a great number of document books before us, it is very difficult to find where the particular exhibit is.
MR. ALDERMAN: I can see that, yes. which I presented on yesterday constitute a cross section of the aggressive war case as a whole. They do not purport to cover the details of any of the phases of the aggressive war case. In effect they do amount to a running account of the entire matter. be helpful to pause at this point to present to the Tribunal a chart. This chart presents visually some of the key points in the development of the Nazi aggression. The Tribunal may find it helpful as a kind of visual summary of some of the evidence received yesterday and also as a background for some of the evidence which remains to be introduced. I am quite certain that as your minds go back to those days, you remember the maps that appeared from time to time in the public press as these tremendous movements developed in Europe. I am quite certain that you must have formed the concept, as I did, in those days of the gradually developing head of a wolf.
In that first chart (indicating) you only have an incipient wolf. He lacks a lower jaw, the port shown in red, but when that wolf moved forward and took over Austria, the Anschluss, that red portion became solid black. It became the jaw of the wolf, and when that lower jaw was acquired, Czechoslovakia was already with its head and the main part of its body in the mouth of the wolf.
Then on chart two you see the mountainous-.portions, the fortified portions, of Czechoslovakia. In rod you see the Sudetenland territories which were first taken over by the Pact of Munich, whereupon Czechoslovakia's head became diminished in the month of the wolf. practically broken, and all that was necessary was the taking over of Bohemia and Moravia and the wolf's head became a solid, black blot on the map of Europe, with arrows indicating incipient further aggressions, which, of course, occurred. of my mind, because it seems to demonstrate the inevitability of everything that went along after the taking over of Austria." aggressive war case will be divided into seven distinct sections. The first section is that concerning preparation for aggression during the period of 1933 to 1936, roughly. The second section deals with aggression against Austria. The third section deals with aggression against Czechslovakia. The fourth section deals with aggression against Poland and the initiation of actual, war. For reasons of convenience, the details of the Polish section will be presented after the British Chief Prosecutor presents his opening statement to the Tribunal. The fifth section deals with the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression by invasions into Scandinavia, the Lowlands and the Balkans. The details on this section of the case will be presented by the British Chief Prosecutor. The sixth section deals with aggression against the Soviet Union, which we shall expect to present.
For reasons of convenience again, the details on this section, like the details on aggression against Poland, will be presented after the British Prosecutor has made his opening statement to the Tribunal. The seventh section will deal with collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggression against the United States. concerning preparation for aggression during the period 1933 to 1936. The particular section of the indictment to which this discussion addresses itself is Paragraph IV (F) and sub-paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c),(d) (e), and (f), which I need not read at a glance, as the Tribunal will recall the allegation.