As long as the fatherland is recognized in the world as the highest earthy possession one will have to understand endeavours to keep this possession and one will not be able to disapprove of them even when it is an adversary who makes them. One may be of a different opinion as to the method which should be used for the realization of these endeavours and as to how freedom is to be attained. This, however, is not decided by the individual but by that person or these persons who hold the power in a state. Every human being wants something to hold on to in life; he must have it if he is not to fall into despair or anarchy. The national order is, besides the moral order, a firm support and the foundation of his existence and this gives him a feeling of security in his life and professional activities. It is the deep longing of all civilized men for order which finds its highest fulfillment in the institutions of the state. On the other hand, the citizen must have confidence that the state, i.e. its official agencies will safeguard law and order. In this respect it should not matter which party provides the guardians of its inviolable principles. That is just where the confidence of anation as a whole expresses itself, namely by leaving leadership to the prevailing majority. National Socialism undoubtedly aimed at and suceeded in rousing the belief in wide circles of the German people that its endeavours were supported by the majority of the people. It thereby procured for itself the alibi of legality. rals have testified here, the leaders of the Wehrmacht believed in the legitimacy of Hitler's government. It looked upon itself as the instrument of a legal government, as it did when the Kaiser, Ebert and von Hindenburg were Germany's representatives. feeling of patriotism and of a soldierly attitude bears in itself a tender cy to become more radical and thereby to degnerate if external circumstances create an actual basis for it. We have experienced the exaggeration of sound national ideas and their development into national chauvinism and we can observe retrospectively bow the sound soldierly idea was exaggerated by influences foreign to its nature and transformed into the militaristic way of thinking.
All these developments are not desultory, which makes them easily recognizable and regulated. The driving forces are mostly not apparent to those who they concern. They are like a poison which acts slowly and unnoticed, and the effect of which finds some day a horrible eruption. It needs no special reasoning that a part of the soldierly and military person who is being geared to a possible war, is ruggedness, and in its potentiality turns into brutality. One often finds on the part of famous, and not only German war leaders the stand point that the brutal war is frequently the mildest one is it leads to a quick ending. This, of course, is desired by every war leads Once the obstacles of peace are removed by the war, all that remains is brutality. It reveals the causes of total war and the source of the terrible disaster, which resulted from it.
The defense has a difficult task in this trial. The German people loc to Nuernberg and with dissension in itself. Some are sceptical and partly tile toward the Defense because they believe the Defense is favoring those whom they consider as war criminals and believe that the Defense wishes to prevent that just punishment be meted out to the defendants. Others say that trial is just a show, at which the defense counsel act, as dummies to give the trial the appearance of a judicial procedure. Accordingly, in the view of these Germans we would make ourselves guilty of patronizing the enemy. at this trial we are fulfilling an obligation in line with the precept of our calling, which needs no justification. the truth, the importance and effects of which on the German people is today inclaculable; in getting to the bottom of the causes, and in answering the question of how all, this could have happened. brought on the disaster over this world will create the possibility for the future of our people to find tis way again to the rest of the world. and metaphysical reasons for this Second World War and not even to examine the flow of events in its entirety, but rather to determine whether and what part these defendants played in that which the victor nations made the object of these proceedings.
finding the truth, had to consist of examining which actual and legal point if any, could be stated in favor of the defendants. It should be said here that with all the cooperation on the part of the Tribunal shown the Defense in producing their evidence, the actual possibility of bringing on defense material was extremely limited. Justice Jackson said in his basic prosecuting speech :
"The accuser and accused are obviously --"
THE PRESIDENT: You seem to be coming back to further attacks upon way in which this case has been tried and that is not what you are here to now. What you are here to do now is to present the case on behalf of the defendant Keitel. communication to you of various documents and you refer to a discussion of the subject which took place as long ago as February of 1946. On that occasion I expressed the view that on behalf of the Tribunal, that the French prosecution might properly show to you or give you the opportunity to look at their documents. From that day to this, that is to say from February until July, you have made no application to the Tribunal or made any complaint to the Tribunal that that has not been done and now, in your final speech, you make this complaint that you have not been allowed to see the documents in spite of the fact that in February I expressed, on behalf of the Tribunal, the opinion that you might see such documents. now to make these complaints after all these months, apart from the fact that you have already spent time which has been involved in reading eleven pages of your speech without coming to anything which really affect the defendant Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I believe that away back in February you told the Prosecution, according to the record, that they should place these documents at my disposal. The Prosecution, unfortunately, have not placed these documents at my disposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Why did you not come back to the Tribunal? You knew perfectly well that I had expressed my opinion on behalf of the Tribunal, and if there was anything to complain about, you had full access to the Tribunal from February until today. It seems to me that it is a frivolous complaint to come now.
DR. NELTE: I hope, Mr. President, that nevertheless the facts which I am putting to you in my manuscript will be considered by the Tribunal, and in a particular sense I shall refer to this matter at a later stage. On 1 February the session took place during which this affair came up, and on 12 February I went to the French Delegation.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what I have stated, Dr. Nelte. I have already pointed that out to you.
DR. NELTE: And the French Prosecution did not give it to me.
THE PRESIDENT: Why did you not come back to the Tribunal if you had any complaint to make? I have said -- and I repeat -- that I think to make a complaint now after not having made it for all these months is a frivolous complaint and an attempt to create prejudice, and I should be glad of your explanation.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, it is merely an attempt to show you that I did not wish to raise a complaint about the Prosecution right away, recognizi as I did that the Prosecution did not want to help me. I am not inclined to raise complaints with higher authorities, and I did not want to do it in this case either.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think that is a most unfair and a most improper thing for a responsible counsel to say. I think the mention of such a complaint is, as I have said, simply an effort on your part to create prejudice against the French Prosecution and against the fair conduct of this trial.
DR. NELTE: No, Mr. President, in my view it was merely meant to show you how very difficult it was for us to find material for our clients.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps you will try and get on to something that is really material for the Tribunal to consider.
DR. NELTE: May I ask you to turn to page 15 where, under Figure 3, I am dealing with the documents. The document governs the hearing of evidence before this Tribunal. Against that the witnesses remain in the background. The more essential it is that we examine these documents to ascertain the possibility of their utilization and their probative value. The Prosecution has submitted as evidence to a large extent official reports which are admitted according to Article 21 of the Charter.
I intended to show with respect to a number of these documents that the value of such documents is only limited.
But I shall limit myself to a in examining this kind of evidence will take my statements into consideration. These numerous official reports submitted contain factual statements which to a great extent are based on witnesses' testimony. These testimonies are not always related in the form of protocols but as summarizing reports. I do not want to dispute that these testimonies of witnesses are made as depsoed in the reports. However, I will not do injustice to any of the witnesses who are not known by the Tribunal, whose testimony is hard to verify for lack of a personal impression, when I say that it concerns mostly very subjective attestations. There are a number of documents in which this is clearly recognizable , and in fact stated, and even documents in which hatred finds its clear expression. I can understand the hatred of these hard hit people. The suffering they had to endure was so great that one cannot expect objectivity from them. I may, however, say too, that such personal feelings are not conducive to rendering the testimony of these sorely afflicted a suitable basis for finding the real truth. I am thinking of the formula of oath so often heard here on the part of the witnesses:
"Swear that you will tell the truth without hatred or fear, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."
These official reports often contain not only factual statements, but final conclusions and judgments. Insofar, the probative value of these official reports cannot be recognized. At the present these judgments go so far, that outside the sphere of those directly involved, they level reproaches against agencies, i. e., the OKW, and Keitel, without it being possible to recognize fromthe document itself, on what the conclusion drawn rests. Aslong as it is a question of the indictment of an individual like the defendant Keitel, one must have recourse to documentary proof which yields concrete facts for responsibility or which at least reveals casual coherence. Above all, it cannot suffice, in order to consider Keitel's responsibility as proved,if in such reports crimes committed by soldiers and officers of the Army or of the Armed Forces are alleged, and we derive responsibility on the part of the defendant Keitel, from this fact alone because he was the chief of staff of the OKW.
It must be added that in these reports, military agencies have often been erroneously misquoted and confused, for example, when the defendant Keitel is spoken of as the "High Commander of the Armed Forces", which is called "OKW" (High Command of the Armed Forced), instead of "O.K.H." (High Command of the Army), etc.
It is not always possible to decide to what extent it is a question of an erroneous conception on the part of the Prosecution or whether it comes from a translation which is not in accordance with the meaning. In order to examine the responsibility of the defendant Keitel, I wish to make clear to the Tribunal, in a manner which excludes any doubt, what were the channels of command and competence, and to this end I have submitted two documents to the Court.
a) "The channels of command in the east" (Document book II K 10)
b) "The development of the situation in France 1940-1945 and the mili tary authorities" (Document bock II K 13) The letter affidavit has also been signed by the co-defendant Jodl.
I will refer these affidavits and make them the contents of my argument without reading from them. Field Marshal Keitel. I shall skip over pages 19 to 21. The reading of the general Indictment and the special Indictment in the trial briefs can be omitted here since, with the exception of the Jewish problem and the persecution of the Church, there is no part of the Indictment which the Prosecution has not raised against the defendant Keitel. holds Keitel responsible only for the period after 1938 and that, as the first point of the Indictment, Keitel is described as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Germany. According to the evidence submitted by the Prosecution, Keitel was also held responsible for the period after 1933 although the American, British and French Prosecutions have seem to have dropped the allegation that Keitel was Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army and the German Armed Forces. The indictment of Field Marshal Keitel is split, therefore, between the periods 1933 to 1938 and after 4 February 1938 until the end.
I shall now continue on page 21, the last paragraph.
but is also accused of personally participating in all the crimes. This comprehensive indictment is a result of the space which the prosecution has devoted to the defendant in its statements. tion, as that of the defendant Keitel. Again and again we hear the words "Keitel - order", "Keitel's decree" and just as often " order of the OKW", "directives of the OKW" etc. in connection with Keitel's name as "chief OKW" after 4 February 1938. From this deprives the very substance of the Indictment, namely, the position the defendant Keitel occupied after 4 February 1938. But from it also derives the scope of the justification. Here, it is not a question of examing to what extent the defendant participated in the individual facts of the case, which in the long run arose from the so-called "Keitelorders" or "OKW instruction", but what matters is the position he occupied; whether he took part and whatpart he took in the planning and execution of those orders and instructions, and finally and most important of all, whether his part in it was casual and culpable in the sense of the law which is to be applied here. It seems of consequence, to stress fromthe outset, several points of view, which are important far the treatment of the case and for its appreciation.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours) AFTERNOON SESSION 8 July A LJG 12-1 (The Tribunal reconvened at 1400 hours, 8 July 1946)
DR. NELTE: The defendant has declared that he admits the contents of the General indictment to be proved from the objective and factual point of view -- that is to say not every individual case -- and this in consideration of the law of procedure governing this trial. It would he senseless, despite the possibility of refuting several documents or indicidual facts, to attempt to shake the indictment as a whole. Therefore, I shall mainly confine myself to the questions concerning the subjective facts and the conspiracy and I will treat only these individual points which are of special imporatnce as regards the personal participation of the defendant Keitel. The disproportion between the happenings and the defendant's present destiny is so great that the defendant Keitel, out of this consideration, would have to wish that such on attitude would expose him to the suspicion that he is fighting for his life, because he would have to fight at any rate out of moral constraint But the defendant has already made it quite clear in his argumentation that he is not fighting for his lead out for his face. eye through Adolf Hitler's death. From 1938 onwards he was in his closest circle and was his almost permanent companion. It is clear to him what that means for this trial. It has often been alleged by the prosecution that by reforming to the deceased the defendants desired to unload their own responsibility upon them. If the purpose of this trial is to obtain the most faithful picture possible of events and connections, it is not fair to start out by discrediting any mention of the deceased, who -- as the prosecution knows also -- are the major culprits. This is especially true for the defendant Keitel whose position, influence, and actions cannot possibly be correctly judged without throwing a light upon the person of Adolf Hitler and upon his relationship with Keitel.
As can already be seen from Mr. Justice Jackson's speech 8 July A LJG 12-2 of Indictment, we are dealing here with an indictment against the National Socialist system.
Actually, the indictment is a global indictment against this system, split into 21 individual indictments. The individual defendants are, to a certain extent, more symbolic figures of the spheres of authority of the state which was ruled by this system; namely, the Party, Cabinet and Wehrmacht.
If I understand Mr. Justice Jackson correctly, he goes even further in saying:
"Above all personal forces are nameless and impersonal forces; their conflict with each other makes up much of humanity's history... What are the real forces which are battling here in front of you?" be left unmentioned at this trial, a problem which M. de Menthon also pointed out: The importance and influence of the so forces which shape fate. Fate and guilt are two poles which do not exclude each ether from their respective spheres; they are ranges which overlap so that there are spheres of life and spheres of effect in which the two forces are at work which make the world move. It can only be hinted at briefly here what forces are at work which shape fate, i.e. what forces cannot be considered as originating in the conscious will of the individual defendants, a sense of national unity, historic events, opinions which are rooted in traditions and environment. Therefore, I will have to go into this background insofar as it is relevant to the defendant Keitel as a parson and type of one of the groups under indictment, because by this means only will you be given the possibility of obtaining a correct picture of the share which the defendant Keitel had in what happened. is said with the full agreement of the defendant Keitel; and insofar as aspects and facts are stated which might exonorate the defendant Keitel, it should be taken as a contribution towards the clarification of what happened and as an answer 8 July A LJG 12-3 to the question of how it could happen.
He does not wish to have his position or the part which he played in this drama minimized, but he would like to prevent, at the same time, a distortion of the picture of his character.
The defendant stated already on the witness stand that he was grateful for the opportunity this trial afforded him to give an account to the world public and the German people if what he did and why he did it. He wishes to help to ascertain the historical truth of what happened. the defendant Keitel, because such an attitude, based on such reasons, made it considerably easier for me to conduct his defense. It was, and is clear to the defendant Keitel: if one considers the horrible conseauences and monstrous deeds which-without raising here the question of guilt--undoubtedly were committed by German people and which can indiputably be traced back causatively to orders and directives with which Keitel came into contact in some form, then one feels quilty without thinking about whether this is a guilt in the legal sense or the tragic feeling of being linked by fate with the causes and, thereby, also with the consequences. defedants had banded together with the Nazi party for a plan which they, indeed, knew could be realized only by the outbreak of a war in Europe. 1933 on he took active part in this conspiracy.
To prove its thesis, the prosecution stated:
a) that the National Socialist program in itself, i.e. according to its wordking and meaning, could be realized, only by using force;
b) that the defendant Keitel recognized or should have recognized it;
c) that with this knowledge, he, together with the others, especially with the co-defendants, planned and prepared, aggresive wars.
As regards these statements, I would like to call the Tri-
bunal's attention, first of all, to the principle part of Mr. Justice Jackson's bill of indictment in which he deals with the program of the Party. He mentiones there a number of points of the program, of which points he says:
"Naturally, these were all aims which were legally unimpeachable". At a different point he says:
"I do not criticize this policy, I wish it were generally recognized". Naturally, this acknowledging criticism is subject to the one limitation: "As long as these aims would be achieved without an aggressive war." that the wording and meaning of the Party program lot the normal personsrecognize that those party-political aims could be realized by use of force only. by the individual defendants at their hearings in court. Especially convincing appeared to me what Dr. Schacht stated on this subject. He concludes his critical evaluation of the Party pro gram with these words: "That is essentially the contents of the National Socialist Party Program and I cannot find that something criminal lies in that." I quote this statement especially because it shows how this program and its recognizable objectives effected a person who may be characterized as intelligent, realistically thinking, free from emotional impulses in politics, of economic far-sightedness and ability to judge. to be realized by use of force, how was the soldier Keitel to come to such a realization?
Keitel was an active officer. As such, he could not be a member of the Party. The officers were prohibited from any political and party-political activity. The Wehrmacht command was intent on keeping the influence of Party politics away from the Wehrmacht. This was true both for the time before 1933 and afterwards. Hitler himself confirmed this principle because he clearly recognized that the time was not yet ripe for giving the corps of officers, let alone the general officers, political character.
According to tradition and interpretation of their profession, those higher officers had a "national attitude", as one used to say, and they welcomed the national points of the program which were put into the foreground by Hitler, they were glad about the cooperation of the Wehrmacht and without hesitation placed themselves behind the government led by Hitler when it proclaimed the fight against the Treaty of Versailles, especially against its military - political clauses. An agreement going beyond these aims or possibly a union with a political object in view did not exist. The generals, among them also Keitel, thought no different from millions of Germans who were not Party members or who were opponents, but who regarded the national aims as self-evident. Now, one cannot fail to see that it is something else of millions of Germans who have no influence, support that part of the program relating to the national aims or the high general officers who led the Wehrmacht. Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that the materialization of these national aims carried with it the danger of a war. But the state of things seems to me to be such that the generals did not see the danger of war in the fact that Hitler wanted to realize these national aims by an aggressive war, but they saw the danger rather in the fact that an assertion of these aims would bring about sanctions by the former enemy powers. The idea of an agressive, warlike realization was far from the generals' minds for absolutely compelling reasons of military impotency. I shall later deal more in detail with this problem which is closely connected with the rearmament. Here is only important that the circles to which Keitel belonged -and I should like to add, between 1933 and 1938 -- (1) had no contact with the Party program; (2) had no relationship with Party circles; (3) sympathized with a part of the Party program because it corresponded to their national attitude; (4) did not think of materializing these national points respect. think of waging an aggressive war, they recognized or should have recognized that Hitler had the intention, of not now, but in the near future, of waging an aggressive war.
Keitel had this knowledge from 1933 on. The argument of the prosecution that this knowledge is the same as the knowledge of the National-Socialist program has been refuted; the same holds tine of the knowledge of the book "Main Kampf", even if one assumes he possessed the book. Hitler's intentions regarding an agression for other reasons. For the period up to 1938 Keitel could not have obtained knowledge from Hitler himself, because Keitel spoke with him late in January 1938 for the first time. the other Party leaders, were unambiguously aimed at preserving peace. Looking back one may call it propagandists camouflage of the opposite intentions. Would that be the case, then this camouflage successfully deceived not only many millions of Germans, but also the foreign countries which were partly critical and partly hostile toward National Socialism. honesty confirmed also by official proposals of disarmament and treaties with England and Poland. He believed them the more so because, as has already been said, an aggressive war had to appear to him as an impossibility. information and knowledge of Hitler's policy up to 5 November 1937 justified his farm conviction that Hitler did not want to realize his political aims by force or aggressive wars. It was only by the speech of 5 November 1937 that this conviction of von Neurath's was shaken.
In the arguments by Dr. Schacht's defense to which I referred, those facts were presented which show a contradiction between the former conduct of the victorious powers and the thesis which theprosecution upholds on this question. By their official relations and beyond them the victorious powers showed that, despite the knowledge of and circumstances the defendants are being accused of, which knowledge has to be assumed, they (the victorious powers) did not believe in Hitler's intentions and/or did not recognize these intentions of realizing his aims by aggressive war.
had to know such intentions of Hitler. This does not appear to be convincing and I can leave it to the Tribunal which -- if all possibilities are taken into consideration -- had better possibilities to get information on Hitler's true intentions. faith and the same ignorance -- unless this knowledge or even the participation results from other circumstances.
Such circumstances during the years 1933 through 1938 may have been: Keitel's activity in connection with the rearmament and in the Reich Defense Committee (Reichsverteidigungsausschuss). summed up by the prosecution:
(1) The secret rearmament by eluding the treaty of Versailles; (2) the rearmament with the purpose of plan rang wars of aggression. apart; since they are different with respect to cause and effect they must also be evaluated legally from different points of view. ment and conversion. The forces of the higherto existing order are struggling against the new powers which have not yet taken a definite shape. Everything is in fermentation. The aims remain obscure: they are camouflaged by the existing nationalistic tendencies which have been taken over. By clever propagandists utilization of these tendencies the psychological basis for the aims pursued by the new lords is being created without being noticed by those concerned by it. defendant Keitel during this period, with which I am going to deal now. Germany's military position. In judging the then Colonel Keitel another consideration enters the picture: how the special sphere to which he belonged was affected by this situation. Keitel considered the Treaty of Versailles and especially the military clauses as a humiliation of Germany. He considered it a duty towards his country to collaborate in putting an end to this situation.
the co-defendant von Neurath gave on 22 June 1946. These words which Bruening spoke, prove that there was a demand which was upheld by the entire people irrespective of the difference in parties: The demand for equal rights and equal security.
The objection to that is: A demand even if upheld by the entire people does not in itself create the right to violate or circumvent opposing contractual regulations.
In principle, one will accept that. However, things were not as simple as that. I do not wish to presume upon a "basic right" of all countries according to which every people must have the right of creating for itself a certain state of defense. But even if one does not want to recognize such a "basic right", one will, 8 July A LJG 14-1 perhaps, understand the state of emergency which actually exists if a country is so limited in its military potential that it is not only liable to military attack by any neighbor, but also politically condemned to impotency.
had occasion to recognize that this was true with regard to the situation in which Germany found herself in the year 1933. the Marshall - report which was submitted to the Tribunal. The following passages written by this outstanding soldier who summarizes the experience of a patriotic and military life as regards the point discussed here under the title " Re-armament", as follows:
"Nature is inclined to pass over weak people. The law that only the strong survive, is generally recognized...."
"The world does not take serious the wishes of the weak. Weakness is too great a temptation for the strong."
"Above all, it seems to me, we must correct the tragic misunderstanding that a policy directed at security is a war policy." important for the defendant Keitel, is the book by the English Major General A. C. Temperley "The Whispering Gallery of Europe" for which the English Foreign Secretary of the second world war, Anthony Eden, has written a very friendly, agreeing preface.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, wouldn't it be possible for you to pass over the reading of those passages which came from the book of Maj. Gen. Temperly? The Tribunal will take notice of them. There are quite a number of long speeches from the book.
DR. NELTE: Yes, Mr. President, I intended to ask the Tribunal whether it would kindly take these passages and give them their official notice. Perhaps one certain passage might be of interest in which Mr. Temperly says -- and that is found on page 38, paragraph 4:
"I also name the general staffs because there is 8 July A LJG 14-2 no greater illusion than that they ( the general staffs), taken as a whole, are in favor of war.
I know the general staffs of many countries very well and have never known any general staff which would have glorified war or would have wished for war. They know too much about it. If they advocated strength, it was because they believed in the idea that armed strength can prevent war.
And I shall continue on page 40, paragraph 3. I refer to the statements by Dr. Henderson, Briand, and so forth. I continue. guiltily violated the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in the meaning of the indictment, the Tribunal will have to consider the facts which have been presented. Any individual charges on this point have not been made. in the Reich. The defendant Keitel has admitted that and he stated that in the official positions he held up to 30 September 1934 and from 1 October 1935 on he participated in this rearmament in accordance with the functions incumbent on him. Like everything the Germans do, the rearmament, too, was well conceived organized. The Prosecution collected datas for that: Especially Document No. 2353 PS and the transcripts of the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee ( Reichsverteidigungsausschuss) . of this period from 1935 to 1938 was not clearly defined. The Prosecution arranged for its presentation of evidence retrospectively and drew a conclusion from the results of the war to the motive of the rearmament, but at the same time it deduced from the fact whic cannot be denied and has not been denied, namely that this rearmament could not be planned and carried out by any one man, that it (the rearmament) constituted a joint plot for the purpose of aggressive wars.
preparations of a different kind for the case of war from which the conclusion may be drawn that these measures have an aggressive character, i.e. that they aimed at an aggressive war? duced for the charged intentions; armament may, in fact must look just the same if it is carried out for security and defense as it does in case of aggressive war. a plot is to be determined, distinction must be made between:
a) Armament and preparations of measures which must be taken for the case of a mobilization becoming necessary, in order to be ready for defense at any time
b) Rearmament and ordering of measures which exceed quantatively - or qualatively the volume under a) to such a considerable degree that from that fact the intention of the political leadership to begin a war will became noticeable to the party concerned, in which case the political question of whether an aggressive, defensive or preventative war is intended, may be disregarded. be whether in connection with those measures, the intention of the planning for an aggressive war was expressed or had become noticeable by other means or whether the measures, because of their nature and volume demand the conclusive deduction that an aggresive war was prepared here. of a development according to plan. In reality, not only were Hitler's far aiming intentions and his planning imputed to an actual happening in whic, objectively viewed, a certain causality seems to be inherent, but also the knowledge and approving support of co-operating circles were imputed to it.