the Munich Pact. It was complicated again only through the visit of Hacha in Berlin and the concomitant events, a step of Hitler's which was in this far reaching form completely surprisong to herr von Ribbentrop . of Slowakia in spite of all warnings, decided upon setting up the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. On the basis of the available material it might be difficult to ascertain the final reasons for Hitler's step. According to the testimony of the defendant Goering they sprang from Hitler's lasting fear that through an alliance of the Czech officer corps with Russia the situation in the Southeastern Territory could be complicated again. This and the esulting strategical and historical reasons might have induced Hitler to this step of 13 March 1939, which came as a surprise also to Herr v. Ribbentrop.
This decision, which is only understandable by Hitler's inclination for surprising decisions, brought a complete change in the German foreign policy.
Herr von. Ribbentrop had at that time, with a warning, demonstrated to Hitler the reaction of the Western powers, especially of England, which had to be expected as a result of this step. question which had been discussed since October 1938. Whereas up to that time the Poles, because of the German policy since 1934, and the return of Olsa territory did not refuse discussions about this problem, the reaction to the setting up of the protectorate could be seen immediately at the end of March. England regarded the establishing of the protectorate as a violation of the Munich Pact and began consultations with a number of countries. At the same time Minister Beck, instead of coming once more to Berlin, went to London and returned from there with the assurance that England would resi any change of the status quo in the East. This declaration was also given in the House of Commons after previous consultation with the French Government.
sse and stated to Herr v. Ribbentrop that any continuation of the revision policy towards Poland, especially as they are concerned with a return of Danzig to the Reich would mean war.
This made the Polish question into an European one. Mr. v. Ribbentrop told the Polish Ambassador at that time that Germany could not be satisifed with this decision. East Prussia could bring a final solution. of the new beginning course of the Polish crisis. I can therefore assume that the actual course of events is known, also inasmuch as they are connected with the annexation of the Memelland which was returned to the Reich through an agreement with Lithuania. shall confine myself to the pointing out of the facts which are apt to clear the role of H. v. Ribbentrop.
The prosecution accuses Mr. v. Ribbentrop that during the Sudeten crisis and the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, he had lulled Poland by pretending friendly feelings. May I, in contradiction of this assertion, point out that the relations between Germany and Poland since the agreement of 1934 were good and even firendly, and that this attitude became of course, even more favorable through the fact that Poland owed the acquisition of the Olsa territory to the German Foreign policy. Germany without the necessity of a deceitful conduct on the part of Mr. v. Ribbentrop. As the evidence has shown, Mr. v. Ribbentrop continued this friendly policy towards Poland even after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as there was no reason to deviate from this attitude.
The prosecution further accuses Mr. v. Ribbentrop of having known that Hitler had already in spring 1939 been resolved to start a war against Poland and that Danzig served only as pretext for this conflict.
It deduces this from the documents US 27 and US 30. They deal with the well known speeches by Hitler on 23 May and 22 August 1939.
May I point out in the first place that Mr. von Ribbentrop was not present at these conferences which were only for military personnel.
A number of key documents have been discussed in detail here. I only wish to name the best known, such as the Hossbach document, the two Schmundt files and the afore mentioned speeches. Quite a number of interpretations of these documents have been the subject of the testimony. People who knew Hitler stated that they were used to extravagant ideas from him in the form of sometimes repeating and surprising speeches and that in consideration of his peculiarities they did not take them seriously. ches in which Hitler asserted the contrary. One can object to that by saying that Hitler had always connected a certain purpose with his utterances. That is certainly true. But it is also true that even the few key documents, submitted as proof of the aggressive war, contain so many contradictions with regard the aggressive intentions deduced from them, that perhaps a critic judging retrospectively could recognize such intentions in accordance with the strict regulation for secrecy; the content of these documents were for that matter only known to these who took part in the conferences. This makes it clear why Herr v. Ribbentrop learned to knew about them only here in the Courtroom. at that time dealt solely with the re-incorporation of Danzig and the establishment of an extraterritorial read through the Corridor, in order to have a direct land-route to East Prussia. As the Court may remember, the desirability of realizing these aims had already been mentioned by Hitler when he appointed Herr von Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister. This demand was historically just as justified, as the solution of the proceeding incorpora tion of areas which were inhabited by Germans became inevitable in this case.
The status of the purely German city of Danzig, which had been determined by the Treaty of Versailles in the course of the erection of a polish state, had always been the cause of frictions between Germany and Poland. Poland had effected this solution at Versailles on the basis that it needed an cutlet to the sea. For the same reason, yet against all ethnological needs, the Corridor was established. Already Clemenceau in his memorandum pointed to this artificial creation as a source of danger, especially due to the fact that the people united in this area had been separated through long years of bitter enemity. It was not difficult to foresee that, as result of this fact, the League of Nations and the International Court at the Hague would be occupied not only with current complaints against violations of the Agreement for Minorities. The same cause gave rise to confiscation of German real estate on the largest scale up to 1 million hectars and the expulsion of far more than 1 million Germans in the course of 20 years. Not without reason had Lord d'Abernon speak of the Danzig-Corridor problem as of the "powder-barrel of Europe". If then efforts were made to solve this question, recognizing the Polish right for maintaining on outlet to the sea, such efforts were fustified from the standpoint of history and common sense. question served as a pretense only of which Herr yon Ribbentrop must have been aware. No evidence has been produced that Herr von Ribbentrop was acquainted with Hitler's aims, which far exceeded these demands. Just as little has it been proved that Herr von Ribbentrop before 1 September 1939, as has also been assorted by the Prosecution, did all he possibly could to avoid peace with Poland, although he knew that a war with Poland would draw Great Britain and France into the conflict. The Prosecution bases this statement on document TC 73. This involves a report of Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, to his Foreign Minister. The document contains nothing whatsoever to substantiate this assertion. Lipski can be counted as classical witness. May I recall that it was Lipski who, during the decisive stage of negotiations before the outbreak of the war remarked that he had not the least cause to be interested in notes or propositions from the German side. After a period of 5 1/2 years as ambassador in Germany, he was very well acquainted with conditions there.
He was convinced that in case of war unrest would break out in Germany and that the Polish Army would march into Berlin victoriously. exactly Lipski, who during the decisive discussion at the Polish Embassy, created the impression with the Swedes that Poland was sabotaging every possibility for negotiations. allegations presented by the Prosecution. So for instance the fact, that Herr Von Ribbentrop knowing that the polish - English Guarantee pact had been signed, by his intervention with Hitler caused the latter to recall the marching-orders for the Armed Force because, according to his conception, a conflict with Poland would also involve the Western Powers. This conception is identical with the conclusions, Herr von Ribbentrop drew from his opinion of the European situation, voiced in the already mentioned document TC 75. Ribbentrop who on 25 August 1939, after the Hitler-Henderson meeting, sent him to Sir Neville Henderson with the verbal communique presented as TC 72/69 in which the contents of Hitlers propositions were drawn up. With it Herr von Ribbentrop combined the urgent request, at once and in person to warmly recommend to the British Government Hitler's proposition. According to the English Blue Book, Sir Neville Henderson could not refrain from calling these proposals exceptionally sensible and sincere. They did not represent the usual Hitler proposals, but "proposals of the League of Nations". days can not deny that everything was done on the German side, to get at least negotiations on a workable basis underway. The opposite side would not have it thus, because the decision had been made to take action this time. The good services of England ended with the breaking off of all mediation without having been able to bring Poland to the table of negotiations.
defeated the purpose of the last decisive discussion with the British Ambassador Henderson by having read the German proposals to Poland so fast, contrary to all diplomatic custom and international courtesy, that Sir Neville Henderson could not understand them, and, hence, could not pass them on. The interpreter, Ambassador Schmidt, was present at this decisive discussion. He has testified here, under oath, that this statement is not true. One may consider Hitler's order, to acquaint Sir Neville Henderson only with the substance of the memorandum, as unwise. The fact is that not only did Herr von Ribbentrop read the entire contents at a normal speed to the British Ambassador, but he also, having the interpreter present, made it possible for Sir Neville Henderson to become familiar with the entire contents and, moreover, to have explanations given on it.
Besides, upon the initiative of Reichsmarshall Goering, it was transmitted to the British Embassy during the same night by dictation to Counsellor of the Embassy Forbs. Thus the British Government should have been able to render the good services offered for opening negotiations based on positive proposals. gation to be true, that the defendant had done everything to avoid peace with Poland. tions concerning aggressive war are not possible without knowledge of the presupposition leading to an armed conflict. Before I proceed to the legal aspects of the conflict with Poland, may I make some additional statements concerning the causes that led to the war. tions of those powers which were satisfied and those which were dissatisfied. It seems to be an inevitable law that, after great war shocks, the victorious states tend as far as possible towards the reestablishment of the pre-war status and pre-war mentality, wheras the conquered are forced to find a way out of the consequencesof their defeat by newmeans and methods. That way the Holy Alliance came about after the Napoleonic wars, and under Metternich's leadership, using legitimacy as an authorization, it tried to ignore the effects of the French Revolution. succeed in either. quickly transformed into a tool of the satisfied states. Every effort to "reinforce" the League of Nations, meant a new bulwark for maintaining the status quo. Under the elegant diction of juridical proceedings power-politics continued. Besides, the obsession by the idea of "securite" soon deprived the newly-created body of any breath of freshness and life.
In this fashion naturally a solution of the problems, created by the end of the first world-war could never be found. In international relations the interests of conservative powers content with the status quo and those of the revolutionary powers trying to do away with it, were found to be in growing conflict. It could only be a question of time, when under those circumstances the political initiative would passto the dissatisfied powers. The formation of this front depended exclusively on the force of the revolutionary spirit, which cristallized in opposition to political complacency and longing for the past. On this fostering-soil grew the doctrines of National Socialism, Fascism and Bolshevism, obscure in many parts of their programs, elastic and incoherent in others. Their power of propaganda was based not so much on their programs but on the fact that they admittedly brought something new and that they did not exhort their followers to worship a political ideal, that had failed in the past. reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr, the fact that the democratic governments were not capable of attaining any-thing for their peoples in need from the other democracies, unavoidably led to a test of the doctrines which had not yet been tried out.
The practical results of this revolution, as we experienced them in Germany after 1933, could, aside of the social program, only consist in abolishing the peace settlements of 1919, whichwere a classical example of the failure in understanding of the revolutionary character of a world-crises. These tasks were for this revolution no juridical questions but doctrines, exactly as it had for a long time been a doctrine for the satisfied states, to keep up the status quo at all costs, eventually at the costs of a new worldwar. the political crises of the past decade.
Every revolution has but two possibilities; either it meets so little resistance, that eventually conservative tendencies develop and an alloy with the old order is formed, or the antagonistic forces are so strong, that finally the revolution breaks because of its having oversharpened its own means and methods. a manner and, in parts, with a remarkable bias towards tradition. But it too could not escape the laws, inherent in history. The aims were too high for one generation, the revolutionary essence too strong. The successes in the beginning were stupefying. But they also caused a lack of criticism as to the methods and aims. groups in the Central European space, if, at the end -- I mean insetting up the protectorate Bohemia and Moravia and in following up the Danzig Corridor question -- revolutionary speed and methods had not been carried to excess as a result of previous successes. No soberly judging person will deny the right to gain a solution in theDanzig Corridor question, delicate as it was. text. Seen from the state of affairs in 1939 this cannot be proved. But it is sure that the opposed party, too, was concerned with other things but the keeping up of the status quo in the East.
National Socialism , and with it in its newly gained strength, the German Reich, had become such a danger in the eyes of the others that after Prague, one was determined to make any further German enterprise a "test case", whereever it should happen. Europe was caused in the first place by economic conditions of "Versailles". it was well known, that the conquered could not comply with its economic provisions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that sentence, at any rate, is objectionable on the ground that I have already stated.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I am not referring to the origin of the Versailles Treaty, but only to its ramifications, which are generally known, and I wanted to emphasize the ramifications, but I have completed this thought, and I do not wish to make any further reference to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: Many things have been said here about the slogan "L e b e n s r a u m". I am convinced that this word would never have become a political program, if after the first world-war one would have given Germany the possibility to link up with the world markets, instead of strangling her economically. By systematically cutting her off from all places where raw materials occurred in the world - all this for "securite" reasons - one of course fed the tendency towards Autarky, the inevitable way out from the barring from the world markets, and, at the same time, one allowed, as the economic situation became more aggravated, the cry for Lebensraum to fall on fertile soil.
So Stalin is right, when he says:
"It would be erroneous to believe that the second world-war came about in a haphazard way or resulted from faults of one or the other of the statesmen, though such faults were made without doubt. In reality the war resulted inevitably from the development of international economic and political forces based on modern monopolistic capitalism."
Professor Jahrreiss has already thoroughly proven in his basic arguments concerning the legal and the actual signification of the Kellogg agreement that the Defense cannot attach to this war prevention program the meaning given to it by the Prosecution.
crime, especially at the 8th League of Nations assembly of 1927; however, at preliminary conversations - and the fact has been proven by documents already submitted to the Court - it was agreed upon that this declaration does not make war a crime in any legal sense, but it is rather the expression of a wish to prevent, for the future, international catastrophes on a world war I scale. Moreover, neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. participated in the League of Nations resolution of 1927.
I and II, remained mere projects -- and the British prosecutor had to acknowledge this in the course of his significant argumentation -- because practical politics could not follow these moral postulates. the problem of definition lies in the difficulty of condensing a political event, depending upon a host of components, into a juridical concept susceptible of covering any of the many-shaped cases occurring in fact. The failure to formulate a definition which could be used in international law has led to the fact that, instead of working out universal characteristics to be used in every single case, the designation of the aggressor has been left to the decision of an organ superior to the contending parties. In such a way, the question of defining the aggressor became the question: "quis judicavit", i.e. "who designates the aggressor". From this decision follows a new difficulty: "what is to be done against the aggressor?" aggression and the sanctions against the aggressor, political alliances determined the obligations of the parties to wage war. In order to improve this unsatisfactory, anarchic situation, the United States, under Secretary of State Bryan -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Isn't this really arguing the same questions that Dr. Jahrreiss has already argued?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have tried not to mention those matters set forth by Professor Jahrreiss. Professor Jahrreiss, in his explanation, concentrated on the Kellogg Pact. I shall try to confine myself to the legal concept of wars of aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the Tribunal only granted the right to have an additional counsel deal with the general questions of law in the view that the other counsel were not going to deal with the same questions of law. Of course, you are not using the words of Dr. Jahrreiss, I should not expect you to do that, but you are arguing the very same topics.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, it had been agreed originally; and, as the Professor showed in his expert opinion, every other counsel has the right to take an attitude quite different from the one he designated.
consequences. I am defining my attitude toward a ggressive war, and, as the President emphasized the other day -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Just a moment. What is involved, then, is that the Tribunal is going to hear twenty arguments upon the general questions of law; and surely it can scarcely have been thought by defendants' counsel that the Tribunal proposed to hear twenty arguments on the general questions of law and also hear Dr. Jahrreiss on it. The only purpose of hearing one counsel was to have the general questions of law dealt with by one counsel alone, and that the others should not speak upon it.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, may I emphasize once more -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Just a moment. The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken.)
DR. DIX: My Lord, may I humbly ask the High Tribunal to give me permission to make just a rather short explanation to the matter which has just taken up the attention of the Tribunal? I should like to remind you of the fact that the initiative to take up certain legal themes and have them dealt with by Professor Jahrreiss, that is a matter which was suggested by the defense and at that time the defense in that way also wanted to follow the High Tribunal's suggestion of brevity and to save time. I should like to ask the High Tribunal to protect us from the fact that this suggestion which we at that time made to the High Tribunal and which was granted by the High Tribunal, not to be used against us, in that the resolution which was taken be interpreted rather broadly. I do not have the resolution before me and I do not intend to deal with it and discuss it, but I should like to say one thing. Professor Jahrreiss did speak and he wanted to speak and he wanted to confine himself to two topics whic, of course, were of a general nature. He spoke about, first, the individual punishable qualities of the aggressive war and the legal position of the Fuehrer decree. These two problems were to be dealt with by Dr. Jahrreiss and these were the two topics that he actually did deal with. problems of a legal nature, which are of a general nature and in a larger or a smaller scale concern each of the defendants, such as, I should like to remind you of the various questions of international law and the question of hostages and forced labor, and the question dealing with the naval fighting and other general questions, and, above all, the matter which my colleague, Dr. Horn,breached and on which problem he was stopped. There is the question: "What is an aggressive war?" There are large basic differences between a military aggression, a juridical aggression, or military aggression. Those are matters which Dr. Jahrreiss did not concern himself with at all and he was not to concern himself with these problems and Dr. Horn understood that this was the primary promise of his speech. I do not wish to arrive at any conclusions but I should like to ask the High Tribunal that the High Tribunal kindly do not put us into the rather questionable situation that we delegate a certain collection of questions and now, through that fact, be put into a situation which he really cannot be held responsible for, that question which we really feel we need to discuss, that we should be prevented from speaking about them -- matters about which Dr. Jahrreiss couldn't concern himself with.
And one more thought; it would be quite possible, and I believe that you gentlemen on the bench will agree with me; this is a purely theoretical matter -- would be quite possible that one would represent a view represented by Jahrreiss. Of course, I do not contradict Dr. Jahrreiss but I am speaking theoretically only. If the first speaker breached and dealt with a certain topic, would it therefore be impossible for any of the following defense counsel,be impossible for him, not for us to deal with this matter? Would he be forced to be silent on such a matter? It seems to me that that couldn't be the purpose of the High Tribunal's ruling; for purposes of brevity, that was the chief aim of Dr. Jahrreiss. I believe we are all of the same opinion. We ask that it should not be interpreted too formally and if someone in good faith says he had to deal with this matter for good reasons,that he be given the possibility to speak further on these subjects even though Dr. Jahrreiss has dealt with the matter; and I ask that he be permitted to speak, if he has that attitude, than try to stop him from speaking when it is a matter for legal consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has been considering this matter and they are fully aware,of course, of the difficulties which may possibly arise if there were differences of opinion among the defendants' counsel upon questions which had been dealt with by Dr. Jahrreiss. They did anticipate when they made the order which specifies that Dr. Jahrreiss should speak on legal issues arising out of that Indictment and Charter which are common to all the defendants. Those are the words of the order, that he would deal with all the issues which were common to all the defendants and in the absence of some difference of opinion, that the other defendants would be prepared to adopt his argument, but the Tribunal thinks that the questions of law may be to some extent very various and difficult and that the only rule which is possible for them to lay down at this stage is that there must be no real repetition by defendants' counsel. The Tribunal apprehends that defendants' counsel will see the necessity for such a rule as that. It cannot be in the interests of an expeditious trial that argument should be repeated over and over again and this Tribunal desires to point out to the defendants' counsel that such repetition upon general matters only tends to distract the attention of the Tribunal from the real defenses of the clients whom they represent and therefore the Tribunal hopes that the defendants' counsel will try to cooperate in this matter and confine such legal arguments as they think it right to present to the Tribunal, to arguments which had not been addressed to the Tribunal by counsel who preceded them -- either Dr. Jahrreiss or any other counsel.
That is all that I need to say at this stage; and as it is now five o'clock the Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 8 July 1946, at 1000 hours) Official Transcript of the International
THE MARSHALL : May it please the Tribunal, Defendant Fritsche is reported absent.
DR. HORN : Dr. Horn, on behalf of the former Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. presentation beginning with Page 35. The English text page number corresponds with the German text page number. aggression and the sanctions against the aggressor, political alliances determined the obligations of the parties to wage war. In order to improve this unsatisfactory, anarchic situation, the United States, under Secretary of State Bryan, took the initiative, in a series of separate treaties, to agree upon delays of respite, which were meant to postpone an outbreak of hostilities, and to allow the passions to cool down. went one decisive step further by determining a procedure for establishing by League organs the permissibility or non-permissibility of war. The decision purported whether the war was permitted or not by the statute. The aim of this settled procedure was to hit the disturber of international order, who was not necessarily identical with the aggressor. The state which went to war in accordance with the resolutions of the League of Nations organs behaved in a lawful way, even when undertaking preliminary hostilities, amounting to an aggression in the military sense. attacked was not sufficient to secure an equitable settlement of international relations. pointed out that the antinomies lawful - unlawful, permitted - prohibited, aggressor - attacked did not apply, it was still being tried to brand the transgressor of international order through the concept of the aggressor.
As the material decision failed owing to the difficulties just mentioned, it was tried to make out of the indeterminable juridical concept a political decision of the League of Nations organs qualified for maintaining international order.
Such was the case in the draft of a mutual assistance agreement elaborated in the year 1923 by order of the League of Nations assembly. The Geneva protocol, which was meant to supplement the statute inadequacies concerning the question of conflict settlement, also transferred to the League of Nations council the decision of determining who had violated the agreement and was, therefore the aggressor, the British chief prosecutor have remained drafts, excepting the Kellogg Pact. definition of the aggressor was once more taken up at the disarmament conference. In this way the definition was established in the year 1933 by the committee for security questions, quided by the Greek Politis, of the general disarmament conference committee. object, in the same year, of a series of separate treaties, at the London conference. The only great power participating was the Soviet Union, which had taken the initiative of the definition at the disarmament conference. This definition has also been adopted by the United States chief prosecutor, who has based thereon the indictment for a crime against peace, before this Tribunal. This definition is no more than a proposal of the prosecution within the limits of the statute, which does not circumscribe the concept of a war aggression. It must be emphasized that Mr. Justice Jackson cannot invoke in this matter any universally acknowledged principle of international law. treaty, as projected, but was merely agreed upon between a number of individual parties in agreements binding only for the concerned. As a matter of fact the only agreements were those between the Soviet Union and a number of states around it. No other great power accepted the definition. In particular, Great Britain kept aloof, notwithstanding the fact that the separate agreements mentioned were actually signed in London. At least the participation of the great powers would have been required for the constitution of an international law principle of such far-reaching importance for the reorganization of international relations.
American chief prosecutionshow that also as far as facts are concerned the proposition does not give much satisfaction. In the important question of point 4 of the definition, the British differs from the American. The old conflict of interests b etween mare liberum and mare clausum has led the prosecution to Sir Hartley Shawcross not mentioning the naval blockade of the coasts and ports of a state as aggressive action. establishing the aggressor, but one does not got around the fact that a formal juridical definition shows the impossibility of doing justice to all actual political cases. the world in the Charter of the United Nations one returned, evidently having recognized this truth, to the idea of a decision by an international institution, without wanting to squeeze its judgment in to the bed of Procrustes of a rigid definition. The Charter of Peace of San Francisco says, in chapter VII Art. 39:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of security."
aggressor nor an institution authorized to designate the aggressor. had completely failed. This was expressed outwardly already by the part that three great powers had left it. How little the League of Nations-Torso was taken notice of in international life, was shown by the attitude of the Soviet Union in the Finnish question. It did not take into consideration in any way the decision of the League of Nations but followed in its dealings with Finland its own interests.
should be understood by the word "attack" in Article 6a of the Charter, this qualification cannot link up with a definition recognized in international law. We therefore must start off from the suppositions which the practices of states and the traditions of diplomacy are went to connect with it. of war, in whatever way it happened, was not valuated juridically.