DR. LATERNSER: The most glaring expression of the absurdity of this "group experiment", however, is given by the insertion of Himmler into the circle of those Army officers. It is a well-known fact that Himmler was the deadly enemy of the Army, and that the leaders of the Armed forces and those of the Waffen SS had no associations with each other except these conditioned by purely military operations at the front line. It is just the inclusion of Hitler and of some of the leaders of the Waffen SS which constitute a convincing proof against the existence of this really impossible institution. with an "organization" The military leaders were not simultaneously in their service posts, but often reached thorn in so widely separated periods, that only a fraction of them might have simultaneously held the quality of membership. This is shown most clearly by the chart submitted to the Tribunal, According to those charts, only seven generals in 1938, only twenty-two generals on the first of November, 1939, only thirty-one generals on the 22 of June, 1941, and only fifty-one generals in November, 1944, that is to say, by far not even half of the indicted officers were in the positions covered by the indictment. officers. Every one of thorn, it is true, was subjected to one single will above has own but only in a military respect, and not as regards an existing association in the manner of an organization. How could these officers, at any time, have been able to appoint organs of their own for the expression of their will? The constant change in the service posts concerned would have excluded any such possibility. Only nine generals and admirals occupied service positions for the whole duration of the war, which would enable them to be included among the so-called "group". On February 4, 1938, only six generals held such service posts. Twenty-one generals held service Poses coming under the so-called "group" only for periods of from the to two and a half years. Sixty-one officers are counted as belonging to the group, although they did not hold the corresponding service posts even for a year.
was absent which would have regulated the acquisition of membership in, on the resignation from, the group, its powers and the activity of its organs their election or appointment. There existed not a single written or oral provision or clause dealing with any kind of community. The Prosecution were, therefore, unable to submit even one single document, proving the existence of a "group" or an "organization." to prove on the strength of the statements made by Generals von Brauchitsch, Halter and Blaskowitz that a "group" did exist, have proved to be quite unsuitable for this purpose as a consequence of the rectifications which were subsequently made. The hearings of field Marshal von Brauchitsch before this Court, and of Col. Gen. Halder before the Commission, have shown that the identical affidavits of both generals constituted a condensed version of several interviews, drawn up by the interrogating officer and submitted to them for signature, and that these written statements were unintelligible in all the points whichare of decisive importance in this question, without the additional explanations given by the witnesses at the moment when they signed these statements. Consequently, the interpretation given to those statements by the Prosecution is wrong. The corrections which have now been made have now been refuted, have thus deprived the Prosecution of its main argument, and of every proof in favor of a "group" formation.
The same applies to the affidavits of Col. Gen. Blaskowitz, which was submitted to the Tribunal in the course of these proceedings. They have also been rectified and completed by affidavit No. 65. Thus, the conclusions drawn by the Prosecution have also in this case proved to be wrong. Nor has a joint action of the organization which might be considered as the expression of the latter's collective will been proved in any of the cases under consideration. It is, by the way, quite impossible to give such proof as this circle of officers had neither by law nor by nature the capacity to negotiate, and could, therefore, not have exercised any joint action as a organization.
kind of an organization might be inferred. The Prosecution are quite wrong when they believe that they can use the military discussions with Hitler, and additional meetings of Field Commanders, as a proof of their theory. the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army groups, or Armies, as was the case in several instances, this was always done for purely military purposes, and the discussions were exclusively concerned with military questions. The work of the Commanders-in-Chief on widely dispersed theaters of operations and their permanent and complete absorption by their military duties, made it impossible from the very outset that they should meet for reasons other than purely military ones. For the same reason, not even the highest military commanders maintained close contact, be it only for the reason that the often mentioned Fuehrer order No. 1 limited the knowledge of each and every one of those Commanders-in-Chief to his own sphere, whatever his position might be. As the three service branches, apart from their operational cooperation in individual cases, existed side by side in complete independence, joint discussions of the Commanders from the various service branches were hold for this reason only on some rare occasions.
If the Prosecution have referred to an affidavit by Col. Gen. Blaskowitz in order to prove the contrary, the latter's supplementary Affidavit No. 55 has shown that he was misunderstood also on this point. in the meaning of the Prosecution. The Prosecution have wrongly interpreted events resulting from the purely military execution of certain tasks. of the existence of an institution similar to an organization, as they were hold -- and this was repeatedly explained in the course of those proceedings merely in order to allow the participants to listen to a speech by Hitler, and to receive his orders subsequently. Looked at from the point of view of the Commanders, these meetings, therefore, and a purely military character.
I may, therefore, sum up the position as follows:
1. The 129 officers concerned merely represent a multiplicity of 2. The designation of "General Staff" and "High Command" is erroneous 3. The circle of officers concerned was neither a "group" nor an "organization" nor an institution similar to an organization.
4. Membership, which is clearly defined in any organization, had in this case to be the subject of long drawn out explanations.
5. None of the officers has ever formally joined an organization, nor have they ever been conscious of having joined an organization or of having been members of it. Most of the so-called "members" did not even know each other personally, their attitude to the ruling regime was widely divergent.
6. There has never been an acting "organ of association", never a "constitution" or a "charter," There has never been a "will of the association" in evidence, nor has any "action of association" been recognizable, 7. The officers concerned, whose names and number we know exactly, can therefore be rendered responsible only as individuals, and only in respect of crimes which they have personally committed.
They were never grouped together collectively, and therefore, they cannot now be grouped together collectively, merely in order to facilitate their punishment. were once to be condemned by a collective verdict on account of a kind of crime against humanity. They had failed to bury their dead. speech, and demanded that the Tribunal should safeguard the principle which was the absolutely indispensable condition of any just verdict, namely; That every military leader could only be indicted as an individual, and sentenced only in accordance with the measure of his personal guilt.
In those days, Socrates enforced his opinion. The Tribunal maintained the principle in spite of the opposition of public opinion, and refused to render a collective verdict. has been looked upon as a fundamental principle of law for the last 2,000 years? are impossible, be it only for the reasons which I have just presented. The Tribunal will have toreject the motion to declare the so-called "General Staff and "High Command" group as a criminal organization.
associating oneself with it -- the "criminality" of the whole of the 129 officers would have to be examined. That means it must be ascertained whether this group as a whole has committed crimes in the meaning of Article Six of the charter. My answer to this question is in the negative. to have at any time combined with the Nazi party for a common plan, having as its object wars of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, presupposes that such a general plan existed, that it was known as a common plan, and finally, that the military leaders, as a whole, had made this plan their own. group of persons as a whole. But I think I have already proved that there existed no such "organization" or "group" as an acting entity of these persons. The Prosecution goes around this unavoidable difficulty by assorting that, 1. The character and the action of the five military chief defendants are characteristic of the whole of the 129 officers, and 2. That, moreover, there is no doubt as to the criminal character of the whole group of these officers.
human actions which are the subject of this trial have been considered as crimes over since the time of Cain, I reply with the sentence that since the days of Cain, it has been claimed that the just shall not be destroyed together with the unjust in the expiation of crimes. The requirement of individual expiation of crimes committed is among the oldest elements of European morals. victorious nations in practice to reach a similar decision in 107 individual trials on the individual guilt or innocence of these 107 living men, as it is being done in the trial against the five military chief defendants. Where is the in or justification of and the legal necessity for, a collective trial against these men? The innocent individual is only too easily destroyed by a preconceived collective verdict.
of the five main defendants are not "with absolute certainty" typical also for the other members of the so-called "group" and thus simultaneously of the criminal character of the "group"itself, is contradicted by actual circumstance The membership in the"group" is subordinated exclusively to the holding of certain service posts. Typical in respect of the "group"is, therefore, only holder of the typical service post. As 95% of the officers concerned were Commanders-in-Chief of Armies or Army groups, the holders of these posts might possibly be considered as typical for the "group" as such, but this can on no condition be said of the five main defendants, not a single one of whomever held such a post. untypical as their service posts do not reappear in the case of any other members of the "group." There is no second chief of the High Command or Chief of the Operations Staff in it, nor is there a second Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and there is certainly not a second Reich marshal. As the main defendants occupy a higher level in the military hierarchy as the typical military leaders, their position is different in respect of the decisive points If one or the other of themain defendants may perhaps have had a theoretical possibility to influence the military resolutions of the Supreme Leadership, the typical member of the group did not even have this theoretical possibility. If the main defendants, at least in their own sphere, knew relationships and backgrounds of orders given, or could obtain such knowledge, this was impossible to the typical member of the group. If in the case of the main defendants, contact with policy was unavoidable because they were at the highest levels, even this possibility was completely absent in the case of the Field Commander. The short observation strikingly shows the arbitrary character of the indictment, pressing together heterogeneous elements, and extending without further ado to the whole of the heterogeneous elements reproaches which the prosecution rightly or wrongly believe they can put forward against the main defendants. observations, I shall, therefore, not deal with the untypical main defendants, but only with those members who can be considered as typical of the overwhelming majority of the "group" only the attitude which these members adopted towards the alleged plans of the Nazis, only their knowledge of these plans and only the extent to which they cooperated in their execution could be used at all, in the meaning of the Prosecution, to build an a charge against the "group". and look for other responsible parties.
But nobody can deny that Hitler alone held the power of the Reich in his hands, and consequently, also held the sol and total responsibility. The essence of every dictatorship ultimately lies in the fact that one man's will is almighty, that his will is decisive in all matters. In no other dictatorship was this principle developed so exclusively as in Hitler's dictatorship. If all military men and all politicians keep repeating this again and again, it is impossible to suspect each and every one of them of lack of courage to stand by his conviction, but it oust have been fact. The dictator exercised the power given to him with an almost demon-like strength of will. Besides him, there was no other will, no other plan, no other conspiracy. As regards the soldiers, it was particularly significant that Hitler had been called upon to assume power by Reich President von Hindenburg, and had then been made unlimited head of State by Reich law and public plebescite. The perfectly legal and formally correct transfer of legislative power, and of the power to give orders, produced the result that also the soldiers submitted to Hitler's personality. Furthermore, he knew how to play off one against the other, but in his decisive resolutions, he had neither advisers nor did he allow independent planning.
Hitler's person is truly comparable with that of Lucifer: Just as Lucifer starts out on his radiant course of light with tremendous speed and immense momentum, gains the supreme summit and the falls down into the deepest darkness, so Hitler followed a similar course. Who ever heard that a Lucifer needed assistance, advisors, or helpers in his lightening ascension? Does he not rather, by the force of his personality carry with him to the heights all the others, and then pulls them down into the depths with the same force?
Is it imaginable that a man of this kind should have engaged in a long term preparation of a plan, surrounded himself with a circle of conspirators, and sought their advice and assistance for his rise?
It is not the intention of this picture to elude responsibility: Every German general is enough of a man to stand up for his actions, but if justice is to be found, the actual circumstances, as they really were, must be recognized, and serve as a basis for the finding of justice. The best proof, howover, against the participation of the generals in Hitler's plans, is given by Hitler himself when he says: "I do not expect my genera's to understand my orders. I expect the generals to follow them". the military leaders as such -- again grouped together under the misleading collective term "General Staff" -- who have the misfortune that the German officer is under the prejudice that he is possessed not by a soldierly but by a "militaristic" mentality. Literature and the press of the world declare with many voices that the German officer does not exercise his soldier's profession only as a duty, but that to him war -- as the center of all his planning and scheming -- constitutes the highest value of all personal and national life. The American Chief Prosecutor defines this idea by saying that "the war is a noble and necessary occupation for all Germans". Corps had been directed for generations, so it is assorted, exclusively to aggression, conquest, domination, and violation of other nations.
It may sometimes be difficult to refute prejudices, -- but to prove this slogan to be unfounded nonsense is rather easy: The attitude and the mentality, which find its characteristic expression, in the General Staff, are known to have been created by men like Frederick the Great, Scharnhorst, Moltke, Schlieffen and Seeckt. If we search the life and the writings of these men for evidence of militaristic spirit, the result is distinctly negative. Hardly ever did a monarch meet with such an enthusiastic praise as Frederick the Great found in the works of the Englishman, Thomas Carlyle and the American George Bancroft, who says in his "History of the United States" that Frederick the Great did a contribute less to the freedom of the world than Washington and Pitt.
Helmet von Moltke, who formed the personality of the German General Staff officer like nobody else before and after him, expressly calls war the last means of safeguarding the existence, the independence and the honor of a state." He, furthermore, declared: "It is to be hoped that this last means will be appli ever more seldomly with our progressing culture. Who would wish to deny that every war, even a victorious one, constitutes a misfortune for one's own nation, because no territorial aggrandisement, no war contribution amounting to billions, can replace the loss of life and offset the grief of mourning families."
Von Moltke's most famous successor, Count Schlieffen, was the author of the often misinterpreted slogan: "To be more than to appear" Which requir of every General Staff officer modesty, quiet work, and absolute renunciation of personal distinction in public. difference existing between this mentality and that of the National Socialist younger Moltke, who was at its head, was a man of resignation, who as an Anthroposophis was even further removed from militaristic conceptions than al his predecessors: As regards, finally, Col. General von Sceckt, the creator the Reichswehr, his principles as laid down in his programmatic essay on the subject "Statesmen and General" published in 1923, are such that this essay could, without essential alterations, he immediately included in any handbook for British, American or French officers. Field Marshal von Mackensen, who was a man who must be considered, together with Hindenburg, as the chief representative of 17111 am II's Officer Carps. On the day when he gave the orders for the great break-through in the battle of Gorlice -- it was the 28th of April, 1915 -- he wrote down the fallowing lines:
"Today my expectations center around a murderous battle......
cost of considerable losses. How many death sentences does my order of attack involve?
It is this idea that wieghs heavily on driven by unavoidable necessity.
How many of the strong and That is the reverse side of a military leader's job".These, therefore, are the facts:
How little have the leading men among the German generals been formed in accordance with the picture drawn of them by an envious, biased or uninformed propaganda in the world. To make this for once quite clear, is, I think, a by which I have to fulfill in this unique trial of historic importance;
Has the German Officer Corps, and in particular, have the German generals changed since 1933? Have they, under Hitler, become disloyal to their teacher, and drifted into a "militaristic" back water? Has the spirit of a Moltke, of a Schlieffen, of a Seeckt become extinct in them? Have the generals turned to a criminal Nazi plan and taken an active part in it? I believe that the facts speak a language of sufficient clarity.
The "common plan", the "conspiracy", with the object of an extension of power which was finally to lead to aggressive war, was at first and primarily, as the Prosecution emphasized again and again, aimed at the subjugation of their own nation, at the extermination of all elements of opposition in their own people. In this process, so the Prosecution alleges, the foundations and experiences required for the planned subjugation and extermination of other nations were to be gained. all circumstances by an inner agreement of the military leaders with these alleged objectives and principles.
What were the facts? Relations between the Officer Corps and the Party were anything but good. When the Party was entrusted with the leadership in all spheres of public life, as well as in the creation of a totalitarian control of trade end industry, the Officer Corps had been given no opportunity to express an opinion. The Officer Corps participated in no political decision. Excesses of high party officials, terrorist methods of the Party, action against the Jews, the political education of the young generation, and the anti-Church attitude adopted by the Party under the leadership of Hitler and Bormann were sharply rejected. The attempt of the SA to take the place of the Armed Forces, and that of the SS to constitute a second Armed Force besides the Wehrmacht, not with the strongest opposition. looked like: Where, then, was the ideological foundation which alone would have rendered common planning possible? Hitler's personality excluded every plan and every conspiracy below, besides, or with him. As regards the military leaders, there was no room, neither under the Constitution, nor in fact, for the pursuit and representation of political aims or political plans. Beyond that, warnings arose from among the indicted officers against the policy pursued since 1935, which later on proved to be a "va banque" policy.
The Chief of the General Staff risked his post and his person to call a halt to the fateful doings of a head of State, resolved to go to extremes. From among the same quarters, a coup d'etat was finally attempted right in the middle of the war. Is there anyone who can still seriously assert that the mentality of those non, their planning and their scheming, was directed only to war and to nothing but war, and to the assistance of a policy, having a war of oppression as its purpose? I believe to ask this question means at the same time to reply in the negative. If the Chief of the American General Staff, General Marshall whose sources of information were no doubt excellent, gives even in his reports to the American president, expression to his conviction that there existed no common plan between the General Staff and the Party, but that much oftener sharp differences had appeared between the two, this is certainly an important and conclusive testimony to which I have nothing to add. military leaders, as a whole, are said to have deliberately, consciously and treacherously committed the crime of planning and executing a war of aggression. crime under the Kellogg Pact, have so often been dealt with by the Defense, that I can refer here to the observations presented by then on the subject. I may, in particular, draw the attention of the Court to the arguments put forward by Professor Jahrreiss. I wish to emphasize, in this connection, only the fact that the whole of the personal represented by me are not politicians, not statesmen, not experts of international law, but merely soldiers. the preceding twenty years, the diplomats and legal advisors of the League of Nations were unable to achieve? A soldier bases his judgment predominantly on his surroundings. In at least three cases during the last decade, they noted that the alleged crime of a war of aggression was not persecuted. Neither after Italy's war against Greece, nor after the Abyssinian war, nor afte the war of the Soviet Union against Finland, were the soldiers of these countries indicted before a Tribunal.
aggression. The Prosecution admit themselves that the classification of a war has nothing to do with strategic defensive or offensive.
plans (including plans for an offensive), to carry them out, and, finally: To participate in a war. The classification of a war as a war of aggression is a purely political opinion. The planning of wars of aggression by soldiers is thus only possible when soldiers enter the political sphere. The decisive point, therefore, is that an officer participating in such planning know that he was concerned with the political plan for a definite plan of aggression: that this war of aggression was an unlawful one and that by his own participation he himself was committing an unlawful act. war present itself to the military leader? The conclusions to be drawn as to guilt or innocence, do not depend on how, after the war and defeat, these events are today clearly recognizable in their development, but how they were visible at the time to the typical German military leader. the longing for an eternal peace makes itself felt. This longing is strongest in the case of those who made the greatest sacrifices in the war. In the first World War, it was the German officers' families from whom the majority of the indicted military leaders originate. eager to sacrifice their own sons in a new war. And should precisely these men be inclined in their minds to start another war of aggression? attitude, a clean mind for honesty and comradeship, which was considered by the officer as his real task. of the German generals, but it was the obvious aim pursued by German policy as such. Reich Chancellor Bruening, who is certainly beyond suspicion, declared on the 15th of February, 1932, that "The claim for equality of rights and equality of security is shared by the whole German nation. Any German Government will have to put forward this claim." Those pages deal with the relative strength and questions of armament. I shall continue on page 39 at the top of the page.
on the course of developments, may, even they themselves were surprised by them. If in all these years, if Hitler's moves were tolerated by foreign countries and, at least, in fact recognized that the reason may be, as Justice Jackson believes, that those foreign countries had "weak governments", but the fact was and remained that there was international recognition. If even foreign countries did not already, at that time, recognize all these developments as the "beginning of the execution" of wars of aggression, how could the German military leaders, as a whole, possibly have been aware of such plans on Hitler's part? the military leaders removed when he looks into the military plans of that period, which contained nothing but directives for defense. In that respect, the final address made by Col. Gen. Book to a circle of high ranking officers on the conclusion of an operational task concerning the subject "War with Czechoslovakia" may be considered as characteristic. In this address, he spoke with great seriousness of the results of the proceeding studies, and stressed the fact that although Germany would be able to defeat the Czech Army within a few weeks, she would subsequently not be in a position to oppose any serious resistance to the French forces, which would, in the meantime, have crossed the Rhine, and invaded southern and central Germany, so that the initial success against Czechoslovakia would in its further consequences have developed into a formidable catastrophe for Germany, These arguments can certainly not be interpreted as indicative of the German generals' lust for war, nor for their approval of Hitler's possible plans of aggression. repeatedly and earnestly emphasized that German policy -- whatever its aims might be -- should never bring out a situation which would lead to a war oil two fronts. In view of the numerous mutual assistance pacts, guarantee obligations, and alliances between all the neighbors of Germany, this altitude excluded as a matter of principle any idea of waging a war of aggression.
History has justified the opinion hold by the generals. Hitler disregarded their warnings, and exclaimed in indignation: "What sort of people are those generals, whom I, as the head of the State, may have to drive into war?
If things were as they should be, I should be unable to escape from the generals' pressure for war:"
Only a man who doesn't want to see the facts, the truth, can neglect these facts. If over there was unanimity among the military leaders, it certainly did not exist with regard to the planning of wars of aggression, but -- based on the very realistic realization of the dangers and consequences of any war for Germany and the world -- agreement did exist in the rejection of such plans of the head of State. unsuitable as "participants" in his plans, and dismissed them. Nor did he consider any other officer from the so-called "Circle of Conspirators" as suitable to become the Supreme Commander, and the future participant in possible plans, but he personally assumed the supreme command of the Armed Forces, andthus became their immediate military superior. had the character of a military order, although representations were still possible, there was nothing left but the duty of the subordinate be obey, when the men who gave the orders held to his opinion. particularly used as a proof of the plans of the "criminal organization." I am referring to the so-called "Hossbach minutes" dealing with the meeting or the fifth of November 1937. What actually did happen?
It was not an "influential group of Nazi conspirators meeting Hitler to consider the situation", but Hitler,in his capacity as head of the State, had convened some military leaders and the Foreign Minister for a meeting. He developed his own ideas: He began by declaring that the problem of Austria and Czecheslovakia must be solved from 1943 to 1945; them he referred to the Poles as possible aggressors. There was no question of settling the Corridor problem, or of conquests to be made in the East, and similar subject.
As regards the reliability of these minutes, the Affidavit No. 210, made by General Hossbach, which I have submitted to the Court, clearly shows that Hossbach did not write down the actual text of the speech while it was being made, but made a written account of it from memory a few days later.
Everybody mows how easily mistakes occur which are liable to distort the actual events whenever records are made subsequently, using the writer's own words, or leaving gaps where his memory fails him.
The following at any rate is certain:
1. The Reich War Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army from England and France, referring at the same time to Germany's 2. Whatever may have been the meaning of Hitler's speech, none of the Hitler at that meeting.
Col. Gen. Fritsch did not even inform 3. But even if an individual officer had received knowledge of the subject of this conference, no conclusions can be drawn from this fact against the whole of the military leaders.
If Hitler contemplated war in six or eight years, this was no reason for uneasiness. In such a long period, numerous political solutions would have been impossible. Nor was it possible to realize Hitler's true ideas from this speech any better than from any of his other speeches.
4. The few officers present at the meeting were bound to draw from his speech at least the positive conclusion that Hitler himself contemplated only an absolutely peaceful development until 1943. Hitler's plans? attitude of the generals towards the whole plan from their reactions to the union with Austria and to the Czechoslovakian question. The special emphasis which is laid on the participation of some officers in the conference held betwee Hitler and the Austrian statesmen, on the Obersalzberg, in February, 1938, is particularly well illustrated by the words which Hitler spoke sometime later; "I selected my most brutal-looking generals to appear as mutes in order to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation to Schuschnigg." were a political action, the background of which was unknown to the generals. The officer saw only that then his troops marched into Austria, they were everywhere showered with flowers, and enthusiastically welcomed by hundreds of thousands, and that there was not a single shot fired.
The deployment plan "Gruen" against Czechoslovakia, to which the Prosecution refer, was not a consequence of the meeting of the fifth of November, 1937, but constituted, nothing but a precautionary measure contemplated in the event of a war with France, and was in the hands of the General Staff already on the first of October 1937, that is to say, as early as the meeting of the fifth of November. Although, even in this case, an agreement was reached which provided for the entry of the German troops, the Chief of the German General Staff, Col. Gen. Beck, warned, in a memorandum drawn up with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, against a policy which right lead to a warlike conflict.
In this memorandum, he emphasizes that any war launched by Germany in Europe must ultimately lead to a World War, with a tragic end for Germany. Col. Gen. Deck was dismissed. When Hitler turned directly to the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Armies on the 10th of August 1938, with the obvious hope of overcoming the resistance of the older Commanders-in-Chief, with the help of the younger generation, the objections raised by these younger officers were such that he became even more suspiciou of the generals. Where, then, was the enthusiasm of the generals for Hitler's plans? Where was their participation in them?
Hitler's constantly changing utterances in the Sudeten question did not enable the military leaders either to realize that he might seriously plan a war. the Czech problem from 1943 to 1945.
On the 20th of May, 1938, he declared in a military directive: "I do not intend to smash Czechoslovakia in thenear future by military action without provocation." inwhich he said: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future." On the 16th of June 1938, he said in another directive, "The immediate objective is the solution of the Czech problem by my own free decision." On the 24th of August1938, he specified that an "incident" in Czechoslovakia *---*t be the prerequisite of a German attack. at the frontier. But political negotiations were opened simultaneously. On the first of October 1938, the territories ceded were peacefully occupied in accordance with the political agreements. quence of a purely political action, the military leaders received only the order for a peaceful entry.