a war, the military leaders of the defeated party were brought to trial. ineptitude or negligence of their military duties, they were suspected of treason, of pursuing political aims, or they were accused of disregarding the rules of warfare or the limitations of their military powers.
There is one feature, however, which must be noted: As a rule, trials were conducted and verdicts rendered by their own state, and not by the enemy victors. To find an example for the latter case, one must go back into history by more than 2,000 years. The Romans strangled their enemy Jugurtha in jail and persecuted Hannibal with their vengeance until they were able to force the cup of poison into his hands at the court of his host. In the more recent history, there is the sole example of Napoleon I, who was banned by the victorious powers to St. Helena, where he died; but he was not taken to account by the victors because he had served his country as a French general, but because he was the emperor of the French, and consequently the political head of his country. Commander of the Armed Forces, has eluded judicial responsibility by his death. As he can no longer be dealt with, the Prosecution have taken the highest military commanders instead of the Supreme Commander and head of the State, made them summarily also political leaders, and attempt in this way to render them responsible. nations, and may well be contemplated with peculiar feelings by allsoldiers of the world. I shall have to deal with this in detail later on -- it is the fact that the German military leaders did not dominate their country, and did not drive it into the war, that they were not politicians, but exclusively, and perhaps even too exclusively, soldiers, which introduces the element of tragedy.
Had they been politicians, Germany would not have fallen into this abyss. If we keep this clearly in our minds, it is obvious that those men are facing their trial before this Court in truth only, because they served their country as soldiers. waged his wars without the assistance of the Armed Forces, that argument cannot be invalidated. Nobody has even been able to wage a war without soldiers. The position of the German military leaders, however, as well as that of all soldiers, is well defined by Carlyle when he says:
"If a man becomes a soldier, his soul and his body thereby become the property of his commanding officer He is not all wed to decide for himself whether the cause for which he fights is good or bad.
His enemies are selected for him, and not by him. It is his duty to obey and to ask no questions." as an allegedly "Criminal Organization", this indictment does not only apply to them, but is also in fact directed -- however strongly it may be desired to deny this publicly -- to the soldiers in general, or at least to the military leaders as a class. Government and fulfilled his military duties, because the Prosecution declares the action of his Government to be illegal and represents him as a partner to such action of the Government, the Prosecution places upon him the obligation to examine the legality of his country's policy, and raises him to the position of a judge called upon to give a verdict on the policy of his State. It cannot be my task to present the consequences which such a mental revolution must have for the soldiers of the world. I can only ask the Tribunal to consider with particular care and in the consciousness of its peculiar responsibility, these special circumstances, when it applies the principles of the Charter to the special position which the soldier ocuupied both in fact and in law. Whenever a noble Judge, after careful self examination, comes to the conclusion that all sorts of reasons might tempt him to be prejudiced against a defendant, he will feel an obligation to weigh the evidence with special care, and to ask himself again and again whether he is guided by a genuine appreciation of the facts, or rather by a sentimental attitude. the Prosecution calls this modestly lack of beauty -- where the judges are exclusively from nations against Whom the defendants fought as soldiers, in this case, I say, the judge is required to do something that is humanly almost impossible, namely to free himself, in the interests of the future of mankind, from the feelings engendered by the struggle which has just come to an end, and by the passions which were whipped up in its course.
I conduct the Defense with the full confidence that, as regards the German military leaders whom I represent, this Tribunal will not exercies retaliation, but will render justice in truth and in the highest meaning of the term. ranking officers of the German Armed Forces, who occupied certain service positions in the military hierarchy, under the double designation "General Staff and OKW" in a "group" both in law and in fact.
Before dealing with the legal aspects of the alleged "groupncharacter" I must present some observations on the term "General Staff" and "High Command" (OKW).
There never existed during Hitler's time a general staff for the whole armed forces, as the Prosecution obviously seems to think along the lines of the "Great General Staff" of the former Imperial Army/
The Navy neither had an Admiral's Staff nor Admiral's Staff officers. nor was the "Naval War Staff"set up in 1933 anything similar to a General Staff. The Navy only participated in the functions of the Army, and of the Armed Forces in general, to the extent to which operational cooperation was required in individual cases. The air Force had a general staff of its own consisting of the chief of the general staff and the general staff officers. Its functions, however, were sharply distinguished from these of the general staff of the Army and were limited to the Air Forces own sphere of activity. Cooperation between the two existed only in the case of joint operations.
Nor was the General Staff of the Army itself, as the Prosecution seems to think, a central agency, but it consisted likewise merely of the chief of the general staff and of the general staff officers. drawn by the prosecution results from the fact that its first chief of the general staff, Col. General Beck, was only received twice by Hitler during the whole term of office from 1935 to 1938.
The "General Staffs" of the Army and of the Air Force, which actually existed, are not in the least concerned with the indictment on the grounds that the indicted 129 officers do not represent these General Staffs as an entity; out of the whole group, the sole members of these general staffs were Col. General Jodl, as chief of the operations staff (Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab) , the Deputy Chief of this staff, and the chiefs of the General Staffs of the Army and the Air Force. All other generals were not general staff officers, but troop commanders, a great many of them, namely, 49 out of the 129 officers, were not even members of the General Staff at an earlier date. If the Prosecut on nevertheless give this group of persons the name of "General Staff", then this amounts to the same thing as if the Roman Catholic Church indicted the Order of the Jesuits but really wanted to attain the Cardinals.
The term "General Staff", therefore, does not cover the 129 indicted officers, but all the General Staff officers who are not in the least concerned with the indictment. It is misleading and arbitrary. A verdict might be based on the designation "General Staff" but it would be directed against an institution, the members of which are not indicted.
The "High Command" had even less the importance of an independent and central leading agency. The proceedings before this Court have clearly shown that it was only Hitler's military operation staff, and that it had no independent powers of its own to give orders. Only four out of the 129 persons ever belonged to the High Command. None of the others are covered by this designation.
The double designation "General Staff" and High Command" does not improve matters either. What is called "General Staff and "High Command actually represents the whole of the officers who occupied the highest service posts in the course of this war.
They were nothing but the heads of the military hierarchy, sharply divided among themselves according to the three service branches. The only link between these high ranking officers was their relation within the military hierarchy, their common professional ethics, and the spirit of comradeship, just as it is the case in all armies. The term "General Staff" and "high Command" is therefore an accumulation of wrong designations -- ar bitrarily selected in order to pretend that there existed a combination of something that was never combined and was not capable either of being combined. As regards the 129 officers, neither the name "General Staff" nor the designation "High command", nor the combination of these two designations, "General Staff" and "High Command", produces a definition covering the functions and all the persons concerned. condemnation if it could be replaced with a more correct name. The term "Military Leaders" or the designation "Holders of the Highest Ranks in the German Armed Forces" would substantially cover the totality of the indicted officers more adquately than the erroneous term "General Staff" and "High Command." But both designations would only be a loose definition and constitute a clear indication of the fact that there existed a multiplicity of persons, but could never be considered as a proof of the existence of any kind of combination of these persons. term constitute in themselves already strong arguments against the assumption of a "Group Organization", it is still necessary to deal with the legal conditions which must be fulfilled in order to be able to consider the indicted 129 officers at all as a "group" or "organization," although it might be nameless.
As the Charter does not define the terms "group" and "Organization", it is necessary for me to say a word or two on the definition of these terms.
In the first place, there is the question as to whether the term "group" is something different than the term "organization."
Or whether both terms are identical. As the Charter uses both terms side by side, even in the sane sentence it must be assumed that these two designations were deliberately chosen in order to emphasize at least a difference in fact. to whether it was actually intended to characterize two different phenomena, because under this Article the Tribunal is only authorized to declare the groups and organizations to be "criminal organizations". Therefore, the Tribunal cannot declare a "group" to be a "criminal organization" if it does not possess the corresponding characteristics, that is to say, if it is not itself also an organization. In this case, the quality of group would be irrelevant. As far as Article Nine is concerned, an unorganized group could not be declared to be criminal.
Nevertheless, the question of the "formation of a group" must be reexamined. chief prosecutor on the natural usage of the language. That means:
The main characteristic of the existence of a "group" of people is the local coexistence of a multiplicity of persons.
One speaks of a "group picture" if several persons are shown side by side, of a group of "curious on-lockers" if a number of people are watching side by side the same event.
From this if follows that the simultaneous coexistence of persons.
As these two characteristics are If this circle of officers cannot be considered as a "group" because the necessary conditions for the formation of the "group" are lacking, the question remains as to whether it was a "group similar to an organization" or even an organization.
If we take the natural usage of the language again as our starting point, we find that the main characteristic of an organization is the fact of "its being organized". But a combination of people is"only organized" if it possesses organs of its own, acting on behalf of the organization, while its creation, its powers and its activities are based on some sort of a constitution. Furthermore this association -- irrespective of whether it be founded in law or may only have an existence based on socialogical fact -- must be able to develop through its own organs a will of its own. An organized association must be as the Prosecutor himself admits, an entity. It is true that this entity need not find expression in so concrete a form that it appears as a special subject in law but it must at least outwardly show the characteristics just mentioned, and must constitute as to its substance a deliberately created voluntary association of severl persons for the pursuit of common purposes.
The main characteristic of an "organization" according to this definition is the "inner purpose" of the association. The external form is not alone decisive for its existence. On the contrary, an associated multiplicity of persons does not become an "organization", unless its inner purpose is that of the pursuit of common aims. lacking both in law and in fact which might justify the assumption that they constitute a group similar to an organization, or an organization. Even the most important condition, namely that of voluntary membership,is not fulfilled. did they remain in these position voluntarily. But that the condition of voluntary memberships must be fulfilled has already been indicated by the Tribunal in its definition of the points of proof considered relevant, and also the Prosecution have called these conditions essential. It is true that the military leaders voluntarily selected the military profess on. They did join the Reichswehr voluntarily in 1920. And in so doing, had to comit themselves for 25 years under a contract. However, they were promoted to the posts which come under the indictment exclusively by reason of their ability, and without any initiative of their own.
By virtue of the commitment entered into, they could not ask to be retired as long as they were capable of carrying out their duties, certainly not during the war when resignation was explicitly prohibited to teem. These events and facts require no proof, as they are the same or similar to all the armies in the world. They are based upon the military power to give orders on the one hand, and the military obligation to obey on the other. way constitute an association of persons based upon voluntary membership. organization because the further condition, namely, the consciousness of these officers that they had joined an association at the moment of their appointment was lacking. this organization exists, and that he is joining it. into the posts which are only new to be grouped together by the Prosecution by the arbitrary process of representing them as a "group" or "organization." How could they, in these circumstances, have been aware at the time of their appointment to the various service positions that this appointment was equivalent to acquiring membership in a kind of association. The argument of the Prosecution that an an earlier date a similar association of General Staff officers existed in what was called the "Schlioffen Society" is irrelevant in connection with the appreciation of the legal aspect with which we are here concerned. The Schlieffen Society, which only met once a year for a lecture and a report, was exclusively concerned with cultivating the spirit of comradeship between the former General Staff officers and those on active service. on active service, who originated from the three service branches, to Set up a similar association during the war. The foundation of a political community was even more out of the question in view of the traditionally unpolitical attitude of the whole German Officer Corps.
The idea that a criminal purpose might have caused an association, as the Prosecution would like us to believe, is quite absurd. nor had the consciousness of joining an association, or of getting together in an organization, the sale fact that they occupied the posts covered by the indictment cannot, in itself, be quoted as a proof that we are concerned with an "organization." to a deliberate association and the existence of an organization. Only some of these officers have ever had contact with each other in connection with their official duties. officers who are alleged to be so unanimous in their opinions. This trial has more than anything else before brought out very clearly the profound divergencies and inner oppositions existing among these high ranking military leaders.
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off there for recess.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours) AFTERNOON SESSION, 23 AUGUST 1946 All page numbers should be followed by the letter "A". (The hearing reconvened at 1425, 27 August 1945).
DR. LATERNSER: The most glaring expression of the absurdity of this "group experiment", however, is given by the insertion of Himmler into the circle of those Army officers. It is a well-known fact that Himmler was the deadly enemy of the Army, and that the leaders of the Armed forces and those of the Waffen SS had no associations with each other except these conditioned by purely military operations at the front line. It is just the inclusion of Hitler and of some of the leaders of the Waffen SS which constitute a convincing proof against the existence of this really impossible institution. with an "organization" The military leaders were not simultaneously in their service posts, but often reached thorn in so widely separated periods, that only a fraction of them might have simultaneously held the quality of membership. This is shown most clearly by the chart submitted to the Tribunal, According to those charts, only seven generals in 1938, only twenty-two generals on the first of November, 1939, only thirty-one generals on the 22 of June, 1941, and only fifty-one generals in November, 1944, that is to say, by far not even half of the indicted officers were in the positions covered by the indictment. officers. Every one of thorn, it is true, was subjected to one single will above has own but only in a military respect, and not as regards an existing association in the manner of an organization. How could these officers, at any time, have been able to appoint organs of their own for the expression of their will? The constant change in the service posts concerned would have excluded any such possibility. Only nine generals and admirals occupied service positions for the whole duration of the war, which would enable them to be included among the so-called "group". On February 4, 1938, only six generals held such service posts. Twenty-one generals held service Poses coming under the so-called "group" only for periods of from the to two and a half years. Sixty-one officers are counted as belonging to the group, although they did not hold the corresponding service posts even for a year.
was absent which would have regulated the acquisition of membership in, on the resignation from, the group, its powers and the activity of its organs their election or appointment. There existed not a single written or oral provision or clause dealing with any kind of community. The Prosecution were, therefore, unable to submit even one single document, proving the existence of a "group" or an "organization." to prove on the strength of the statements made by Generals von Brauchitsch, Halter and Blaskowitz that a "group" did exist, have proved to be quite unsuitable for this purpose as a consequence of the rectifications which were subsequently made. The hearings of field Marshal von Brauchitsch before this Court, and of Col. Gen. Halder before the Commission, have shown that the identical affidavits of both generals constituted a condensed version of several interviews, drawn up by the interrogating officer and submitted to them for signature, and that these written statements were unintelligible in all the points whichare of decisive importance in this question, without the additional explanations given by the witnesses at the moment when they signed these statements. Consequently, the interpretation given to those statements by the Prosecution is wrong. The corrections which have now been made have now been refuted, have thus deprived the Prosecution of its main argument, and of every proof in favor of a "group" formation.
The same applies to the affidavits of Col. Gen. Blaskowitz, which was submitted to the Tribunal in the course of these proceedings. They have also been rectified and completed by affidavit No. 65. Thus, the conclusions drawn by the Prosecution have also in this case proved to be wrong. Nor has a joint action of the organization which might be considered as the expression of the latter's collective will been proved in any of the cases under consideration. It is, by the way, quite impossible to give such proof as this circle of officers had neither by law nor by nature the capacity to negotiate, and could, therefore, not have exercised any joint action as a organization.
kind of an organization might be inferred. The Prosecution are quite wrong when they believe that they can use the military discussions with Hitler, and additional meetings of Field Commanders, as a proof of their theory. the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army groups, or Armies, as was the case in several instances, this was always done for purely military purposes, and the discussions were exclusively concerned with military questions. The work of the Commanders-in-Chief on widely dispersed theaters of operations and their permanent and complete absorption by their military duties, made it impossible from the very outset that they should meet for reasons other than purely military ones. For the same reason, not even the highest military commanders maintained close contact, be it only for the reason that the often mentioned Fuehrer order No. 1 limited the knowledge of each and every one of those Commanders-in-Chief to his own sphere, whatever his position might be. As the three service branches, apart from their operational cooperation in individual cases, existed side by side in complete independence, joint discussions of the Commanders from the various service branches were hold for this reason only on some rare occasions.
If the Prosecution have referred to an affidavit by Col. Gen. Blaskowitz in order to prove the contrary, the latter's supplementary Affidavit No. 55 has shown that he was misunderstood also on this point. in the meaning of the Prosecution. The Prosecution have wrongly interpreted events resulting from the purely military execution of certain tasks. of the existence of an institution similar to an organization, as they were hold -- and this was repeatedly explained in the course of those proceedings merely in order to allow the participants to listen to a speech by Hitler, and to receive his orders subsequently. Looked at from the point of view of the Commanders, these meetings, therefore, and a purely military character.
I may, therefore, sum up the position as follows:
1. The 129 officers concerned merely represent a multiplicity of 2. The designation of "General Staff" and "High Command" is erroneous 3. The circle of officers concerned was neither a "group" nor an "organization" nor an institution similar to an organization.
4. Membership, which is clearly defined in any organization, had in this case to be the subject of long drawn out explanations.
5. None of the officers has ever formally joined an organization, nor have they ever been conscious of having joined an organization or of having been members of it. Most of the so-called "members" did not even know each other personally, their attitude to the ruling regime was widely divergent.
6. There has never been an acting "organ of association", never a "constitution" or a "charter," There has never been a "will of the association" in evidence, nor has any "action of association" been recognizable, 7. The officers concerned, whose names and number we know exactly, can therefore be rendered responsible only as individuals, and only in respect of crimes which they have personally committed.
They were never grouped together collectively, and therefore, they cannot now be grouped together collectively, merely in order to facilitate their punishment. were once to be condemned by a collective verdict on account of a kind of crime against humanity. They had failed to bury their dead. speech, and demanded that the Tribunal should safeguard the principle which was the absolutely indispensable condition of any just verdict, namely; That every military leader could only be indicted as an individual, and sentenced only in accordance with the measure of his personal guilt.
In those days, Socrates enforced his opinion. The Tribunal maintained the principle in spite of the opposition of public opinion, and refused to render a collective verdict. has been looked upon as a fundamental principle of law for the last 2,000 years? are impossible, be it only for the reasons which I have just presented. The Tribunal will have toreject the motion to declare the so-called "General Staff and "High Command" group as a criminal organization.
associating oneself with it -- the "criminality" of the whole of the 129 officers would have to be examined. That means it must be ascertained whether this group as a whole has committed crimes in the meaning of Article Six of the charter. My answer to this question is in the negative. to have at any time combined with the Nazi party for a common plan, having as its object wars of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, presupposes that such a general plan existed, that it was known as a common plan, and finally, that the military leaders, as a whole, had made this plan their own. group of persons as a whole. But I think I have already proved that there existed no such "organization" or "group" as an acting entity of these persons. The Prosecution goes around this unavoidable difficulty by assorting that, 1. The character and the action of the five military chief defendants are characteristic of the whole of the 129 officers, and 2. That, moreover, there is no doubt as to the criminal character of the whole group of these officers.
human actions which are the subject of this trial have been considered as crimes over since the time of Cain, I reply with the sentence that since the days of Cain, it has been claimed that the just shall not be destroyed together with the unjust in the expiation of crimes. The requirement of individual expiation of crimes committed is among the oldest elements of European morals. victorious nations in practice to reach a similar decision in 107 individual trials on the individual guilt or innocence of these 107 living men, as it is being done in the trial against the five military chief defendants. Where is the in or justification of and the legal necessity for, a collective trial against these men? The innocent individual is only too easily destroyed by a preconceived collective verdict.
of the five main defendants are not "with absolute certainty" typical also for the other members of the so-called "group" and thus simultaneously of the criminal character of the "group"itself, is contradicted by actual circumstance The membership in the"group" is subordinated exclusively to the holding of certain service posts. Typical in respect of the "group"is, therefore, only holder of the typical service post. As 95% of the officers concerned were Commanders-in-Chief of Armies or Army groups, the holders of these posts might possibly be considered as typical for the "group" as such, but this can on no condition be said of the five main defendants, not a single one of whomever held such a post. untypical as their service posts do not reappear in the case of any other members of the "group." There is no second chief of the High Command or Chief of the Operations Staff in it, nor is there a second Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and there is certainly not a second Reich marshal. As the main defendants occupy a higher level in the military hierarchy as the typical military leaders, their position is different in respect of the decisive points If one or the other of themain defendants may perhaps have had a theoretical possibility to influence the military resolutions of the Supreme Leadership, the typical member of the group did not even have this theoretical possibility. If the main defendants, at least in their own sphere, knew relationships and backgrounds of orders given, or could obtain such knowledge, this was impossible to the typical member of the group. If in the case of the main defendants, contact with policy was unavoidable because they were at the highest levels, even this possibility was completely absent in the case of the Field Commander. The short observation strikingly shows the arbitrary character of the indictment, pressing together heterogeneous elements, and extending without further ado to the whole of the heterogeneous elements reproaches which the prosecution rightly or wrongly believe they can put forward against the main defendants. observations, I shall, therefore, not deal with the untypical main defendants, but only with those members who can be considered as typical of the overwhelming majority of the "group" only the attitude which these members adopted towards the alleged plans of the Nazis, only their knowledge of these plans and only the extent to which they cooperated in their execution could be used at all, in the meaning of the Prosecution, to build an a charge against the "group". and look for other responsible parties.
But nobody can deny that Hitler alone held the power of the Reich in his hands, and consequently, also held the sol and total responsibility. The essence of every dictatorship ultimately lies in the fact that one man's will is almighty, that his will is decisive in all matters. In no other dictatorship was this principle developed so exclusively as in Hitler's dictatorship. If all military men and all politicians keep repeating this again and again, it is impossible to suspect each and every one of them of lack of courage to stand by his conviction, but it oust have been fact. The dictator exercised the power given to him with an almost demon-like strength of will. Besides him, there was no other will, no other plan, no other conspiracy. As regards the soldiers, it was particularly significant that Hitler had been called upon to assume power by Reich President von Hindenburg, and had then been made unlimited head of State by Reich law and public plebescite. The perfectly legal and formally correct transfer of legislative power, and of the power to give orders, produced the result that also the soldiers submitted to Hitler's personality. Furthermore, he knew how to play off one against the other, but in his decisive resolutions, he had neither advisers nor did he allow independent planning.
Hitler's person is truly comparable with that of Lucifer: Just as Lucifer starts out on his radiant course of light with tremendous speed and immense momentum, gains the supreme summit and the falls down into the deepest darkness, so Hitler followed a similar course. Who ever heard that a Lucifer needed assistance, advisors, or helpers in his lightening ascension? Does he not rather, by the force of his personality carry with him to the heights all the others, and then pulls them down into the depths with the same force?
Is it imaginable that a man of this kind should have engaged in a long term preparation of a plan, surrounded himself with a circle of conspirators, and sought their advice and assistance for his rise?
It is not the intention of this picture to elude responsibility: Every German general is enough of a man to stand up for his actions, but if justice is to be found, the actual circumstances, as they really were, must be recognized, and serve as a basis for the finding of justice. The best proof, howover, against the participation of the generals in Hitler's plans, is given by Hitler himself when he says: "I do not expect my genera's to understand my orders. I expect the generals to follow them". the military leaders as such -- again grouped together under the misleading collective term "General Staff" -- who have the misfortune that the German officer is under the prejudice that he is possessed not by a soldierly but by a "militaristic" mentality. Literature and the press of the world declare with many voices that the German officer does not exercise his soldier's profession only as a duty, but that to him war -- as the center of all his planning and scheming -- constitutes the highest value of all personal and national life. The American Chief Prosecutor defines this idea by saying that "the war is a noble and necessary occupation for all Germans". Corps had been directed for generations, so it is assorted, exclusively to aggression, conquest, domination, and violation of other nations.
It may sometimes be difficult to refute prejudices, -- but to prove this slogan to be unfounded nonsense is rather easy: The attitude and the mentality, which find its characteristic expression, in the General Staff, are known to have been created by men like Frederick the Great, Scharnhorst, Moltke, Schlieffen and Seeckt. If we search the life and the writings of these men for evidence of militaristic spirit, the result is distinctly negative. Hardly ever did a monarch meet with such an enthusiastic praise as Frederick the Great found in the works of the Englishman, Thomas Carlyle and the American George Bancroft, who says in his "History of the United States" that Frederick the Great did a contribute less to the freedom of the world than Washington and Pitt.
Helmet von Moltke, who formed the personality of the German General Staff officer like nobody else before and after him, expressly calls war the last means of safeguarding the existence, the independence and the honor of a state." He, furthermore, declared: "It is to be hoped that this last means will be appli ever more seldomly with our progressing culture. Who would wish to deny that every war, even a victorious one, constitutes a misfortune for one's own nation, because no territorial aggrandisement, no war contribution amounting to billions, can replace the loss of life and offset the grief of mourning families."
Von Moltke's most famous successor, Count Schlieffen, was the author of the often misinterpreted slogan: "To be more than to appear" Which requir of every General Staff officer modesty, quiet work, and absolute renunciation of personal distinction in public. difference existing between this mentality and that of the National Socialist younger Moltke, who was at its head, was a man of resignation, who as an Anthroposophis was even further removed from militaristic conceptions than al his predecessors: As regards, finally, Col. General von Sceckt, the creator the Reichswehr, his principles as laid down in his programmatic essay on the subject "Statesmen and General" published in 1923, are such that this essay could, without essential alterations, he immediately included in any handbook for British, American or French officers. Field Marshal von Mackensen, who was a man who must be considered, together with Hindenburg, as the chief representative of 17111 am II's Officer Carps. On the day when he gave the orders for the great break-through in the battle of Gorlice -- it was the 28th of April, 1915 -- he wrote down the fallowing lines: