The period following this is bot brought under discussion by the Prosecution.
The defense, however, must go into even this as evidence in refutation. It is easy to find a proof in established facts from this time, that the assertions of the Prosectution from the earlier period must be incorrect. The Prosecution leaves Papen at the termination of his activity in Vienna and it gives no explanation for the reason to which Papen's current inactivity can be traced back. There is no cause, no event, which could have impelled the alleged conspirators to this conduct. the outbreak; of the war. tor Papen at this time abandoned his previous course, in spite of the possibilities that were doubtless available. The Prosecution ought to have cleared up this transformation in some way, if one is not immediately to regard the interpretation of the actions in the earlier period as inconcusive in the sense of a criminal objective. Papen retired to the country after the incorporation of Austria, where he remained aloof from public life for over a year, until April 1939. This fact is important if one considers the situation at that time. The 4 February 1938 doubtless brought about a more rigorous course in German foreign policy. tool of Hitler for the first actions in preparation for this police. Were this applicable, then one would have to regard Papen, in consideration of the result aimed at, as a hundred-per-cent diplomat. This so successful diplomat and conspirator now does not go to some place where he can continue his activity further, where preparations might have to be made in a similar manner, as for example in the Sudetenland. He is not placed in a position, where the great political threads run together, in Paris, London or Moscow, where on the basis of his international reputation he might indeed appear as undoubtedly the most suitable man to support the Hitlerite policy. eign policy of Hitler, when the Sudeten crisi, the incorporation of Czechoslovakia and the preparations of the war against Poland created a period of an extremely tense political atmosphere. If at that time Hitler did not take his services into consideration at all, then it is clearly apparent from this alone, that Papen was not a conspirator, not even a follower of Hitler and not even the instigator of the first success of Hitlerite policy, the incorporation of Austria.
upon in a situation in which it was not the object to occupy a country, or to make preparations for the intended operations. Papen is called upon at a time when the policy of expansion of our Italian ally into Albania cause difficulties and gave reason to fear entanglements with Turkey. And so here is a clear task, that of maintaing the status of peace. own support, then it still does not avoid passing unfavorable judgement on the acceptance of the post by Papen. It ism therefore, also necessary to go into this point in detail.
Papen was also very reluctant to accept this new appointment. Twice already, in more peaceful times, he had refused the appointment out of general considerations, because he no longer watned to be active in any official position at all. Now he sees reasons to which he can no longer close his eyes. He sees a new task to which he believes it his duty to devote himself. 1939. Even from a secondary flank the spark could easily fall on the powder barrel. A conflict between Italy and Turkey, could, in fulfillment of existing treaties, bring about a general war. If by his activity he could at least exclude the possibility of war to this extent, Papen must have found personal justification for taking over the mission. He was confronting the problem which confronts all those who have been called upon to cooperate within the framework of a system of which they disapprove. To stand aside, to adopt a completely passive attitude, is, of course, the easier way, particularly if no other reasons impel the person in question to accept the post. The more difficult way is to take over a task within the framework of an over-all policy of which one disapproves, which in part of its field offers an aim worthy of achievement. And if this partial field is of such importance that the prevention of a possible was depends on it, then the decision to take over such a mission can only be understandable and worhty of approval.
If only the most remote possibility of attaining such a goal exists, then private interests and feelings must step into the background. to Ankara, if one sees that by his intervention in the spring of 1939 the Italians were moderated from the German side and belligerent complications were avoided, if one considers that later Papen was successfully able to prevent the war from being extended to Turkey and the more distant southeastern territories, then in looking back one can only say that his taking over the mission against his personal feeling was the right decision. made efforts to baring about a peace of renunciation as early as the year 1939, then we must also approve this acceptance of the mission for this reason, independently of the fact of what final success was to crown his efforts, even if one could have only figured on quite a dwindling possibility of reaching the desired goal. The assumption of such a position would finally also be justified from the moral viewpoint if he had only had as much as one single partial success, as, for example, the saving of 10,000 Jews from the deported to Poland, which has been confirmed by the affidavit of Marchionini. arise from the judicial inquiry concerning this affidavit. involved were saved by the intervention of Papen. Papen confirmed, upon interrogation, the correctness of the affidavit. This confirmation corresponds also with the facts. This does not mean, however, that the meaning of that action, as it is know to Marchionini today and which he mentions therefore in his affidavit, was already known the. Papen knew, of course, that the deportation to Poland for an unknown purpose and with an unknown goal was something very grave. This also explains his intervention. He knows onlh today, the same as Marchionini, certainly only knows today in all clarity, that the path of these people was not supposed to lead into deportation labor, but directly into the gas chambers.
naire of the present Apostolic Annuncio in Paris, Roncolli, describing Papen's attitude from personal knowledge. and Baron von Lersner. It clearly shows a unified peace policy, a peace policy which, independently from the momentary military and political situation, even at the highes point of German victories, stressed a peace of renunciation. Papen was, according to the statements of Rose and Kroll, deeply affected by the outbreak of the Polish war and condemned it from the first. the assertions of the Prosecution? Paper is supposed to have brought about the war in conspiracy with Hitler. The Prosecution believes it can deduce the criminal act from his behaviour in the years preceeding the war. No proof has been submitted as to what may have turned Papen the conspirator, into an advocate of peace. It has rested its accusations on the shaking foundation of deductions and omitted to verify whether the assertions of the Prosecution might in any possible way be in agreement with the whole personality of the defendant. In view of the nature of the indictment, one cannot be content to solve the problem by the assumption of a splitting of his personality oand an opportunistic attitude. The indictment includes crimes of monstrous proprtions. Such an indictment must also rest on the personality of the culprit. Participation in such a conspiracy is only conceivable in the case of a complete identity with the doctrines discussed in the proceedings and described as "Nazism", to their utmost consequences. A conspirator, in the sense of the indictment, can only be a man who has given himself up entirely, with the whole of his personality, to that tima. He must be a man in whom even the last moral ties have been abolished. Such a personaoluty cannot be a phenomenon of brief duration; the readiness for such a crime must lie within the person of the culprit.
In contrast to the distorted picture of Papen's character drawn by the Prosecution, his true personality has been shown up during these proeceedings in all clarity. We see a man who is rooted by origin and education in tradition and concervative ideas, a man of consciously responsible national feeling, to whom for just these reasons a regard for others is natural.
knowledge of the world, preclude from the first his seeing things from a one-sided viewpoint, according to his own national wishes. He knows that life requires understanding and the willingness to understand. He knows that international life is b*---*incerity and faith and that one must stand by one's word. which he always makes the basic principle of his actions, must necessarily stand in opposition to the ideological doctrines of National socialism. We have followed his political career and seen that he held fast through all the periods of his activity to his basic political creed which was built on these elements. responsibilities, he did not evade any of the tasks assigned to him. And even it we are witnessing in the end the collapse of his hopes and his endeavours, this cannot be the touchstone for the sincerity of his convictions. sense of the facts established in the Charter can surely only have been possible on the basis of the legal simplifications which an indictment offers to the Prosecution. In the facts of the case against Papen, even this interpretation must fail. involved himself in the alleged conspiracy. Opposed to this is the reality. In the evidence offiered in refutation, facts are established which make a connection of his person with even the idea of the facts in the indictment impossible. of the charge brought against him.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
IA recess was taken).
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Flaeschner, counsel for the defendant Speer.
DR. FLAESCHNER: Mr. President, may it please the Tribunal: points of the indictment, which essentially coincide with the stipulations of Par. 6a - c). The French Prosecution which has substantiated more definitely the individual charges against defendant Speer desists from charging defendant Speer with a violation of Par. 6a) of the Statute of the Penal Code and demands only the application against Speer of Par. 6b and c). However, since the legal concept of conspiracy during the oral proceedings has frequently been clarified by referring to the person of the defendant Speer, and since the assertion was set forth that the defendant Speer also had made himself guilty within the meaning of the Penal Code paragraph of a violation of fig. 6a) of the Statute, the details must be entered into by way of precaution. preparations, launching and conduct of a war of aggression or a war violating international treaties, and this, indeed, at a time when the defendant assumed the office of Minister of Armaments, which was expanded to a Ministry for Armament and War Production 1 1/2 years later, when the German Reich was at war with all countries, to which she capitulated in May 1945. At the time the defendant assumed Government affairs, all the facts mentioned under Par. 6a) ha altogether taken place and defendant Speer's activity did not alter the actuall existing situation to the slightest extent. situation. His previous activity was that of an architect, who occupied himself exclusively with peace time construction and did not contribute by his activity, either toward preparation nor launching of a war violating international treaties. Please refer to my document book on page 29, document 1435-PS. If under the circumstances which Par. 6a) of the Statute materially and legally characterizes as a punishable act it were a case of generally prevailing international law, and if individual culpability of persons who bring about the facts of the cases were generally recognized, in international law defendant Speer in my opinion could still not be held responsible for these facts, for not the slightest evidence has been produced during the proceedings that Speer contributed towards bringing about these facts.
In this connection we must consider that culpability of an attitude requires that the person in question must have contributed in some way or other towards the bringing about of the facts which have been declared punishable, i.e. he must have caused the result which was declared punishable to be brought about. If, however, as in the case under consideration, defendant Speer entered the Government without having contributed anything at all towards the so-called crimes against peace, he cannot be charged with criminal responsibility for this, even if such responsibility could be applicable to other members of the government. The Prosecution used the expression that the defendant had accepted and/or approved the proceeding crimes against peace by joining the government. Such a concept taken from the field of civil law cannot be applied to criminal law. Criminal law applies only to Circumstances consisting of actions which serve to bring about the circumstances declared punishable. Nor is this altered by the introduction of the legal concept of conspiracy. In this connection reference may be made to Dr. Stahmer's detailed statement on conspiracy. The legal views set forth in that statement are also made the subject of my detailed statement. In order to avoid repetition, reference is made to it, as well as to the full statements of Prof. Jahrreiss. It can, therefore, be confirmed that defendant Speer cannot be charged with a so-called crime against peace. regarding his activity have shown that Speer by virtue of his position as architect, exercised exclusively architectural - artistic functions also in the Party set-up, Speer was the commissioner for construction in the Hess staff; here it was a matter of a purely technical task, which had nothing at all to do with any form of preparation for war. The Party, which strove to seize and influence all the vital functions of the people, had created the position of commissioner for construction, to execute and shape the Party structures uniformly. For their construction projects, the regional leaders of the NSDAP and the other Party offices were to apply to this office for consultation; however, they availed themselves of this only to a very slight extent.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaeschner, the Tribunal thinks it might be appropriate at sometime convenient to you if you were to deal with the question of the meaning of the words "waging of a warfare of aggression" in article 6-a. I don't want to interrupt you to do it at this moment in your speech but at sometime convenient to you the Tribunal would like you to give your interpretat of the words in Article 6-a "waging of a war of aggression".
DR. FLAESCHNER: Yes, Mr. President. Perhaps I might return to this point later, Mr. President, after I concluded this topic. Naturally it was a purely architectonic task, when the Party acted as person for whom building was performed. Considering the peculiarity of architectionic will to fashion things, each architect naturally pursues his own intentions in solving the problems put to him. The activity of the defendant as commissioner for construction was therefore relatively restricted and of secondary importance, since he did not even have an apparatus of his own at his disposal. It would be erroneous to try to assume therefrom any participation on the part of the defendant in any crimes against the peace. The same holds true for the defendant's remaining functions prior to and during the war up to his assumption of office as minister When the defendant was given the job of reshaping the appearance of the towns of Berlin and Nuernberg, this activity had nothing at all to do with any crimes against the peace; on the contrary, his activity was rather to be regarded as a prevention of war preparations, as this task of his required raw materials an equipment to a very great extent, from which rearmament might otherwise have benefited directly or indirectly. The construction projects assigned, to Speer were, moreover, calculated, and planned far ahead. They could only cause the impression in Speer that Hitler reckoned with a long period of peace. It is therefore, out of the question for the defendant prior to his assumption of office as Reich Minister to have contributed directly or indirectly to the realization of facts, which are characterized by Par. 6a) of the Charter as cr* against peace. The fact too, that the defendant was a member of the Reichstag from 1941, cannot be quoted in support by the Prosecution, because as the Prosecution itself pointed out, the Reichstag in the authoritarian regime has sunk to complete insignificance and had become merely an institution that accepted and proclaimed the Fuehrer's decisions.
In this respect also responsibility for the guilt of war is out of the question, for no activity whatever of the Reichstag is recognizable in extention of the war to the Soviet Union and the United States. reproaching the defendant with an offense against Par. 6a) of the Statute. during his term of office through the fact, that workers were transferred against their will from the occupied countries to Germany, where they were employed for the purpose of the conduct of war or the production of war materia The following should be said in this connection:
The Prosecution reproaches the defendant with violations of Par. 52) of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare insofar as according to this convention services can be demanded of nationals of the occupied country only for the necessities of the occupation army; moreover, they have to be in proportion to the resources of the country and must not imply the obligation of the persons concerned, to take part in military actions against their native land. The Hague convention on land warfare establishes in Par. 2) that all countries participating in the war in question must have joined it in General participati clause as it is known. The Soviet Union not having entered into the Conventi* on Land warfare, the latter could be applicable to the conditions created by the war against the Soviet Union only if the legal principles laid down in the Convention should be considered as universally valid international law. Above all we have, therefore, to start from the principle that a different legal judgment has to be applied to those areas belonging to states that were partner of the Hague Convention on Land warfare, and for such areas whose states are not to be regarded as treaty partners. deportation of laborers from territories occupied in war-time by an enemy power can be justified in virtue of Art. 52) of the HLO. Art 52) which constitutes a limitation of Art. 46) ofthe Hague Convention on Land Warfare, inasmuch as the principle is stipulated that fundamentally the population of occupied territori and their property are to be involved as little as the necessities of war will allow.
Starting from this principle, it is new necessary to examine whether, in virtue of it, a deportation for the purpose of securing labor potential for the essential war economy of a belligerent country is prohibited to any extent. In this respect, the question must be considered, and it make: a difference whether the deportation carried out by the occupying belligerent State is in accordance with conventions agreed upon with the Government of the country occupied by the belligerent State. The Prosecution have defended the view that such conventions are legally void because they were made under the constraint of occupation, and because tire Government existing in France during the time of occupation could not be considered as representative of the French nation. International juridical conventions will always be influenced in their contents by the respective centers of gravity of the contracting parties. In every peace treaty concluded between a victor and a vanquished State, this proportion of centers of gravity will be reflected in the contents. This is not, however, contrary to the nature of treaties. an agreement between the German andexisting French government, relative to the assignment of labor potential, is equally ineffectual. The so-called Vichy Government existing at the time was the only Government existing in French metropolitan territory: it was the lawful successor of the government in office before the occupation, and internationally acknowledged by the fact that states then not yet involved in the war preserved diplomatic relations with it.
Moreover, it cannot be taken for granted that the disposition manifested in the conventions by the French Government to cooperate with the then victorious German Reich was in contradiction to the genuine popular opinion of the French Nation.
Reference can be made in this respect to Document R 12 4, page 34 of my Document Book. Particular attention must be given here to the economical situation of occupied France at the time. After France's withdrawal from hostilities, the whole of French metropolitan territory was included in the total blockade, with the result that those raw materials not produced at home were no longer forthcoming, and production came to a standstill. Thus, a considerable proportion of the French productive potential was put out of a ction and a number of workers in this way were deprived of a living. Moreover, the French Government did not pledge itself to an unreserved dispatch of labour potential to Germany, but subordinated this to compensational provisions such as the liberation of prisoners of war etc. the conclusion of the convention by the French Government were actually fulfilled, is immaterial to the matter of determining whether the conventions in question were authentic treaties or not. That those agreements have the character of a treaty cannot be juridically doubted. In virtue of them the accusation of the Prosecution that the removal of workers from the occupied French territories was carried out against their will and therefore illegally, can have no justification. Agreements such as those concluded between the German and French Governmental Departments cannot be introduced as a criterion for the judgment of the legal background relative to the workers from Belgium and Holland, since in these countries the Government had deserted and consequently there was no existent political authority, The remaining General Secretaries of the Government could not be considered as Government representatives and the decrees, by virtue of which the dispatch of workers to Germany was carried out, were enacted on the directive of the Reich Commissioner in the person of the military Commander-in-Chief.
23 July M LJG 7-2 the dispatch of labourers effected by then has already been explained by Dr. Steinbauer in his opposition concerning the activity of defendant Seyss-Inquart in Holland. In order to avoid repetition, I refer you to those explanations. the principle that the Soviet Union did not become a contracting party to the Hague Convention of Land warfare. It remains, however, to be examined whether the principle set down in Art. 46 of the Hague Convention of Land warfare, with reference to the treatment of civilians in war, and in the case of occupation of a belligerent country by the enemy, is not be considered as a universally valid International Law and therefore applicable even if the belligerent country concerned is not specifically party to the Hague Convention of Lund Warfare. On examination of this question, the deportation of workers from occupied territories would prove to be illegal, which means that a particular circumsta nce must come up to cancel its illegality. considered as one such circumstance. Of course, the theory International Law is controversial as to whether and in what measure such an emergency can legalize an intrinsically illegitimate practice, but the admissibility of such an emergency must be envisaged in these cases when the State is fighting for its bare existence. the declared goal of the Allies, such a state of emergency was to be considered by the German State as having arisen, since there remained no doubt but that it was the intention of the enemy to destroy the German State to its very foundations. existent at an earlier stage, after it had become clear that the war had ceased to be, as conceived by the Hague Convention of Land Warfare, a settlement of differences between two States, and become a war in which it was sought, not only to strike at the fighting forces of the belligerents but primarily the economic forces of the 23 July M LJG 7-3 belligerent Nations, and thereby what is termed as their war potential.
The Hague Convention of Land Warfare rests upon a conception of war which was overwhelmed in the first World War and much more so in the second World War. If in the first World War the belligerents sought to strike at each other's economy by blockade and counter-blockade, in the second World War they have moreover, in addition to the more indirect effect of blockade, introduced direct damaging nation against the enemy by the destruction of its production installations by means of aerial war. Against the conception of war at the base of the Hague Convention of hand Warfare, a complete change has come about. In view of the consideration that a country can only resist a technically well equipped adversary if it has, itself, at its disposal a potential of uninterrupted productive potential of the adversary. This was the aim of the British blockade, not only of Germany but of every country in the German sphere of influence. Dr. Kranzbuehler has already discussed the questions related to this subject. Reference can be made to his statement as far as it is concerned. the regions belonging to the German national territory but also to destroy the production potential and possibilities existing in the occupied territories. Aerial war, with continuous air raids, was directed against economic targets in France, Belgium and Holland, the Czech Territories, Poland, Austria, and bad as its further aim the interruption and putting out of action of the whole communications system, not only on the front and its immediate rear but hundreds of kilometers behind it, with the purpose of paralysing the adversary's vital functions. The air offensive of the Allies against J apan is particularly clearly indicative of this. This war overlapped the bounds of the Hague Convention of L and Warfare. It does not make any more difference between the national territory of the adversary end the occupied territories which are likewise included in the enemy blockade. In this war, which made it its purpose to destroy not only the national existence but the economic productive capacity of the adversary, one can speak of a real national emergency.
When defendant Speer was appointed Minister, the economic war we have just described was in full swing on either side. It was indeed the task of Speer's department to solve just the production problems resulting from it. Thus, Speer was placed in the middle of this economic war.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaeschner, I would like to ask you this question. Is there any communication between States, either at the League of Nations or elsewhere, since the war of 1914-18, which suggests that the Hague Rules on Land Warfare were no longer applicable? Perhaps you would consider that question and answer it at your convenience?
DR. FLAESCHNER: Mr. President, I can already deny this question or answer in the negative. In the meantime, that is the time elapsed between the two World Wars. Those problems have just been touched, and as far as I am in a position to judge, this question was touched in the matter of Naval warfare, and relative to land warfare as far as it applied to the prisoners of war. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare did not apply to special agreements dealing with special ways or means of waging wars. There are no amendments or appendices to the Hague Convention in this respect. I am thinking of various means of combat which have been in the meantime excluded in the conduct of a warfare. As far as the principles are concerned end the principles laid down in the Hague Convention, there have been no changes in the meantime.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then, I understand you to say there has been no communication between States since the 1914-18 War, which suggests that the Hague Rules on Land Warfare are no longer applicable?
DR. FLAESCHNER: Yes. measures taken on the German side were expedient in remedying the state of emergency. several occasions that the imported labor was intended to be used as labor for service at the front.
This is certainly one of the points of view which induced Germany to resort to foreign workers, but it is by no means the only valid, not even ideed the overwhelmingly decisive point of view.
It is a fact that the total blockade of the German Reich carried out by the adversary compelled the Reich to an increasing extent to build plants for the production of substitutes in order to carry on the war in its now definitely technical form. It is another fact that the distrubances of economic life caused by aerial warfare made it necessary to present to an increasing use of labor. Merely as an example, allow me to mention how much additional labor was necessary for the repair of air raid damage. This situation involved a state of emergency, inasmuch as the pursuit of a war of self-preservation would not have been possible without the erection of such additional production plants. an emergency cancelling the illegality of the proceedings since the war was begun as a war of agression and was therefore illegal from the outset, the answer is that, as far as defendant Speer is concerned, this much may be said in his favor, that he believed in the existence of such a state of emergency and had reason to do so. of the origin of the war, so far as they Lave been exposed here by the Prosecution, were not known to most of the defendants, but least of all to the defendant Speer. constitutes an objectively illegal measure according to International Law, it remains to be examined what share of it can be charged to the defendant Speer. At his interrogation, prior to the beginning of the Trial on 18 October 1945, defendant Speer has admitted having known that, at least as far back as September 1942, foreign workers had ceased to come voluntarily to the Reich. He said he had countenanced the compulsory measure because there was no other possibility of meeting the Labor requirements in a different way. It must be concluded from this declaration that the defendant was convinced of the necessity of this emergency measure.
Subjectively it must therefore be considered in his favour that he believed in the existence of such a state of emergency excluding illegality.
But in the first place it must be examined, as to what extent defendant Speer has actually contributed to the institution of deportations to Germany. In this respect, we must start from the principle that defendant Speer had a purely technical task which he has sufficiently described in his evidence. Reference can be made thereto. For the fulfillment of his task, he stated his labour requirements. How these requirements were met has been told in detail by witnesses Schieber and Schmel. Requirements were submitted as a whole and it was incumbent upon defendant Sauckel to satisfy them. These requirements included the totality of labour required, and it was the defendant Sauckel's task to meet these requirements according to possibilities and according to his best judgment. It was for him to carry out an exhaustive round-up of domestic labour potential as well as the procurer of foreign labour. That defendant Speer made it a point to procure German labor in the first place for the tasks to be carried out by him and for which he was commissioned by the Government, has been told by witnesses Schieber and Kehrl (Doc. Book II, Pages 109, 115, 117, 118, 129) and they made these statements in their interrogation. That the satisfaction of his labour demands for the achievement of his task; the increase of armament production, was admittedly of considerable though not decisive importance, is evidenced by the testimony of witness Saur (Document Book II)*---* according to which an increase of 4 to 4.9 million workers was achieved for the armament finishing industry during the defendants activity as Armament Minister, whilst the production of armament parts increased in the proportion of 5 1/2 and up to 7 in many departments.
It must therefore be borne in mind that the increase of armament production incumbent upon defendant Speer was primarily achieved, not through increase of labor potential, but rather thanks to technical and organizational measures. It must be once more inferred from this that, for the defendant, procurement of labour potential was admitted on important though not the decisive element in the carrying out of the task assigned to him. The defendant has quite plausibly stated that he had demanded workers from Sauckel but that he had insisted upon having German workers first of all.
In the defendant's opinion, the increase of labor potential in the economic sector controlled by him could have been achieved without resorting t foreign labor to the extent in which it was done. The measures taken by the defendant for the purpose of preventing the deportation of workers from the West into the Reich have been adequately described by the evidence. In taking those measures, namely the removal of consumer goods production and manufacture of vital armament parts such as, for instance, forged parts, railway equipment, etc. to the Western countries and installation of protected industries there, Speer was actuated by the knowledge that the conscription of workers from France as well as from Belgium would be stopped. The consequence of his talks with the French Minister Bichelonne was, as the defendant explained at his interrogation, practically the end of the deportation of workers to Germany The results have been accurately described by the General labor Commissioner at the session of the Central Planning Board on the 1 March 1944 (p 32/33 Speer Document Book). In spite of every resistance opposed to this policy (compare Sauckel's letter to Hitler dated 17 March 1944, Document 3819-PS) Speer persevered in his purpose. The report of Hitler's conference on 4 January 1944, submitted by the Prosecution under No. 556-PS, shows too by the decision adopted, that the protected industries, the abolition of which Sauckel tried to obtain, were to remain inaccessible to seizure by Sauckel's labor conscription.
(Compare also Speer Exhibit 10m page 26) Speer wanted to employ French workers in France, in the effort to transfer production of consumer goods and products which did not represent arm* production to the occupied Western territories. He wished to utilize for armament production the German worker made available through the closing down of German plants. (See Document R-124, pp 33/34 of Speer document book). In this manner Speer was able to increase production, because German workers, as a result of elimination of language difficulties, could more easily be retrained and because food difficulties were eliminated. (Compare Kehrl, page 110, Speer document book). preponderantly used in the production of civilian goods, but not in armament production. dustries it must also be said: The statute is derived from two factual circumstances; deportation for forced labor and forced labor itself. Compulsory labor in France was ordered, through a decree of the French Government *---* to international law there could be no objection to this, unless one would take the position that the French Government was not entitled to take such measures and to issue such decrees. As was deposed by defendant Speer, French economic leadership obtained its independence through the agreement with Bichelonne, naturally with the restrictions which resulted from the agreement. As established by Bercks (see document book I, page 381), coworker of defendant Sauckel, from the protected industries of France 20% went to French economy; on the other hand more than 40% went from consumer goods industry did not manufacture weapons and direct implements of war, for the German authorities would surely not have left them to the French offices. misgivings as to the manner in which we presented our evidence, to the effect that purposeful questions were irrelevant, then the viewpoint of the Defense, on the contrary may be established that this speech is only for the purpose clarifying the question of legality. If the French Government was justified in decreeing compulsory labor service and if plants, employing French worker:
on the basis of this decree or on the basis of voluntary labor contracts, we provided with orders on German accounts, no legal objection could be raised. The establishment of protected industries which hindered the withdrawal of laborers and their transfer to Germany, and the removal of some individual branches of production to France, Belgium and Holland, led to the objective satisfying the requirements of German Economy in a legally unobjectionable manner. Although defendant Speer did not completely check the transfer of workers, he nevertheless did succeed in decreasing their commitment appreciable Instead of the policy of transplanting foreign workers to the Reich, a policy which was pursued by other Reich offices, the defendant pursued the objective of committing the labor for his purpose in their homeland. (Compage Speer Exhibit 9, page 24 and page 27 of the Speer document book). To this external worked against the tendency of deporting workers from their homeland. the intensification of deportation for forced labor, the Prosecution refers to document 556-PS, which represents a file memo by Sauckel, concerning a telephone conversation with Speer on 5 January 1943. In contrast to this, the copy of the Fuehrer protocol of 3 to 6 January 1943, which was the object of the telephone conversation, has been submitted. Even if here also sharp remarks by Hitler are repeated, it nevertheless does not reveal the tendency which was noted by Sauckel in his file memo. The order issued to Speer in this Fuehrer protocol for the management of the French armament industry, gave his pretext for the establishment of protect industries. The termination of labor commitment from France was thereby accomplished, consequently, therefore, the opposite of what the Prosecution would like to prove, Reference must be made hereby to document book RF-22. There it is asserted that due to the Speer-Bichelonne agreement, labor commitment to Germany as of October 1943 had been decreased about 1/10 (compare page 41 Speer document book).
it is of no importance whether he acted in such a way for reasons of expediency or because he considered the other procedure as illegal. What solely matters in this case is the success which actually brought to an essential standstill the transfer of labor forces to Germany, as evident from the docu ment quoted, RF-22. Speer Exhibit 12, page 19 of the document book Speer, and the testimony of Seyss-Inquart (11 June '46), that in spite of the loss of industry in the Western territories and the intention of other Departments to bring the unemployed workers to Germany, Speer carried through the maintenance of his protected industries, and that the plan of further commitment of foreign work ers to Germany collapsed definite. The duty to examine the measures of Sauckel as to their international legal admissibility cannot be invoked in the case of the defendant Speer and this for the following reasons: to Reich Territory had already been practiced for some time. Speer relied of the assumption that the legal foundations for these measures had been examine before their introduction. He did not have the legal duty of examining independently the legal basis; he could rely on the assumption that the offices handling labor commitment had examined the legal basis of their activity. He had it confirmed to him repeatedly by the Plenipotentiary for Labor in the course of his activity that the transfer of labor to the Reich was carried o* strictly within legal limits. He could rely on it that the authorities charge by the St ate direction with the tasks of procurement of labor would, on their part, examine the measures carried out by them for the execution of these task as to their legal admissibility. The activity of the defendant within the framework of the State direction could, if transferred to civil law, be compared with that of the technical works Manager of a factory, whereas Sauckel position would correspond to that a director of the personnel office. In such a case the technical Works Manager's duty is not to examine if and to we extent the employment contracts concluded with the individual workers conference to legal regulation.