However, the relation-
5 July A LJG 15-2a ship between Mr. von Ribbentrop and the conservative diplomatic corps became more and more difficult. This acting ambassador (Titularbotschafter) who had managed to acquire Hitler's confidence was distrusted because his activity could not be controlled by the Foreign Office. to see in Mr. von Ribbentrop the man who could help him in the fulfillment of his pot wish - and, we may say, of that of the German people - to bring about a general political alliance with England. The tendency to realizing those intentions originated in real as well as ideal motives. that it is the bad luck of our nation and of all of Europe that Germany and England were never able to understand each other, in spite of serious attempts of both countries during the last 50 years.
The ideal motives rested in Hitler's undisputable preference for many approved internal institutions of the empire. with the Versailles policy which was sanctioned by England with the final approval by France. And thus the first practically useful armament limitations were accomplished after many years of fruitless negotiations. created at the same time. The naval agreement and its effects may also have been the reason for Hitler to appoint Herr von Ribbentrop Ambassador to the court of St. James the following year, after the death of Hoesch. naval agreement, as little success had he in offering a general alliance to England. Was it the fault of Herr von Ribbentrop's diplomacy or the basic difference of interests? attack these people at once with proposals and requests. If at the first moment one may, especially from the German side, recognize many mutual characteristics in the British, still on close contact one will note profound differences. Both root in a different soil. Their spiritual field is watered by various streams. The deeper the Germans and the British go, the greater will be the proof of the difference of their faith and their intellect. The deeper the British and the French penetrate into the nature of the other, the more mutual features they will find. Common political interests in the past 50 years have deepened those mutual features between the British and the French. alliance with a continental military power and has searched for and found satisfaction of this interest, according to the standpoint of British aims, sometimes in Vienna sometimes in Berlin and from the beginning of the 20th century in Paris.
Even at the time of Herr von Ribbentrop's activity as an ambassador, England's interest did not require a deviation from this line. To this was added the basic British attitude that Great Britain did not wish to commit herself on the continent.
Added to this was the fact that authoritative men in the Foreign Officethought still too much in the political terms of the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, and this attitude was still, now as then, governed by leaning towards France. were negligible, their political power inferior to that of the opposition. To this were added the difficulties which resulted for Herr von Ribbentrop from Germany's participation in the non-interference committee, which at that time met in London in order to keep the powers out of the Spanish civil war. the German-British relationship on his departure as an Ambassador from London. The answer to this will best be furnished by document RC 75, which contains the view of Herr von Ribbentrop about the then prevailing situation of Germany with regard to foreign politics and the future possibility for shaping German-British relations. by the status-quo in Central Europe. He entertains the conviction that the implementation of these objectives of foreign politics will by force lead Germany and England "into different camps". loose at first, with powers of equal interests (Italy and Japan). Through this policy he hopes to bind England at the danger points of her Empire, and still to keep open the possibility of a understanding with Germany. Sudetenland. According to his conviction then prevailing, England will not in both these questions give her consent to a modification of the status-quo but might be forced through the power of circumstances to tolerate a solution of these questions. East will , however, cause England always to become an opponent of Germany in arguments of such nature. Herr von Ribbentrop upheld this interpretation not only in 1938 when this document was penned, but contrary to the assertions of the prosecution warned Hitler of this dsnger even before and at the outbreak of the second World War.
as was asserted here, represent the British toward Hitler as a degenerate nation, but he says in this document quite clearly that England would be a hard and keen opponent to the pursuance of German interests in central Europe.
These interpretations of Germany's attitude in foreign politics at that time, as expressed in TC 75, evidently agreed with Hitler's idea inasmuch as in the course of the Fritsche crisis Herr von Ribbentrop took over the foreign ministry in place of the resigning Herr von Neurath.
According to Herr von Ribbentrop's testimony, Hitler asked him upon entering his office, to assist him in solving 4 problems. These consisted in the Austrian, the Sudeten German, the Memel as well as the Danzig and Corridor question.
As shown by the evidence this 5 July LJG 16-1a was not a secretive understanding which was arrived at by the two statesmen.
The Party program contains, in point 3, the demand for revision of the peace treaties of 1919. In a number of speeches Hitler repeatedly pointed out the necessity of fulfilling these German demands. Reich Marshal Goering testified here that, in November 1937, he explained to Lord Halifax the necessity of solving these questions and said that they were an integral part of German foreign politics. These goals he also presented openly to the French Minister Bonnet. Herr von Ribbentrop therefore gave his principle support to goals which were known and which resulted, of necessity, from the dynamics at that time prevailing in central Europe on account of the recuperation of the Reich. bentrop as a Minister reached in the solution of these questions, I shall explain in connection with my remarks on the participation in the conspiracy of which the defendant is accused. Only this much may be said here, that, as was proven by evidence, with the dismissal of Freiherr von Neurath the concentration in Hitler's hands of the decisive authority also in the field of foreign politics had found its conclusion. Herr von Neurath was the last Foreign Minister who, at first as a Foreign Minister, had managed to maintain a decisive influence on foreign politics under the regime of National Socialism, which in time, with the increasing power of the regime, he had to surrender to Hitler's striving totality, more and more. whom Hitler had selected after his own taste. without a doubt has a strong component in the purely personal relations among the rulers. Seen from this point of view, it is necessary for the understanding of certain actions and history to look into the relations between Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop.
Herr von Ribbentrop, as a well to do man from the nationalistic 5 July LJG 16-2a camp, saw in Hitler and in his party efforts which corresponded with his own ideas and feelings.
Herr von Ribbentrop's ideas about the foreign countries visited by him aroused Hitler's interest. Hitler's personality and political convictions formed in Herr von Ribbentrop a form of loyalty, the final explanation of which one can perhaps find in the effects of the power of suggestion and hypnosis. but also an enormous number of people on this side as well as on the other side of the border foil victim to this power. law, will find its final explanation only from the point of view of the effect on the masses and in the psycholoty, to say nothing of the pathological form of these phenomena. This task may be left to the sciences concerned. results of the evidence - I nay, with the permission of the tribunal, present, after clarifying those facts, the role of Herr von Ribbentrop within the alleged conspiracy for the plotting of wars and acts of aggression with breach of contracts. 10 days when he was called upon by Hitler to participate in the conference with the Austrian Bundeskanzler and his Foreign Minister on 12 and 13 February 1938 in Berchtesgaden. Evidence presented in court has confirmed the fact that questions especially involving Austria were exclusively within the domain of Hitler. The then Ambassador von Papen reported directly to the Head of the State. Herr von Ribbentrop had no influence whatever upon activities of the party in Austria as well as in the southeastern territory. My client alleges to have been informed only rarely and not officially about its activities there.
The former Austrian Foreign Minister Dr. Guido Schmitt deposed that Herr von Ribbentrop did not participate in the decisive conference between Hitler and Schuschnigg. During the rest of the conference he did not conduct himself in the Hitlerian style 5 July LJG 16-3a and created the impression of not being informed on the subject, which was probably due to his late activity in London and his being appointed Foreign Minister only recently.
From this unobjectionable conduct of v. Ribbentrop the prosecution has deduced that Hitler and Ribbentrop had agreed upon a premeditated maneuver. It sees in H. v. Ribbentrop's conduct that which is typically characterised as "double talk". .Must not the undisputable data and facts as regards H. v. Ribbentrop, the impression of the witness Schmidt, hence resulting, my portrayal of Ribbentrop's position as minister, his lack of information on the long planned preparations with respect to Norway and Denmark, and other undeniably prooved facts, raise the question whether H.v. Ribbentrop participated in decisions of foreign policy to a far lesser degree than is contended by the prosecution? far as Austria's annotation is concerned, he played no important part. For him Austria remained a country mutilated by "St. Germain," a country which, according to healthy principles could hardly exist and which once shared a common destiny in history with Greater Germany. The National Socialists were not the first to awaken Austria to the thought of a union with Germany. This thought had ripened,in the German element of the Hapsburg Monarchy since the revolution of 1848 aimed at a democratic and Greater Germany. It was fought for by the Social-Democrats for ideological and realistic reasons after the downfall of this Monarchy. It was this very democracy that saw in the Weimar state their spiritual offspring. The economic distress resulting from the destruction of the Danube area as an economic entity nurtured the thought of a union with the Reich, which was economically better off.
fostering soil. In any event, presuppositions for a union with Germany existed, when assistance of Austria by Italy ceased, through closer relations of the former towards Germany by reason of the Abyssinian conflict. Further reasons that contributed to and justified the union will be specifically stated by my colleague Dr. Steinbauer. preted in the narrow sense of the law of reunion of 13 March 1938, which was signed also by H. V. Ribbentrop, the union did not even correspond with the intentions of Hitler but was put through by him. the violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding article of the Treaty of St. Germain as well as the violation of the treaty between Austria and Germany of 11 July 193
THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through to me, I think, as though you had said,"...the union did not even correspond with the intentions of Hitler, but was arrived at" -- it should have been "by Goering himself".
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. HORN: In justification of these violations one could point out that the provisions concerned constitute a violation of the basic right of self-determination. The outcome of the vote after the annexation at any rate clearly confirms the Austrian attitude of that time. a further justification of violation. One could refer to the statement of Under Secretary Butler in the House of Commons who, upon questioning after the union assorted that England had given no special guarantee for the independence of Austria as undertaken in the Treaty of St. Germain.
facts. Positive law always lags behind the ideal state of justice Such is the case not only in laws governing internal relations but also in International Law. provisions are contained for change of circumstances, history shatters them by revolution in order to rebuild them upon a new base. evaluated is questionable. To general principles of the adaptability of justice to the might of facts I shall refer later on.
An Englishman asserted:
"We have to face the stubborn fact that Central Europe is populated by an almost solid block of 80 million people who are highly gifted, highly organized and who are conscious of these achievements in the highest degree. The majority of these people have the strong and evidently unexterminable desire to be united in one state". of 1919 was put in motion by the annexation of Austria and the racial theories of National Socialism. No attentive observer could fail to notice the effect of the annexation upon the neighboring states. with the particulars of the then proceeding efforts by the various groups of Germans in the neighboring states for incorporation into the Reich. The facts which have now become history are only too well known. My task here is to examine whether these events are the results of a premeditated plan of on individual person or of a group of persons, or whether a long and artificially stored up force assisted in accomplishing the objectives which were assigned to Herr von Ribbentrop by Hitler at the time of his appointment. German Party to force the Anschluss now on their part too.
in his capacity as Foreign Minister he engaged in the creating of difficulties under the Sudeten German Henlein. It further accuses him of having induced the Sudeten German Party to increase their demands step by step,instead of entering the Czeckoslovak government, and in that way of having prevented a solution of the whole problem without having made the German Government appear as pace maker. the contrary. It is true that Herr von Ribbentrop know that the Anschluss efforts of the Sudeten Germans received help from the party, but he had no influence on this party policy nor any therough knowledge of it. With regard to the difficulties which had arisen with the Czech Government caused by the separation efforts of the Sudeten Germans and their partly uncontrollable policy, Herr von Ribbentrop found it necessary to take care of the realization of the Sudeten German aims within the limits of a responsible policy.
the Munich Pact. It was complicated again only through the visit of Hacha in Berlin and the concomitant events, a step of Hitler's which was in this far reaching form completely surprisong to herr von Ribbentrop . of Slowakia in spite of all warnings, decided upon setting up the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. On the basis of the available material it might be difficult to ascertain the final reasons for Hitler's step. According to the testimony of the defendant Goering they sprang from Hitler's lasting fear that through an alliance of the Czech officer corps with Russia the situation in the Southeastern Territory could be complicated again. This and the esulting strategical and historical reasons might have induced Hitler to this step of 13 March 1939, which came as a surprise also to Herr v. Ribbentrop.
This decision, which is only understandable by Hitler's inclination for surprising decisions, brought a complete change in the German foreign policy.
Herr von. Ribbentrop had at that time, with a warning, demonstrated to Hitler the reaction of the Western powers, especially of England, which had to be expected as a result of this step. question which had been discussed since October 1938. Whereas up to that time the Poles, because of the German policy since 1934, and the return of Olsa territory did not refuse discussions about this problem, the reaction to the setting up of the protectorate could be seen immediately at the end of March. England regarded the establishing of the protectorate as a violation of the Munich Pact and began consultations with a number of countries. At the same time Minister Beck, instead of coming once more to Berlin, went to London and returned from there with the assurance that England would resi any change of the status quo in the East. This declaration was also given in the House of Commons after previous consultation with the French Government.
sse and stated to Herr v. Ribbentrop that any continuation of the revision policy towards Poland, especially as they are concerned with a return of Danzig to the Reich would mean war.
This made the Polish question into an European one. Mr. v. Ribbentrop told the Polish Ambassador at that time that Germany could not be satisifed with this decision. East Prussia could bring a final solution. of the new beginning course of the Polish crisis. I can therefore assume that the actual course of events is known, also inasmuch as they are connected with the annexation of the Memelland which was returned to the Reich through an agreement with Lithuania. shall confine myself to the pointing out of the facts which are apt to clear the role of H. v. Ribbentrop.
The prosecution accuses Mr. v. Ribbentrop that during the Sudeten crisis and the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, he had lulled Poland by pretending friendly feelings. May I, in contradiction of this assertion, point out that the relations between Germany and Poland since the agreement of 1934 were good and even firendly, and that this attitude became of course, even more favorable through the fact that Poland owed the acquisition of the Olsa territory to the German Foreign policy. Germany without the necessity of a deceitful conduct on the part of Mr. v. Ribbentrop. As the evidence has shown, Mr. v. Ribbentrop continued this friendly policy towards Poland even after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as there was no reason to deviate from this attitude.
The prosecution further accuses Mr. v. Ribbentrop of having known that Hitler had already in spring 1939 been resolved to start a war against Poland and that Danzig served only as pretext for this conflict.
It deduces this from the documents US 27 and US 30. They deal with the well known speeches by Hitler on 23 May and 22 August 1939.
May I point out in the first place that Mr. von Ribbentrop was not present at these conferences which were only for military personnel.
A number of key documents have been discussed in detail here. I only wish to name the best known, such as the Hossbach document, the two Schmundt files and the afore mentioned speeches. Quite a number of interpretations of these documents have been the subject of the testimony. People who knew Hitler stated that they were used to extravagant ideas from him in the form of sometimes repeating and surprising speeches and that in consideration of his peculiarities they did not take them seriously. ches in which Hitler asserted the contrary. One can object to that by saying that Hitler had always connected a certain purpose with his utterances. That is certainly true. But it is also true that even the few key documents, submitted as proof of the aggressive war, contain so many contradictions with regard the aggressive intentions deduced from them, that perhaps a critic judging retrospectively could recognize such intentions in accordance with the strict regulation for secrecy; the content of these documents were for that matter only known to these who took part in the conferences. This makes it clear why Herr v. Ribbentrop learned to knew about them only here in the Courtroom. at that time dealt solely with the re-incorporation of Danzig and the establishment of an extraterritorial read through the Corridor, in order to have a direct land-route to East Prussia. As the Court may remember, the desirability of realizing these aims had already been mentioned by Hitler when he appointed Herr von Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister. This demand was historically just as justified, as the solution of the proceeding incorpora tion of areas which were inhabited by Germans became inevitable in this case.
The status of the purely German city of Danzig, which had been determined by the Treaty of Versailles in the course of the erection of a polish state, had always been the cause of frictions between Germany and Poland. Poland had effected this solution at Versailles on the basis that it needed an cutlet to the sea. For the same reason, yet against all ethnological needs, the Corridor was established. Already Clemenceau in his memorandum pointed to this artificial creation as a source of danger, especially due to the fact that the people united in this area had been separated through long years of bitter enemity. It was not difficult to foresee that, as result of this fact, the League of Nations and the International Court at the Hague would be occupied not only with current complaints against violations of the Agreement for Minorities. The same cause gave rise to confiscation of German real estate on the largest scale up to 1 million hectars and the expulsion of far more than 1 million Germans in the course of 20 years. Not without reason had Lord d'Abernon speak of the Danzig-Corridor problem as of the "powder-barrel of Europe". If then efforts were made to solve this question, recognizing the Polish right for maintaining on outlet to the sea, such efforts were fustified from the standpoint of history and common sense. question served as a pretense only of which Herr yon Ribbentrop must have been aware. No evidence has been produced that Herr von Ribbentrop was acquainted with Hitler's aims, which far exceeded these demands. Just as little has it been proved that Herr von Ribbentrop before 1 September 1939, as has also been assorted by the Prosecution, did all he possibly could to avoid peace with Poland, although he knew that a war with Poland would draw Great Britain and France into the conflict. The Prosecution bases this statement on document TC 73. This involves a report of Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, to his Foreign Minister. The document contains nothing whatsoever to substantiate this assertion. Lipski can be counted as classical witness. May I recall that it was Lipski who, during the decisive stage of negotiations before the outbreak of the war remarked that he had not the least cause to be interested in notes or propositions from the German side. After a period of 5 1/2 years as ambassador in Germany, he was very well acquainted with conditions there.
He was convinced that in case of war unrest would break out in Germany and that the Polish Army would march into Berlin victoriously. exactly Lipski, who during the decisive discussion at the Polish Embassy, created the impression with the Swedes that Poland was sabotaging every possibility for negotiations. allegations presented by the Prosecution. So for instance the fact, that Herr Von Ribbentrop knowing that the polish - English Guarantee pact had been signed, by his intervention with Hitler caused the latter to recall the marching-orders for the Armed Force because, according to his conception, a conflict with Poland would also involve the Western Powers. This conception is identical with the conclusions, Herr von Ribbentrop drew from his opinion of the European situation, voiced in the already mentioned document TC 75. Ribbentrop who on 25 August 1939, after the Hitler-Henderson meeting, sent him to Sir Neville Henderson with the verbal communique presented as TC 72/69 in which the contents of Hitlers propositions were drawn up. With it Herr von Ribbentrop combined the urgent request, at once and in person to warmly recommend to the British Government Hitler's proposition. According to the English Blue Book, Sir Neville Henderson could not refrain from calling these proposals exceptionally sensible and sincere. They did not represent the usual Hitler proposals, but "proposals of the League of Nations". days can not deny that everything was done on the German side, to get at least negotiations on a workable basis underway. The opposite side would not have it thus, because the decision had been made to take action this time. The good services of England ended with the breaking off of all mediation without having been able to bring Poland to the table of negotiations.
defeated the purpose of the last decisive discussion with the British Ambassador Henderson by having read the German proposals to Poland so fast, contrary to all diplomatic custom and international courtesy, that Sir Neville Henderson could not understand them, and, hence, could not pass them on. The interpreter, Ambassador Schmidt, was present at this decisive discussion. He has testified here, under oath, that this statement is not true. One may consider Hitler's order, to acquaint Sir Neville Henderson only with the substance of the memorandum, as unwise. The fact is that not only did Herr von Ribbentrop read the entire contents at a normal speed to the British Ambassador, but he also, having the interpreter present, made it possible for Sir Neville Henderson to become familiar with the entire contents and, moreover, to have explanations given on it.
Besides, upon the initiative of Reichsmarshall Goering, it was transmitted to the British Embassy during the same night by dictation to Counsellor of the Embassy Forbs. Thus the British Government should have been able to render the good services offered for opening negotiations based on positive proposals. gation to be true, that the defendant had done everything to avoid peace with Poland. tions concerning aggressive war are not possible without knowledge of the presupposition leading to an armed conflict. Before I proceed to the legal aspects of the conflict with Poland, may I make some additional statements concerning the causes that led to the war. tions of those powers which were satisfied and those which were dissatisfied. It seems to be an inevitable law that, after great war shocks, the victorious states tend as far as possible towards the reestablishment of the pre-war status and pre-war mentality, wheras the conquered are forced to find a way out of the consequencesof their defeat by newmeans and methods. That way the Holy Alliance came about after the Napoleonic wars, and under Metternich's leadership, using legitimacy as an authorization, it tried to ignore the effects of the French Revolution. succeed in either. quickly transformed into a tool of the satisfied states. Every effort to "reinforce" the League of Nations, meant a new bulwark for maintaining the status quo. Under the elegant diction of juridical proceedings power-politics continued. Besides, the obsession by the idea of "securite" soon deprived the newly-created body of any breath of freshness and life.
In this fashion naturally a solution of the problems, created by the end of the first world-war could never be found. In international relations the interests of conservative powers content with the status quo and those of the revolutionary powers trying to do away with it, were found to be in growing conflict. It could only be a question of time, when under those circumstances the political initiative would passto the dissatisfied powers. The formation of this front depended exclusively on the force of the revolutionary spirit, which cristallized in opposition to political complacency and longing for the past. On this fostering-soil grew the doctrines of National Socialism, Fascism and Bolshevism, obscure in many parts of their programs, elastic and incoherent in others. Their power of propaganda was based not so much on their programs but on the fact that they admittedly brought something new and that they did not exhort their followers to worship a political ideal, that had failed in the past. reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr, the fact that the democratic governments were not capable of attaining any-thing for their peoples in need from the other democracies, unavoidably led to a test of the doctrines which had not yet been tried out.
The practical results of this revolution, as we experienced them in Germany after 1933, could, aside of the social program, only consist in abolishing the peace settlements of 1919, whichwere a classical example of the failure in understanding of the revolutionary character of a world-crises. These tasks were for this revolution no juridical questions but doctrines, exactly as it had for a long time been a doctrine for the satisfied states, to keep up the status quo at all costs, eventually at the costs of a new worldwar. the political crises of the past decade.
Every revolution has but two possibilities; either it meets so little resistance, that eventually conservative tendencies develop and an alloy with the old order is formed, or the antagonistic forces are so strong, that finally the revolution breaks because of its having oversharpened its own means and methods. a manner and, in parts, with a remarkable bias towards tradition. But it too could not escape the laws, inherent in history. The aims were too high for one generation, the revolutionary essence too strong. The successes in the beginning were stupefying. But they also caused a lack of criticism as to the methods and aims. groups in the Central European space, if, at the end -- I mean insetting up the protectorate Bohemia and Moravia and in following up the Danzig Corridor question -- revolutionary speed and methods had not been carried to excess as a result of previous successes. No soberly judging person will deny the right to gain a solution in theDanzig Corridor question, delicate as it was. text. Seen from the state of affairs in 1939 this cannot be proved. But it is sure that the opposed party, too, was concerned with other things but the keeping up of the status quo in the East.
National Socialism , and with it in its newly gained strength, the German Reich, had become such a danger in the eyes of the others that after Prague, one was determined to make any further German enterprise a "test case", whereever it should happen. Europe was caused in the first place by economic conditions of "Versailles". it was well known, that the conquered could not comply with its economic provisions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that sentence, at any rate, is objectionable on the ground that I have already stated.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I am not referring to the origin of the Versailles Treaty, but only to its ramifications, which are generally known, and I wanted to emphasize the ramifications, but I have completed this thought, and I do not wish to make any further reference to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: Many things have been said here about the slogan "L e b e n s r a u m". I am convinced that this word would never have become a political program, if after the first world-war one would have given Germany the possibility to link up with the world markets, instead of strangling her economically. By systematically cutting her off from all places where raw materials occurred in the world - all this for "securite" reasons - one of course fed the tendency towards Autarky, the inevitable way out from the barring from the world markets, and, at the same time, one allowed, as the economic situation became more aggravated, the cry for Lebensraum to fall on fertile soil.
So Stalin is right, when he says:
"It would be erroneous to believe that the second world-war came about in a haphazard way or resulted from faults of one or the other of the statesmen, though such faults were made without doubt. In reality the war resulted inevitably from the development of international economic and political forces based on modern monopolistic capitalism."