Both acted in their capacity of state agencies, so that this is not a general measure with use of the Party machinery and knowledge of all political leaders. 1941, expressly emphasizes that it is not the affair of Political Leaders to confiscate Church property. out by the prosecution. Documents 848-PS and 849-PS deal with excesses against Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg. It transpires that this action was carried out by forces foreign to the local Party. sermon by Cardinal Faulhaber at Freising. The records show that the Political Leaders were given explicit instructions not to interfere with the religious services held there, even if Cardinal Faulhaber should deliver a sermon against National Socialism. Actually, there was no interference with the service by Political Leaders. It is noteworthy that according to the records, Cardinal Faulhaber declared himself willing to officiate a few months later in the same church, " through the mediation of Mayor Lederer of Freising, who was at the same time Kreisleiter and Standortfuehrer of the SA." were in reality end that the Political Leaders could not have had any real picture.
Nor could the "Mythos" given them any explanation on the Church question. This book was hard to understand and never received the official Party stamp of unobjectionability. The witness, Count Wolff-Metternich, has stated that Hitler expressly called the book a private work of Rosenberg, which did not please him. That is Affidavit P.L. 62 c.
The persecution of the Jews was the most obvious event. It can be explained quite apart from war of aggression. The events are known: Economic driving back of the Jews, defamation by the Jewish Star, and elimination from social life, the issuance 22 Aug A LJG 22-2 Meehan of the Nurnberg laws, evacuation toward the East, and, finally, extermination.
Here we can only investigate the extent of the accurate participation of the Political Leaders and their knowledge and the type and scope of the ensures. Leaders. Insofar as they tended to restrict the influence of the Jews, they were welcomed by them and corresponded with the Party program. Jewish Star was considered disgraceful, Shore was opposition to the confiscation of property and the evacuation. Tribunal through examinations of witnesses. It was a surprise maneuver prepared by Goebbels during the absence of the Gauleiters from their Gau. Because of possible opposition, the Party machinery was circumvented. As far as the political leaders had the possibility of taking any action, many Gauleiters refused to carry out the orders or issued counter-orders, as soon as they learned about the foreshadowed action. The witness, Gauleiter Kaufmann, has confirmed this for Hamburg. This witness, Gauleiter Wahl, has testified the same before the Commission for the Gem Schwaben; and the attitude of the Gauleiter for Koblenz Trier is contained in Affidavit PL 54-P. planned use of the political leader has also not been determined. All witnesses' testimony confirms here the surprise, opposition, and discrepancy of their actions. before the Gauleiters and Gau judges on the 20th of November, 1938, that the severest measures would be taken against all concerned. The report of the Supreme Party Judge Buch, produced by the prosecution, according to which the punishment was a mere force, was unknown. The leniency of the Tribunal had been explained by stating that the nun of the street could not be condemned as long as the instigator, Goebbels, remained free.
22 Aug A LJG 22-3 Meehan events, led to belief in the sincerity of the resettlement plans, which in reality proved to be preliminaries of extermination. The affidavit signed by Witness -Albert, P. L. No. 54-h says that Himmler pretended even in 1942 in a memorandum that he endeavored a legal and humane solution of the Jewish problem at a cost of twenty-five to thirty million marks. purpose of war, but exclusively for the solution of the racial question. The real happenings in the East came down to us as remote rumors and were not given credit because of their monstrosity, but were considered as enemy propaganda. In this connection, the "explanation" issued by the Party Chancellery on October 9, 1942, is significant.
This is Document P. L. No. 49. Here, the political leaders were told the atrecities were not true.
Document D-998 containing the periodical "Die Lage" of 23 August, 1944 mentions the Jewish problem in Hungary. The actual events were not referred to. Because of its small circulation and the fact that this article appeared only toward the end of the war, it is not bound to effect in my way the basic opinions of the public.
The bulk of the political leaders' ideas on the Jewish question, irrespective of their rank and district, is clearly shown by Affidavit PL 54, which contains a summary of 26,000 sworn declarations. leaders for war crimes. Jews are concerned. be supposed of the majority of political leaders. The Press announced that governments of other countries, such as Hungary, France and Italy, took measures, similar to that of the Germans. What happened in reality was unknown in Germany. Document Pl-No. 49, Confidential Information issued by the Party Chancellery dealing with the details of October 10, 1942, concerning Rumors regarding the Situation of the Jews in the East, was destined to cover up and deny the facts. have been presented to the Witness Hirt before the Tribunal.
Document U.S.S.R. 143 concerns the removal of Slovak street names and the use of the German language for officials. Thorough an examination, however, shows that this was a measure of tie Styrian home union (Heimatbund) which issued circulars to its local sections. This was not a party organization. These events concerned the little town of Pettau, which was inhabited by Germans before the 1919 peace treaty. Krain, which formerly was inhabited by German settlers, and Document USSR-191 shows that these were measures taken by the SD in the border regions of Styria.
the carrying out of which remained unknown in the political leaders. in the East are dealt with at considerable length. Whether those charges are generally justified, cannot yet be judged on the basis of proceedings so far held. It can, however, be examined what knowledge the political leaders had of these events and in how far they were responsible for them.
Document 1058-PS contains Rosenberg's speech before the beginning of the war in the East. His defense counsel has commented upon it in detail. This speech was secret and known only to a small circle.
Document L-221 of July 16, 1941, concerns the Crimea. These are secret marginal remarks of Bormann concerning a discussion in the Fuehrer headquarters. on the Crimea is likewise unknown to the public.
From Frank's Diary derive the charges against the political leaders the food, situation in the Government General. General knowledge of the fact that during the year 1941, 40 per cent of the population suffered from malnutrition because of the political leaders' measures, cannot be supposed. As far as food supply difficulties had become known in the border countries, they might have been brought about by other causes, especially after a lost war.
Document R-36 shows Bormann's Frightful Views on the treatment of the population in the eastern territories. It is the position taken by Dr. Markull, of the Ministry, for the occupied territories in the East, dated August 19, 1942, addressed to Rosenberg. The open and severe terms, as well as the indignant opposition with which it was met, prove that Bormann's views were not accepted and that other measures were taken. The fact particularly that this was put before Rosenberg proves that there was no doubt about his consent with the refusal.
Other incidents became known to a large number of people. Document 1130-PS contains the repeatedly quoted speech of Reichslieter Koch held in Kiev on the 1st of April, 1945, on the subjected the Master Race.
The evidence shows that Koch himself knew that his opinions were not shared. He said that his chiefs of sections could be divided into two groups, the one working against him openly, the other secretly. Reichskommissar for the establishing of Germanism, dating from February and June 1942. They refer to the re-Germanization of former German Rations in the Eastern Territories, which in itself is not inadmissible. One of those decrees is addressed to the Gauleiters for their information. It contains no mention of any criminal measures.
The Prosecution concludes from Document No. 327-PS that the Gauleiters took part in the liquidation of *-*rmous fortunes in the East. A closer examination shows that this is but the liquidation of German firms which had been set up as State enterprises cat the cost of considerable subsidies. In a letter of 17 October 1944 the Gauleiters are merely being requested not to interfere with the liquidation meanwhile taking place in German territory. All this goes to show that the political leaders as a whole could have no special knowledge of any incidents of a criminal nature.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, before we adjourn, the Tribunal will adjourn tomorrow, Friday, at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
DR. SERVATIUS: I did not hear, By Lord.
THE PRESIDENTS: The Tribunal will adjourn tomorrow at 4 o'clock in the afternoon.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 23 August 1946, at 1000 hours).
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal the defendants Hess and von Papen are absent.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, your Honors; shall turn to the activities of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg which begins on page 39 of the written script. matter. As the defense counsel of the defendant Rosenberg has already explained, this was an order of Hitler's giving personal instructions to Rosenberg and not to a Party agency. This is shown in document 136-PS, i.e. a letter of Hitler's of 29 January 1940, and in the Fuehrer decree of 1 March 1942, document 149-PS. It is confirmed by testimony given before the Commission by the witness Dr. Mueller and by Graf von Roedern. An affidavit of the witness Kuenzler (No. 58-A) is to the same effect, stating that the officers of the Reichs Treasurer knew that this order was intended for Rosenberg personally.
And indeed, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg was not a Party organization. The members were scientists and specialists who had nothing to do with the Party, and who in many cases, were foreigners. All had been recruited for the emergency service obligation.
The leader of the Einsatz in Paris was not a political leader. This special section was distinguishable even outside the Party by a special uniform. Treasurer of the Party, the prosecution concluded that political leaders were also concerned. Document 145-PS shows that it was only alone, and that the Rosenberg Ministry as a State office had to bear the costs. This was corroborated by the witness Kuenzler, a leading official in the Party finance administration, in affidavit 58-A. The witness Dr. Mueller, consultant for matters of private property, testified to the same effect before the Commission.
(Transcript page 1614.) referred to document 071-PS, according to which the final settlement of the confiscations which had been carried out by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg should be made by the Gauleiters. The preface of this document, however, shows that it applies only to the confiscations within the German territory of property belonging to people of an "idealogical opposition". It is connected with document 072-PS which merely contains a proposition in connection with the church question. This proposition does not suggest that the Gauleiters confiscate things. It merely states they should look after them until their seizure by a more competent authority, in order to avoid anything getting lost, existed there to which any such instructions could be given. ultimate destination of these cultural values. The witnesses Mueller, transcript page 1629, and Kuenzler, affidavit 58-A, stated before the Commission, that those objects should be dealt with in the peace negotiations. There remains the action concerning furniture (Moebelaktion) mentioned by the prosecution through which the furniture of 70,000 householders in France was transferred. This was an action of the East Ministry, and was carried out by its own personnel. the juridical situation clear, and have shown that the political leaders were in no way concerned with these prisoners.
23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2 -1 But the Prosecution have confronted the political leaders with document 656-PS, US exhibit 339, which is a directive of the OKW from the year 1944. It gives the guard details the right of self defense, in view of the request of the enemy propaganda to prisoners-of-war asking them to use force. In cases of extreme emergency, use of arms is permissible. The political leaders are in no way connected with this directive and its execution. foreign workers when dealing with them as defense counsel for Sauckel. the Commission and on 31 July 1946 before the Tribunal regarding the actual facts. I further refer to affidavits 55a, to 55d, and to affidavit 55, which comprises 15,000 statements under oath. They give a reliable picture of general living and working conditions of these foreign laborers. Everything speaks against a systematic program of negligence and mistreatment or a general approval of the conditions as they were alleged. to document EC-63. This is a directive of the Peasants Union of Baden, of 6 March 1941 regarding treatment of Polish agricultural workers. It is an individual measure and it originates from a time prior to the unified settlement of labor allocation. It does not originate from a Party office, the Peasants Union being an independent professional organization outside the Party formation. The directives has been rescinded in view of the subsequent regulations for all foreign workers. however, that this directive in practice was not carried through with the approval of the political leaders. Here reference is made to the testimony of a number of political leaders from the Gau Baden, which has been collected in affidavit P.L. number 68. I further refer you to the testimony of the witness Hohr (peasants Union - Bavaria), who was heard before the Commission on 5 July, 23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2-2 1946, the testimony of Gauleiter Wahl for the Gau of Schwaben who was heard before the Commission on 15 July 1946, and to the testimony of the Ortsgruppenleiter Wegscheider.
workers were concerned, it is shown from the confidential information of the Party Chancellory of 9 December 1943 (Document P.L. No, 98), that such interference has only been carried through at the express wish of the person concerned. The list annexed to the document also shows that an interference was the exception (compare with affidavit Hahler 56a). landings is the last war crime which is particularly incriminating the political leaders. against the civilian population were admissable, or whether the rage of the population was justified, but only with the fact that a killing of such fliers by the population was permitted without a previous judgment. It remains now to clear up the question -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you are passing from the treatment of foreign workers to another part of your speech, The Tribunal would like to know what your case is with reference to the treatment of foreign workers by the political leaders, and whether you contend that they did not assist in placing and controlling the laborers who were brought to Germany under the forced labor program.
DR. SERVATIUS: I am denying that they participated in the rambling up and bringing up of these laborers. They only had the duty of supervising the duties and welfare, the welfare of these workers and were concerned to see it was supervised.
THE PRESIDENT: You agree then that they undertook the duty of supervision of the laborers?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes - but that they fulfilled that duty. After all, in the case of Sauckel, a number of Gauleiters had been heard on the subject, all of whom have confirmed the fact 23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2-3 that they were authorized, to act on behalf of the laborers and took care of this welfare question, that was dealt with in the case of Sauckel.
I am just given to understand I didn't understand your question. Are you stating about the guarding of those workers? Is it about the guarding?
THE PRESIDENT: The words I used were whether you contend that they had not assisted in placing and controlling the laborers who were brought to Germany under the forced labor program.
DR. SERVATIUS: If that was the question, then my answer can remain in the form I have given before.
THE PRESIDENT: You do agree that although you say they did not assist in the rounding up, I think that was the word you used, or the bringing up of the laborers to Germany, they did assist in the supervision and controlling of the laborers who had been brought to Germany?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, they had the supervision, the duties in that capacity for the labor employment. They had to control the question whether the Labor Front and the work Leaders were taking care properly of their duties. They had no direct responsibility, only an additional duty. On Sauckel's behalf, checking to see whether his instructions were being fulfilled.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you contending that they did not know the laborers came involuntarily?
DR. SERVATIUS: That I am not denying. I admit the Gauleiter had to know and probably did know that the workers came because they had been compulsorily called up.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. I think you got to the bottom of page 44 or near it.
DR. SERVATIUS: I was dealing with the question of lynching.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 44, in the English.
DR. SERVATIUS: Page 44, that is where I got. I said it remains now to clear up the question whether such war crimes were generally tolerated and approved of by the political leaders.
23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2-4 of the Fuehrer Hess, document 062-PS. It concerns a secret directive regarding the behavior of the population towards crashed airplanes and towards parachutists, and, with reference to the latter it contains a directive that they are to be either arrested or "made harmless". today, one has to firstly consider that we are here concerned with enemy soldiers who have been ordered to carry out a combat action. It is hardly possible for the civilian population to arrest them and we therefore have to understand the expression to mean that other methods for safety have to be taken in order to avoid damage. note that during the year of 1940, in view of the then prevailing air situation, one could only theoretically count on such happenings; it was a preventative measure which, according to the document itself, followed the French directives. The passage in the document asking for special secrecy can be perhaps explained by the fact that the civilian population received a directive which could cause them to be combatants. Actually no events originating from that time where a violation of international law was committed against flyers became known. Furthermore, the "Confidential Information of the Party Chancellory" of 4 December 1942, speaks clearly against such a measure. It firmly rejects any measures against flyers, as had been the practice in Japan. the war crimes, have to be judged differently. It is further necessary to examine the documents and to determine how far the political leaders had knowledge in general or were participants.
Himmler's order, dated August 10, 1943, Document R-110, is addressed to the higher SS and Police Chief. According to this, the competent Gauleiter had to be informed, but competent were 23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2-5 only those who held official functions, that is, Reich Defense Commissars and Reichstatthalter.
These functions had nothing to do with political activities. incitement. Thus the conclusion is to be drawn that not all Gauleiters had been informed and in any case no Kreisleiter nor any other subordinate party office. I draw your attention to the evidence of witness Hoffman during his testimony of July 2 1946. formed of Himmler's directives to the Police Officers only in that capacity as Reich Defense Commissar.
Bormann's circular of May 30, 1944 (Document Number 067-PS) was destined to inform all political leaders that they should tolerate the lynching of fliers.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not quite sure that I understand what your argument is there. Is your argument that in the Document 110, the competent Gauleiters does not include all the Gauleiters?
DR. SERVATIUS: Only those who were with the Reich Defense Commissars end Reichstatthalter. Only they give knowledge or instructions in their capacity as agents of the State. Other Gauleiters did not have that and they were not all involved. The Gauleiter in his capacity of a Reich Defense Commissar and Reichstatthalter did not inform his subordinate.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you say that the Gauleiters ceased to have control over their Gaus unless they were appointed Reich Defense Commissars end Reichstatthalter?
DR. SERVATIUS: Those agencies were separated, and instructions only reached some, nor the Kreisleiters. In the prescribed official channels -
THE PRESIDENT: That is not the answer to my question. What I asked you was are you saying that the Gauleiters who were not Reich Defense Commissars or Reichstatthalter had ceased to hold 23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2 -6 any authority in the Gaus of which they were Gauleiters?
DR. SERVATIUS: No. I only went to say that the service channel would mean the passing through of those instructions. I have quoted witnesses who testified that the Kreisleiters did not receive any knowledge of those instructions. It is that with which I an going to deal with next.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. SERVATIUS: It was caused by Goebbel's newspaper articles of the preceding day, in which he addressed the population directly. leaders cooperated, and whether these war crimes had been permitted everywhere with the consent and general approval of the Political leaders. This was certainly not the case. On the contrary three of the Gauleiters concurred by testifying before the Commission that they realized the possible repercussions of the circular, and that they did not forward it to the Kreisleiters contrary to the orders given them. That is by Witness Hoffman, witness Kauffmann, and witness Wahl. The same was testified by the Gauleiters of Mecklenburg, Weser-Ems, and Tyrol (Affidavits 61-C, 61-H and 61-G). decree, indicates that the same was done in other Gaus. So far as they received the decree, they did not translate it into practice, and did not forward it because of its dangerous nature. I quote the following witnesses: Meyer-Wendeborn, Kreis Oldenburg; Kuehl, Kreisleiter Ost-Hannover; Biedermann, Gauleiter office of Thueringen; Brueckmann, Kresileiter Hesson-Nassau; Naumann, Kreisleiter, Saxeny; Ever, Gau Westmark; Haus, Kreisleiter Wetzler. confirmed that they did not forward the decree. An announcement concerning the re-admissibility of lynching was made on the 25 February 1945, that is, nine months later. It is remarkable for the political leaders that this witness has hesitated such a long time before acting according to the desires of Bormann and Hitler. During his testimony before the Commission, the witness declared that he had withdrawn his draft, and that the announcement was made without his knowledge. In fact, in his Gau, the order has never been carried out, which is proved by affidavit of Karl Scholtis, Ortsgruppenleiter, PL-61A. remarked that only a few witnesses have been examined, and that only a few affidavits could be taken out of the mass of material available. However, it is no doubt established that in general the political leaders did not follow the criminal suggestions.
In spite of the embitterment, despair, and misery at the destruction of many human lives, violation of the rules of warfare were prevented.
Affidavit 61 includes approximately 11,000 individual statements. These statements not only bear witness to a passive rejection of dangerous methods, but in many cases confirm positive steps taken to protect the fliers against the excited population. of having worked through the foreign organizations of the NSDAP, as a fifth column abroad. Evidence for this has neither been produced during the hearing of witnesses before this Tribunal on the occasion of the hearing of the case of Defendant Hess, nor during the hearing of evidence before the Commission. The Foreign organizations merely served in drawing together of the party members of German citizenship, living abroad and it was meant to maintain in them the understanding for German Nationalism. It was expressedly prohibited for members of the Foreign organizations to make propaganda for the National Socialist idea amongst the inhabitants of the host countries, and to cooperate with political groups abroad even if those were representing National Socialist or Fascist ideas. For that reason, it was also forbidden for them to collaborate with the American-German union; this prohibition was in fact strictly observed. Comparing examination of witness von Roedern. the first World War, they were as testified by witness von Roedern on the occasion of his examination before the Commission against policy of expansion. They had no other goal, but that of maintaining peace with every means, and for that reason, it was out of the question that they were active in a fifth column. Members of the Foreign organizations were prohibited from any collaboration with the German Secret Service by order of their Chief Bohle. If individual members of the Foreign organization have infringed this order, then they did not do so on behalf of the Foreign organizations, but against its explicit instructions. This becomes apparent also from the fact that the foreign states concerned, for instance England, have never prohibited the Foreign organization in spite of such instances; to the contrary, the legal character of the Foreign organizations was repeatedly and expressly recognized by foreign states.
Finally, the fact that the Foreign organizations have never exercised activities as a fifth column becomes apparent from the fact that they remained operative in foreign countries until the end, even at a time when no difficulties of a diplomatic nature could have arisen for these states if they had prohibited the foreign organization. is what is the over-all picture that results? It is to be examined whether the cases investigated were individual occurrences, or whether they were held together by a mutual bond, and thus indicate the criminal character of the political leaders. expensive evidence. One must admit on the basis of the occupation of all of Germany, and the activity of the authorities, the last nook and cranny has been searched and the evidence has been brought here, but for that very reason the material surprises one on closer examination because of its scantiness; it is shown that it does not cover the field of the application of the prosecution. that occurrences which happened once at one place necessarily happened constantly in all other directions. The individual occurrences can be brought into a system only by the "Conspiracy" which demonstrates the criminal character, but it is a conspiracy which is to be proved by the incoherent facts. defense witnesses. they are all witnesses on their own behalf. hearing of the members, guaranteed by the Charter, would be void of meaning. The witnesses are not appearing on their own behalf, but as witnesses with a general knowledge of occurrences, and conditions which can only be cleared up through the members of the organizations themselves.
Their credibility must be shown by the uniformity of many testimonies. of the proceedings is to eliminate evidence on those points, and later proceedings. There every individual would be able to bring witnesses for the correctness of his testimony, but too late. If the testimony is to be untruthworthy, this must be proved in the individual case; that evidence can not, however, be given by having a witness draw conclusions which he can not draw correctly, because he lacks insight and knowledge. Only a few witnesses were heard before the Commission and the Tribunal. the criminal character of an organization. The witness can generally give little testimony about conditions as a whole, which are under examination, even if he has an extensive knowledge of things, and even his testimony can be only gragmentary.
Only a comprehensive inquiry con bring clarification. The Prosecution had a good opportunity for this in the camps, that all internees were examined is shown by the individual trials which were carried out as a result of this examination, but crime as a general phenomenon could not be established. through access to a sort of Enquete. In the proceedings before the Tribunal Enquetes were admitted in the form of Government reports. To prove general occurrences, they in fact do not seem superfluous.
The weaknesses of the Enquete are well known; their main danger lies in the choice of witnesses. In the present case, however, the circle of witnesses is limited to comp inmates. The affidavits of approximately 38,000 persons which were submitted are not a selection from the camps, but a digest. to check the statements, because of their extent. Under the prevailing circumstances, however, this checking is assured; the circumstances of all witnesses from the camps are know and confirmed through investigations. The statements of the witnesses can be checked at any time.
That such an examination is possible is shown by the establishment of De-Nazification Chambers. the affidavits in a lump, without having examined the real value, this procedure can not lead or turn to any real result.
value, then the uniformed picture is destroyed on which the prosecution has based their plea. the part of all political leaders, based on their position or based on their knowledge and approval, a joint responsibility can arise. jointly affected through occurrences in another local group in the city and whether someone who had been a political leader in 1930 is effected by events which have occurred during the war. The question is whether a Blockleiter will suffer the effects caused by the circumstance that on the basis of secret instructions human beings were removed by Coup de Grace. according to the statement of the prosecutor of the Soviet Union not be proved with certainty before the year of 1933. According to Appendix A of the Indictment of the Organizations, the Reichs Government is held responsible for a conspiracy only after 1934. Only one of the Documents used against the Political Leaders refers to the year 1933 (PS-374). It deals with a local anti-Jewish boycott.
All other documents concern events after 1938. The majority of Documents only deals with war-time. be decisive, but only events which at the time when they took place bore a general character. existence of the party, then I believe that this position is unattainable. to which the honorary Blockleiter is supposed to be equally responsible as a Reichsleiter or Gauleiter. Difference must be made according to the position held.