that they are therefore criminal is an unnatural construction of facts. Any proof for such an assumption is lacking. building up of Socialism as well as for a war of aggression. Thus, the orientation of economy can serve good as well as evil.
The British prosecutor has shown us another point of view. He has stated that intervention against their own government is possible in order to protect Nationals. This conclusion he draws from the fact that even war should be waged out of humanitarian reasons. been stated in the beginning. Even International Law does not recognize a right of intervention upon moral grounds.
Crusades are not permissible. is because the misuses are being connected with the crimes in the charter. concerning the pressure exerted upon voters.
The most important one is Document D-43 of the year 1936. It concerns inquiry of the Minister of the Interior of the Reich as to which officials did not fulfil their obligations to vote. The Ortsgruppenleiter are asked to comment upon this. This is a letter of the Kreisleitung (the Kreisleiter office) in Bremen. Another Kreisleiter, the witness Kuehl, declared before the Commission (Record page 1907) that he did not receive such an inquiry. The general character of this inquiry is thus put in doubt. importance. It originates from the SD Sector Koblenz, and mentions the statement of the District Manager (Kreisgeschaeftsfuehrer) about the reasons of the bad election results due to quarrels of a personal nature. Both documents deal with the results of the election after the vote. exchanged between the lowest offices of the SD in Erfurt and concern election control. The closest cooperation with the Ortsgruppenleiter is advised. it is shown that the commanding agency of the party in no way enters into action.
These are merely individual measures of other agencies. No general practice or knowledge can be deduced from that. of the 1940 edition, in which it is said that the Blockleiters should report anyone spreading dangerous rumors. In this connection the household card indexes were established which, in the Gau Cologne, contained extensive measures of surveillance. Leaders in this manner and whether it was done in conformity with the instruction of the Party agencies.
contrary. See Decree No. 127 of the 5th of October 1936 In the orders of the Fuehrer's Deputy (Document No. P.L. 34). that these instructions were followed and that the indexes they knew of were not of a spying nature. It is thereby proved that the system of the Gau Cologne was not generally followed and that it was not valid for all Gaus. witness Dr. Kuehn who, as the counsellor of the Superior Provincial Court (Oberlandesgerichtsrat) was competent for the Heimtueckegesetz in the Ministry of Justice.
The witness declared in the interrogation of 10.7.1946 that proceedings were generally taken up upon the denunciation of inimical neighbors or others, and only very rarely upon the instigation of Political leaders. The only concrete testimony of spying submitted by the prosecution is Document D-901, in which a Blockleiter and janitor of the Assembly Hall reports a secret meeting of the members of the Confessional Church in his building. camps as coupled with the count of spying. State and taken into custody seems to be a custom adopted by politicians. It is based upon reciprocity and represents retaliation for the losses in the political struggle.
A connection with war of aggression is not established. The count of indictment of the prosecution will, therefore, be directed rather against misuses incurred through excesses and atrocities. SD of 10.3.40, Document P.L. No. 100, arrests were made solely by the Gestapo. Any intervention on the part of Political Leaders was strictly forbidden (P.L. No. 29). In this manner secrecy was assured from the beginning.
the political leaders through the fact that even after their release the political prisoners and their families had to remain under surveillance, and that this order was carried out. This is Document P.L. No. 100, which created such astonishment in court today. The witness, Count von Roedern, testified before the Commission concerning the knowledge of the conditions in the concentration camps. He said that in the beginning of 1943 the county group leaders of the Foreign Organization had visited the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen, and had gained the impression on that occasion that the rumors about the concentration camps circulating abroad at that time were without foundation. (Commission record page 1897).
The witness, Sieckmeier, states in affidavit P.L. No. 57 that in the Spring of 1939 he visited the concentration camp Buchenwald with 150 American guests, and the witness Wuensche states in affidavit P.L. No. 57B that in June of 1938 he visited the concentration camp Sachsenhausen with a class of the Berlin Zollschule (School for customs officials). Both state that the quarters and the food of the prisoners were in conformity with the regulations. Thirty five further statements of political leaders who had visited such camps are contained in the collective affidavits. They are all of the same effect.
14,763 statements summarized in Affidavit P.L. No. 57 show that these political leaders knew nothing of the conditions in the concentration camps, and that upon inquiry they received no answer in seven cases,and that satisfactory answers were received in 102 cases. the prosecution. of these measures, and that they had no general knowledge of them.
Document 630-PS, a letter of Hitler's of the 1st September 1939 proves that it is a so-called special secret order, which was given directly to the Reichsleiter without portfolio Bouhler, and Dr. Brandt. Neither the Reichsleiters nor the Gauleiters were told of such special secret orders (Document 59A, Affidavit Hederich).
According to Document D-906, No. 3 and 6, the medical commission concerned seems to have taken up contact with the Gauleiter or Kreisleiter in individual cases.
It is noteworthy, however, that just in the last document it is noted that the Hoheitstraeger (Bearers of Sovereignty) are not involved since the regulations do not contemplate this.
Confirmation of these facts is given by the collective affidavits P.L. 59 of Karl Richard Adam, who states that 7,642 political leaders executed affidavits to the effect that they had received no orders, and had not been involved in carrying out of such measures.
Great precautions had been taken to keep these facts a secret; but nevertheless some knowledge was gained of them,and rumors were circulated. This is borne out by special notes recommending secrecy in the incriminating documents. The witness Meyer-Wendeborn stated before the Tribunal that upon his inquiry he was told that these were but rumors. Two medical men, Dr. Engel (P.L.59B), and Kreisleiter Dr. Dietrich (P.L.59C) confirmed the official denial of the mercy killing.
Were these measures in any were connected with the conduct of the war? borne out in document M-152. this idea from the viewpoint of "Natural selection "(Zuchtwahl) and which pointed out the custom in ancient Greece of exposing and abandoning the unfit. though a member of a Gautabe defines mercy killing in case of war as war measure in Document D-906.
I now come to the events which appeared openly: smashing of the unions, persecution of the churches and persecution of the Jews.
The "smashing " of the free trade unions was well know. It was a revolutionary act. It was admissible or inadmissible, like any revolution. It was an event which happened only once-- for which the responsibility is clear. The Political Leaders did not have a direct part in its execution, but they knew the event and approved it. other reasons were decisive.
The 150 large and small unions, which included 30% of the workers, were already at the end of their strength before they were dissolved. Economically, the majority of them were facing collapse; the many years of unemployment had depleted their treasuries, but increased the demands upon them. The political parties which dominated unions had been helpless in the face of the economic crisis; they had been powerless against Hitler, and so resigned. Mass withdrawals which took place at the end of 1932 and at the beginning of 1933 had thus made the unions merely shadows. On the other hand the workers transferred to the NSBO, thereby aligned themselves with the idea of labor peace and of community which was recognizably ably preparing the way for the solution of the economics crisis.
In a similar way the employers' organizations were compelled to maintain in labor peace, and were dissolved. The purpose of the elimination of all organizations was to reach a settlement between labor and capital; the class struggle was replaced by the duty to care for the workers on the one side, and the duty of loyalty on the other side, as keys to the elimination of the economic distress. That the projecting was so understood and approved by the workers is shown by the circumstances of frictionless cooperation; thus the economic-political proceeding was justified after the event. Then there is the incriminating question of the church question. That the churches were at variance with National Socialism is well known. That the cruses of this quarrel were that the churches were opposed to an intended war of aggression is unknown. After power-political differences at the beginning it was later reasons of Christi morals which increasingly called the Church to fight against national Socialism. Generally, the churches were indifferent to the foreign policy of States according to the principle, "To the State that which belongs to the Stat." Conflict with the Church was contrary to the Party program, and Hitler himself never preached it. He would probably have preferred to win over the churches. He tried to do so through the Concordat and had successes through the proclamation of the Fulda Conference of Bishops and the proclamation of the Austrian Bishops after the Anschluss. The propaganda against the Church was limited and was directed against the Members of the clergy who interfered in politics. There was no real organized fight against the Church. The separation of Church ad State was demanded in order to overcome the splitting of the people by the various Confessions. Thus, Hitler in 1933, immediately after the seizure of power told the witness Count Wolf-Matternich that it was inexcusable if the Christian Church was combatted (affidavit P.L. No. 62 c.), and the witness Theology Professor Fabricius confirms this attitude. (Affidavit P.L. No. 62 a.). For the Political Leaders this conviction manifested its If in the fact that even before 1933 some theology students, theology professors, and churchmen had joined the Party. After 1933 there was a strong movement for rejoining the Church among those who had left the Church under the influence of Marxism; there were many retroactive marriage and Christening ceremonies, which is shown by Affidavit P.L. 62a and 62b - Prof.
Fabricius and Theologian Buth. The witness Shoen confirms an affidavit, P.L. No. 62, that of 500 Political Leaders whose statement ha examined 42% simulataneously held Church offices. The witnesses Wegscheider and Kaufmann, who were examined before the Tribunal, also testified that numerous Political Leaders held a Church office. The Bishops Dr. Groeber and Dr. Berning were appointed to the State Council (Staatsrat) that is the affidavit Count Wolf-Metternich, P.L. 62 c. witness Schoen (P.L. 62) who, in the examination of 21, 131 affidavits, noted that in the individual Ortsgruppen (Local group) church life remained undisturbed and that the Party participated in Church life occasionally officially, and, in some cases, in uniform. Thus, in the individual local groups there was a good relationship with the clergy, and this was expressed publicly at celebrations. activities and statements are in contradiction to the general Party line. The leader of that group was Bormann.
Of 23 documents which were submitted by the prosecution against the Political Leaders on the church question, no less than 9 documents are statements of opinion by Bormann. Seven documents concern the SS as well as the SD and the Gestapo. Four documents deal with three local occurrences, and one document consists of the personal opinion of Gauleiter Florian. There follows a quotation from the "Mythos", and a document with directives for the RAD. (Reich Labor Service) All these documents do not show that the Political Leaders on the whole participated in the elimination of the Church. I comment on the individual documents: The document containing the most serious charge is the secret decree of Bormann to the Gauleiters on "National Socialism and Christianity". On this subject there is an affidavit by the witness Haderich, according to which Bormann issued this decree independently and Hitler instructed him to recall and destroy this circular. The witness Gauleiter Kauffmann confirmed before the Tribunal here that this decree was recalled. The same thing is shown by the testimony of the witness Hoffmann before the Commission on 3 July 1946. In affidavit P.L. 62 b the witness Buth states that the defendant Rosenberg likewise rejected the decree and prepared an objection. A Document 098-PS is a letter of Bormann to Rosenberg and deals with a so-called National Socialist Catechism. It is a personal opinion of Bormann. There is no answer of Rosenberg at hand. In this letter a meeting of the Reichsleiters is suggests. The affidavit of the witness Hederich states that such a meeting never took place. There follow a number of documents which show Bormann's constant personal urging towards the separation of Church and State. Document 070-PS regarding school devotions lies in this direction; as also document 840-PS. admission of theologians into the Party; end 107-PS, directives for the participation of the RAD in church ceremonies. The following documents, 100-PS and 101-PS. are letters of Bormann to Rosenberg expressing the wish for their own literature for soldiers: Rosenberg is here attacked because of the attitude which he took in favor of a book in a religious vein by Reichsbischof Mueller. This proves Bormann's purely personal activity.
In the same field there is Document 064-PS again a letter of Bormann to Rosenberg. It demands comment on an inclosed letter of Gauleiter Florian of 23 September 1940, who had objected to a religious writing by General Rabenau. It is a personal opinion which is not typical of the general attitude of the Political Leaders. A further action of Bormann is shown by document 116-PS, a letter to Rosenberg of 24 Jan 1939 on the curtailment of the theological faculties. Here Rosenberg is not instructed to execute curtailment as the prosecution erroneously assumes; but another letter is merely sent to him for his information, in which a curtailment of the faculties was welcomed. The continuation of Rosenberg's efforts of spreading his opinion is shown by a letter of Bormann of 17 May 1939 to Rosenberg. Here Bormann sends a plan of the Reichs Education Minister on the limitation of the theological faculties. Likewise only with a request for his opinion, and not, as the prosecution assumes, for the immediate execution of the measure under consideration. Then the Political Leaders are charged with the activities of the Gestapo on the basis of the files of a conference of church specialists of the Gestapo. This cannot be taken as evidence of proof of the anti-church attitude of the Political Leaders. Nor did the Political Leaders have any direct connection with the confiscation of church property. The submitted Document R-101 (correspondence of the RSHA) shows confiscation by the Reich Governor and Gauleiter and by the Eastern German agriculture Company, (Ostdeutsche Landwirtschaftsgessellschaft GmbH) 22 Aug A LJG 22-1 Meehan in the Warthegau.
Both acted in their capacity of state agencies, so that this is not a general measure with use of the Party machinery and knowledge of all political leaders. 1941, expressly emphasizes that it is not the affair of Political Leaders to confiscate Church property. out by the prosecution. Documents 848-PS and 849-PS deal with excesses against Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg. It transpires that this action was carried out by forces foreign to the local Party. sermon by Cardinal Faulhaber at Freising. The records show that the Political Leaders were given explicit instructions not to interfere with the religious services held there, even if Cardinal Faulhaber should deliver a sermon against National Socialism. Actually, there was no interference with the service by Political Leaders. It is noteworthy that according to the records, Cardinal Faulhaber declared himself willing to officiate a few months later in the same church, " through the mediation of Mayor Lederer of Freising, who was at the same time Kreisleiter and Standortfuehrer of the SA." were in reality end that the Political Leaders could not have had any real picture.
Nor could the "Mythos" given them any explanation on the Church question. This book was hard to understand and never received the official Party stamp of unobjectionability. The witness, Count Wolff-Metternich, has stated that Hitler expressly called the book a private work of Rosenberg, which did not please him. That is Affidavit P.L. 62 c.
The persecution of the Jews was the most obvious event. It can be explained quite apart from war of aggression. The events are known: Economic driving back of the Jews, defamation by the Jewish Star, and elimination from social life, the issuance 22 Aug A LJG 22-2 Meehan of the Nurnberg laws, evacuation toward the East, and, finally, extermination.
Here we can only investigate the extent of the accurate participation of the Political Leaders and their knowledge and the type and scope of the ensures. Leaders. Insofar as they tended to restrict the influence of the Jews, they were welcomed by them and corresponded with the Party program. Jewish Star was considered disgraceful, Shore was opposition to the confiscation of property and the evacuation. Tribunal through examinations of witnesses. It was a surprise maneuver prepared by Goebbels during the absence of the Gauleiters from their Gau. Because of possible opposition, the Party machinery was circumvented. As far as the political leaders had the possibility of taking any action, many Gauleiters refused to carry out the orders or issued counter-orders, as soon as they learned about the foreshadowed action. The witness, Gauleiter Kaufmann, has confirmed this for Hamburg. This witness, Gauleiter Wahl, has testified the same before the Commission for the Gem Schwaben; and the attitude of the Gauleiter for Koblenz Trier is contained in Affidavit PL 54-P. planned use of the political leader has also not been determined. All witnesses' testimony confirms here the surprise, opposition, and discrepancy of their actions. before the Gauleiters and Gau judges on the 20th of November, 1938, that the severest measures would be taken against all concerned. The report of the Supreme Party Judge Buch, produced by the prosecution, according to which the punishment was a mere force, was unknown. The leniency of the Tribunal had been explained by stating that the nun of the street could not be condemned as long as the instigator, Goebbels, remained free.
22 Aug A LJG 22-3 Meehan events, led to belief in the sincerity of the resettlement plans, which in reality proved to be preliminaries of extermination. The affidavit signed by Witness -Albert, P. L. No. 54-h says that Himmler pretended even in 1942 in a memorandum that he endeavored a legal and humane solution of the Jewish problem at a cost of twenty-five to thirty million marks. purpose of war, but exclusively for the solution of the racial question. The real happenings in the East came down to us as remote rumors and were not given credit because of their monstrosity, but were considered as enemy propaganda. In this connection, the "explanation" issued by the Party Chancellery on October 9, 1942, is significant.
This is Document P. L. No. 49. Here, the political leaders were told the atrecities were not true.
Document D-998 containing the periodical "Die Lage" of 23 August, 1944 mentions the Jewish problem in Hungary. The actual events were not referred to. Because of its small circulation and the fact that this article appeared only toward the end of the war, it is not bound to effect in my way the basic opinions of the public.
The bulk of the political leaders' ideas on the Jewish question, irrespective of their rank and district, is clearly shown by Affidavit PL 54, which contains a summary of 26,000 sworn declarations. leaders for war crimes. Jews are concerned. be supposed of the majority of political leaders. The Press announced that governments of other countries, such as Hungary, France and Italy, took measures, similar to that of the Germans. What happened in reality was unknown in Germany. Document Pl-No. 49, Confidential Information issued by the Party Chancellery dealing with the details of October 10, 1942, concerning Rumors regarding the Situation of the Jews in the East, was destined to cover up and deny the facts. have been presented to the Witness Hirt before the Tribunal.
Document U.S.S.R. 143 concerns the removal of Slovak street names and the use of the German language for officials. Thorough an examination, however, shows that this was a measure of tie Styrian home union (Heimatbund) which issued circulars to its local sections. This was not a party organization. These events concerned the little town of Pettau, which was inhabited by Germans before the 1919 peace treaty. Krain, which formerly was inhabited by German settlers, and Document USSR-191 shows that these were measures taken by the SD in the border regions of Styria.
the carrying out of which remained unknown in the political leaders. in the East are dealt with at considerable length. Whether those charges are generally justified, cannot yet be judged on the basis of proceedings so far held. It can, however, be examined what knowledge the political leaders had of these events and in how far they were responsible for them.
Document 1058-PS contains Rosenberg's speech before the beginning of the war in the East. His defense counsel has commented upon it in detail. This speech was secret and known only to a small circle.
Document L-221 of July 16, 1941, concerns the Crimea. These are secret marginal remarks of Bormann concerning a discussion in the Fuehrer headquarters. on the Crimea is likewise unknown to the public.
From Frank's Diary derive the charges against the political leaders the food, situation in the Government General. General knowledge of the fact that during the year 1941, 40 per cent of the population suffered from malnutrition because of the political leaders' measures, cannot be supposed. As far as food supply difficulties had become known in the border countries, they might have been brought about by other causes, especially after a lost war.
Document R-36 shows Bormann's Frightful Views on the treatment of the population in the eastern territories. It is the position taken by Dr. Markull, of the Ministry, for the occupied territories in the East, dated August 19, 1942, addressed to Rosenberg. The open and severe terms, as well as the indignant opposition with which it was met, prove that Bormann's views were not accepted and that other measures were taken. The fact particularly that this was put before Rosenberg proves that there was no doubt about his consent with the refusal.
Other incidents became known to a large number of people. Document 1130-PS contains the repeatedly quoted speech of Reichslieter Koch held in Kiev on the 1st of April, 1945, on the subjected the Master Race.
The evidence shows that Koch himself knew that his opinions were not shared. He said that his chiefs of sections could be divided into two groups, the one working against him openly, the other secretly. Reichskommissar for the establishing of Germanism, dating from February and June 1942. They refer to the re-Germanization of former German Rations in the Eastern Territories, which in itself is not inadmissible. One of those decrees is addressed to the Gauleiters for their information. It contains no mention of any criminal measures.
The Prosecution concludes from Document No. 327-PS that the Gauleiters took part in the liquidation of *-*rmous fortunes in the East. A closer examination shows that this is but the liquidation of German firms which had been set up as State enterprises cat the cost of considerable subsidies. In a letter of 17 October 1944 the Gauleiters are merely being requested not to interfere with the liquidation meanwhile taking place in German territory. All this goes to show that the political leaders as a whole could have no special knowledge of any incidents of a criminal nature.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, before we adjourn, the Tribunal will adjourn tomorrow, Friday, at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
DR. SERVATIUS: I did not hear, By Lord.
THE PRESIDENTS: The Tribunal will adjourn tomorrow at 4 o'clock in the afternoon.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 23 August 1946, at 1000 hours).
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal the defendants Hess and von Papen are absent.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, your Honors; shall turn to the activities of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg which begins on page 39 of the written script. matter. As the defense counsel of the defendant Rosenberg has already explained, this was an order of Hitler's giving personal instructions to Rosenberg and not to a Party agency. This is shown in document 136-PS, i.e. a letter of Hitler's of 29 January 1940, and in the Fuehrer decree of 1 March 1942, document 149-PS. It is confirmed by testimony given before the Commission by the witness Dr. Mueller and by Graf von Roedern. An affidavit of the witness Kuenzler (No. 58-A) is to the same effect, stating that the officers of the Reichs Treasurer knew that this order was intended for Rosenberg personally.
And indeed, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg was not a Party organization. The members were scientists and specialists who had nothing to do with the Party, and who in many cases, were foreigners. All had been recruited for the emergency service obligation.
The leader of the Einsatz in Paris was not a political leader. This special section was distinguishable even outside the Party by a special uniform. Treasurer of the Party, the prosecution concluded that political leaders were also concerned. Document 145-PS shows that it was only alone, and that the Rosenberg Ministry as a State office had to bear the costs. This was corroborated by the witness Kuenzler, a leading official in the Party finance administration, in affidavit 58-A. The witness Dr. Mueller, consultant for matters of private property, testified to the same effect before the Commission.
(Transcript page 1614.) referred to document 071-PS, according to which the final settlement of the confiscations which had been carried out by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg should be made by the Gauleiters. The preface of this document, however, shows that it applies only to the confiscations within the German territory of property belonging to people of an "idealogical opposition". It is connected with document 072-PS which merely contains a proposition in connection with the church question. This proposition does not suggest that the Gauleiters confiscate things. It merely states they should look after them until their seizure by a more competent authority, in order to avoid anything getting lost, existed there to which any such instructions could be given. ultimate destination of these cultural values. The witnesses Mueller, transcript page 1629, and Kuenzler, affidavit 58-A, stated before the Commission, that those objects should be dealt with in the peace negotiations. There remains the action concerning furniture (Moebelaktion) mentioned by the prosecution through which the furniture of 70,000 householders in France was transferred. This was an action of the East Ministry, and was carried out by its own personnel. the juridical situation clear, and have shown that the political leaders were in no way concerned with these prisoners.
23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2 -1 But the Prosecution have confronted the political leaders with document 656-PS, US exhibit 339, which is a directive of the OKW from the year 1944. It gives the guard details the right of self defense, in view of the request of the enemy propaganda to prisoners-of-war asking them to use force. In cases of extreme emergency, use of arms is permissible. The political leaders are in no way connected with this directive and its execution. foreign workers when dealing with them as defense counsel for Sauckel. the Commission and on 31 July 1946 before the Tribunal regarding the actual facts. I further refer to affidavits 55a, to 55d, and to affidavit 55, which comprises 15,000 statements under oath. They give a reliable picture of general living and working conditions of these foreign laborers. Everything speaks against a systematic program of negligence and mistreatment or a general approval of the conditions as they were alleged. to document EC-63. This is a directive of the Peasants Union of Baden, of 6 March 1941 regarding treatment of Polish agricultural workers. It is an individual measure and it originates from a time prior to the unified settlement of labor allocation. It does not originate from a Party office, the Peasants Union being an independent professional organization outside the Party formation. The directives has been rescinded in view of the subsequent regulations for all foreign workers. however, that this directive in practice was not carried through with the approval of the political leaders. Here reference is made to the testimony of a number of political leaders from the Gau Baden, which has been collected in affidavit P.L. number 68. I further refer you to the testimony of the witness Hohr (peasants Union - Bavaria), who was heard before the Commission on 5 July, 23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2-2 1946, the testimony of Gauleiter Wahl for the Gau of Schwaben who was heard before the Commission on 15 July 1946, and to the testimony of the Ortsgruppenleiter Wegscheider.
workers were concerned, it is shown from the confidential information of the Party Chancellory of 9 December 1943 (Document P.L. No, 98), that such interference has only been carried through at the express wish of the person concerned. The list annexed to the document also shows that an interference was the exception (compare with affidavit Hahler 56a). landings is the last war crime which is particularly incriminating the political leaders. against the civilian population were admissable, or whether the rage of the population was justified, but only with the fact that a killing of such fliers by the population was permitted without a previous judgment. It remains now to clear up the question -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you are passing from the treatment of foreign workers to another part of your speech, The Tribunal would like to know what your case is with reference to the treatment of foreign workers by the political leaders, and whether you contend that they did not assist in placing and controlling the laborers who were brought to Germany under the forced labor program.
DR. SERVATIUS: I am denying that they participated in the rambling up and bringing up of these laborers. They only had the duty of supervising the duties and welfare, the welfare of these workers and were concerned to see it was supervised.
THE PRESIDENT: You agree then that they undertook the duty of supervision of the laborers?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes - but that they fulfilled that duty. After all, in the case of Sauckel, a number of Gauleiters had been heard on the subject, all of whom have confirmed the fact 23 Aug M LJG Cumoletti 2-3 that they were authorized, to act on behalf of the laborers and took care of this welfare question, that was dealt with in the case of Sauckel.