Moreover, it cannot be taken for granted that the disposition manifested in the conventions by the French Government to cooperate with the then victorious German Reich was in contradiction to the genuine popular opinion of the French Nation.
Reference can be made in this respect to Document R 12 4, page 34 of my Document Book. Particular attention must be given here to the economical situation of occupied France at the time. After France's withdrawal from hostilities, the whole of French metropolitan territory was included in the total blockade, with the result that those raw materials not produced at home were no longer forthcoming, and production came to a standstill. Thus, a considerable proportion of the French productive potential was put out of a ction and a number of workers in this way were deprived of a living. Moreover, the French Government did not pledge itself to an unreserved dispatch of labour potential to Germany, but subordinated this to compensational provisions such as the liberation of prisoners of war etc. the conclusion of the convention by the French Government were actually fulfilled, is immaterial to the matter of determining whether the conventions in question were authentic treaties or not. That those agreements have the character of a treaty cannot be juridically doubted. In virtue of them the accusation of the Prosecution that the removal of workers from the occupied French territories was carried out against their will and therefore illegally, can have no justification. Agreements such as those concluded between the German and French Governmental Departments cannot be introduced as a criterion for the judgment of the legal background relative to the workers from Belgium and Holland, since in these countries the Government had deserted and consequently there was no existent political authority, The remaining General Secretaries of the Government could not be considered as Government representatives and the decrees, by virtue of which the dispatch of workers to Germany was carried out, were enacted on the directive of the Reich Commissioner in the person of the military Commander-in-Chief.
23 July M LJG 7-2 the dispatch of labourers effected by then has already been explained by Dr. Steinbauer in his opposition concerning the activity of defendant Seyss-Inquart in Holland. In order to avoid repetition, I refer you to those explanations. the principle that the Soviet Union did not become a contracting party to the Hague Convention of Land warfare. It remains, however, to be examined whether the principle set down in Art. 46 of the Hague Convention of Land warfare, with reference to the treatment of civilians in war, and in the case of occupation of a belligerent country by the enemy, is not be considered as a universally valid International Law and therefore applicable even if the belligerent country concerned is not specifically party to the Hague Convention of Lund Warfare. On examination of this question, the deportation of workers from occupied territories would prove to be illegal, which means that a particular circumsta nce must come up to cancel its illegality. considered as one such circumstance. Of course, the theory International Law is controversial as to whether and in what measure such an emergency can legalize an intrinsically illegitimate practice, but the admissibility of such an emergency must be envisaged in these cases when the State is fighting for its bare existence. the declared goal of the Allies, such a state of emergency was to be considered by the German State as having arisen, since there remained no doubt but that it was the intention of the enemy to destroy the German State to its very foundations. existent at an earlier stage, after it had become clear that the war had ceased to be, as conceived by the Hague Convention of Land Warfare, a settlement of differences between two States, and become a war in which it was sought, not only to strike at the fighting forces of the belligerents but primarily the economic forces of the 23 July M LJG 7-3 belligerent Nations, and thereby what is termed as their war potential.
The Hague Convention of Land Warfare rests upon a conception of war which was overwhelmed in the first World War and much more so in the second World War. If in the first World War the belligerents sought to strike at each other's economy by blockade and counter-blockade, in the second World War they have moreover, in addition to the more indirect effect of blockade, introduced direct damaging nation against the enemy by the destruction of its production installations by means of aerial war. Against the conception of war at the base of the Hague Convention of hand Warfare, a complete change has come about. In view of the consideration that a country can only resist a technically well equipped adversary if it has, itself, at its disposal a potential of uninterrupted productive potential of the adversary. This was the aim of the British blockade, not only of Germany but of every country in the German sphere of influence. Dr. Kranzbuehler has already discussed the questions related to this subject. Reference can be made to his statement as far as it is concerned. the regions belonging to the German national territory but also to destroy the production potential and possibilities existing in the occupied territories. Aerial war, with continuous air raids, was directed against economic targets in France, Belgium and Holland, the Czech Territories, Poland, Austria, and bad as its further aim the interruption and putting out of action of the whole communications system, not only on the front and its immediate rear but hundreds of kilometers behind it, with the purpose of paralysing the adversary's vital functions. The air offensive of the Allies against J apan is particularly clearly indicative of this. This war overlapped the bounds of the Hague Convention of L and Warfare. It does not make any more difference between the national territory of the adversary end the occupied territories which are likewise included in the enemy blockade. In this war, which made it its purpose to destroy not only the national existence but the economic productive capacity of the adversary, one can speak of a real national emergency.
When defendant Speer was appointed Minister, the economic war we have just described was in full swing on either side. It was indeed the task of Speer's department to solve just the production problems resulting from it. Thus, Speer was placed in the middle of this economic war.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaeschner, I would like to ask you this question. Is there any communication between States, either at the League of Nations or elsewhere, since the war of 1914-18, which suggests that the Hague Rules on Land Warfare were no longer applicable? Perhaps you would consider that question and answer it at your convenience?
DR. FLAESCHNER: Mr. President, I can already deny this question or answer in the negative. In the meantime, that is the time elapsed between the two World Wars. Those problems have just been touched, and as far as I am in a position to judge, this question was touched in the matter of Naval warfare, and relative to land warfare as far as it applied to the prisoners of war. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare did not apply to special agreements dealing with special ways or means of waging wars. There are no amendments or appendices to the Hague Convention in this respect. I am thinking of various means of combat which have been in the meantime excluded in the conduct of a warfare. As far as the principles are concerned end the principles laid down in the Hague Convention, there have been no changes in the meantime.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then, I understand you to say there has been no communication between States since the 1914-18 War, which suggests that the Hague Rules on Land Warfare are no longer applicable?
DR. FLAESCHNER: Yes. measures taken on the German side were expedient in remedying the state of emergency. several occasions that the imported labor was intended to be used as labor for service at the front.
This is certainly one of the points of view which induced Germany to resort to foreign workers, but it is by no means the only valid, not even ideed the overwhelmingly decisive point of view.
It is a fact that the total blockade of the German Reich carried out by the adversary compelled the Reich to an increasing extent to build plants for the production of substitutes in order to carry on the war in its now definitely technical form. It is another fact that the distrubances of economic life caused by aerial warfare made it necessary to present to an increasing use of labor. Merely as an example, allow me to mention how much additional labor was necessary for the repair of air raid damage. This situation involved a state of emergency, inasmuch as the pursuit of a war of self-preservation would not have been possible without the erection of such additional production plants. an emergency cancelling the illegality of the proceedings since the war was begun as a war of agression and was therefore illegal from the outset, the answer is that, as far as defendant Speer is concerned, this much may be said in his favor, that he believed in the existence of such a state of emergency and had reason to do so. of the origin of the war, so far as they Lave been exposed here by the Prosecution, were not known to most of the defendants, but least of all to the defendant Speer. constitutes an objectively illegal measure according to International Law, it remains to be examined what share of it can be charged to the defendant Speer. At his interrogation, prior to the beginning of the Trial on 18 October 1945, defendant Speer has admitted having known that, at least as far back as September 1942, foreign workers had ceased to come voluntarily to the Reich. He said he had countenanced the compulsory measure because there was no other possibility of meeting the Labor requirements in a different way. It must be concluded from this declaration that the defendant was convinced of the necessity of this emergency measure.
Subjectively it must therefore be considered in his favour that he believed in the existence of such a state of emergency excluding illegality.
But in the first place it must be examined, as to what extent defendant Speer has actually contributed to the institution of deportations to Germany. In this respect, we must start from the principle that defendant Speer had a purely technical task which he has sufficiently described in his evidence. Reference can be made thereto. For the fulfillment of his task, he stated his labour requirements. How these requirements were met has been told in detail by witnesses Schieber and Schmel. Requirements were submitted as a whole and it was incumbent upon defendant Sauckel to satisfy them. These requirements included the totality of labour required, and it was the defendant Sauckel's task to meet these requirements according to possibilities and according to his best judgment. It was for him to carry out an exhaustive round-up of domestic labour potential as well as the procurer of foreign labour. That defendant Speer made it a point to procure German labor in the first place for the tasks to be carried out by him and for which he was commissioned by the Government, has been told by witnesses Schieber and Kehrl (Doc. Book II, Pages 109, 115, 117, 118, 129) and they made these statements in their interrogation. That the satisfaction of his labour demands for the achievement of his task; the increase of armament production, was admittedly of considerable though not decisive importance, is evidenced by the testimony of witness Saur (Document Book II)*---* according to which an increase of 4 to 4.9 million workers was achieved for the armament finishing industry during the defendants activity as Armament Minister, whilst the production of armament parts increased in the proportion of 5 1/2 and up to 7 in many departments.
It must therefore be borne in mind that the increase of armament production incumbent upon defendant Speer was primarily achieved, not through increase of labor potential, but rather thanks to technical and organizational measures. It must be once more inferred from this that, for the defendant, procurement of labour potential was admitted on important though not the decisive element in the carrying out of the task assigned to him. The defendant has quite plausibly stated that he had demanded workers from Sauckel but that he had insisted upon having German workers first of all.
In the defendant's opinion, the increase of labor potential in the economic sector controlled by him could have been achieved without resorting t foreign labor to the extent in which it was done. The measures taken by the defendant for the purpose of preventing the deportation of workers from the West into the Reich have been adequately described by the evidence. In taking those measures, namely the removal of consumer goods production and manufacture of vital armament parts such as, for instance, forged parts, railway equipment, etc. to the Western countries and installation of protected industries there, Speer was actuated by the knowledge that the conscription of workers from France as well as from Belgium would be stopped. The consequence of his talks with the French Minister Bichelonne was, as the defendant explained at his interrogation, practically the end of the deportation of workers to Germany The results have been accurately described by the General labor Commissioner at the session of the Central Planning Board on the 1 March 1944 (p 32/33 Speer Document Book). In spite of every resistance opposed to this policy (compare Sauckel's letter to Hitler dated 17 March 1944, Document 3819-PS) Speer persevered in his purpose. The report of Hitler's conference on 4 January 1944, submitted by the Prosecution under No. 556-PS, shows too by the decision adopted, that the protected industries, the abolition of which Sauckel tried to obtain, were to remain inaccessible to seizure by Sauckel's labor conscription.
(Compare also Speer Exhibit 10m page 26) Speer wanted to employ French workers in France, in the effort to transfer production of consumer goods and products which did not represent arm* production to the occupied Western territories. He wished to utilize for armament production the German worker made available through the closing down of German plants. (See Document R-124, pp 33/34 of Speer document book). In this manner Speer was able to increase production, because German workers, as a result of elimination of language difficulties, could more easily be retrained and because food difficulties were eliminated. (Compare Kehrl, page 110, Speer document book). preponderantly used in the production of civilian goods, but not in armament production. dustries it must also be said: The statute is derived from two factual circumstances; deportation for forced labor and forced labor itself. Compulsory labor in France was ordered, through a decree of the French Government *---* to international law there could be no objection to this, unless one would take the position that the French Government was not entitled to take such measures and to issue such decrees. As was deposed by defendant Speer, French economic leadership obtained its independence through the agreement with Bichelonne, naturally with the restrictions which resulted from the agreement. As established by Bercks (see document book I, page 381), coworker of defendant Sauckel, from the protected industries of France 20% went to French economy; on the other hand more than 40% went from consumer goods industry did not manufacture weapons and direct implements of war, for the German authorities would surely not have left them to the French offices. misgivings as to the manner in which we presented our evidence, to the effect that purposeful questions were irrelevant, then the viewpoint of the Defense, on the contrary may be established that this speech is only for the purpose clarifying the question of legality. If the French Government was justified in decreeing compulsory labor service and if plants, employing French worker:
on the basis of this decree or on the basis of voluntary labor contracts, we provided with orders on German accounts, no legal objection could be raised. The establishment of protected industries which hindered the withdrawal of laborers and their transfer to Germany, and the removal of some individual branches of production to France, Belgium and Holland, led to the objective satisfying the requirements of German Economy in a legally unobjectionable manner. Although defendant Speer did not completely check the transfer of workers, he nevertheless did succeed in decreasing their commitment appreciable Instead of the policy of transplanting foreign workers to the Reich, a policy which was pursued by other Reich offices, the defendant pursued the objective of committing the labor for his purpose in their homeland. (Compage Speer Exhibit 9, page 24 and page 27 of the Speer document book). To this external worked against the tendency of deporting workers from their homeland. the intensification of deportation for forced labor, the Prosecution refers to document 556-PS, which represents a file memo by Sauckel, concerning a telephone conversation with Speer on 5 January 1943. In contrast to this, the copy of the Fuehrer protocol of 3 to 6 January 1943, which was the object of the telephone conversation, has been submitted. Even if here also sharp remarks by Hitler are repeated, it nevertheless does not reveal the tendency which was noted by Sauckel in his file memo. The order issued to Speer in this Fuehrer protocol for the management of the French armament industry, gave his pretext for the establishment of protect industries. The termination of labor commitment from France was thereby accomplished, consequently, therefore, the opposite of what the Prosecution would like to prove, Reference must be made hereby to document book RF-22. There it is asserted that due to the Speer-Bichelonne agreement, labor commitment to Germany as of October 1943 had been decreased about 1/10 (compare page 41 Speer document book).
it is of no importance whether he acted in such a way for reasons of expediency or because he considered the other procedure as illegal. What solely matters in this case is the success which actually brought to an essential standstill the transfer of labor forces to Germany, as evident from the docu ment quoted, RF-22. Speer Exhibit 12, page 19 of the document book Speer, and the testimony of Seyss-Inquart (11 June '46), that in spite of the loss of industry in the Western territories and the intention of other Departments to bring the unemployed workers to Germany, Speer carried through the maintenance of his protected industries, and that the plan of further commitment of foreign work ers to Germany collapsed definite. The duty to examine the measures of Sauckel as to their international legal admissibility cannot be invoked in the case of the defendant Speer and this for the following reasons: to Reich Territory had already been practiced for some time. Speer relied of the assumption that the legal foundations for these measures had been examine before their introduction. He did not have the legal duty of examining independently the legal basis; he could rely on the assumption that the offices handling labor commitment had examined the legal basis of their activity. He had it confirmed to him repeatedly by the Plenipotentiary for Labor in the course of his activity that the transfer of labor to the Reich was carried o* strictly within legal limits. He could rely on it that the authorities charge by the St ate direction with the tasks of procurement of labor would, on their part, examine the measures carried out by them for the execution of these task as to their legal admissibility. The activity of the defendant within the framework of the State direction could, if transferred to civil law, be compared with that of the technical works Manager of a factory, whereas Sauckel position would correspond to that a director of the personnel office. In such a case the technical Works Manager's duty is not to examine if and to we extent the employment contracts concluded with the individual workers conference to legal regulation.
He has only to see to it that the labor forces put at his disposal to carry out his tacks are being employed in the right place and in the right manner. This cannot be countered with the argument that the defendant Sauckel merely considered himself as the deputy of the defendant Speer. This would not present a just picture of the distribution of tasks between the two codefendants as carried out by the State direction. The fact cannot be even looked that of all the sectors which put in their requisitions to the defen dant Sauckel, the ones presented by the defendant Speer were the most important for the conduct of the war and, therefore, had priority over the others.
This does not mean, however, that is was Sauckel's duty to satisfy absolutely all the demands of the sector represented by Speer before all the others. He did not do this, as is evident from the collective evidence. particularly the testimonies of the witnesses Schieber -- Document Book II p. 114, and Kehrl -- document Book I p. 106, and could not even do this, as the demands of the other sectors, which were all designated as "Bedarfstraeg* (users), were very often equally urgent, and the labor potential at hand was not sufficient to fill all the demands equally. Had Sauckel not been more than a "deputy of Speer", a tool who had only to carry out the instructions of Speer, the profound differences between the two could never have come into existence. defendant Sauckel as Plenipotentiary for Lob or was made possible through the intervention of the defendant Speer, and that this gave reason to believe to Sauckel had been more or less a tool of the defendant Speer or depended on him to a large extent. This assumption does not correspond with the facts. Speer discovered that the procurement of labor for the plants which had up to them been carried out by the Ministry of Labor could not fill the demand made on them. This activity represented, within the frame-work of the find try of Labor, only a small fraction of its overall functions. the Ministry of Labor could not overcome sufficiently the tendencies of the Gauleiters in their various districts, because every Gauleiter had the am bition to prevent the transfer of workers from his Gau to another to the be of his ability The department of the Ministry of Labor, with its pure redtape, did not appear to be capable of this task, and the suggestion was in to the State direction to charge a Gauleiter with this Assign.
The demand connected with this suggestion of Speer, namely to put the Gauleiter charged with the procurement of labor under him was not granted by the State direction, and this because of other existing competencies. The person proposed by Speer was also turned down, and the defendant Sauckel was appointed instead. Therefore, only organizational reasons were involved in Speer's endeavors to create a Plenipotentiary of Labor, the purpose of which consisted in overcoming the above-mentioned opposition directed against the activity of the Labor Procure it Office of the Ministry of Labor. To draw from the so facts the conclusion that the defendant Speer was responsible for all the measures ordered be the defendant Sauckel would be erroneous. of the Centra Planning Board, in the course of which the problem of the Procurement of Labor was discussed, cannot be used to support the claim of the Prosecution. The prosecution attempts to prove, as a result of the session of Central Planning Beard, that the defendant Speer had played a leading part in the procurement of labor from foreign countries. To counter this following must be stated : The Prosecution has only submitted the texts of the minutes of the Central Planning Board; that is the minutes which were taken down *---* the course of the session, but not the decisions which were made a the bases of this session, These, however are decisive.
However, all the defendant Speer's reports include also resolutions of the Central Planning Board and contain notes laced at the disposal of the Allied authorities, it would have been easy for the Prosecution to present such conclusion, from which a decisive cooperation of the defendant in the procurement of labour could be deduced. Such conclusions do not exist, how ver, and cannot therefore be drawn from the fact that at the conferences of the Central Planning Board questions of labour mobilization were mentioned which the Central Planning Board had taken over in its sphere of activity.
is given in Speer Exhibit No. 7 under No. 42. In it the labour sphere of the Central Planning Board is firmly outlined. The procurement and distribution of labour should not be included in the sphere of competence of the Central planning Board as the new office of the Plenipotentiary of lab was created just for that purpose. It follows also from the testimony that when the co-defendant Sauckel discussed fully the question of policy of * commitment before the Central Planning Board, he underlined sharply his independence of the Central Planning Board and laid weight thereon that is decisions were accountable only to the Fuehrer in the last instance. For this I refer to the testimonies the witness Kehrl and the witness Schieb Speer Exh. No. 36 an 37. Nothing contradicts the fact that attempts were made in the Central Planning Board to influence the sphere of activity of the General Plenipotentiary for Labour. These attempts, however, did not lead to any results. for the transportation of labour from the occupied territories to the Reich cannot be deduced from his activity within the framework of the Central Planning, Board. portion of the workmen made available to him by Sauckel were brought to Germany against their will and that he used these Workmen in the industry under his supervision, this conclusion encounters legal criticism. of International Law, such crime would be terminated with the removal of labor to the Reich. The fact that the persons removed into Reich territory were assigned for work establishes, legally speaking, a new act of facts to which thee Prosecution applies the concept of "slave labor".
In this connection the following should be considered : By reason of the Reich Compensation Law and the enactment decree there existed for every German an obligation to make his services available for war purposes. Through the Labor Office as highest instance, the State leadership could dispose of the labor of every State national for any purpose it deemed appropriate, and it did so.
Foreign workers who were removed to Germany became likewise subject to this regulation. There is no attempt made on our part to deny that no prevision is found in the Hague Convention on Land warfare itself which would support labor compulsion in force for German nationals to be extended to inhabitants of the occupied territories. Since the Hague Land Warfare Convention reflect the influence of a different concept of warfare, it could not yet take conditions into consideration which were brought on by economic warfare. Yet it is not possible to answer affirmatively the question whether the Hague Land Warfare Convention conclusively regulates the summariness of all powers incumbent upon on occupation authority. An affirmation is contradicted by the practice of all nations who participated in this war. But in this respect also the angle of the above-mentioned State emergency situation can be resorted to for a correct evaluation and appreciation of the case. It should be admitted that the Prosecution is right in that this extension of labor liability can be justified from that point of view only.
Assuming the Prosecution's contention of a lack of legal justification for the extension of labor liability to foreign nationals of occupied territories, there remains the need for checking the extent to which culpability could be claimed for the defendant Speer because of the employment of labor hold under such compulsion. That the defendant Speer although he was not responsible for this, still attempted to facilitate the living conditions of these workers and that he also helped to correct bad conditions -insofar as these come to attention- is shown by Exhibits 3, 4 and 5 of the Speer document book, pages 7,8,9, of the document book, be made to the testimony of the defendant himself, in direct examination as well as in cross-examination, when he described his activity in that field. defendant Speer during his cross-examination a series of documents, purportedly to prove the bad treatment of foreign workers by the firm of Krupp in Essen, himself stated that he does not held the defendant Speer responsible for such individual incidents, See page 11861 of the German transcript of Court proceedings.
The documents involved were the affidavit of Dr. Jaeger, document D-238, discussed by Dr. Servatius; a letter of the Locomotive Manufacturing Department of the firm of Krupp, dated Feburary 1942, just after the defendant Speer had taken office as Reich Minister. Conditions as described therein had called for Speer's intervention with Hitler in March 1942, Speer Exhibit No. 3, page 7 of the Document Book Speer. Another document also submitted, document D-321 describes conditions as they prevailed when Russian laborers came to Essen in 1941; in other words, before the defendant Speer took office.
Document D-258, USA Exhibit No. 896, which camp up during cross-examination was not produced as proof of charge against the defendant, as stated by Justice Jackson, see page 11872 of the German transcript of Court Proceedings. Further documents then submitted, all deal with incidents in the Krupp Works. all of them. These documents show that improper conditions of a general nature for which the firm of Krupp might beheld responsible resulted from the effects of air bombardment and demolition following quarters incidental thereto. But even if the incidents cited should have actually occurred with that firm -- which the defense is not in a position to verify -- these incidents would not supply adequate ground for the assumption that the conditions under which foriegn laborers worked in armament industries were uniformly the same. Picking out only on firm and examining it does not permit the drawing of conclusions as to a whole system.
But only findings covering the system as such would yield evidence. influence criminal evaluation of his actions in principle, but it would be of decisive import in establishing the measure of his participation. and prisoners of war was already in existence; it is not he who introduced it. Thus he should not be considered as the originator, which may likewise deserve to be taken into account for the establishment of judgment, since it did not seem possible to abrogate the practice after its establishment. The employment of foreign labor in German economy was not something unusual. In peace times also a great number of foreign laborers were employed in agriculture, in mining, in surface and in underground workings. had already been brought, to Germany to a considerable extent, even before the defendant Speer took office, and only a portion of them belonged to the sector under Speer's control. Sauckel and Speer, how assignment and distribution of workers into the establishments most recently under the control of the defendant Speer was handled will be described below. Acting in behalf of the Speer Ministry, Commissions and pools assigned to the individual establishments certain production tasks as part of the armament program. The factory then figured out the number of workers needed. This was reported to the Armament Command and at the same time also to the Labor Office there labor requirements of all works were recorded. The Armament Commands examined all requests for workers received from all works under their jurisdiction and passed then on to the Armament Inspection Offices. Labor requirements reported to the Labor offices were forwarded by them to the Gau Labor Offices. Armament Inspection Offices collected the requests and forwarded them to the Speer Ministry, Labor Mobilization Division. The Gau Labor Offices directed applications which they received to the General Commissioner for the Commitment of Labor. In this connection it is noteworthy that in 1942 the Speer Ministry controlled only construction work and Army armament. Navy and Air armament handled their requests for labor independently. In the spring of 1943 Navy armament was assigned to the Speer Ministry; from then on, Navy handled its labor requisitions by way of the Labor Commitment Division; in the fall of 1943 the rest of production was added while Aircraft armament continued to handle its requisitions independently through the General Commissioner for the Mobilization of Labor until August 1944.
Prosecution's assumption, according to which Speer is seen as the main beneficiary of Sauckel's mobilization of labor can be disproved. Incidentally, it is mentioned that alongside of the Speer Ministry there existed essential industries and agencies of equal importance, for instance the Wehrmacht Administration, the Transport System and so forth; this has also been confirmed by the testimony of witnesses. The General Commissioner for the Commitment of Labor distributed the labor at his disposal among the various essential Industries and agencies, assigned the required labor to the Gau Labor Offices who, in turn, referred them to the local labor offices where allotment of individual laborers to the individual establishments was handled, on the strength of applications which had undergone examination through the branches of the Armament Offices. This cumbersome type of procedure was possible through the introduction of the so-called "red-slip process" which was applied in the case of exceptionally urgent production assignments (Speer Exhibit No. 37, page 122 of Document Book). A certain number of red slips were made available monthly by the General Commissioner for the Commitment of Labor to the Armaments Ministry, for distribution by the latter to the individual industrial works under its supervision by way of the industries self-administration agencies. The individual factory then presented these red slips to the Labor Office, and these requests for workers covered by red slips were sited upon without regard for the requirements of other essential industries and agencies, and not until then could allotment of labor be made to other establishments. In all instances where normal requests for labor are involved, allotting was exclusively in the hands of labor authorities under direction of the defendant Sauckel, so that neither the individual factory nor the offices of the defendant Speer nor the latter himself had any influence on the distribution. The question whether local labor or foreign labor, or prisoners of was were used to satisfy requisitions was left for the Labor Authorities to decide (Document Book II, page 108, 109). the decree of 1 December 1942 (Document No. 4006-PS), issued jointly by Speer and Sauckel.
The Prosecution contends that this document and the decree of 22 June 1944, simultaneously submitted, furnish a basis for appraisal of the power ratio between Speer and Sauckel. Therefore, some comment on this is appropriate. General Commissioner for the Commitment of Labor was authorized to examine requests for labor, to the extent to which they came from the armaments industry. If then a case arose that a factory asked for the additional laborers required to carry out the production job assigned to it, the General Commissioner for the Commitment of Labor reserved to himself the right of examination as to its necessity. The intention was to make the individual factory exert the greatest possible economy in the use of labor within its own works. Another purpose of these commissions was to establish the extent to which an establishment might be in a position to spare of its own labor for work in other plants, without impairing the task assigned to it. It was the task of the Armaments Ministry and of the agencies under its authority to determine the priority range in the consideration of requests for labor received by establishments under its jurisdiction. They also had to determine which of the plants was in a position to make workers available to other plants whenever both made the same product for the same Wehrmacht requirements. As an example, supposing the supply program to be modified for a plant manufacturing vehicle supplying articles, it was left to the Armaments Commands to decide whether the labor power thus set free should be assigned to another factory in the same line of production. In general, the allotment of labor remained in the hands of the General. Commissiner for the Commitment of Labor. The agencies of Speer's Ministry were merely concerned. with directing the labor already available to these branches of industry as assigned to these establishments through the General Commissioner for the Commitment of Labor. Plenipotentiary General for Labor, and furthermore the Plenipotentiary-General for Labor participated authoritatively in the examination of the question as to what extent plants could release labor in order to make it available to others.
Combing-out action. The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor was therefore not limited to any extent through this mutual agreement between him and the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production. His task was merely now as before to procure labor for the plants, he was even given a considerable amount of authority in labor questions, to look over the armament plants subordinated to the defendant Speer and to examine if and to what extent these plants could make labor available for other plants. The decree of 22 June 1944 ordered that labor which was already available was to be used in accordance with directives of the Central Authorities or according to the orders of the Chairman of the Armament Commission. It must also be noted in this respect that it was not a matter of using new labor unskilled in armament work which, now as before, was procured through the Plenipotentiary General for Labor, but solely so-called transfer-actions from one armament plant to the other. The Sauckel Agencies therefore could no longer, in accordance with this decree, check the demands for labor on the part of the plants subordinated to the Speer Ministry, if the Chairman of the Armament Commission had recognized these demands This decree did not bring any change in the basic distribution of authority, according to which the plenipotentiary-General for Labor had to procure the required labor and handled the whole allocation of labor. If the Agencies of the Plenipotentiary-General allocate labor on a demand for labor which had already been checked, then it was left to their decision as to what labor, if native or foreign etc. was to be furnished. The authority of the Agencies of the Minister for Armament in questions of the commitment of labor were limited to a large extent to the execution of so-called transfer-actions, i.e. assignment of labor from one armament plant to another. It would be wrong to try to conclude a considerable limitation of the authority of the PlenipotentiaryGeneral for Labor and afundamental expansion of Speer's authority from these decrees. It would be just as wrong to conclude from this that the influence of the Armament Ministry had been increased over other authorities of the Plenipotentiary-General for Labor. Sauckel, the Prosecution has finally submitted a file note of General Thomas, the Director of the War Economy- and Armament Division in the OKW regarding a discussion between the defendant Speer himself on the one hand, and the Directors of the Armament Offices of the three branches of the Wehrmacht on the other hand of 24 March 1942, in which Thomas states that the Fuehrer considered Speer as his main authority and his trustee for all economic spheres.
This note can only be understood in connection with the report of the account which General Thomas gave regarding his activity as Director of the War Economy and Armament Office, and which has been presented in excerpt form to the Tribunal under file No. 2353-PS. Prior to Speer's appointment as Minister for Armament, Thomas had tried to effect that the position of the General. Plenipotentiary for Economy, which had been provided in the Reich Defense Law, would be expanded to an Agency which would control the whole war economy. When now the armament economy was confronted with high demands in connection with the first winter campaign in Russia and the losses which had been sustained there, and Hitler, after the death of Dr. Todt, appointed Speer to be his successor in the Ministry for Armaments and Munitions, Thomas thought to see in Speer a personality who would receive the authority which he had striven to obtain for the General Plenipotentiary for Economy, This, however, did not occur. As has been shown from the evidence, Speer only received the army equipment and the construction system. The subordination of the now agency of the Plenipotentiary-General for Labor under his Ministry, for which the defendant Speer was striving, was not sanctioned by Hitler. Speer's rights as Minister for Armament are stated in the decree. The generally maintained expectations of General Thomas, which the latter had linked with Speer's appointment, were therefore not fulfilled in anyway. Speer only received an increased authority when, in the year 1943 he took over industrial production from the Ministry of Economy. But even then he was still far from having the sphere of work which General Thomas had expected for Speer.