"On Goering's question, the Fuehrer decided that:
a) The armed forces determine what shall be built.
b) In the shipbuilding program, nothing is to be changed.
c) The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 or 1944.
"Schmundt certified this text.
MR ALDERMAN: Mr President, the translation was closer than I had anticipated.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR ALDERMAN: We think, as I have just said, that this document leaves nothing unproved in those allegations in the indictment. It demonstrates that the nazi conspirators were proceeding in accordance with a plan. It demonstrates the cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. It demonstrates that the questions concerning Danzig, which the nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of aggressive expansion for food and lebensraum. initiation of war in September 1939, I must bring to the attention of the Tribunal a group of documents concerning an address by Hitler to his chief military commanders, at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939, just one week prior to the launching of the attack on Poland. group. The first one, I do not intend to offer as evidence. The other two, I shall offer.
The reason for that is this: The first of the three documents came into our possession through the medium of an American newspaperman, and purported to be original minutes of this meeting at Obersalzberg, transmitted to this American newspaperman by some other person; and we had no proof of the actual delivery to the intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document, therefore, merely served to alert our prosecution to see if it could find something better, Fortunately, we did get the other two documents, which indicate that Hitler on that day made two speeches, perhaps one in the morning, one in the afternoon, as indicated by the original munites, which we captured.
By comparison of those two documents with the first document, we conclude that the first document was a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches. three supreme commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the commanding generals, bearing the title "Oberbefehlshabers," Commandersin-Chief. prosecution set out to find better evidence of what happened on this day. In this the prosecution succeeded. In the files of the OKW at Flensberg, the Oberkomnando der Wehrmacht, Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, there were uncovered two speeches delivered by Hitler at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. These are numbered documents, Numbers 798 PS and 1014 PS, in our series of documents. we have had the first document, which I do not intend to offer, marked for identification EXHIBIT USA 28 For Identification. Accordingly, I offer the second document, 798 PS in evidence as EXHIBIT USA 29; and the third document, 1014 PS as EXHIBIT USA 30. I shall not necessarily read the entire speech. Commanders in Chief on 22 August 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to show where the speech took place?
MR ALDERMAN: Obersalzberg.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that?
MR ALDERMAN: You mean on the document?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR ALDERMAN: I am afraid the indication "Obersalzberg," came from the first document which I have not offered in evidence. I have no doubt that the defendants will admit that Obersalzberg was the place of this speech.
The place is not significant; it is the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR ALDERMAN: (Reading) "I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you my have insight into the individual clement on which I base my decision to act, and in order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss militray details.
"It was clear to me that a confict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in Spring." (I interpolate, I think he is there referring to the May document, which I have already read, L-79.) "But I thought I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in order to fight first against the West, but this plan which was agreeable to me could not be executed, since essential points have changed.
"It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a conflict in the West.
"Poland wants access to the sea.
"The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an unopportune moment.
"I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two personal constitions (Isuppose he means "personalities."
That probably is an inapt translation), my own personality, and that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, because of my political activity. ( I interpolate: to comment on the tremendous significance of the fact of a war which engulfed almost the whole world, dependings on one man's personality.)
"Furthermore, the fact that probable no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority. My existence is, therefore, a factorof great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.
"The second personal factor is II Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy's loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy. v "The third factor, favorable for us is France. We can ask only benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco's personality He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a facist Party of our internal unity.
"On the other side ,a negative picture, as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England of France. (I interpolate: I think Adolf Hitler must have overlooked one in England , perhaps many.) (Mr Alderman continues:)
"For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to lose:we can only gain. Our econmic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must act. Our opponents risk much and gain only little. Englans's stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities, no masters, no men of action.
I interpolate again. Perhaps that last sentence explains what he meant by no personalities -- no masters having authority thst he had over his nation.
"Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for us,; in the Mediterranean rivalry amont to Italy, France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.
"The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved: Conflict between England and Ireland, the south African Union became more independent, concessions had to be made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries . A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.
"France's position has also deteriorated, particularly in the Mediterranean .
"Further favorable factors for us are these:
"Since Albania there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation .
"Rumania did not grow stringer. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hunary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been rule by small minds, insteady weak men.
"All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in two to three years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.
"The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.
"The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propostitions to Polandthe Danzig corridor, were disturbed by England's intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The initative cannot be allowed to pass to others. This moment is more favorablethan in two to three years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could only change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures.
They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later."
"Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution." A long discussion follows which I think it is unnecessary to read, and then towards the end, I resume: "We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation." And then the last paragraph of one sentence: "Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty." entitled, "Second Speech by the Fuehrer on 22 August 1939." Reading then from United States Exhibit 30, headed, "Second Speech by the Fuehrer on 22 August 1939:
"It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade-barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations. Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers. Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, greatest confidences, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each other, but me. We have the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisites were not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only through his mental power.
"Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.
"I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.
"Have no pity. Brutal attitude. 80,000,000 people shall get what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest has the Right. Greatest severity.
"Quick decision necessary. Unshakable faith in the German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders give way.
"First aim: advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war of atrition.
"New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until complete elimination "Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements.
The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning."
That ends the exhibit. The Tribunal will recall that in fact the start was actually postponed until September 1.
DR. STAHMER: I should like to make a statement or explanation of these last two read documents, both the documents that were read as well as the third that was not read, but however which was taken into consideration, are not recognized by the Defense. In order to avoid the appearance that this objection has been raised without due reason, I should like to justify it as follows: Both the documents that were read contain a number of factual mistakes. They are not signed. Moreover, only one meeting took place, and this is the cense for the lack of precision of the documents. No one in that meeting was commissioned with taking down stenographically the events in the meeting, and since all signatures are lacking, it can not be determined who wrote them or who is responsible for their reliability. The third document that was not read is, according to the photostatic copy in the Defense's document room, simply written by typewriter.
There is no indication of place nor time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have nothing to do with the third document because it has not been read.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document has nevertheless been published in the press and was apparently given to the press by the prosecution. Both the defense and the defendants have consequently a lively interest in giving a short explanation of the facts concerning this document.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is trying this case in accordance with the evidence and not in accordance with what is in the press, and the third document is not in evidence before us.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize that counsel wonder how these two documents which I have just read are in our hands. They come to us from an authentic source. They are German documents. They were found in the OKW files. If they aren't correct records of what occurred, it surprises us that with the thoroughness with which the Germans kept accurate records, they would have had these records in their OKW files that didn't represent the truth.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal will of course hear what evidence the defendants choose to give with reference to the documents.
MR. ALDERMAN: It has occurred to me in that connection that if any of these defendants have in their possession what is a more correct transcription of what the Fuehrer said on this occasion, the court should consider that. On the other question referred to by counsel, I feel somewhat guilty. It is quite true that by a mechanical slip, the press got the first document, which we never at all intended them to have. I feel somewhat responsible. It happened to be included in the document books that were handed up to the court on Friday, because we had only intended to refer to it and give it an identification mark and not to offer it. I had thought that no documents would be released to the press until they were actually offered in evidence. With as large an organization as we have, it is very difficult to police all those matters.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal would like to know how many of these documents are given to the press.
MR. ALDERMAN: I can't answer that.
COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, it is my understanding that as and when documents are introduced in evidence, then they are made available to the press.
THE PRESIDENT: In what numbers?
COL. STOREY: I think about 250 copies of each one, about 200 or 250 mimeographed copies.
(Laughter among defendants and counsel.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the defendants' counsel should have copies of these documents before any of them are handed to the press. I mean to say that in preference to gentlemen of the press, the defendants' counsel should have the documents.
COL. STOREY: Your Honor, if it pleases the court, I understand that these gentlemen had the ten documents on Saturday morning or Sunday morning. It had them for 24 hours, copies of the originals of these documents that have been read today, down in the information center.
THE PRESIDENT: I stated, in accordance with the provisional arrangements which was made, and which was made upon your representation, that ten copies of the trial briefs and five copies of the volumes of documents should be given to the defendants' counsel.
COL. STOREY: Sir, I had the receipts that they were deposited at the room.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am pointing out to you, Colonel Storey, that if 250 copies of the documents can be given to the press, then the defendants' counsel should not be limited to five copies.
COL. STOREY: If your honor please, the 250 copies are the mimeographed copies in English when they are introduced in evidence. I hold in my hands or in my briefcase here a receipt that the document books and the briefs were delivered 24 hours in advance.
THE PRESIDENT: You don't seem to understand what I am putting to you, which is this: that if you can afford to give 250 copies of the documents in English to the press, you can afford to give more than five copies of the defendants' counsel -- one each.
COL. STOREY: I see your point, your Honor-
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we needn't discuss it further. In the future that will be done.
DR. DIX: May I make the point that of the evidence documents, every defense counsel shall receive one copy and not simply one for several members of the defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: The aggressive war having been initiated in September, 1939, and Poland having been totally defeated shortly after the initial assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war into a general war of aggression extending into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into the Balkans. Under the division of the case between the four chief prosecutors, this aspect of the matter is left to presentation by the British chief prosecutor.
mention is that following the opening statement by the British chief prosecutor on Count 2, we expect to resume the detailed handling of the latter phases of the aggressive war phase of the case. The British instead of the Americans will deal with the details of the aggression against Poland. Then with this expansion of the war in Europe and as a joint part of the American case under Count 1 and the British case under Count 2, I shall take up the aggression against Russia and the Japanese aggression in detail. So that the remaining two subjects with which I shall ultimately deal in more detail, namely by presentation of significant documents, is the case of the attack on the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on the 22nd of June 1941, and the case on collaboration between Italy and Japan and Germany and the resulting attack on the United States on the 7th of December, 1941. this point, present two documents. The first of these two documents establishes the premeditation and deliberation which preceded the attack. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had a code name for the secret operation "Case Green", so in the case of aggression in the Soviet Union, they had a code name "Case Barbarossa".
THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that?
MR. ALDERMAN : B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a- after Barbarossa of Kaiser Friederich. From the files of the OKW at Flensburg we have a secret directive, Number 21, issued from the Fuehrer's Headquarters on 18 December 1940, relating to Case Barbarossa. This directive is more than six months in advance of the attack. Other evidence will show that the planning occurred even earlier. The document is signed by Hitler and is initialled by the defendant Jodl and the defendant Keitel. This secret order was issued in nine copies. The captured document is the fourth of these nine copies. It is Numbered Document 446 P-S, in our numbered series.
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 31.
the first page of that directive. The first page of the English translation. The paging may be different on the German original.
It is headed "The Fuehrer and commander-in-chief of the German Armed Forces" with a number of initials, the meaning of which I do not know, except OKW. It seems to be indicated to go to GK Chiefs, which I suppose to be General Kommando Chiefs. "The Fuehrer's Headquarters, 18 December 1940. Secret. Only through Officer. Nine copies. 4th copy. Directive Number 21, case Barbarossa.
"The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa) the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks. forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down. against England also during an Eastern campaign. against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations. been done - to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941. not be recognized. basis: I. General Purpose:
In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the the general line Volga-Archangelsk.
In case of necessity, the last through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps that would be a convenient time to adjourn for ten minutes.
(The court then, at 3:41 p.m. took a recess)
MR. ALDERMAN: If it please the Tribunal, another secret document captured from the OKW files, we think, establishes the motive for the attack on the Soviet Union. It also establishes the full awareness of the Nazi conspirators of the crimes against humanity which would result from their attack. The document is a memorandum of 2 May, 1941, concerning the results of a discussion on that day with the State Secretaries concerning the Barbarossa. The document will be an issue by a member of the Soviet Staff, about General Thomas, set up to handle the economic exploitation of the territory occupied by the Germans during the course of the aggression against Russia. The document is numbered 2718-PS, and our numbered series of documents are offered in evidence as Exhibit USA 32. the introductory matter:
"Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files la." ing attack on the United States on 7 December, 1941. With the unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet Union in June, 1941, the Nazi conspirators and, in particular, the Defendant Ribbentrop, called upon the Eastern co-architect of the New Order, Japan, to attack in the rear.
Our evidence will show that they incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result In an attack on the United States.
For a time, they maintained their purpose with the preference that the United States not be involved in the conflict, realizing the military implication of an entry of the United States into the War. However, their incitement did result in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and long prior to that attack, they had assured the Japanese that they would declare War on the United States should a United States-Japanese conflict occur. It was in reliance on those assurances that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor. I shall offer only one document to prove this point. The document was captured from the files of the German Foreign Office. It consists of notes dated 4 April 1941, signed by "Schmidt," regarding discussions between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop. The document is numbered 1881-PS in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 33. In the original, it is in very large typewritten form In German. I shall read what I deem to be the pertinent parts of this document, beginning with the four paragraphs, first reading the heading being, "***second copy to General Schubert, Key 2, 1941.
Memorandum; About the result of to-day discussion with "1) The war can only be continued if al 1 armed "2.) There is no doubt that as a result many take out of the country the things necessary for us."
from in Mr. Justice Jackson's opening statement. The staggering implications of that document are hard to realize.
In the words of the document, the motive for the attack was that the War which the Nazi conspirators had launched in September, 1939, can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by Russia in the third year of the War. Perhaps there never was a more sinister sentence written than the sentence in this document which reads:
"There is no doubt that as a result many millions the country the things necessary for us."
* * * * "MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, that the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission.
Japan inventions."
the German original.
"Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States.
In case that the country should decide Great Britain.
He (Matsuoka) personally believed, Britain.
Army and Navy had, however, to count on the out in the South Sea.
For this reason the German greatest value to Japan.
It was a question how "To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese these developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.