Point one: The collaboration in the seizure and consolidation of power by the National Socialists has, as has already been pointed, out been dropped. Rhineland. military service nor with rearmament. Jodl's diary contains not a single word about re-armament. He was a member of the Reich Defense Committee, which was not, however, concerned with the re-armament questions. He was here concerned with the measures which were to be taken by the civilian authorities in case of mobilization. There was nothing illegal in that. We were not forbidden to mobilise, for instance, in case of an enemy attack. The preparations in the demilitarized zone which were proposed to the Committee by Jodl limited themselves also to the civilian authorities and consisted only of preparation for the evacuation of the territory west of the Rhine in order to defend the line of the river Rhine in case of a French occupation. The preparations were purely of a defensive nature. kept very strictly secret, this is not evidence of any criminal plans, but only the natural thing to do. As a matter of fact, particular caution was imperative, for the French occupation of the Ruhr was still fresh in peonies' memory.
Neither had Jodl anything to do with the occupation of the Rhineland; he learned about it only five days before the execution of this decision of the Fuehrer's. Further statements are superfluous, for according to the Charter neither re-armament nor the occupation of the Rhineland -- whether they were contrary to international law or not -- belong to the criminal actions under Article 6. aggressive war was seen in them. But who would have thought of an aggressive war at that period? In 1938, owing to lack of trained troops, we could not have put into the field one sixth of the number of divisions our expected enemies, France, Czechoslovakia and Poland, could have produced. The first stage of re-armament was supposed to be reached in 1942. The Western Wall was to be completed by 1952.
Heavy artillery was lacking entirely. Tanks were at the testing stare. The ammunition situationwas catastrophic. In 1937 we did not possess a single capital ship. As late as 1939 we did not have more than 26 seagoing U-beats, which was less than one tenth of the British and French figure. As far as war plans are concerned there existed only a plan for the protection of the Eastern frontier. The description of our situation in the Reich Defense Committee is very typical. It was said, in a matter of fact way, that a future war would be fought on our own territory; hence that it could only be a defensive war. This -- please note -- was a statement made during a secret session of this Committee. The possibility of offensive action was not mentioned at all. But we were than not capable of serious defensive action either. Forthis very reason the generals already thought of themselves as gamblers at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland. But that any one of then could have been sufficiently utopian to think an offensive -- there is not even the semblance of any evidence for such thinking.
As Points 4) - 6) the Trial brief designates participation in the planning and execution of the attack on Austria end Czechoslovakia.
A deployment plan against Austria did not exist at all. The Prosecution quoted the document C 175 as such. But this is a misunderstanding. It is merely a program for the elaboration of the most various war plans; for instance for the war against England, against Lithuania, against Spain, etc. Among those theoretical possibilities of war, the "Fall Otto" is also mentioned; that is an intervention in Austria in case of an attempt to restore the Habsburgs. It says in the document that this plan is not to be elaborated but merely to be "thought out". But, as there was no indication whatsoever of such an attempt by the Habsburgs, nothing at all was prepared for this. Two days later came the order to propose certain deceptive actions, obviously in order to put pressure on Schuschnigg so that he should comply with the Obersalsberg agreements. There is nothing illegal in this, even if the Prosecutor speaks about "criminal methods".
Fuehrer's decision to march in. The Fuehrer gave this order to march in by telephone. Jodl's written order served only to file it. If this had been the authoritative order, it would after all have come much too late. It was issued at 0900 hours on the 11 March and the march in took place on the following morning. Its course was described to us. The troops had purely peace-time equipment. The Austrians crossed the border to meet and welcome them. Austrian troops joined the columns and marched with the German troops to Vienna. It was a triumphal procession with cheers and flowers.
As lateras the spring of 1938 Hitler stated that he did not intend "to attack Czechoslovakia in the near future." After the partial Czech mobilization, which was unprovoked, he changed his view and decided to solve the Czech problem after the 1 October 1938, and not on the 1 October 1938, as long as there was no interference to be expected from the Western Powers. Staff. He did it in the conviction that his work would remain theoretical because -- as the Fuehrer wanted under all circumstances to avoid a conflict with the Western Powers -- a peaceful settlement was to be expected. Jodl tried to achieve only one thing -- that the plan should not be interfered with by Czech provocation. And really things happened as he expected they would. After the examination by Lord Runcinan had show the untenableness of the racial conditions in Czechoslovakia and the justification of the German national point of view, the Munich Agreement with the Western Powers took place. might be organized as a motive for marching in. He has given us the reasons for it. But the incident did not take place. This memorandum is not a breach of international law, even if only because it is a question of internal considerations which never achieved importance outside. And even if this idea had been put into execution, such guiles have always been used, every since the Greeks built their Trojan Horse. Ulysses, the initiator of this idea, is praised for this by the ancient poets as "a man of great cunning" and not branded as a criminal. I do not see anything unethical in Jodl's behaviour either, for, after all, in the relations between states somewhat different ethical principles are applied from those in boarding schools for young Christian girls.
fully as that of Austria. Greeted enthusiastically by the liberated population, the troops entered the German areas, which had been evacuated to the agreed line by the Czech troops. Both these marchings in are not crimes according to the Charter They were not attacks (this presupposes the use of force) still less wars (they presuppose armed fighting), let alone aggressive wars. To consider such peaceful invations as "aggressive wars" would be to exceed even the notorious conclusion based on analogies of National Socialist criminal legislation.
The four signatory powers could have included these invasions, which were still a recent memory, in Article 6, but this was not done because it was obviously intended to restrict the completely new kind of punishment of individual persons to wars, but net to penalize such unwarlike actions. Quite generally speaking, it must be said: any interpretation of the penal rules of the Charter which extends them is inadmissible. The old saying applies: "privilegia stricte interpretenda sunt". Here we have an example of privilegium odiosum. Indeed there has probably never been a more striking example of a privilogium odiosum than the unilateral prosecution of members of the Axis Powers only. for having drafted an invasion plan against Czechoslovakia at a time when a peaceful settlement was not yet ensured. But Jodl reckoned with a peaceful settlement and had good reason to expect it. He therefore lacked the indention of preparing an aggressive war.
To this statement of facts which exclude Jodl's guilt must be added a legal consideration: We have decided - and there should be no doubt about it: There is no punishment for crimes against the peace without a violation of International Law. Now if the Charter makes preparations for aggressive war subject to punishment, it clearly means that a person who prepared an aggressive war which actually took place should be punished. On the contrary, war plans, which remained nothing but plans, do not belong here. They are not contrary to International Law. International Law is not concerned with what gees on in people heads and in offices. Things which are immaterial from the international point of view are not contrary to International Law. Aggressive plans which are not executed in the same way as more aggressive intentions - may be unethical, but they not contrary to law and do not come under the Charter. It is here a question of plans which were not carried out because the peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland based on international agreement was not an aggressive war, and the occupation of the rest of the country, which furthermore was accomplished without resistance and without war, no longer had any connection with Jodl's plans.
March 1939 need not be discussed in greater detail here, for Jodl was at the time in Vienna and did not take part in this action, Neither did he have anything to do with its planning, for it has no connection whatsoever with Jodl's former work in the General Staff. Since then the military situation had changed completely; The Sudetenland with its frontier fortifications was in German hands. The unopposed marching in which then took place, therefore, followed totally different plans, if such plans existed at all. Jodl did not take part in this marching-in. Poland: the essential things have already been said on this subject: At the moment when Jodl left Berlin, no deployment plan against Poland existed. When he returned on the 23 August 1939 the intention existed to outer Poland on the 25th. The plan for this was naturally ready; Jodl did not have a share in it. Poland in the Fuehrer's train on the 3rd September and that this was a proof that he took part in the war. Is this, too, a reproach against a soldier? countries from Norway to Greece. The Trial brief gathers these seven wars together into one point and quite rightly too. They from one unit, because all of them resulted with military necessity and with logical consequences from the Polish war and from England's interference. It is for this very reason that the fact that Jodl had nothing to do with the unleashing of the war against Poland is so important when judging him.
it is known how everything really came about. The only criterion for the judgment of Jodl's behaviour is how he saw the situation at its various stages, whether, according to that what he saw and knew. He considered Hitler's various decisions to wage war justified and to what extent he influenced developments. That is all that we are concerned with here.
to refer to the statements made by Dr. Siemers the day before yesshould like to make an insertion at this point. It seems to be a statement regarding international law which is not contained in my manuscript.
In reference to the statements made by Dr. Siemers in this regard day before yesterday, in order to avoid any misunderstanding I should like to add the following:
1. There is not the slightest doubt that the merchant ships of a state at war may cross the neutral coastal waters. If its enemy, in order to prevent any traffic of that sort, mines the coastal waters, this fact is a clear breach of neutrality. Capital ships and battle ships have the right of passing through, insofar as they adhere to the rules which have been stipulated and do not participate in any combat action in the coastal waters. And if this applies even to capital and battle ships, it applies all the moreso to ships who are transporting prisoners of war.
2. The fact that a war is a war of aggression does not in any way influence the validity and application of the normal war and neutrality right. A contrary opinion would lead to absurd results and would serve only to become a grave-digger for the complete right of war. There would be no neutral states, and the relations between the belligerents would be dominated and determined by the principles of brute force and its applications. Each shot would be murder, each instance of capture would be punishable deprivation of freedom, and each bombardment would be a criminal material damage.
such principles by either side, and even the Prosecution does not uphold the point of view.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. EXNER: Nor does the Prosecution maintain this point of view, otherwise they would not have charged the defendant with certain deeds as being crimes against the laws of war and neutrality laws. The entire reproach under point three would be quite senseless and not understandable. And apart from that, Prof. Jahrreiss dealt with this question on Pages 32 to 35 of his final argument. from Hitler himself - about the fears of the German Navy that England intended to go to Norway. He then received information which left no doubt that these fears were basically right. He also had regular reports according to which the waters near the Norwegian coast were coming more and more into the English sphere of domination, so that Norway was no longer actually neutral.
Jodl was firmly convinced - and still is today - that the German troops prevented the English landing at the last minute.
No matter how Hitler's decision may be judged legally, Jodl did not influence it; he considered the decision justified and was bound to consider it as such. So, even if one wished to regard Hitler's decision as a breach of neutrality, Jodl did not give criminal help by his work on the General Staff.
(b) Belgium-Holland-Luxemburg. the war in the West to its conclusion, there was no other course but a military offensive. In view of the inadequacy of the German equipment at the time and the strength of the Maginot-Line, there was, however, from a military point of view, no otherpossibility for an offensive than through Belgium. operating through Belgium. But Jodl also fully knew, as did every German who experienced August, 1914, how difficult a political decision was faced thereby as long asBelgium was neutral, i.e., was prepared and in a position to keep out of the war. justified doubts could arise now, showed that the Belgian Government was already co-operating, in breach of her neutrality, with the general staffs of Germany's enemies. This, however, can be dropped here in the defense of Jodl. It suffices to know -- and this is indisputable -- that part of Belgium's territory, i.e., the air over it, was being continuously used by Germany's Western enemies for their military purposes.
And this applies perhaps even more strongly to the Netherlands. Since the very first days of the war, British planes have flown over Dutch and Belgian territory as and when they pleased. Only in some of the numerous cases did the Reich government protest, and these were 127 cases.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, will you refer the Tribunal to the evidence which you have for that statement?
DR. EXNER: Please?
THE PRESIDENT: Will you refer me to the evidence that you have for that statement?
DR. EXNER: What statement, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: That protests were made in 127 cases.
DR. EXNER: I am referring to the statements made by the witness von Ribbentrop. He was the one who said that 127 protests went out.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. EXNER: The prosecution does not put the legal question correctly. Before air warfare gained its present important position, conditions were such that a state which wished to remain neutral could withheld its territory from continual military use by one of the belligerents as and when the latter wishd, or else give clear notice of the termination of its neutrality. Since air warfare became possible, a state can hand over, to have to hand over, to one of the belligerents the air over its territory and yet remain outwardly and diplomatically neutral. But, by the very nature of the idea, the defense of its neutrality can be claimed only by a state whose whole territory lies, de facto, outside of the theatre of war. no longer de facto neutral, for the air over them was, in practice, with or against their will, freely at the disposal of Germany's enemies. What contribution they thus made towards England's military strength, i.e., towards the strength of only one of the belligerents, is known to everybody. It is necessary only to think of Germany's Achilles' heel: The Ruhr. barrier constituted by Holland and Belgium protected our industrial areas against air attacks, their neutrality was to be disregarded; but when it protected France and England, its violation was a crime.
Jodl naturally realized the situation. His opinion on the legal question, was, of course, a matter of complete indifference to Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, please.
Dr. Exner, is it your contention that it is is accordance with international law that if the air over a particular neutral state is made use of by one of the warring nations, the other warring nation can invade that neutral state without giving any warning to the neutral State?
DR. EXNER: In this connection, Mr. President, I should like to say that this continuous use of the air space of a state -- that is, for the purpose of attacking; having those planes over this territory with the idea of attacking Germany--was a breach of nuetrality.
This breach of neutrality justified the fact that Germany would not considerBelgium a nuetral country any longer.
Therefore, whom the standpoint of the Kellogg Pact, or any reproaches heaped upon Germany in this respect. Whether one can reproach Germany with the fact that she did not declare war, that is something I do not wish to deal with. in advance either.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, you are not prepared to answer the question I put to you?
DR. EXNER: The question was to this effect, Mr. President, whether a prior declaration was necessary. That was the question, Mr. President, wasn't it?
THE PRESIDENT: Whether you can attack a neutral state without giving any prior warning, that is, whether, in accordance with international law, you can attack a neutral state in such circumstances without giving any prior warning. That is the question.
DR. EXNER: The assertion is to the effect that it was no longer a neutral State, Mr. President. When it was attacked it was no longer a neutral state.
THE PRESIDENT: Then your answer is in the affirmative; you say that you can attack without giving any warnings, is that right?
DR. EXNER: There is an agreement in international law that war is always to be declared in advance. In that respect, Germany would have been obligated to declare war beforehand. However, above and beyond that, because of the fact that this was a neutral state, I do not believe that there was an obligation in existence. I cannot see just why there should have been an obligation to this state, because this state had been neutral at one time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, you say that there is a general obligation to declare war before you actually invade. You don't say, do you, that the fact that Holland was a neutral state prevented that obligation attaching?
DR. EXNER: That I do not wish to assume. A general obligation;
yes; but I do not believe there was a special obligation, because of the former neutrality on the part of Holland and Belgium. I would not know how I could justify that, or what reasons I could give.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. EXNER: Now I shall turn to point (c), Greece. Greece against his will at the beginning of October, 1940. When the Italians get into trouble a request was made for German help. Jodl advised against it since English intervention in the Balkans would then have to be reckoned with and every hope of localizing the Italo-Greek conflict would thus be lost. Hitler then ordered everything to be prepared for the necessity which might perhaps nevertheless arise, if German help for Italy against Greece became inevitable (Orders of the 12th November and 13 December, 1940). it was clear thatGreece would be involved in the Great German-English struggle. The question was now whether her territory would lie within the war zone controlled by the British or the Germans. And as in the case of Norway, Belgium, and Holland, part of the territory of these countries was already at England's disposal before the beginning of open hostilities, and they were, therefore, de facto at least, no longer neutral -- and perhaps could no longer be neutral, so it was also with Greece now. The prosecution, on Greece, established that British troops were landed on the Greek mainland on 3 March 1941, after Crete had, already some time before that, come within the area controlled by the British. Hitler did not give permission for aerial warfare at Crete until 24 March 1941, and began the land attacks only on 6 April.
Here, too, Jodl had no influence on Hitler's decisions. He could have no doubt that Hitler's decision was inevitable as the war between the world powers was now developing. There was no choice; ever-increasing parts of Greek territory would have been drawn into the sphere of English power and would have become the jumping-off points for bombing squadrons against the Roumanian oil-fields had Germany not stopped this process. Moreover, the experiences of the first World War were frightening; the coup de grace was then made from Salonica.
(d) Yugoslavia.
Hitler wanted to keep Yugoslavia out of the war too. The German troops in the Balkans had the strictest orders to respect its neutrality rigorously. Hitler even declined the application by the Chief of the Army General Staff to askthe Yugoslav Government for permission to let sealed trains with German supplies through their territory.
joined the Tripartite pact was considered by Hitler as a malicious betrayal. He was of the opinion that the change of Government at Belgrade, which altered the course of its foreign policy 180 degrees, was only possible if England or the Soviet Union or both had provided cover from the rear. He was now certain that the Balkans would be fully drawn into the war tangle. He was certain that the German troops in Bulgaria were directly threatened and also tie German Line of Communication which ran close to the Yugoslav frontiers. morning following the Belgrade putsch, any separation from which was absolutely lacking. Jodl's suggestions, and later Ribbentrop's, too, to make things unambiguous by means of an ultimatum, were not considered at all. He wanted to make sure that Yugoslavia and Greece should not come into the sphere of influence of England but into that of Germany. The next day's news concerning Moscow's telegram of friendship to the Belgrade Putsch Government and about the Yugoslav deployment then already in progress, as confirmed by the statement of General von Greiffenberg, Doc. book III. A J. 12 (Jo.65) and lastly the Russo-Yugoslav Friendship pact were for Jodl irrefutable signs that Hitler had seen the connection of events correctly.
Point 9 of the trail brief concerns the Soviet Union. what each of the two Governments, that of Berlin and that of Moscow, wished to achieve by the Government of the 23-8-1939 is today not certain. One thing is, however, certain and that is that those partners who work up till then enemies, had not entered into a marriage of love. And the Soviet Union was for the German partner a completely mysterious quantity. And it regained so, too. Anyone who does not consider this fact can in no way judge Hitler's decision to make a military attack on the Soviet Union, and above all the question of guilt. decision without listening to the slightest advise from anyone to say nothing of taking it. He wavered for many months in his opinion about the intentions of the Soviet Union. were from the very beginning full of incidents. The Soviets at once occupied the territories of the Baltic States and of Poland with disproportionately strong forces.
divisions in the East, the Russian Deployment against Ressarabia with at least 30 divisions, reported by Canaris, and the deployment into the Baltic territory caused great anxiety. On the 30th June 1940 apprehensions were allayed so that Jodl -- as the Document PS 1776 has shown -- even thought that Russia could be counted on as a helper in the fight against the British Empire. But in July there were renewed worries. The Russian influence was advancing energetically in the Balkans and the Baltic territories. Hitler began to fear Russian aggressive intentions as he told Jodl on the 29th July. were no longer required, actually had nothing to do with this. It ocorred at the request of the Commanded-inChief in the East who could not fulfil his security task with his weak forces.
Hitler's worry concerned above all the Rumanian oilfields. He would have liked most to eliminate this threat already in 1940 by a surprise action. Jodl replied that, owing to the bad deployment possibilities in the German Eastern territories, this could not be considered before winter. Hitler demanded veritification of this opinion. Jodl arranged for the necessary investigations in a conference with his Staff in Reichenhall, which was obviously misunderstood by the Russian prosecution. On the 2nd August Hitler ordered improvements to be made in the deployment possibilities in the East -a measure which was no less indispensable for defence than for an offensive. August -- 10 Infantry Divisions and 2 Panzer Divisions were brought into the Government-General in case a Blitz action should become necessary for the defence of the Rumanian oilfields. The German troops, now totalling 25 divisions, were certainly intended to appear stronger than they really were, so that an action should be unnecessary. This is the sense of Jodl's order for counter-espionage (PS 1229). Had there been offensive intentions them, there would rather have been an attempt to make one's own forces appear smaller than they were.
of the army orders -- without Jodl knowing anything about it -- to prepare an operational plan against Russia for any eventuality. In any case, the General Staff of the army worked on operational plans of this kind from the fall of 1940 onward (General Paulus). on the 30th August 1940. If Jodl was to believe his utterances, Hitler was becoming convinced that the Soviet Union had firmly resolved to annihilate Germany in a surprise attack while she was engaged against England. The leaders of the Red Army had, according to a report of the 18th September, declared a German-Russian war to be inevitable (Doc. C 170). In addition reports came in of feverish Russian preparations along the demarcation line. Hitler counted on a Russian attack in the summer of 1941 or winter of 1941/42. He thus decided, should the discussions with Moletov not clear up the situation favourably, to take preventive stops. For then the only chance for Germany lay in offensive defence. For this eventuality, preparatory measures were ordered by Hitler on the 12-11-1940 (PS 444). On 18 December 1940 Hitler ordered the military preparations. Should the conn months clear up the situation, all the better. But it was necessary to be prepared in order to deliver the blow in the spring of 1941 at the latest. This was presumably the latest possible moment, but also the earliest, since more than four months were required for the deployment. military risk, the undertaking of which could be decided upon only if all political possibilities of averting the Russian attack were really exhausted. Jodl came to the conclusion at that time that Hitler actually had exploited every possibility.
The situation grew worse. According to the reports which were received by the Army General Staff, at the beginning of February 1941, 155 Russian divisions, i.e. 2/3 of the total Russian strength known to us, had deployed opposite Germany. But the first stage of the German deployment had just begun.
The Government's telegram of friendship to the participants in the Belgrade Putsch on the 27 March 1941 destroyed Hitler's last hope. He decided upon an attack, which actually had to be postponed for more than a month owing to the Balkan war.
German Units, without which the attack could not be conducted at all, were brought to the front only in the last two weeks, i. e. after the 10th June. preservation, and was indisputably permitted according to the Kellog-Briand-Pact. The "Right of Self-Defense" was understood thus by all the signatory states. leaders are not to be blamed for their error. They had reliable reports on Russian preparations which could only have sense if they were preparations for war.
The reports were later confirmed. For when the German attack met the Russian forces, the leadership of the German front got the impression of running into a gigantic deployment against Germany General Winter developed this here in detail in addition to Jodl's statements, particularly with regard to the enormous number of now aerodromes near the line of demarcation, and he drew particular attention to the fact that the Russian staffs were provided with maps of German territories. Field Marshal von Rundstedt also confirmed this as witness before the Commission. This will come before the court during the further course of the trial. against Russia unless he had been absolutely firmly convinced that no other path lay open for him at all. Jodl knew that Hitler knew the danger of a two front war fully and would risk the victory over England - which he thought was no longer in doubt - only in an inescapable emergency.
Jodl only lid his job as an officer of the General Staff. He was convinced, and still is today, that we were waging a genuine preventive war. That Jodl did not intend to increase the number of our enemies by a world power is obvious, and is also shown by documents. I am re ferring to the German transcript pp.
10894 - 10 897). Now what is the position with regard to the responsibility for these campaigns? A declaration of war is a decision in the field of foreign politics, the most important one in the whole of this field. state as to who is responsible for this decision - politically, criminally and morally; it depends on the way the formation of a will in the field of foreign politics takes place in this state according to its constitution. Prof. Dr. Jahrreiss has spoken about this:: in the Fehrer state it is exclusively the Fuehrer who has to make this decision. Anyone who advises him about this cannot be responsible, for, if what the Fuehrer orders has legal force, he who influences this order cannot be acting illegally. anyway participate in the Fuehrer's decision or influence it are also co-responsible. If we take this legal conception as authoritative the question of responsibility crystallizes into a problem of competence. delimited, there must be rulings on competence laying down what each official is called upon to do and not to do. Thus in all states the relations between the military and the civil administration is naturally regulated, as also within the military and within the administration the spheres of tasks and the relations between their thousands of offices are regulated. If things were otherwise chaos would reign. tions between the political and military leadership is important. For the military is the most important instrument of policy and the assistant may easily try to become master - the military interferes in politics. They had no right to vote, were not allowed to go to political meetings and in fact any statements on politics were looked upon askance. For it could in some way he looked upon as a taking of sides, whereas the taking of sides was severely banned.
The military were to be politically blind, completely neutral and knowing only one point of view, which was that of legistimacy, i.e. subordination to the legitimate ruler. war, it was not meltke but Bi**rck who advised the King as to the political decision. This changed during the last years of the first World War. General Ludendorff became the strongest man in the Reich owing to the force of his personality and the weakness of his political opponents. people often talk of German militarism. For the time when the soldier seized political power this was justified. The Weimer State got rid of this completely. The non-political character of the armed forces was stressed with all sharpness and the military again limited to its particular field. This went so far that a civilian was made Minister for war, who had to represent the armed forces politically in the Reichstag. For the longest time it was a Liberal-Democratic Minister, who was meticulously careful to avoid all political influence by the goner sharp distinction between politics and military, indeed he even stressed it in a certain sense. He, who wished to make the whole people politically minded, wanted a non-political Wehrmacht. The soldier was deprived of political rights: He was not allowed to vote or to belong to any party, not even the NSDAP, as long as the old law on compulsory military service was in force. He also remained consistent towards his own party. When, after Fritsch had gone, as now Commander-in-Chief of the army was to be appoint it would have been easy enough to have chosen Reichenau, who had National-Socialist leanings, but he appointed von Brauchitsch. He did not want any political generals, not even National Socialist ones. His point of view was that he was the Fuehrer and he the politician; the generals had to see to their own affairs; they know nothing about politics. He did not even tolerate advice when it concerned politics.
The generals did in fact, repeatedly venture to express doubts as to his political plans, but were obliged here to limit themselve s strictly to purely military points of view. for that matter, not characteristically German. It applies also, if I see rightly, to Angle-Saxon democracies, and indeed to a particularly strong degree.
At any rate it was so under Hitler: he made political decisions, and it was only on their military execution that the generals had any influence. It was their task to make the military preparations necessary for all politics eventualities. But it was Hitler who pressed the button to set the machine in motion. The "whether" and "when" were decided by the Fuehrer. It was not for them to weigh, the opportuneness, the political possibility or the legal permissibleness. owing to the hardly comprehensible mistrust he felt towards his generals. A remarkable phenomenon, - anyone who disregards it can never come to understand the atmosphere which remained in the Fuehrer's Headquarters. It was a mistrust - as he thought - of the reactionary attitude of the officers' corps He never forgot that the Reichswehr had fired at National Socialism in 1923. This was, moreover, the natural mistrust of a military expert, and also probable the mistrust of the political expert towards political dilettantes in officers' uniform. This mustrust of the political outlook of his military entourage was moreover by no means entirely unfounded. For the generals had wanted to put a brake on his rearmament plans, to hold him back from the occupation of the Rhineland and had expressed objections to his march into Austria, and to his occupation of the Sudetenland; And yet all these actions had succeeded smoothly and without bloodshed. The generals felt like gamblers When carrying the plans out, but Hitler was sure of his game. Is it to be wondered at that their political judgment did not carry too much weight with him, and is it to be wondered at that, on the other side, the apparent infallability of his political judgment met with more and more recognition?