DR. STAHMER : Mr. President --
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Stahmer, what you are desiring to offer in evidence is the conclusion of the report or the protocol or whatever it is called, is that right ?
DR. STAHMER : Yes.
THE PRESIDENT : That, I take it, isn't a very long document, is it ?
DR. STAHMER : No, Mr. President. I am sorry but I have not received the minutes of the session. Therefore, I do not know just what is contained in this protocol, but I do recall -- and one of my colleagues confirmed this to me just now -- at that time I was permitted to submit the entire so-called report of the commission and I quoted certain passages, and with the permission of the High Tribunal I reserved the right to use the entire report and submit it later.
THE PRESIDENT : Well, I don't know what you mean by the whole report, or what you mean fey the protocol.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, if I may repeat once more, this 5 July M LJG 11-1 was a rather comprehensive protocol in which the findings of the investigations were set out.
The entire course of the proceedings were set down and it concluded with a general expert opinion. Facts are described at length and set forth at length are the various factors and pieces of evidence; matters as viewed by the experts on the spot; the fact that they interrogated the Russian population; that they checked over the site on the spot and all of those things were presented by me with the permission of the High Tribunal.
Mr. President, may I be permitted to make one more remark to clarify these matters? I remember this incident very specifically for this reason; that you, Mr. President, suggested and asked whether I had another copy of this protocol. I said, "No, I have only the "White Book.'" that the other witness be called in so that I could have a copy made of this protocol. Mr. President, you thereupon said, no, I should take the book back and then afterwards for me to submit a copy.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will look at the record to sec exactly what happened.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have not seen the protocol myself. I do not know, therefore, just what it contains and if it is not set down that way then the protocol does not seem to be complete. However, I do remember the fact quite clearly that events did take that course.
THE PRESIDENT: We will continue then.
DR. STAHMER: The statement of the witness should be subject to doubt for the witness did not give any explanation for the fact that he took the attitude be did about the protocol of 30 April, 1943; that he did not contradict or oppose it; that he did not refuse to sign it and that he did not, at a later tine, consult the other experts and tell them how he felt. torn down, especially since the other eleven exports agreed and endorsed the statements set forth in this report.
5 July M LJG 11-2 sary to set forth the individual reasons which speak for the correctness of the statements contained in the German "White Book" of April 30, 1943. ing, that is in the fall of 1941, is arbitrarily set down and it cannot be true in any case for the corpses were winter clothing, as the witness Markov noticed on the corpses upon which he performed an autopsy. The fact that shells and pistols of German make were found does not permit us to conclude that this shooting was carried out by Germans. In the German white Book" it has already been pointed out that the German plant which produced this ammunition exported considerably and especially to the east. solely to determine whether the 11,000 Polish officers were shot after the capture of Smolensk by the Germans so that this deed could only have been committed by the Germans. The Prosecution did not succeed in proving this fact and therefore this accusation will have to be striken from the charges.
Mr. President, now I shall turn to my conclusion. I shall turn to my last few concluding remarks. I imagine it would take me roughly a little more than ten minutes, Mr. President, and I rather think it would be suitable for me to finish this all at once, that I either finish my entire conclusion or if I may be permitted, to make a suggestion that we recess new.
Shall I continue now?
THE PRESIDENT: If you can finish in ten minutes we will go on until you finish, Dr. Stahmer.
DR. STAHMER: It may take me a little more than ten minutes, Mr. President. I should like to point out that I would not like to interrupt my concluding remarks.
THE PRESIDENT: P erhaps if it would be more convenient to you -- we will do whichever you like, we will recess now, if you like.
It is a very hot day and we will recess now if you prefer.
5 July M LJG 11-3
DR. STAHMER: I would prefer to have the recess now for the heat is bothering me a little bit today, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
(A recess was taken until 1400.)
(The hearing reconvened at 14 00 hours, 5 July 1946.)
DR. STAHMER: I shall continue now with the conclusion. the following viewpoints must be considered for the appreciation of his actions: impressions as a young officer and combat airman during world Ear I, during which he proved an outstanding man and was awarded the highest award for bravery, the order of "Pour le merite". He experienced the collapse of the German war effort as -- as it was seen by him --- a consequence of German treachery from within. wanted to give themselves a new constitution on a democratic basis and then hoped to be able to work their way up again by industry and perseverance. In this, the confidence in the far-sightedness of the victorious powers of that time, especially in the fourteen points of Wilson, played a great part. Weimar democracy came into a serious crisis from which it was not to recover. This, together with the subsequent world economic crisis, formed the prerequisite which could not be ignored for the fact that Hitler was able to seize power.
At first, the "fight against Versailles" made his rise as a party loader possible, Goering as witness described how he agreed with Hitler during their first meeting in the conviction that nothing could be achieved by paper protests. to the entire world, Goering as well as Hitler were convinced that Goering inevitably would become a victim of Bolshevism if it was not possible to awaken against the latter sufficient defensive strength by the reestablishment of German self-confidence at home. It was understood that they also had to stand up with rigour against the Versailles powers. But in this, Hitler started out without question from the fact that Germany belong basically to the West, culturally, economically and even politically. He Hebelieved that the Bolshevist danger, at first directed against Germany, would afterwards also threaten the Western countries.
He, therefore, was of the opinion that he would he able gradually to gain their recognition and support if he took up the ideological struggle against the East. policy until the actual collapse. One nay today rightly condemn it as having failed from the beginning; one must not forgot that, at first, many things in the development clearly seemed to justify it. Thus it can be explained how Hitler succeeded in winning over an increasing part of the Germans to his following. He recognized in him the born national leader who understood how to influence the masses and to guide them and who, driven by a fascinating, strong will, could not be frightened by any obstacle. He realized that under a democratic constitution only such a man of certainly demoniacal-demagogic talent could survive. And therefore he joined him. fatherland, he did not think of using Hitler only as a tool for his own new rise to power. He rather took it upon himself from the beginning to recognize in him the only man vested with authority -- the "Fuehrer" -and to be satisfied with a subordinate role. He, the famous air force captain and bearer of "pour le merite", did not hesitate to swear the oath of allegiance to Hitler, then still an unknown man, an oath which was to be valid for his entire life and was valid. be so completely misunderstood as to lead to the accusation against him of a conspiracy, entered into from the beginning for the purpose of committing crimes. the treaty of Versailles. Although theWeimar government had made repeated attempts to achieve a liberation from the especially burdening obligations of this treaty, Germany was not successful in her endeavors for a revision.
the victors of Versailles to keep Germany down permanently? Was it not true in the world that might went before right, and would the Germans achieve something only when they got up the courage to hit on the table forcibly with their fists? of that time. To construe from then a proof for the conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution, would mean a complete misunderstanding. Actually, the development after 1933 appears to justify Hitler completely. He easily achieved with his methods much more than what - if given freely - would have kept the Weimar government in power. foreign countries not only to conclude treaties with Hitler - such as the naval agreement of 1935 and the Munich pact of September 1938 but also the willingness to participate in the party rallies to the end, the fact that Hitler had chosen the correct road for reaching international understanding. the fall of 1938. If Hitler would afterwards have observed loyally the Munich agreement, then he would probably have taken the arguments out of the hand of the "stop" policy carried out against him. Not only would the peace have been kept, but Hitler could also have harvested the fruits of his domestic and foreign policy, carried out until then and recognized by all powers. with their catastrophic consequences are to be charged solely to him, or who has to share the responsibility. All Germans who followed Hitler at any time and in any way, are accused. For, it is said by the Prosecution, above all of those who did not trust him from the beginning for anything good and who denied the legality of his government from the beginning -"It could be seen from the beginning that it would end as it did:" Thus, everyone who supported him at any time and in any way, is therefore also guilty.
sad result it cohstructs an obligation which must annihilate all belief not only in freedom, but also in the insight of man. Naturally Hitler did not desire the end as it happened. He often enough announced publicly that he was not out for the laurels of war, but that he would like to devote the rest of his life to peaceful reconstruction. limit his goals when he could no longer believe in their achievement by peaceful and humane means.
force generally in any form, then he need not have gone his own way and have looked for a new solution. A certain play with force, as long as it does not degenerate, will therefore have to be left at his disposal. Where the degeneration began -- because of the lack of other points of reference -- can only be surmised from the results which he actually caused with his policy. Most certainly he did not foresee and intend the bad results. However, it will have to be considered as his guilt that he would never let himself be taught by his failures, but only lot himself be led to increasingly exorbitant acts. How much of this guilt, however, can and may be charged also to his followers?
Whoever did not reject Hitler's methods, and thereby him personally, from the very beginning as illegitimate,found difficulty in recognizing where Hitler's political aims came to an end, to give justifying reasons for his measures, and where afterwards his politics became a crime. In this respect the border, from the standpoint of purely German law sentiments, surely ran along a line considerably different from that of other nations or mankind. The latter, for example, were hardly interested in the maintenance of the Weimar Constitution and the basic rights granted by it to the individual German. Its violation therefore, up to the Second World War, has never caused other states to intervene with the German Government. On the other hand, once the war had broken out, the Germans were forced to give precedence to German interests over their sympathy with members of other, especially enemy, states. Each of them believed to be doing enough if he took care, in his field, that unnecessary hardships were avoided. To rebel against orders which came from the highest German command would not only have appeared completely senseless and hopeless, but, until shortly, until the bitter end, it would also have been a violation of German legality and thereby a criminal injustice. Accusations that no rebellion was undertaken can therefore be raised only if the breach of formal legality, without consideration of the immediate practical effect, and only on behalf of the principle -- ergo the attitude of a revolutionary -- could be defined as a legal obligation. they cannot be mentioned seriously at all because the hitherto existing international law was primarily based on the unlimited sovereignty of the states.
No state is willing to submit vital decisive questions to the judgment of other, however great a majority it may be or however independent a tribunal . And now every individual citizen of such a soveriegn state was supposed to have not only the right in relation to the other nations or humanity, but even the duty to rebel against the legal power machine of his own state, because the latter violated human rights and the rights of humanity. such an imposition, amde retroactively, pronounces its own sentence. It would place the autonomy of the individual above state sovereignty. Thereby the strength of the individual person would not only be immeasurably overestimated, but this would have to lead to the breaking of the last ties of traditional order, to anarchy. Compared to such a man* of thinking Goering almost represents the exact opposite pole. As others went into the war in order to fight war as such, so he became a revolutionary in order to restore honor to the concept of loyalty. Thus, having once cast his lot with the Fuehrer, he stood by his side even after he had already lost the latter's confidence for a long time; yes, even after he had been sentenced to death by Hitler. He remained loyal until today, in spite of everything by excusing Hitler before himself, repeatedly. To many this may appear incomprehensible, and many may see more weakness than strength in it.
In this loyalty, however, the man reveals his whole nature, Goering has been described in the press as a late Renaissance type; and there is something in this. Although of high intelligence, he allowed himself to be guided in his actions loss by considerations of common-sense than by the feelings of his impetuous heart. primarily subjective. He not only sees his surroundings and other people impassionately as immovable quantities he has to reckon with, but he, rather and above all, is sensitive to the effect they have on him and how they call for his approval or disapproval so that he finally makes his personal reaction to them the basis of his judgment as a whole. Supreme Staff Judge Dr. Lehmann, he always showed himself at pains to remain just and to lend an ear to considerations of sentiment. He always kept himself free from doctrinal prejudices. As a soldier, he always endeavored to hit on the right factor in the individual case. His judicial decisions and his social attitude, which General Bodenschatz testified to amongst other things, show his serious moral feeling of responsibility. His attitude towards all criminal acts directed against the honor of women are proof of his chivalry. But he takes no dogmas for his standards in this, only the spontaneous judgment of his feelings, not only intellect, therefore, but life. From this, he derives his ideas and the values which determine his actions. to him meant everything to him and was the substance of his life. Ambassador Henderson had already judged Goering correctly, when he wrote about him: seen greater loyalty and devotion than he maintains toward Hitler. He was recognized as the second power in the country, and always gave me to understand that he was Hitler's natural successor as loader.
Men in secondary places often tend to emphasize their own importance. In all the open discussions in which I engaged with Goering, he never spoke of himself or the great part which he had played in the Nazi revolution; Hitler had done everything, all confidence was confidence in Hitler, every decision was Hitler, and he himself was nothing."
This judgment still applies today. But his loyalty became his disaster, and the world, for him, sank into ruins. He certainly recognized many a mistake of the past, but he never showed the regret, which many would like to see with him. He thereby remains true to himself, as well. With this the picture of his character ends. again searching for a firm foundation for life, the positive value of such loyalty too should not be ignored.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I understand that you have not had your speech translated into any of the languages. Is that so?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, yesterday I told the General Secretary the reasons which made it impossible to have the speech translated. However, I have given the interpreters the text in German, and I was told that the German text is a big help to them in making the translation as quickly and as accurately as possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has already pointed out to you, many days ago, that it is very inconvenient to them not to have a copy of the speech before them. If you propose to make a speech, they will do the best they can to appreciate it. It makes it very much more difficult and very much more inconvenient not to have the speech translated.
DR. SEIDL: I shall have the translation made as quickly as possible for the case of the defendant Funk.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, and Judges, when in 1918 the German Army, after more than four years of heroic struggle, laid down its arms, this was done in confidence in the assurances of President Wilson which he had repeatedly given in 1918.
In the victory speech of 8 January 1918, the President of the United States of America, in 14 points, had demanded among ether things open -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal has already intimated, as you must know, that the question of the 14 points, and the question of the justice of the Treaty of Versailles, is irrelevant. They do not propose to listen to it. You have been told that before, and many documents have been rejected which dealt with this subject.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I do not intend to comment on the question of whether the Versailles Treaty is just or not. The point is this. The prosecution submitted the Versailles Treaty in evidence. They left the Versailles Treaty the main point of the indictment as far as Point 1 is concerned.
My investigation aims at the following: First,was the Versailles Treaty formed legally? Second, -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): I spoke only of the injustice of the Versailles Treaty. But it is even more irrelevant to question whether the Versailles Treaty is a legal document or not. We do not propose to listen to your contending that the Versailles Treaty is not a legal document. There are plenty of matters which are of material moment for your client which you have to discuss before us, and that is not one of them.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I cannot leave the Court in the dark on the fact that the Versailles Treaty and its consequences, especially the original connection between the seizure of power by National Socialism as a result of the consequences of the Versailles Treaty are a considerable part of my speech.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I have told you that the Tribunal will not listen to your contending either that the Versailles Treaty was not a legal document or that it was in any way unjust. On those topics, we do not propose to hear you.
Dr. SEIDL: Must I understand the statement of the Court to the effect that I will not be permitted to speak of the consequences of the Versailles Treaty, and particularly the connection of these consequences with the rise of the National Socialist Party and with the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler and the co-defendants?
THE PRESIDENT: Look. The Versailles Treaty is, of course, an historical fact, and the Tribunal cannot prevent you from referring to it as an historical fact. But as to its justice or as to its being a legal treaty, the treaty which Germany signed, you will not be heard. are going to say. But we will not listen to that sort ofargument.
DR. SEIDL: Then I shall begin on Page 6 of the German manuscript, in the second paragraph. Versailles at the moment when it was signed. In the program of the National Socialist Labor Party of Adolf Hitler, this struggle against the Versailles peace dictate and for its revision assumed a please far surpassing all other demands. It was the leading forts from which the whole inner political activity of the Party developed, and which, after the seizure of power, was to form the basis for all foreign political considerations and decisions. Rudolf Hess. Like Hitler, he, Rudolf Hess, was also a front-line soldier in the First World War. As a volunteer, he joined at the outbreak of the war, and until he was wounded in Rumania, he had risen to lieutenant of infantry. When this wound made further service with the infantry impossible, he reported to the air corps. in 1919, after the conclusion of the Versailles Peace Treaty, he had to recognize that the victors had not wanted a peace of justice and the adjustment of interests, for, as could not be expected otherwise, the peace conditions of Versailles, and especially the burden of the reparations, had to have a devastating effect.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, it may be difficult for you to cut out of your speech the various references to the topics which I have referred to, but you must kindly try to do it. For if you continue to refer to the topics to which I have referred, namely the justice or the legality of theTreaty of Versailles, the Tribunal will have to stop your speech and go on with some of the other defendants.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, what I was speaking of just now is not a matter of justice or legality, but it is a question of the consequences, and refers to an investigation of the original connection. If the Prosecution, in weeks of presenting evidence, showed how the rise of the National Socialist Party came about, and how the numbers of it s mandates increased-
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Dr. Seidl, th ose are all facts which the prosecution is perfectly entitled to prove. What you are now referring to is an argument that certain clauses of the Versailles Treaty were unjust. And that is an argument which the Tribunal is not prepared to listen to. It is not a statement of fact; it is an argument.
DR. SEIDL: Of course, it is an argument.
THE PRESIDENT: I have said that it is an argument we are not going to listen to. If you do not understand what I mean, you will have to stop continuing your speech. Do you understand that?
DR. SEIDL: Page 8, then. more one of the first -
It is impossible, Mr. President, to continue my speech, because all the following statements are concerned with the question of what the defendant Hess did up to the seizure of power, and I must say that the essential part of his activity was to work within the Party and among the German people towards a revision of the Versailles Treaty and its most unbearable terms. This is the question of the whole National Socialist movement to 1933.
THE PRESIDENT: If you confine yourself to statements of fact as to what the defendant Hess did, there will be no objection to it at all. But as I said, If you make arguments that the Treaty of Versailles is illegal or unjust, the Tribunal will not hear you.
DR. SEIDL: I shall continue. And I ask the President, sinceI do not know the limit exactly, to interrupt me if I should choose a subject which refers to -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Dr. Seidl, you knew perfectly will the limits which have been laid down by the Tribunal many weeks ago as to the question of the justice or the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles.
There has been a great number of documents rejected on the ground that they dealt with the justice or theinjustice of the Treaty of Versailles, and you must have known that perfectly well.
DR. SEIDL: Then I ask the Court to tell me whether I am permitted to make statements to the effec t that the economic conditions, especially the great unemployment, resulted from the reparation terms of the Versailles Treaty and the refusal of the victorious powers of 1919 to change the policy or reparations accordingly.
THE PRESIDENT: You may certainly state what the condition of Germany was. That is a matter of fact.
DR. SEIDL: Then I shall begin on Page 8.
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal is perfectly familiar with this type of argument; I mean, we are not going to lose sight of the argument. We knew all about the argument; we do not want to hear it. We think it is entirely irrelevant.
Can't you go on to other passages of your speech which are important for the defendant Hess? As I have said, there are a great many matters which have been proved by the prosecution and which have been answered by the defense; and upon those matters we desire to hear you.
DR. SEIDL: I shall begin on page ten, with the second paragraph. Therefore, in the Reichstag elections of the 14th of September 1930, the new Reichstag with no less than one hundred and seven delegates. That is in part and the result of the economic crisis of the time --- the great unemployment and thus, indirectly also of the adjustment of reparations contrary to all common sense by the Versailles Treaty and the refusal of the victorious States, in spite, of urgent warnings to improve the readjustments. It is ture --
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you know that is again an argumentative statement, that the Treaty of Versailles was unfair and that the victorious powers had failed to recognize the essential justice of Germany's case or something of that sort. If you can't adjust your speech to what I have laid down, we shall have to ask you to recast the whole speech.
DR. SEIDL: Then I shall go over to page 11, second paragraph. I shall go to page 12. We, the German people, in referring to the Peace Treaty of Versailles had disarmed and they could expect with justification that the victorious powers would also --
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Dr. Seidl. Dr. Seidl, as you don't appear to be capable of recasting your speech as you go along to accord to the Tribunal's ruling, the Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage. It will go on with the next defendant's case. You will then have the opportunity of recasting your speech and you will submit your speech for translation before it is presented and I would explain that this is the reason why the Tribunal does not propose to hear you upon these matters. They are irrelevant to the issues that the Tribunal has to try. If they were in any way relevant to the charges which are made against the defendant in the Indictment, they would of course hear them but they are, in the considered opinion of the Tribunal in no way relevant to the charges upon which the defendants are being tried and therefore the Tribunal do not propose to hear them. The justice of the Treaty of Versailles has nothing to do with whether or not the war which was made by Geramny was aggressive. It has nothing to do with the war crimes with which the defendants are charged and therefore it is irrelevant and for that reason we don't propose to hear it. Now, as I say, as you are unable apparently to recast your speech, you will be given an opportunity of recasting it in private and you will then submit it for translation and you can then deliver it; and now we will go on with the case against the defendant Ribbentrop.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have just heard that the translations are being brought up. Perhaps I may wait until the translation gets here ?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you might go on. We can hear what you say and take it down.
DR. HORN: Yes, sir. Mr. President and Judges :
" All great upheavals of history of the world and especially in modern Europe have at the same time been wars and revolutions."
We are standing in the midst of such a upheaval. It absolutely is not concluded as yet. To select single events in order to render judicial judgment is not only almost impossible, but entails the danger of too early a verdict. Make no mistake about it. tain part of Europe. We have to form a judgment about a catastrophe which touches the deepest roots of our civilisation. tional and international events. Germany is much interested in the development of the idea of the law if its use leads to a betterment of international morals. This court has the high task, not only to decide about certain defendants, and uncover the causes of the present catastrophe, but at the same time it will create norms which are expected to be adopted universally. No law should be created that is only applied to the weak. Otherwise we ability for total resistance and thereby make war still more pitiless than the case which I represent.
H. von Ribbentrop is being considered among the conspirators as the man mainly responsible for the foreign policy and diplomatic side of an alleged conspiracy, which is supposed to have had as its goal the preparation and execution of aggressive wars.
It is my task to find out from the evidence when an attack in the meaning of international law is prevalent, and in which cases aggressive wars were conducted. nition by the American and British prosecutors, but has, beyond all a basis in realities.
Only the knowledge of those promises permits the adoption of 5 July A LJG 15-1a an attitude which will serve as a basis for the decision of the court.
I am therefore deferring the discussion of the problematic aspects of aggression and aggressive wars till I have presented to the court the evidence for the valuation of German foreign policy and the participation in it by H. von Ribbentrop. of criminal law, I shall examine especially, to what extent H. von Ribbentrop checked or promoted the decisions concerning foreign policy during the time of his political activity.
Mr. von Ribbentrop's first stop into the world of the balancing of interests and therefore of the international game of power was successfully taken when he in 1935 concluded the naval agreement between Germany and England. The circumstances under which this treaty came to life are as significant for the political problems of those years as they are characteristic for judging the personality von Ribbentrop's and his further political development. This treaty - as it is known in informed quarters - came about under exclusion of the official German diplomacy. The then German very sceptical toward this project. Both Hoesch and the Wilhelmstrasse did not believe that England was inclined to concluding such a treaty, which contradicted the terms of part V of the the different disarmament conferences. Furthermore they did not believe that such an agreement could materialize a few weeks after the Council of the League of Nations had declared the restoration of German military sovereignty as a broach of German obligations, and England, France and Italy had met at Stresa in order to counteract this German stop. They did by no moans believe that a successful conclusion of such a far reaching treaty with its fundamental significance could be achieved by an outsider like Mr. von Ribbentrop. icant as far reaching. The authority of Mr. von Ribbentrop who came from the party rose in Hitler's eyes.