management of the concentration camps, passed from the defendant to the Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler. The defendant cannot be held responsible for the subsequent evolution of the concentration camps; for the fact that they became especially after the outbreak of the war more and more gruesome places of torture and death, and led -- partly intentionally partly through the chaotic war conditions -- to the death of countless people, so that finally, in the last days before the breakdown of Germany, and through errors in organization they turned into one vast graveyard.
Certainly he know that there still were concentration camps, also that the number of inmates had risen because of war tensions, and that they also contained foreigners because of the expansion of the war machine over all of Europe - but the horrible occurences as they have been disclosed in this trial were unknown to him.
He knew nothing of the irresponsible experiments which were being carried out on inmates because of misinterpretation of true scientific spirit. The testimony of witness field marshal MILCH has shown that the Luftwaffe was not interested in these experiments, did not participate in them, and that the defendant personally did not learnanything specific at all about this matter. as such have anything to do with thelater extermination of Jews Which apparently originated in HEYDRICH'S and HIMMLER'S brains, and was kept secrect in a masterly manner, and was disclosed after the collapse as the horror of Auschwitz and Maidanak.
This beings me to the Jewish question: the Jewish question during his interrogation as witness; furthermore, he has shown in all their details the reasons which influenced the national Socialist party and after the siezure of power, influenced that State, to take a hostile attitude toward the Jews. Nurnberg laws in the Year 1935, which were intended to keep the race pure, and that in his capacity as Commissioner for the four Year Plan, he issued decress during the years 1938 and 1939 which had as their aim the exclusion of Jews from economic life. meant a one-sided and serious intervention into the legal sphere of Jews. foundation, is obscure.
For here it is a question of a purely domestic problem -
namelu the regulation of the, legal position of one's own subjects; according to interntionally recognized legal opinion at that time, the German Reich as a sovereign state could freely settle such a problem. of citienship rights were extremely sever, they nevertheless in no way comprise an offense against humanity. tain circle of citizens in their legal position have also been made by other states without offense being taken at such measures or without other states considering themselves induced to intervene, Reich Marshal Goering always refused any illegal or violent action against Jews. This is clearly shown by his attitude toward the action against Jews during the night of 9 to 10 November 1938, instigated by Goebbels, of which he was informed only after the deed had been done, and which he condemned most severely. In this respect, he raised serious objections with Goebbels and Hitler. On this matter, the precise statements of witnesses BODENSCHATZ and KOERNER are available. The testimony of Dr. UIBERREITHER shows how greatly GOERING disapproved of this action. According to the former, the defendant summoned all Gauleiters to Berlin several weeks after this incident and in an address censured the violent action with the sharp words that this action did not correspond to the dignity of the state, and that it had caused serious damage to German prestige abroad. That the defendant was no race fanatic, became generaly known by his expression: "I decide who is a Jew". It has been established sufficiently that he aided many Jews, extermination of the Jews. He never would have approved such a measure, and opposed it with all his might. For he had too much political insight not to recognize the tremendous and at the same time, senseless dangers which would perforce result for the German people from such a brutal and detestable extermination drive.
Goering had already proved by the above mentioned speech to the Gauleiters that he did not wish to ruin himself in the eyes of the world public and world opinion because of the treatment of Jews.
agreed to such an undertaking or for him to have participated in it in any manner. It is understandable, if it is held against the defendant, that he should have been informed about such horrible measures as the second man in the state. defendant that he know nothing of these atrocities, are met with a certain amount of distrust. no information about such acts ever reached him. understood only by one familiar with German conditions - may be explained from the fact - and this is the sole solution of the riddle - that HIMMLER, as was also emphasized by General JODL during his interrogation, know most masterfully how to keep his actions secret, to obliterate all traces of his atrocities, and to deceive the surrounding world and even his and Hitler's closer entourage. ness HOESS who confirms Himmler's instruction concerning absolute secrecy toward everyone.
The question may come up here: Did not the legal obligation, exist for the defendant to instigate investigations about this matter and to get reliable information as to the true wherabouts of Supposedly evacuated Jews, and as to their fate? And what legal consequence results if he carelessly refrained from such investigations and thus carelessly violated his legal obligation to act incumbent on him by virtue of his position? The decision of this extremely complicated question of Law and fact may be left undecided because Goering, even as the second man in the state, did not have the power to prevent such measures if they were carried out by Himmler and were ordered, or at any rate, approved by Hitler.
Mr. President, yesterday I stated that I still wished to deal 5 July M LJG 9-1a with the case "Katyn", and I intend to interpolate, dealing with this matter, before I go on with my conclusion.
I an sorry I was not able to get any translations in this respect because the testimony was only given a few days age. However, this matter is not very long. The interpreters have a copy. I shall begin with this report. Katyn case, in which the taking of evidence was concluded only a few days back. The Russian prosecution based their indictment on the findings of an investigation, which is set down in Document USSR 54. The following conclusion is drawn from the entire evidential material as presented: camps west of Smolensk, were still there in these three camps when the Germans came into Smolensk, up to and including September, 1941. Second, these prisoners of war were taken from those prisoner-of-war camps by the German occupation troops in the autumn of 1941.
Third, the mass shooting of the Polish prisoners of war was carried out by the German military authorities who had concealed themselves under the code name "Staff of the Engineering Battalion 537" at whose lead was Colonel Ahrens, together with his co-workers, Lt. Rex and Lt. Hodt. accusation? This question has to be answered in the negative. From the contents of this document we can not determine any fact of guilt, as the time of this perpetration, September of 1941, is determined and as the act of the crime at Katyn forrest is specified. With the material at hand, which limited this crime so very much, it was the sale work of the prosecution to prove that those things did take place; but those facts do not stand up after a subsequent examination. at. Ahrens cannot be considered one of the perpetrators of this misdeed because this deed was committed in September, 1941, and 5 July M LJG 9-2a Ahrens, together with Regiment 537, took ever the command at the end of November, 1941.
That was when Ahrens came to Katyn, and up until that time he had never been in the Eastern theater of war. Before Ahrens, Colonel Bedenck was in command of the regiment. He came to the regimental staff in August of 1941 and then took a leave. Before Colonel Bedenck, First Lt. Hodt, at the end of July of 1941, immediately after the capture of Smolensk, came to the Dnieper Castle, together with a First Commando, and he remained there until the arrival of the regimental staff, to which he did not at that time belong. He was transferred to the regimental staff only in September of 1941, and from that time on he lived in the little Castle constantly. not be concluded or derived from the document which has been submitted, and such facts have not been presented here. Therefore, it is not proved that Bedenck and Hodt could be considered as perpetrators. ment 537 or any other military unit had participated in or had committed this act: the hands of the Germans. In that way they would have become German prisoners of war. The fact that they had been captured would have had to have been reported to the Army Group Center. witness Eichborn. Considering the tremendous number of prisoners, it is quite out of the question that a report of that nature could have not taken place inadvertently. Apart from that, the capturing of 11,000 Polish officers could, under no circumstances, have been concealed from the Army Group. As can be seen from the testimony of General Oberhaueser, the Army Group never had any notice or any knowledge to this effect.
and Oberhaueser, it can be concluded that at the time of the capture 5 July M LJG 9-3a of Smolensk by the Germans there could not have been any Polish officers present in those camps.
Eye witnesses who could have soon the officers at this period of time were not interrogated by the Russian Commission. what he says here is that there were no eye witnesses interrogated by the Russian Commission, eye witnesses who could have testified as to the Polish officers having been in these concentration camps at that time.
A railroad employee who was interrogated in this matter knew nothing from his own experience and observation.
The transport of so many Polish prisoners could not have been kept from the Russian population even if the transport had been carried on most unobtrusively and secretly, and shootings on such a large scale could not have taken place without the Russian population gaining knowledge and taking notice of them. 200 meters there was a public highway through which there was open traffic,and this highway was used daily and to a great extent by the Russian civilian population. Anything that took place in the little forest of Katyn could be seen from this highway. estates, which remained occupied by the owners during the time of the German occupation, and there was constant contact with the regimental staff. There are no reliable statements and testimony dealing with either the transport or the observation of shootings. Never, even on the part of the Germans, would such a site as actually was found be chosen for the mass shooting. This site was located between the main road and the regimental quarters, and as such would have been completely unsuitable for such an act. As I have already stated, there was lively traffic on the nearby road, and there was also traffic in the direct vicinity of the graves which were near a small road connecting the regimental headquarters with the main road. Even soldiers who had not participated would have had to see any act like that if it had taken place. very unsuitable. It was a technical unit, a signal corps unit the most unsuitable of all for such a task. the site of the deed on the 20th of September 1941, and they could only give testimony from that date on. But from the end of July there was an advance unit near the castle, and from August, a regimental staff. It is quite out of the question that in the period of time of perhaps six weeks this act could have been perpetrated. The few people who were at their disposal were so overburbened with military tasks that in this short period of time it would have been quite impossible for them not only to kill 11,000 prisoners, but also to dispose of the bodies.
allegdly helped with the disposal of the bodies. That cannot be proved. None of the Russian population had ever seen such prisoners. In no case could the dead be disposed of so quickly, and the site made unrecognizable so that the Witnesses Oberhaueser and Eichborn on their frequent trips to the Knieper Castle would not have seen any signs of such activity.
The testimony of the witness Baseliveski is not relevant. He allegedly heard a story to this effect from a certain Menchagin who cannot be found now. This witness did not make any personal observations. He himself did not see any Poles. He was told this by students, that they, the students, had seen Poles, but they did not know the number of Poles or where they were being kept.
This testimony is very spotty and it seems to be worthless, and the testimony given by the two witnesses cannot be quoted in that connection.
medical testimony. The German Government put out an expert report, made by 12 members of a commission who were representatives of legal medicine from European universities. However, the Prosecution refers to an expert opinion which was deposed by a group of Russian experts only. The first expert opinion, that given by the German Government, is to be preferred since it was compiled by experts who were completely impartial. ment contained in the report of the 30th of April 1943. Allegedly, he did not agree with the findings; he did not agree with the statement that the shootings took place in the months of March and April 1940, and this testimony must be met with misgivings.
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Stahmer, you realize, of course, that you haven't offered in evidence the report of this German commission. You expressly refrained, as I understand it, from offering the report of the German Commission.
Dr. Stahmer : Mr. President, that is a mistake. I did not refrain from doing so. Rather, I was not granted the submission of the White Book, but I was granted that the submission of the report of the 30th of April 1943. However, I could not submit it immediately for it was contained in the White Book and I was to have copied made. These copies are being made, Mr.President, and they will be submitted. I used some of the passages from the protocol, from the records, with the express approval of the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT : I know you did, and of course if you want to offer it there will be no objection to your offering it, but certainly I understood that you were only offering in evidence the parts of which you read to the witness. That, I think, was put to you at the time you were cross examining the witnesses on behalf of the Prosecution. different and that you want to offer the whole of the report, then that matter will be considered by the Tribunal if the Tribunal hasn't already considered it. report to be offered in evidence ?
DR. STAHMER : Mr. President --
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Stahmer, what you are desiring to offer in evidence is the conclusion of the report or the protocol or whatever it is called, is that right ?
DR. STAHMER : Yes.
THE PRESIDENT : That, I take it, isn't a very long document, is it ?
DR. STAHMER : No, Mr. President. I am sorry but I have not received the minutes of the session. Therefore, I do not know just what is contained in this protocol, but I do recall -- and one of my colleagues confirmed this to me just now -- at that time I was permitted to submit the entire so-called report of the commission and I quoted certain passages, and with the permission of the High Tribunal I reserved the right to use the entire report and submit it later.
THE PRESIDENT : Well, I don't know what you mean by the whole report, or what you mean fey the protocol.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, if I may repeat once more, this 5 July M LJG 11-1 was a rather comprehensive protocol in which the findings of the investigations were set out.
The entire course of the proceedings were set down and it concluded with a general expert opinion. Facts are described at length and set forth at length are the various factors and pieces of evidence; matters as viewed by the experts on the spot; the fact that they interrogated the Russian population; that they checked over the site on the spot and all of those things were presented by me with the permission of the High Tribunal.
Mr. President, may I be permitted to make one more remark to clarify these matters? I remember this incident very specifically for this reason; that you, Mr. President, suggested and asked whether I had another copy of this protocol. I said, "No, I have only the "White Book.'" that the other witness be called in so that I could have a copy made of this protocol. Mr. President, you thereupon said, no, I should take the book back and then afterwards for me to submit a copy.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will look at the record to sec exactly what happened.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have not seen the protocol myself. I do not know, therefore, just what it contains and if it is not set down that way then the protocol does not seem to be complete. However, I do remember the fact quite clearly that events did take that course.
THE PRESIDENT: We will continue then.
DR. STAHMER: The statement of the witness should be subject to doubt for the witness did not give any explanation for the fact that he took the attitude be did about the protocol of 30 April, 1943; that he did not contradict or oppose it; that he did not refuse to sign it and that he did not, at a later tine, consult the other experts and tell them how he felt. torn down, especially since the other eleven exports agreed and endorsed the statements set forth in this report.
5 July M LJG 11-2 sary to set forth the individual reasons which speak for the correctness of the statements contained in the German "White Book" of April 30, 1943. ing, that is in the fall of 1941, is arbitrarily set down and it cannot be true in any case for the corpses were winter clothing, as the witness Markov noticed on the corpses upon which he performed an autopsy. The fact that shells and pistols of German make were found does not permit us to conclude that this shooting was carried out by Germans. In the German white Book" it has already been pointed out that the German plant which produced this ammunition exported considerably and especially to the east. solely to determine whether the 11,000 Polish officers were shot after the capture of Smolensk by the Germans so that this deed could only have been committed by the Germans. The Prosecution did not succeed in proving this fact and therefore this accusation will have to be striken from the charges.
Mr. President, now I shall turn to my conclusion. I shall turn to my last few concluding remarks. I imagine it would take me roughly a little more than ten minutes, Mr. President, and I rather think it would be suitable for me to finish this all at once, that I either finish my entire conclusion or if I may be permitted, to make a suggestion that we recess new.
Shall I continue now?
THE PRESIDENT: If you can finish in ten minutes we will go on until you finish, Dr. Stahmer.
DR. STAHMER: It may take me a little more than ten minutes, Mr. President. I should like to point out that I would not like to interrupt my concluding remarks.
THE PRESIDENT: P erhaps if it would be more convenient to you -- we will do whichever you like, we will recess now, if you like.
It is a very hot day and we will recess now if you prefer.
5 July M LJG 11-3
DR. STAHMER: I would prefer to have the recess now for the heat is bothering me a little bit today, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
(A recess was taken until 1400.)
(The hearing reconvened at 14 00 hours, 5 July 1946.)
DR. STAHMER: I shall continue now with the conclusion. the following viewpoints must be considered for the appreciation of his actions: impressions as a young officer and combat airman during world Ear I, during which he proved an outstanding man and was awarded the highest award for bravery, the order of "Pour le merite". He experienced the collapse of the German war effort as -- as it was seen by him --- a consequence of German treachery from within. wanted to give themselves a new constitution on a democratic basis and then hoped to be able to work their way up again by industry and perseverance. In this, the confidence in the far-sightedness of the victorious powers of that time, especially in the fourteen points of Wilson, played a great part. Weimar democracy came into a serious crisis from which it was not to recover. This, together with the subsequent world economic crisis, formed the prerequisite which could not be ignored for the fact that Hitler was able to seize power.
At first, the "fight against Versailles" made his rise as a party loader possible, Goering as witness described how he agreed with Hitler during their first meeting in the conviction that nothing could be achieved by paper protests. to the entire world, Goering as well as Hitler were convinced that Goering inevitably would become a victim of Bolshevism if it was not possible to awaken against the latter sufficient defensive strength by the reestablishment of German self-confidence at home. It was understood that they also had to stand up with rigour against the Versailles powers. But in this, Hitler started out without question from the fact that Germany belong basically to the West, culturally, economically and even politically. He Hebelieved that the Bolshevist danger, at first directed against Germany, would afterwards also threaten the Western countries.
He, therefore, was of the opinion that he would he able gradually to gain their recognition and support if he took up the ideological struggle against the East. policy until the actual collapse. One nay today rightly condemn it as having failed from the beginning; one must not forgot that, at first, many things in the development clearly seemed to justify it. Thus it can be explained how Hitler succeeded in winning over an increasing part of the Germans to his following. He recognized in him the born national leader who understood how to influence the masses and to guide them and who, driven by a fascinating, strong will, could not be frightened by any obstacle. He realized that under a democratic constitution only such a man of certainly demoniacal-demagogic talent could survive. And therefore he joined him. fatherland, he did not think of using Hitler only as a tool for his own new rise to power. He rather took it upon himself from the beginning to recognize in him the only man vested with authority -- the "Fuehrer" -and to be satisfied with a subordinate role. He, the famous air force captain and bearer of "pour le merite", did not hesitate to swear the oath of allegiance to Hitler, then still an unknown man, an oath which was to be valid for his entire life and was valid. be so completely misunderstood as to lead to the accusation against him of a conspiracy, entered into from the beginning for the purpose of committing crimes. the treaty of Versailles. Although theWeimar government had made repeated attempts to achieve a liberation from the especially burdening obligations of this treaty, Germany was not successful in her endeavors for a revision.
the victors of Versailles to keep Germany down permanently? Was it not true in the world that might went before right, and would the Germans achieve something only when they got up the courage to hit on the table forcibly with their fists? of that time. To construe from then a proof for the conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution, would mean a complete misunderstanding. Actually, the development after 1933 appears to justify Hitler completely. He easily achieved with his methods much more than what - if given freely - would have kept the Weimar government in power. foreign countries not only to conclude treaties with Hitler - such as the naval agreement of 1935 and the Munich pact of September 1938 but also the willingness to participate in the party rallies to the end, the fact that Hitler had chosen the correct road for reaching international understanding. the fall of 1938. If Hitler would afterwards have observed loyally the Munich agreement, then he would probably have taken the arguments out of the hand of the "stop" policy carried out against him. Not only would the peace have been kept, but Hitler could also have harvested the fruits of his domestic and foreign policy, carried out until then and recognized by all powers. with their catastrophic consequences are to be charged solely to him, or who has to share the responsibility. All Germans who followed Hitler at any time and in any way, are accused. For, it is said by the Prosecution, above all of those who did not trust him from the beginning for anything good and who denied the legality of his government from the beginning -"It could be seen from the beginning that it would end as it did:" Thus, everyone who supported him at any time and in any way, is therefore also guilty.
sad result it cohstructs an obligation which must annihilate all belief not only in freedom, but also in the insight of man. Naturally Hitler did not desire the end as it happened. He often enough announced publicly that he was not out for the laurels of war, but that he would like to devote the rest of his life to peaceful reconstruction. limit his goals when he could no longer believe in their achievement by peaceful and humane means.
force generally in any form, then he need not have gone his own way and have looked for a new solution. A certain play with force, as long as it does not degenerate, will therefore have to be left at his disposal. Where the degeneration began -- because of the lack of other points of reference -- can only be surmised from the results which he actually caused with his policy. Most certainly he did not foresee and intend the bad results. However, it will have to be considered as his guilt that he would never let himself be taught by his failures, but only lot himself be led to increasingly exorbitant acts. How much of this guilt, however, can and may be charged also to his followers?
Whoever did not reject Hitler's methods, and thereby him personally, from the very beginning as illegitimate,found difficulty in recognizing where Hitler's political aims came to an end, to give justifying reasons for his measures, and where afterwards his politics became a crime. In this respect the border, from the standpoint of purely German law sentiments, surely ran along a line considerably different from that of other nations or mankind. The latter, for example, were hardly interested in the maintenance of the Weimar Constitution and the basic rights granted by it to the individual German. Its violation therefore, up to the Second World War, has never caused other states to intervene with the German Government. On the other hand, once the war had broken out, the Germans were forced to give precedence to German interests over their sympathy with members of other, especially enemy, states. Each of them believed to be doing enough if he took care, in his field, that unnecessary hardships were avoided. To rebel against orders which came from the highest German command would not only have appeared completely senseless and hopeless, but, until shortly, until the bitter end, it would also have been a violation of German legality and thereby a criminal injustice. Accusations that no rebellion was undertaken can therefore be raised only if the breach of formal legality, without consideration of the immediate practical effect, and only on behalf of the principle -- ergo the attitude of a revolutionary -- could be defined as a legal obligation. they cannot be mentioned seriously at all because the hitherto existing international law was primarily based on the unlimited sovereignty of the states.
No state is willing to submit vital decisive questions to the judgment of other, however great a majority it may be or however independent a tribunal . And now every individual citizen of such a soveriegn state was supposed to have not only the right in relation to the other nations or humanity, but even the duty to rebel against the legal power machine of his own state, because the latter violated human rights and the rights of humanity. such an imposition, amde retroactively, pronounces its own sentence. It would place the autonomy of the individual above state sovereignty. Thereby the strength of the individual person would not only be immeasurably overestimated, but this would have to lead to the breaking of the last ties of traditional order, to anarchy. Compared to such a man* of thinking Goering almost represents the exact opposite pole. As others went into the war in order to fight war as such, so he became a revolutionary in order to restore honor to the concept of loyalty. Thus, having once cast his lot with the Fuehrer, he stood by his side even after he had already lost the latter's confidence for a long time; yes, even after he had been sentenced to death by Hitler. He remained loyal until today, in spite of everything by excusing Hitler before himself, repeatedly. To many this may appear incomprehensible, and many may see more weakness than strength in it.