This breach of neutrality justified the fact that Germany would not considerBelgium a nuetral country any longer.
Therefore, whom the standpoint of the Kellogg Pact, or any reproaches heaped upon Germany in this respect. Whether one can reproach Germany with the fact that she did not declare war, that is something I do not wish to deal with. in advance either.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, you are not prepared to answer the question I put to you?
DR. EXNER: The question was to this effect, Mr. President, whether a prior declaration was necessary. That was the question, Mr. President, wasn't it?
THE PRESIDENT: Whether you can attack a neutral state without giving any prior warning, that is, whether, in accordance with international law, you can attack a neutral state in such circumstances without giving any prior warning. That is the question.
DR. EXNER: The assertion is to the effect that it was no longer a neutral State, Mr. President. When it was attacked it was no longer a neutral state.
THE PRESIDENT: Then your answer is in the affirmative; you say that you can attack without giving any warnings, is that right?
DR. EXNER: There is an agreement in international law that war is always to be declared in advance. In that respect, Germany would have been obligated to declare war beforehand. However, above and beyond that, because of the fact that this was a neutral state, I do not believe that there was an obligation in existence. I cannot see just why there should have been an obligation to this state, because this state had been neutral at one time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, you say that there is a general obligation to declare war before you actually invade. You don't say, do you, that the fact that Holland was a neutral state prevented that obligation attaching?
DR. EXNER: That I do not wish to assume. A general obligation;
yes; but I do not believe there was a special obligation, because of the former neutrality on the part of Holland and Belgium. I would not know how I could justify that, or what reasons I could give.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. EXNER: Now I shall turn to point (c), Greece. Greece against his will at the beginning of October, 1940. When the Italians get into trouble a request was made for German help. Jodl advised against it since English intervention in the Balkans would then have to be reckoned with and every hope of localizing the Italo-Greek conflict would thus be lost. Hitler then ordered everything to be prepared for the necessity which might perhaps nevertheless arise, if German help for Italy against Greece became inevitable (Orders of the 12th November and 13 December, 1940). it was clear thatGreece would be involved in the Great German-English struggle. The question was now whether her territory would lie within the war zone controlled by the British or the Germans. And as in the case of Norway, Belgium, and Holland, part of the territory of these countries was already at England's disposal before the beginning of open hostilities, and they were, therefore, de facto at least, no longer neutral -- and perhaps could no longer be neutral, so it was also with Greece now. The prosecution, on Greece, established that British troops were landed on the Greek mainland on 3 March 1941, after Crete had, already some time before that, come within the area controlled by the British. Hitler did not give permission for aerial warfare at Crete until 24 March 1941, and began the land attacks only on 6 April.
Here, too, Jodl had no influence on Hitler's decisions. He could have no doubt that Hitler's decision was inevitable as the war between the world powers was now developing. There was no choice; ever-increasing parts of Greek territory would have been drawn into the sphere of English power and would have become the jumping-off points for bombing squadrons against the Roumanian oil-fields had Germany not stopped this process. Moreover, the experiences of the first World War were frightening; the coup de grace was then made from Salonica.
(d) Yugoslavia.
Hitler wanted to keep Yugoslavia out of the war too. The German troops in the Balkans had the strictest orders to respect its neutrality rigorously. Hitler even declined the application by the Chief of the Army General Staff to askthe Yugoslav Government for permission to let sealed trains with German supplies through their territory.
joined the Tripartite pact was considered by Hitler as a malicious betrayal. He was of the opinion that the change of Government at Belgrade, which altered the course of its foreign policy 180 degrees, was only possible if England or the Soviet Union or both had provided cover from the rear. He was now certain that the Balkans would be fully drawn into the war tangle. He was certain that the German troops in Bulgaria were directly threatened and also tie German Line of Communication which ran close to the Yugoslav frontiers. morning following the Belgrade putsch, any separation from which was absolutely lacking. Jodl's suggestions, and later Ribbentrop's, too, to make things unambiguous by means of an ultimatum, were not considered at all. He wanted to make sure that Yugoslavia and Greece should not come into the sphere of influence of England but into that of Germany. The next day's news concerning Moscow's telegram of friendship to the Belgrade Putsch Government and about the Yugoslav deployment then already in progress, as confirmed by the statement of General von Greiffenberg, Doc. book III. A J. 12 (Jo.65) and lastly the Russo-Yugoslav Friendship pact were for Jodl irrefutable signs that Hitler had seen the connection of events correctly.
Point 9 of the trail brief concerns the Soviet Union. what each of the two Governments, that of Berlin and that of Moscow, wished to achieve by the Government of the 23-8-1939 is today not certain. One thing is, however, certain and that is that those partners who work up till then enemies, had not entered into a marriage of love. And the Soviet Union was for the German partner a completely mysterious quantity. And it regained so, too. Anyone who does not consider this fact can in no way judge Hitler's decision to make a military attack on the Soviet Union, and above all the question of guilt. decision without listening to the slightest advise from anyone to say nothing of taking it. He wavered for many months in his opinion about the intentions of the Soviet Union. were from the very beginning full of incidents. The Soviets at once occupied the territories of the Baltic States and of Poland with disproportionately strong forces.
divisions in the East, the Russian Deployment against Ressarabia with at least 30 divisions, reported by Canaris, and the deployment into the Baltic territory caused great anxiety. On the 30th June 1940 apprehensions were allayed so that Jodl -- as the Document PS 1776 has shown -- even thought that Russia could be counted on as a helper in the fight against the British Empire. But in July there were renewed worries. The Russian influence was advancing energetically in the Balkans and the Baltic territories. Hitler began to fear Russian aggressive intentions as he told Jodl on the 29th July. were no longer required, actually had nothing to do with this. It ocorred at the request of the Commanded-inChief in the East who could not fulfil his security task with his weak forces.
Hitler's worry concerned above all the Rumanian oilfields. He would have liked most to eliminate this threat already in 1940 by a surprise action. Jodl replied that, owing to the bad deployment possibilities in the German Eastern territories, this could not be considered before winter. Hitler demanded veritification of this opinion. Jodl arranged for the necessary investigations in a conference with his Staff in Reichenhall, which was obviously misunderstood by the Russian prosecution. On the 2nd August Hitler ordered improvements to be made in the deployment possibilities in the East -a measure which was no less indispensable for defence than for an offensive. August -- 10 Infantry Divisions and 2 Panzer Divisions were brought into the Government-General in case a Blitz action should become necessary for the defence of the Rumanian oilfields. The German troops, now totalling 25 divisions, were certainly intended to appear stronger than they really were, so that an action should be unnecessary. This is the sense of Jodl's order for counter-espionage (PS 1229). Had there been offensive intentions them, there would rather have been an attempt to make one's own forces appear smaller than they were.
of the army orders -- without Jodl knowing anything about it -- to prepare an operational plan against Russia for any eventuality. In any case, the General Staff of the army worked on operational plans of this kind from the fall of 1940 onward (General Paulus). on the 30th August 1940. If Jodl was to believe his utterances, Hitler was becoming convinced that the Soviet Union had firmly resolved to annihilate Germany in a surprise attack while she was engaged against England. The leaders of the Red Army had, according to a report of the 18th September, declared a German-Russian war to be inevitable (Doc. C 170). In addition reports came in of feverish Russian preparations along the demarcation line. Hitler counted on a Russian attack in the summer of 1941 or winter of 1941/42. He thus decided, should the discussions with Moletov not clear up the situation favourably, to take preventive stops. For then the only chance for Germany lay in offensive defence. For this eventuality, preparatory measures were ordered by Hitler on the 12-11-1940 (PS 444). On 18 December 1940 Hitler ordered the military preparations. Should the conn months clear up the situation, all the better. But it was necessary to be prepared in order to deliver the blow in the spring of 1941 at the latest. This was presumably the latest possible moment, but also the earliest, since more than four months were required for the deployment. military risk, the undertaking of which could be decided upon only if all political possibilities of averting the Russian attack were really exhausted. Jodl came to the conclusion at that time that Hitler actually had exploited every possibility.
The situation grew worse. According to the reports which were received by the Army General Staff, at the beginning of February 1941, 155 Russian divisions, i.e. 2/3 of the total Russian strength known to us, had deployed opposite Germany. But the first stage of the German deployment had just begun.
The Government's telegram of friendship to the participants in the Belgrade Putsch on the 27 March 1941 destroyed Hitler's last hope. He decided upon an attack, which actually had to be postponed for more than a month owing to the Balkan war.
German Units, without which the attack could not be conducted at all, were brought to the front only in the last two weeks, i. e. after the 10th June. preservation, and was indisputably permitted according to the Kellog-Briand-Pact. The "Right of Self-Defense" was understood thus by all the signatory states. leaders are not to be blamed for their error. They had reliable reports on Russian preparations which could only have sense if they were preparations for war.
The reports were later confirmed. For when the German attack met the Russian forces, the leadership of the German front got the impression of running into a gigantic deployment against Germany General Winter developed this here in detail in addition to Jodl's statements, particularly with regard to the enormous number of now aerodromes near the line of demarcation, and he drew particular attention to the fact that the Russian staffs were provided with maps of German territories. Field Marshal von Rundstedt also confirmed this as witness before the Commission. This will come before the court during the further course of the trial. against Russia unless he had been absolutely firmly convinced that no other path lay open for him at all. Jodl knew that Hitler knew the danger of a two front war fully and would risk the victory over England - which he thought was no longer in doubt - only in an inescapable emergency.
Jodl only lid his job as an officer of the General Staff. He was convinced, and still is today, that we were waging a genuine preventive war. That Jodl did not intend to increase the number of our enemies by a world power is obvious, and is also shown by documents. I am re ferring to the German transcript pp.
10894 - 10 897). Now what is the position with regard to the responsibility for these campaigns? A declaration of war is a decision in the field of foreign politics, the most important one in the whole of this field. state as to who is responsible for this decision - politically, criminally and morally; it depends on the way the formation of a will in the field of foreign politics takes place in this state according to its constitution. Prof. Dr. Jahrreiss has spoken about this:: in the Fehrer state it is exclusively the Fuehrer who has to make this decision. Anyone who advises him about this cannot be responsible, for, if what the Fuehrer orders has legal force, he who influences this order cannot be acting illegally. anyway participate in the Fuehrer's decision or influence it are also co-responsible. If we take this legal conception as authoritative the question of responsibility crystallizes into a problem of competence. delimited, there must be rulings on competence laying down what each official is called upon to do and not to do. Thus in all states the relations between the military and the civil administration is naturally regulated, as also within the military and within the administration the spheres of tasks and the relations between their thousands of offices are regulated. If things were otherwise chaos would reign. tions between the political and military leadership is important. For the military is the most important instrument of policy and the assistant may easily try to become master - the military interferes in politics. They had no right to vote, were not allowed to go to political meetings and in fact any statements on politics were looked upon askance. For it could in some way he looked upon as a taking of sides, whereas the taking of sides was severely banned.
The military were to be politically blind, completely neutral and knowing only one point of view, which was that of legistimacy, i.e. subordination to the legitimate ruler. war, it was not meltke but Bi**rck who advised the King as to the political decision. This changed during the last years of the first World War. General Ludendorff became the strongest man in the Reich owing to the force of his personality and the weakness of his political opponents. people often talk of German militarism. For the time when the soldier seized political power this was justified. The Weimer State got rid of this completely. The non-political character of the armed forces was stressed with all sharpness and the military again limited to its particular field. This went so far that a civilian was made Minister for war, who had to represent the armed forces politically in the Reichstag. For the longest time it was a Liberal-Democratic Minister, who was meticulously careful to avoid all political influence by the goner sharp distinction between politics and military, indeed he even stressed it in a certain sense. He, who wished to make the whole people politically minded, wanted a non-political Wehrmacht. The soldier was deprived of political rights: He was not allowed to vote or to belong to any party, not even the NSDAP, as long as the old law on compulsory military service was in force. He also remained consistent towards his own party. When, after Fritsch had gone, as now Commander-in-Chief of the army was to be appoint it would have been easy enough to have chosen Reichenau, who had National-Socialist leanings, but he appointed von Brauchitsch. He did not want any political generals, not even National Socialist ones. His point of view was that he was the Fuehrer and he the politician; the generals had to see to their own affairs; they know nothing about politics. He did not even tolerate advice when it concerned politics.
The generals did in fact, repeatedly venture to express doubts as to his political plans, but were obliged here to limit themselve s strictly to purely military points of view. for that matter, not characteristically German. It applies also, if I see rightly, to Angle-Saxon democracies, and indeed to a particularly strong degree.
At any rate it was so under Hitler: he made political decisions, and it was only on their military execution that the generals had any influence. It was their task to make the military preparations necessary for all politics eventualities. But it was Hitler who pressed the button to set the machine in motion. The "whether" and "when" were decided by the Fuehrer. It was not for them to weigh, the opportuneness, the political possibility or the legal permissibleness. owing to the hardly comprehensible mistrust he felt towards his generals. A remarkable phenomenon, - anyone who disregards it can never come to understand the atmosphere which remained in the Fuehrer's Headquarters. It was a mistrust - as he thought - of the reactionary attitude of the officers' corps He never forgot that the Reichswehr had fired at National Socialism in 1923. This was, moreover, the natural mistrust of a military expert, and also probable the mistrust of the political expert towards political dilettantes in officers' uniform. This mustrust of the political outlook of his military entourage was moreover by no means entirely unfounded. For the generals had wanted to put a brake on his rearmament plans, to hold him back from the occupation of the Rhineland and had expressed objections to his march into Austria, and to his occupation of the Sudetenland; And yet all these actions had succeeded smoothly and without bloodshed. The generals felt like gamblers When carrying the plans out, but Hitler was sure of his game. Is it to be wondered at that their political judgment did not carry too much weight with him, and is it to be wondered at that, on the other side, the apparent infallability of his political judgment met with more and more recognition?
customs of it, as has been drastically represented to us here, was that, had a general raised objections to Hitler's political decisions, he would not actually have been shot, but his sanity would have been doubted. Thus, at the beginning of military undertakings, the chances of the plan were hardly over considered in general discussions. None of the important decisions since 1938 came as the result of advice. On the contrary, the decision often came as a total surprise to the military command. Thus it was for instance, with the march into Austria, of which Jodl learned two days before, or in the case of the attack on Jugeslavia, which was suddenly decided upon by Hitler and carried out without any preparations within a few days. The alleged "discussions" at the Fuehrer's quarters, the course of which the witness Field Marshal Milch described so clearly, were nothing else but the "issuing of orders". the individual departments were sharply divided, and the method which Hitler used in order to make these divisions as insurmountable as possible is of interest. This was achieved by the method of secrecy. Enough has been said about this, particularly about the so-called "Blinkers order", which forbade anybody to get an insight into anybody else's work. It thus happened that each department was isolated and strictly limited to its own sphere of tasks. Obviously what Hitler desired to achieve by this system was that he should retain the reins in his hands as the only fully informed person.
Indeed, even more: he strengthened this system still more by only too often playing individual personalities, groups and departments off one against the other to prevent any conspiracy amongst them.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have concluded my paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(A short recess was taken).
DR. EXNER: These methods of isolationism which I mentioned before, were interesting, because they often inevitably came into conflict with one of the basic ideas of National Socialism - the Fuehrer principle - but were carried through in spite of this. For instance, when the sphere of competence of two departments covered the same territory, such as perhaps the competence of a military commander and of Himmler in the same occupied territory. What was ordered by one did not concern the other, even though the carrying out of the order might encroach upon the arrangemen for which the other was responsible. Thus the military commander was in no way the master in his territory. Things were the same incidentally in the civil administration too: there was the duplication of the Landrat (prefect) as a state functionary and the Kreisleiter (district leader) as a Party functionary of the Reich Governor, and the Gauleiter. Everywhere there was a dualism of powers and therefore a dissipation of Power. There was method in this: it prevented lower organs becoming too strong and secured the power of supreme leadership. It may be said epigrammatically that the Fuehrer principle was realized only in the Fuehrer.
What then was the position of Jodl's sphere of competence within all this machinery? was a department of the OKW coming under Keitel. Jodl's main task was, as the name of the departmentimplies, to assist the Supreme Commander in the operational leadership of the armed forces. He was the Fuehrer's advisor on all operational questions - in a certain sense the Chief of General Staff of the armed forces. The task of this chief of general staff in all countries in which this arrangement is known, is not that of giving orders but of advising, assisting and carrying out. Even if from this alone, it follows that Jodl's position has frequently been misunderstood during the course of this trial.
1.) He was not Keitel's chief of staff, but the chief of the most important department of the OKW, though he had nothing to do with the other departments and sections of the OKW.
ment.
He was not Keitel's deputy. Keitel in Berlin was represented by the senior departmental chief and that was Admiral Canaris. At the Fuehrer Headquarters there was only the Operational Staff of the Armed Froces for which Jodl was reporting directly to the Fuehrer. The other sections of the OKW he had to do with.
2.) It is also wrong when Jodl is designated by the prosecution as the Commander of one campaign or another. He had no power of command, let alone being in command of an army.
3.) It was also wrong when it was repeatedly said that Warlimont was present at the meeting of the 23 May 1939 as Jodl's "representative" or assistant. Warlimont was in the OKW, at the time -- Jodl had left the OKW in October 1938 and had nothing more to do with Werlimont in May 1939.
What results from all this with reference to Jodl's responsibility for the real or alleged wars of aggression? In general, one can only be made responsible for what one does criminally whereas one should not do it, and for what one has criminally failed to do whereas one ought to have done it. What an officer or an official had do or not do in a question of competence. So this is where the problem of competence assumes its importance for us. Let us look at it more closely: broaches of international law. This reproach is justified only if it was within his competence to examine, before he carried out his task, the legality of the war which might be waged and to make his co-operation dependent on this decision.
This must be very difinitely contested. Whether to wage a war is a political question and is the politician's concern. The question of how to wage war is the only question concerning the armed forces. The armed forces can suggest that the war is, in view of the opponent's strength, too risky or that the war can not be waged at a particular season, but the final decision rests with the politicians.
Armed Forces would become at least morally guilty of complicity in a war of aggression if he had incited the decisive quarters to bring about a war, or if, drawing attention to military superiority, he had advised the political leadership to exploit the moment in order to carry out extensive plans of conquest. In such cases one could call him an accomplice, because he -over and above his military task -- intervened in politics and provoked the decision for war. But if he plans and carries out the plan of war in eventu, i.e. in case the political leadership decide on war he does nothing else but his evident duty. from a contrary conception: the competent authority declares war, and the Chief of General Staff, who regards this war as contrary to International Law, does not co-operate. Of the Chief of General Staff is luckily of the same opinion as the Head of the State, but one of the army commanders has objections and refuses to march, another one has doubts and has to think it ever first. Can a war be waged at all in this case, be it a war of defense or a war of aggression could not be vindicated at all. The Security Council of the Allied Nations has decided to set up a world police with the task of protecting world peace against aggression. And also the creation of a world General Staff has been considered which would have to plan and carry out this punitive war. Now let us imagine that the Security Council decides on a punitive war and the Chief of General Staff replies that, in his opinion, there is no aggression. Would not the whole Security apparatus in this case depend on the subjective opinion of a single non-political person, i.e. would it not in fact become illusory?
I only add one more thing in passing: If this opinion should prevail what efficient man would still decide to become a regular officer, if, on reaching a high position, he had to rish being put on trial for crimes against the peace in case of defeat?
impose on a General the duty of examining the legality of a war. The General will only seldom be in a position to judge whether the State to be attacked by him has broken its neutrality or whether it threatens to attack or not. And furthermore, the conception of a war of aggression and of war contrary to law is, as Prof. Jahrreiss has explained, still completelv uncleared and contested among the practitioners and theoreticians of International Law. And now, a General, who lives far apart from all these considerations, is to recognize, that it is his duty to carry out a legal examination? the really tragic position in which, this general would find himself. On one side is his evident duty towards his own state, which he particularly took an oath to fulfil as a soldier, on the other side this duty not to support any war of aggression, a duty which forces him to commit high treason, and desertion and to break his oath. One way or the other he will have to be a martyr.
The truth is this: As long as there is no superstate authority which impartially establishes whether, in a concrete case, such a duty does exist for the individual and as long as there is no superstate authority which will protect people who fulfil this duty against punishment for high treason and desertion, an officer cannot be held criminally responsible for a breach of the peace. the prosecution has fallen into: on one hand it reproaches the generals with not having been solely soldiers, but also politicians;on the other hand it demands of them that they should remonstrate against the pol itical leadership and sabotage its resolutions -- in short, that they should not solely be solders, but politicians..
The prosecution do actually acknowledge this up to a certain point. They say that it is not intended to punish the generals for having wages war -for this is their task -- but they are reproached with having caused the war.
And the second argument, which often recurs, is that without the general: as helpers, Hitler could not have waged these wars, and that makes them coresponsible.
This argument contradicts itself. For the help which the generals gave Hitler consisted in the planning and carrying out of the military operations, i.e. in waging the war, for which they can, in the opinion of the prosecution too, not be criminally accused. Let us look at this more closely. Jodl is said to have caused wars. It has been sufficiently proved that he played absolutely no part in the launching of the polish campaign. And it was this very campaign which, with strategic necessity, brought about all the further happenings. to be able to say, according to what we know now, that in this assertion there lies an enormous over-estimation of Jodl's power in the Hitler state. The resolution to start the war was far removed from his influence. Advice from the generals was not heard on this very point. At most, purely military considerations for and against could be submitted. And the Norwegian campaign was the only one of all these campaigns which a military man advised Hitler to carry out for reasons of strategic necessity. But that was not Jodl. As regards the latter, the assertion that he caused wars would be founded on nothing. Lot the protocol, the memorandum, or any other document be shown according to which Jodl at any time incited people to war, or even only recommended the resolution to start a war. His Gauleiter speach is producer against him. In it Jodl shows -- looking back -- how the events developed out of one another. For instance, how the Austrian Anschluss facilitated action against Czecho-Slovakia, and how the occupation of Czechoslovakia facilitated the action against Poland. But it is bad psychology to deduce from this that a general plan for all this existed from the first. It I buy a book which draws my attention to another one, and I then buy the latte as well, does it follow that at the time of the first purchase I already had the intention of getting the second one as well? If Hitler had extensive plans right from the start, Jodl did not know of them. let alone conset to them.
His purely defensive deployment plan of 1938 already proves that by itself alone. to carry it out successfully. It is this supporting activity which is the object of the second of the arguments mentioned earlier. wars. But only a layman can build up a responsibility on that. If the Generals do not do their job, there is no war. But one must add: if the Infantryman does not march, if his rifle does not fire, if he has nothing to clothe himself with and nothing to ear, there is no war. Is therefore the soldier, the gunsmith, the shoemaker and the farmer guilty of complicity in the war? The argument is based on a confusion between guilt and causation. All these persons, and many others too, effectively co-operated in the waging of the war. But can one therefore attribute any guilt to them? Is Henry Ford partly responsible for the thousands of accidents which his cars cause every year? If an affirmative answer is given to the question of causation, the question of guilt is still not answered. The prosecution even refrain from putting this question.
The question of guilt will be discussed later. Here only the following is anticipated: A guilty participation in the planning and carrying out of a war of aggression presupposes 2 things:
1.) That the culprit knew that this war was an illegal war of aggression
2.) That, by reason of this knowledge, it was his duty to refrain from co-operating in it.
The latter links up with what has already been mentioned: by virtue of his position, it was Jodl's duty to make plans: Whether they were used or remained unused, did not depend on him. It is characteristic that Jodl made a whole series of deployment plans which were never carried out. All General Staff tasks are only drawn up for an eventuality in case the political leadership should "press the button". Often they did it, often they did not. That was no longer a matter for the General Staff Officer. recognises the war as a war of aggression. The question is, therefore, how these things appeared to him. How they were in reality interests the historian. The decisive question for the criminal lawyer is: What reports were submitted to Jodl about the conduct of the enemy? Could it be taken from thes reports, that the enemy was acting contrary to his neutrality; that he was preparing an attack on us, etc. Jodl believed them to be true. I must stress this, because it has been said here at times: "the Court will decide whether this was a war of aggression." That, of course, is true, because if the Court decides that it was not a war of aggression, any sen tencing for a war of aggression will fall out from the start. But if the court agrees that the war was, in fact, launched illegally, this does not in itself affirm the guilt of any person.
Someone who takes someone else's watch in the belief that it is his own is no thief. The guilt is lacking, for had it really been his own watch, he would not have been liable to punishment. So if Jodl believed that facts existed which, had they been true, would have made the war a legally admissible one, a sentence for breach of the peace would not arise.
question how if conformed with the ethical code of an officer to assist in a war which they had recognized to be illegal. had, for reasons of conscience,refused to collaborate. What difference would there have been then between him and a soldier who throws away his rifle in battle and retreats? Both of them would be liable to the death penalty for disobeying orders in war. who, for religious reasons, refuses to take up arms and not treat them as we do. But that, doubtless, does not apply to a man who, owing to objections based on international law, does not co-operate in the war decided on by the political leadership. One would object that it is not his affair, not an affair of his conscience, to examine the admissibility of the war, but that this is the duty of the responsible state authorities. According to continent al law, one would not even begin to consider such an excuse for refusing obedience. an attempt to lower them morally but not as an accusation touching the subject of these legal proceedings. The international Military Tribunal is not a court of honour which decides about the actions of the accused as they concern honour, but a criminal tribunal which has to judge certain actions which have been declared criminal by the Charter. It appears to me that the Prosecution forgot this fact on several occasions. trial brief, regarding crimes against the laws of war and humanity, I must make a few preliminary remarks. 70 and also the whole of page 71 and begin again at the top of page 72.
Again we must turn first to the question: wherein lay Jodl's responsibility as Chief of the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces?
Chief in the Operational leadership of the Armed Forces. This staff, however, had still other departments in addition to the Operational Departments of the three branches of the Armed Forces. When the operational tasks increased tremendously during the winter of 1941/1942, a division of work was arranged between the chief of the OKW and Jodl, according to which Hodl was only responsible for the military operations and the drawing up of the Armed Forces Report, while the Chief of the OKW worked on all other matters in connection with the Quartermaster Department and the organizational department of the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces. It follows from all this that Jodl had nothing to do with prisoners-of-war, for which a special department in the OKW was responsible, nor with the administration of the occupied territories, and therefore, nothing with the seizure of hostages and with deportations (I shall discuss UK 56 later.) operations or in the rear military zone. orders; nevertheless, there are many orders which Hodl signed either "by order" or with his own "J". them:
l). There are orders which commence with the words "The fuehrer has ordered" and are signed by Jodl, or signed by Keitel and initialed by Jodl. These are orders which were given by the Fuehrer orally, with the order to Jodl to draft them or put them into writing. With regard to that responsibility, the same applies here fundamentally as for the orders signed by Hitler. For, in order to determine the responsibility, one must ask the questions: What was the task of the person to whom the order was communicated? What was it his right and his duty to do? Jodl's task was only a formal one: he had to word what was already established, to give it the usual shape of a military order, without being allowed to alter anything in its contents.