He does not wish to have his position or the part which he played in this drama minimized, but he would like to prevent, at the same time, a distortion of the picture of his character.
The defendant stated already on the witness stand that he was grateful for the opportunity this trial afforded him to give an account to the world public and the German people if what he did and why he did it. He wishes to help to ascertain the historical truth of what happened. the defendant Keitel, because such an attitude, based on such reasons, made it considerably easier for me to conduct his defense. It was, and is clear to the defendant Keitel: if one considers the horrible conseauences and monstrous deeds which-without raising here the question of guilt--undoubtedly were committed by German people and which can indiputably be traced back causatively to orders and directives with which Keitel came into contact in some form, then one feels quilty without thinking about whether this is a guilt in the legal sense or the tragic feeling of being linked by fate with the causes and, thereby, also with the consequences. defedants had banded together with the Nazi party for a plan which they, indeed, knew could be realized only by the outbreak of a war in Europe. 1933 on he took active part in this conspiracy.
To prove its thesis, the prosecution stated:
a) that the National Socialist program in itself, i.e. according to its wordking and meaning, could be realized, only by using force;
b) that the defendant Keitel recognized or should have recognized it;
c) that with this knowledge, he, together with the others, especially with the co-defendants, planned and prepared, aggresive wars.
As regards these statements, I would like to call the Tri-
bunal's attention, first of all, to the principle part of Mr. Justice Jackson's bill of indictment in which he deals with the program of the Party. He mentiones there a number of points of the program, of which points he says:
"Naturally, these were all aims which were legally unimpeachable". At a different point he says:
"I do not criticize this policy, I wish it were generally recognized". Naturally, this acknowledging criticism is subject to the one limitation: "As long as these aims would be achieved without an aggressive war." that the wording and meaning of the Party program lot the normal personsrecognize that those party-political aims could be realized by use of force only. by the individual defendants at their hearings in court. Especially convincing appeared to me what Dr. Schacht stated on this subject. He concludes his critical evaluation of the Party pro gram with these words: "That is essentially the contents of the National Socialist Party Program and I cannot find that something criminal lies in that." I quote this statement especially because it shows how this program and its recognizable objectives effected a person who may be characterized as intelligent, realistically thinking, free from emotional impulses in politics, of economic far-sightedness and ability to judge. to be realized by use of force, how was the soldier Keitel to come to such a realization?
Keitel was an active officer. As such, he could not be a member of the Party. The officers were prohibited from any political and party-political activity. The Wehrmacht command was intent on keeping the influence of Party politics away from the Wehrmacht. This was true both for the time before 1933 and afterwards. Hitler himself confirmed this principle because he clearly recognized that the time was not yet ripe for giving the corps of officers, let alone the general officers, political character.
According to tradition and interpretation of their profession, those higher officers had a "national attitude", as one used to say, and they welcomed the national points of the program which were put into the foreground by Hitler, they were glad about the cooperation of the Wehrmacht and without hesitation placed themselves behind the government led by Hitler when it proclaimed the fight against the Treaty of Versailles, especially against its military - political clauses. An agreement going beyond these aims or possibly a union with a political object in view did not exist. The generals, among them also Keitel, thought no different from millions of Germans who were not Party members or who were opponents, but who regarded the national aims as self-evident. Now, one cannot fail to see that it is something else of millions of Germans who have no influence, support that part of the program relating to the national aims or the high general officers who led the Wehrmacht. Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that the materialization of these national aims carried with it the danger of a war. But the state of things seems to me to be such that the generals did not see the danger of war in the fact that Hitler wanted to realize these national aims by an aggressive war, but they saw the danger rather in the fact that an assertion of these aims would bring about sanctions by the former enemy powers. The idea of an agressive, warlike realization was far from the generals' minds for absolutely compelling reasons of military impotency. I shall later deal more in detail with this problem which is closely connected with the rearmament. Here is only important that the circles to which Keitel belonged -and I should like to add, between 1933 and 1938 -- (1) had no contact with the Party program; (2) had no relationship with Party circles; (3) sympathized with a part of the Party program because it corresponded to their national attitude; (4) did not think of materializing these national points respect. think of waging an aggressive war, they recognized or should have recognized that Hitler had the intention, of not now, but in the near future, of waging an aggressive war.
Keitel had this knowledge from 1933 on. The argument of the prosecution that this knowledge is the same as the knowledge of the National-Socialist program has been refuted; the same holds tine of the knowledge of the book "Main Kampf", even if one assumes he possessed the book. Hitler's intentions regarding an agression for other reasons. For the period up to 1938 Keitel could not have obtained knowledge from Hitler himself, because Keitel spoke with him late in January 1938 for the first time. the other Party leaders, were unambiguously aimed at preserving peace. Looking back one may call it propagandists camouflage of the opposite intentions. Would that be the case, then this camouflage successfully deceived not only many millions of Germans, but also the foreign countries which were partly critical and partly hostile toward National Socialism. honesty confirmed also by official proposals of disarmament and treaties with England and Poland. He believed them the more so because, as has already been said, an aggressive war had to appear to him as an impossibility. information and knowledge of Hitler's policy up to 5 November 1937 justified his farm conviction that Hitler did not want to realize his political aims by force or aggressive wars. It was only by the speech of 5 November 1937 that this conviction of von Neurath's was shaken.
In the arguments by Dr. Schacht's defense to which I referred, those facts were presented which show a contradiction between the former conduct of the victorious powers and the thesis which theprosecution upholds on this question. By their official relations and beyond them the victorious powers showed that, despite the knowledge of and circumstances the defendants are being accused of, which knowledge has to be assumed, they (the victorious powers) did not believe in Hitler's intentions and/or did not recognize these intentions of realizing his aims by aggressive war.
had to know such intentions of Hitler. This does not appear to be convincing and I can leave it to the Tribunal which -- if all possibilities are taken into consideration -- had better possibilities to get information on Hitler's true intentions. faith and the same ignorance -- unless this knowledge or even the participation results from other circumstances.
Such circumstances during the years 1933 through 1938 may have been: Keitel's activity in connection with the rearmament and in the Reich Defense Committee (Reichsverteidigungsausschuss). summed up by the prosecution:
(1) The secret rearmament by eluding the treaty of Versailles; (2) the rearmament with the purpose of plan rang wars of aggression. apart; since they are different with respect to cause and effect they must also be evaluated legally from different points of view. ment and conversion. The forces of the higherto existing order are struggling against the new powers which have not yet taken a definite shape. Everything is in fermentation. The aims remain obscure: they are camouflaged by the existing nationalistic tendencies which have been taken over. By clever propagandists utilization of these tendencies the psychological basis for the aims pursued by the new lords is being created without being noticed by those concerned by it. defendant Keitel during this period, with which I am going to deal now. Germany's military position. In judging the then Colonel Keitel another consideration enters the picture: how the special sphere to which he belonged was affected by this situation. Keitel considered the Treaty of Versailles and especially the military clauses as a humiliation of Germany. He considered it a duty towards his country to collaborate in putting an end to this situation.
the co-defendant von Neurath gave on 22 June 1946. These words which Bruening spoke, prove that there was a demand which was upheld by the entire people irrespective of the difference in parties: The demand for equal rights and equal security.
The objection to that is: A demand even if upheld by the entire people does not in itself create the right to violate or circumvent opposing contractual regulations.
In principle, one will accept that. However, things were not as simple as that. I do not wish to presume upon a "basic right" of all countries according to which every people must have the right of creating for itself a certain state of defense. But even if one does not want to recognize such a "basic right", one will, 8 July A LJG 14-1 perhaps, understand the state of emergency which actually exists if a country is so limited in its military potential that it is not only liable to military attack by any neighbor, but also politically condemned to impotency.
had occasion to recognize that this was true with regard to the situation in which Germany found herself in the year 1933. the Marshall - report which was submitted to the Tribunal. The following passages written by this outstanding soldier who summarizes the experience of a patriotic and military life as regards the point discussed here under the title " Re-armament", as follows:
"Nature is inclined to pass over weak people. The law that only the strong survive, is generally recognized...."
"The world does not take serious the wishes of the weak. Weakness is too great a temptation for the strong."
"Above all, it seems to me, we must correct the tragic misunderstanding that a policy directed at security is a war policy." important for the defendant Keitel, is the book by the English Major General A. C. Temperley "The Whispering Gallery of Europe" for which the English Foreign Secretary of the second world war, Anthony Eden, has written a very friendly, agreeing preface.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, wouldn't it be possible for you to pass over the reading of those passages which came from the book of Maj. Gen. Temperly? The Tribunal will take notice of them. There are quite a number of long speeches from the book.
DR. NELTE: Yes, Mr. President, I intended to ask the Tribunal whether it would kindly take these passages and give them their official notice. Perhaps one certain passage might be of interest in which Mr. Temperly says -- and that is found on page 38, paragraph 4:
"I also name the general staffs because there is 8 July A LJG 14-2 no greater illusion than that they ( the general staffs), taken as a whole, are in favor of war.
I know the general staffs of many countries very well and have never known any general staff which would have glorified war or would have wished for war. They know too much about it. If they advocated strength, it was because they believed in the idea that armed strength can prevent war.
And I shall continue on page 40, paragraph 3. I refer to the statements by Dr. Henderson, Briand, and so forth. I continue. guiltily violated the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in the meaning of the indictment, the Tribunal will have to consider the facts which have been presented. Any individual charges on this point have not been made. in the Reich. The defendant Keitel has admitted that and he stated that in the official positions he held up to 30 September 1934 and from 1 October 1935 on he participated in this rearmament in accordance with the functions incumbent on him. Like everything the Germans do, the rearmament, too, was well conceived organized. The Prosecution collected datas for that: Especially Document No. 2353 PS and the transcripts of the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee ( Reichsverteidigungsausschuss) . of this period from 1935 to 1938 was not clearly defined. The Prosecution arranged for its presentation of evidence retrospectively and drew a conclusion from the results of the war to the motive of the rearmament, but at the same time it deduced from the fact whic cannot be denied and has not been denied, namely that this rearmament could not be planned and carried out by any one man, that it (the rearmament) constituted a joint plot for the purpose of aggressive wars.
preparations of a different kind for the case of war from which the conclusion may be drawn that these measures have an aggressive character, i.e. that they aimed at an aggressive war? duced for the charged intentions; armament may, in fact must look just the same if it is carried out for security and defense as it does in case of aggressive war. a plot is to be determined, distinction must be made between:
a) Armament and preparations of measures which must be taken for the case of a mobilization becoming necessary, in order to be ready for defense at any time
b) Rearmament and ordering of measures which exceed quantatively - or qualatively the volume under a) to such a considerable degree that from that fact the intention of the political leadership to begin a war will became noticeable to the party concerned, in which case the political question of whether an aggressive, defensive or preventative war is intended, may be disregarded. be whether in connection with those measures, the intention of the planning for an aggressive war was expressed or had become noticeable by other means or whether the measures, because of their nature and volume demand the conclusive deduction that an aggresive war was prepared here. of a development according to plan. In reality, not only were Hitler's far aiming intentions and his planning imputed to an actual happening in whic, objectively viewed, a certain causality seems to be inherent, but also the knowledge and approving support of co-operating circles were imputed to it.
There can be no dispute over the statement that the economic capacity of a country, which in its totality must be regarded as armament for the case of war, will eventually get to a point which must be considered of decisive importance for solving the question of when the rearmament, i.e. the status of the entire industry essential for war, exceeds the capacity of armament for defense. account especially for the defendant Keitel, as a soldier, that until he took over the office of Chief of OKW on 4 February 1953, he had not hold a decisive position.
Now, that part did the defendant Keitel play at that date?
a) In the field of rearmament with regard to material and personnel,
b) in the field of administrative and - as charged by the prosecution - military-political rearmament which was dealt with under the heading of "Reichsverteidigungsrat" (Reich Defense Council). historical development of the organization data and I beg the Tribunal to take official notice of those matters, and I shall continue on page 47. ploitation and organization of the manpower of a country into military formations, but it is essentially a problem of industrial capacity and of its appropriate utilization for the production of all necessary war materials. requires expenditure of money and even more of time. (Establishment of industrial equipment stocks).
When Germany procalimed its equal rights as regards its need for national defense - that is, the supreme importance of its defense - it did not have the means to help its material rearmament as they had been taken away on recognition and execution of the disarmament plan.
It has been confirmed here during tye trial on different hads, that first 10, then 7-8 years were reckoned on, and foreseen in order to give material equipment in the hitherto prohibited modern weapons and supplies, especially munitions, to the peace time Wehrmacht which had been disclosed to the world with the proclamation of freedom in national defense in 1935. This becomes comprehensible if one considers that even the USA with its unlimited means, which were not impaired by the effects of war, required 4 to 5 years for the necessary conversion and rearmament in this war. It results from this that rearmament, if it is intended to exceed the limits of defensive armament, is only to be achieved gradually, in the case of nations, whic - like Germany in 1934, had no armaments.
1st stage: Creation of the prerequisites with regard to industries and raw materials (capacities) for the production of war supplies.
accordance with the efficiency inmanpower of a nation. Those and no military aircraft at its disposal, it can well be believed that any soldier of judgment had to assume that under the given circumstances there could be no thought of a war, let alone a war of aggression. capacity of chief of staff of theWehrmacht bureau, must be considered as purely preparatory and organizational. Keitel is of course responsible for General Thomas, chief of the defense economy staff. The technical details and the extent of his activity can be seen from document PS 2353, which is correct in essence despite the fact that Thomas, in declaration prefixed to this historical document, now wants it to look as if he had altered his original notes and given them a more favourable turn to please Hitler, this in case of the arrest he apprehended. This does not correspond to the facts. What Thomas wrote, proves according to defendant Keitel's opinion, that a "war armament" with Mobilization of the industrial capacity and its conversion toward war economy began only at the beginning of October 1939. It further proves, that the statements of the defendants which were examined here, as far as they were connected with this rearmament, and especially Dr. Schacht until 1937, are in complete agreement on the following point: that it cannot be admitted that in this period wars of aggression were desired, and according to the momentary state of armament they must have appeared impossible. period. The evidence has demonstrated that until spring 1938 only 27 peace time divisions were poorly equipped and that 10 to 12 reserve divisions were in preparation; at that time the Wehrmacht had no other supplies nor armaments at its disposal.
If, despite this fact, and without general mobilization, it succeeded by the fall of 1938 in preparing an army of almost 40 divisions for the aggression against Czechoslovakia, when at that time it had the poorest protection on its western front, one can see what was the maximum war potential in those days. Under such circumstances and in knowledge of the armament situation and war potentials of neighboring country which were mutually united by alliances and assistance pacts, none of the generals of the old school could ever think of occasioning a war. The fact, that already one year later, in 1939, the state of German armaments was substantially improved, must primarily be traced back to the occupation of Czechoslovakia. strategic plan for any aggression whatsoever. General Jodl has declared on the witness stand, that when in 1935 he came to the Wehrmacht bureau, no plan nor anything similar was in existence, except what was foreseen in the case of internal unrest. The occupation of the de-militarized Rhineland zone was not planned, but was improvised by Hitler.
The "Initial Assembly and Combat Directives of June 1937" is a general instruction for eventual and possible military conflicts. EC 194. This is an order issued by the supreme commander of the Wehrmacht, von Blomberg, on the subject of aerial reconnaissance and the observation of submarines movements during the occupation of the Rhine, Keitel signed and forwarded this order. established by the Treaty ofVersailles. It is indisputable that in view of the size of the Reich, its unprotected borders and the way East Prussia was cut off, this figure was absolutely inadequate for creating a feeling of internal security and the possibility of defense in the face of an attack from the outside world, such as may be considered for any country and nation an elementary right. This state of insufficiency, which had been provided by the military clauses, of the Treaty of Versailles, was discussed before 1933, already with a view to improving it without using the actual soldiers for it.
An examination was made and it was found that in cases of mobilization a series of tasks could betaken over by the civil ministries. Hereby, it was a question of tasks of a purely defensive nature, which cannot in any way be considered aggressive. They were tasks of national defense, and principally, the following. like the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of these points. As is quite clear, these are matters for defense only. the committee of advisers. (Referentenausschuss) It consisted of advisers coming from the different civil ministries, who after being recognized by the ministry of the interior (Severing up to the end of 1935) met for conferences at the Reich ministry. The Reichswehr minister charged the then colonel Keitel to direct these meetings. At the latter the advisers received and discussed the desires of the Reich ministry as regards the aforementioned tasks, which the individual ministers could take over in case of a mobilization.
During Minister Severing's time this cooperation worked without friction in order to satisfy as for as possible the wishes of the Reichswehr minister, and it went on in the same way after 30 January, 1933. The scope of the tasks and the composition remained the same. When on 4 April 1933, a Reich Defense Council was established through a resolution of Hitler's new Reich government, the committee was maintained; it changed only its designation: the committee of advisers became the Reich Defense Committee. However, it did not change its field of action and was not charged with any new competency. It only grew in size as it went on developing, especially after the introduction of general military service. Now as before, the Reich Defense Committee was a body, which had to give advice in questions of national defense concerning the civilian sector, which had to be prepared and also partly taken over by the civil ministries. For this count of the indictment it must be made quite clear that, after 4 April 1933, Keitel's position did not change either, and especially that he did not become a member of the Reich Defense Council.
statements of the prosecution, may be considered as factually non-existent according to the result of the evidence produced - later on I will come back to the time after 1938. In any case, the prosecution could not prove that there was any session of the Reich Defense Council during this period. The protocols submitted dealt without exception with the session of the Reich Defense Committee and themembers of this committee reported to their competent ministries, which inturn, had the opportunity to give, in the framework of the cabinet, the necessary concrete form to the suggestions and proposals discussed in the Reich Defense Committee. For this reason there were never any sessions of the formal legally existing Reich Defense Council, so that witnesses could rightly say that the Reich Defense Counsil existed only on paper. ministry, and later, from October 1935, as brigadier general (Chief in the Wehrmacht bureau of the Reich war minister), Keitel was a member of the Reich Defense Committee. the war ministry, and thus had no function connected with this count of the indictment. During this time also he did not participate in sessions of the Reich Defense Council, the protocols of which have been presented by the prosecution as having a specially probative value. committee of advisors, was the last session in which Keitel participated before being transferred to duty with the troops. The first session after his transfer to the Reich War Ministry was heldon 6 December 1935; it is put down as the 11th session of the Reich Defense Committee. And, therefore, in the examination of Keitel's responsibility, although one has to exclude the above protocols as well as the work done in general by the Reich Defense Committee during the two years of sessions 3 to 10, I will nevertheless make them the subject of my statements, as it is from these protocols that one can see what the Reich Defense Committee was doing. of an institution , which exists in this or some other form in every country, and which serves the purpose of national defense doomed legitimate by every country has now been presented as an important argument in the evidence given of plans and preparations in view of aggression.
1934, and 1935, reveal the character of the work as that of preparations for the event of war. But it is likewise evidence, that it is a question of preparations which were intended to bring about a more perfect degree of readiness in national defense in case of mobilization.
If the "Political situation" is mentioned twice, these allusions point to the fear in neighbouring states of military sanctions. Reference is made to the case of Abyssinia, which led to sanctions against Italy. impotency, which made it impossible to secure the open frontiers of the Reich. fear deriving from the situation at the time that the publishing of measures, though of a defensive nature, would produce preventive measures on the part of the victorious powers. attitude of certain states after the complete disarmament of Germany.
This question is important for Keitel's attitude, for he affirmed that the conclusion drawn from the prescribed secrecy was erroneous and that the secrecy was a proof of a bad conscience, and the bad conscience a proof of knowledge of illegality. advisory body in matters of national defense insofar as the civilian sector was concerned by a mobilization. At no time did it ever Indulge in discussions concerning rearmament as regards manpower or material or concerning plans of aggression. that the Committee of Reich Defense was contemplating plans for aggression.
I do not wish to read the next new sentences. Here we deal with the liberation of the Rhine River, a question which was designated as the technical liberation of the Rhine River.
This came up in Goering's testimony.
I shall continue on page 5, paragraph 3:
The true nature of the Committee's activities is set out quite simply and clearly in the "Bookof Mobilization for the Civilian Administration." It refers to the result of discussions between all the members of the Reich defense Committee and is an appendix to the mobilization plan of the Wehrmacht as well as to that of armaments. of your decision. You may see from them whether the prosecution is right in its supposition of a total planning of aggressive war, or whether the defendant Keitel was right when he stated during his hearing: "What has been discussed and planned here is what every country is entitled to do and what the responsible agencies are bound to do, if they do not wish to violate their most sacred duty, namely the safeguarding of the security of their country." as for the German Wehrmacht: For Keitel which could not yet form an opinion of the newly-created office of the "Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht" with the high sounding name; for the Wehrmacht which lost on that day its relative independence. Hitler broke down the last barriers between himself and the Wehrmacht - the nation in arms - by removing both the Commander in Chief Of the Wehrmacht and the constitutionally responsible Reich Minister of War. This truly portentuous decision became fatal for Keitel and the German nation, though at the time of its occurrence this was not realized by the participants. That they may be blamed for not realizing it, it is easy to say now in retrospect. At the time, everybody who was not an inveterate sceptic or pessimist had to base his judgement on the development of things in general and on the strength of the personalities involved. Neither the one nor the other could be clearly seen on 4 February 1938. days and who met him for the first time as man to man in the preliminary discussions, the decision was none of his own. Hitler assigned him to the newly created office of Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and Keitel accepted it.
Even if we disregard entirely the human emotions connected with such a seemingly brilliant promotion there was no reasonable ground for the Chief of the Wehrmacht office in the Reich Ministry of war to decline the offer, since von Blomberg himself had proposed him. The way Hitler considered this office could not be discerned by Keitel. from the statements made by Dr. Lammers and from the affidavit deposed by Blomberg, on page 59, I shall quote the penultimate p aragraph:
"In the future, I shall, not have any Minister of War; neither will I have in the future a Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht to stand between me, thehighest commander, and the other high commanders of the Wehrmacht."
On page 60, from Blomberg's affidavit in answer to question 24, I quote the second half:
"He asked for a suggestion for the assignment of a 'Chef du Bureau' who would direct and carry out current affairs under him and thus under Hitler's responsibility. I named Keitel, who, under me, had carried out this office very well."
In answer to question 27:
"I proposed Keitel as 'Chef du Bureau' believing that I had put him on the right job."
In answer to question 29, "Was it not Hitler's intention to create a tool for himself in the person of Keitel, whose capacity for organization and hard work seemed to him valuable, as an executive organ for his decisions and command?":
"This question is emphatically confirmed by me. Hitler's original intention at that time was most certainly to have at his disposal a trustworthy subordinate organ and in no way an adviser who claimed same responsibility." known to the Tribunal, so I do not have to read, it to you. It results therefrom, for the position of the defendant Keitel and the questions of his competence and responsibility as well as from the hearing of witnesses, that:
1) Hitler did not want either a responsible minister of war or any other person but himself to exercise the commanding authority over the entire Wehrmacht.
He united in his on person both of these institutions by declaring that in regard to the commanding authority he would from now on exercise it directly and personally as well as the functions of the Reich Minister of War, which were to be administered by Keitel under his instructions.
2) Hitler also created a military staff as advisory council in military technical matters. He designated it as the High Command of the Wehrmacht. It was nothing more than the military chancellory of the Fuehrer and Highest Commander. Such chancellelleries were already existing as Reich Chancellery, Chancellory of the President, and Party Chancellery. The defendant Keitel was assigned to the post of Chief of the military chancellory with the title of Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, nemaed for short, Chief OKW.
3) Hence, it follws that the OKW was not intended to be an intermediary agency between the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and the three Wehrmacht sections. The contrary assumption of the prosecution, which is connected with a graphic representation, is founded upon an erroneous judgment. An intermediary level between the supreme commander and the three high commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces as existed before 4 February 1938, with rights of its own, no longer existed now. The OKW, in which the defendant Keitel was the Chief of Staff, was no independent military agency or authority, but exclusively Hitler's military-technical staff and his war ministry office. The OKW had no independent authority whatsoever, neither the power to issue ordersnor the military authority. Therefore, the OKW could not issue its own orders. All instructions, decrees, normal directions or orders issued by the OKW were rather the expression of the desires of the supreme commander of the Wehrmacht. The commander-in-chief of the three Wehrmacht branches were always aware of the fact that no intermediary level existed between them and the supreme commander. They never considered or recognized the OKW as such. This is confirmed by the affidavits of the codefendants Grand Admiral Doenitz and Raeder as well as by the testimony of Reich Marshal Goering and Dr. Lammers. It is an entirely erroneous conception that the OKW or in this case the defendant Keitel as chief of the OKW, would have had the authority to issue instructions or orders on his own.