Are the facts correctly stated in this article? by some journalist or other, I would have been ex traordinarily busy. These statements are the opinion of a journalist and nothing more.
THE PRESIDENT: That was not the question. The question was whether they were correctly stated, as a matter of fact. You can answer that.
THE WITNESS: Yes-No.
THE PRESIDENT: Which do you mean-Yes or No?
THE WITNESS: The decorations are correctly stated. Apart from that, it is not correct.
MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY: I have no further questions to put.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Luedinghausen, do you wish to re-examine?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for defendant von Neurath):
Mr. President, yesterday afternoon, I was under the impression and felt that Baron von Neurath was very tired and very strained through the previous examination and that he was no longer in a position to do justice fully to the questions which were put to him. This, after all, is not surprising, if you consider that Herr von Neurath is in his 74th year of life and that, apart from that, he is suffering from a fairly serious heart disease. I feel obliged, therefore, to refer back to various points ofthe cross examination of yesterday and put a few questions to him. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, you have stated that because of the excesses of the SA and other radical circles in 1933 and later, you often protested to Hitler. What was the reason for that? Why did you go to Hitler direct, and why did you not raise your objections during the meetings of the Cabinet, which were still taking place during that period? contradiction and that he was not accessible to any objections if these were raised in a larger circle of persons, because he would then always develop the complex that he was facing some sort ofopposition against which he had to defend himself. It was different, however, when you were alone with him. Then, at least during the earlier years, he was accessible to reasonable argument, and he would allow many qualifications of radical measures to be achieved. seen the affidavit of Geist where he talks about excesses, that there was a meeting of the Cabinet, during which the repitition of such affairs was strongly protested by various ministers, including non-Nazi ministers. Hitler was most receptive to these objections, and he stated that such excesses would not be allowed to recur. Shortly afterwards he made a speech during which he gave the corresponding assurances publicly. From then until June 1934 no furtheroutrages or excesses took place. boycott, which lasted twenty-four hours.
A Yes, that was done by request of Dr. Goebbels, but actual measures of force and outrage did not take place on that occasion.
It was confined merely to boycotting. nection was the result of intervention jointly by von Papen and myself to Hitler and Hindenburg. A perfectly correct description of this episode is contained, as I remember, in an article of the time in the American periodical Time of April 1933, which is contained in my document book.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, it was presented in my document book Number 1 under Number 9. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: and so on and so forth, Sir David yesterday referred to the arrest Of the well-known author von Ossietski. Can you remember that this von Ossietski had previously been sentenced by a German court--before the seizure of power--for a lengthy term of imprisonment?
A Yes, I remembered that afterwards. I do remember that Herr von Ossietski had been sentenced before the seizure of power. I can not remember under which government that was done, but he was sentenced by a Reich court for treason. He had received a lengthy penitentiary sentence, but he had not yet served that sentence, and that was the reason why he was again arrested. report of letter submitted by the Prosecution yesterday which was compiled by Ministerial Director Koepke on 31 May 1934, which is GB 668. Did you consider that in this report of Koepke's and the information contained therein there was proof for the inclusion of the Foreign Office in the subversive activities of the Austrian Nazis?
A No, not at all. This was a report which Ministerial Director Koepke made to me about a visit by Mr. Waechter, whom he described as a responsible Austrian individual. This Mr. Waechter was trying to establish contact with the Foreign Office and with Hitler to draw attention to the dangers arising from the increasing radicalism of the Austrian Nazis. The head of the Political Department, Koepke, identifies himself with Waechter regarding the apprehensions , and he had agreed that in that respect he would furnish a report.
was different from Koepke's. In order to draw attention of Hitler to the matter, I passed this report on to Hitler. the treatment of the Czech problem by you and Frank yesterday. This is document 3859-PS. You had submitted it to the Chief of the Reich Chancellory to prepare your oral report to Hitler. Was the report written by Frank identical to the matter raised in the Frederick document of 15 October? document. That memorandum you said,was based on plans of the SS, Party circles, and the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube district, regarding a deportation of Czechs to eastern territories. You went on to say that in order to stop those plans, which you described as nonsensical, Frank had written this memorandum in which a less radical solution was recommended, which was, in fact, approved by Hitler later on up to a certain point, and that in reality nothing happened, which was what you intended, and that the idea of assimilation had in practice been buried. Is that right?
A Yes, that is true. This entire affair and the origin of the memorandum is very difficult to explain. It can only be understood from the entire interior political development. The efforts of the Gauleiter of the surrounding districts were towards partitioning the protectorate, and had advanced rather far. They had all submitted memorand to Hitler. All these memorana were proposing the radical solution of the whole problem. That meant, in ether words, that it had to be feared that Hitler would agree to the wishes of the Gauleiter.
In order to stop him, I had to submit proposals about which 26 June M LJG 6-1 I myself had said that they were impracticable.
I did it, first of all, with the thought that later on I could have them buried. of those memoranda. I myself did not write the memoranda; that was done by my office, but, I must say, on the strength of directives which I submitted. It was merely a tactical maneuver to get at Hitler, because I was afraid that he would follow the radical su gestions made by Himmler. What I did in fact achieve was that Hitler gave a strict order--which is what I had demanded--to the effect that all these plans were no longer to be discussed, but that only the so-called assimilation remained in operation, which could only be carried out over a period of many years. In fact, nothing whatever happened, and that was exactly what I was aiming at. which was issued to the German authorities in the Protectorate, regarding the treatment to be given to the German-Czech problem publicly. That is document 3862 , dated the 27th of June, 1941. discussion you had with Hitler about it? I said so yesterday, because in the following year agitation suddenly began again towards such Germanization and partitioning of the Protectorate. I objected to that end, once the question was decided, I prohibited it from being reopened. Chief of the Security Police, addressed to Secretary of State Frank, dated 21 July 1943, that is to say, after you had resigned. From that document the prosecution are attempting to draw the conclusion that you, following a decree dated the 5th of May 1939, had considered the leader of the SA and Security Police 26 June M LJG 6-2 in Prague to be your political expert and had appointed him in this manner.
In what way did he actually act in that respect? Was he active at all?
A We, he was not; that is just it. The reminding letter, dated July 1943, will show you that he never became active.
MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to state here that the question was incorrectly put. This document is not dated in the year 1943 or 1942 , but it is dated the 21st of July, 1939. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: which were introduced yesterday by the prosecution, and which were proposals submitted by various departments and heads of departments of your administration regarding manpower and employment of the students who became unemployed through the closing down of the Czech universities? a proposal from an official which never even reached me, as my Undersecretary of State had turned it down before it get to me. Just how I could possibly be hold responsible for the contents of a draft submitted by a small official I cannot understand. German-Austrian agreement dated the 11th of July, 1936. As is mentioned in a previously submitted report from Dr. Rainer, which the prosecution have submitted and which was addressed to Buerckel--I refer to document PS-812--is it correct that Hitler, immediately after the signing of that agreement, had personally stated to Dr. Rainer and the Austrian Nazi Leader Globocnik that this agreement of the 11th of July, 1936, was signed with perfectly honest and upright intentions by him, that the Austrian National Socialists too should, under all 26 June M LJG 6- 3 circumstances, adhere strictly to this agreement, and that they were to conduct themselves accordingly during their contact with the Austrian Government?
A Yes, that is correct. As I think I said to you yesterday, I believe I can also remember that Rainer actually confirmed it here when he was a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: One last question, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: H e answered these questions perfectly clearly, according to his view, yesterday.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I am actually through, Mr. President. I have only one more question in conclusion of the entire examination of my client. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: again end again. They accused you of the fact that although you, in your own words, did not agree with the Nazi regime and its methods, and although you considered many of the things that were done despicable, in spite of all this you did not resign, but you continued in the government. Will you please explain that to us once more? my promise to Hindenburg to enter into the government and to remain there as long as I possibly could, and that I would attempt to steer a peaceful and moderate course for the German Government and to save Germany from any conflagration. That was my order and my task, and nothing else. It wasn't only this promise of mine to Hindenburg, it was also my duty, and because of my feeling of responsibility towards the German Nation, that I should save the German Nation from a war as long as possible. the cause of my disregarding any personal wishes of my own, which were certainly quite different.
Unfortunately, my power and my influence as Foreign 26 June M LJG 6-4 Minister did not reach far enough for no to prevent disastrous and immoral actions in any other spheres, for instance, in internal politics, although I did try in many cases, and last, but not least, the Jewish question.
stand by my post, and that I should not resign even if, in other spheres where I had no influence, matters occurred which hurt me deeply and hurt deeply my opinion. ception, or a different attitude than I. I have experienced similar attacks when, in 1919, after the first revolution, I entered the Social Democrat Cabinet and placed myself at their disposal. There too the most serious attacks were written against me. told me.
A Yes, of course I have. It isn't easy to belong to a government whose tendencies you do not agree with, and for which one then finds himself held responsible later on.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, with that I have completed my reexamination. If I may make a suggestion, perhaps we could adjourn now and I could then commence to examine my witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have some questions to ask?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I ask permission for my client to be absent from the session this afternoon and tomorrow, because I have important questions to discuss with him.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant von Ribbentrop?
DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. HORN: Thank you.
DR. THOMA: (Counsel for the defendant Rosenberg): Mr. President, yesterday afternoon General Raginsky asked whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath's foreign policy. The interpreter just told me that she translated it wrongly. They translated it "whether Ribbentrop interfered in Neurath's policy". This question has not been translated yet; therefore, I ask permission to ask Neurath whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath's foreign policy.
THE WITNESS: No, in no way. I never talked to Rosenberg about politics.
DR. THOMA: Then I ask that the record be corrected correspondingly. It should not say "whether Ribbentrop interfered in Neurath's policies", but "whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath's policies".
THE PRESIDENT: The record will be corrected. BY THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Justice Biddle):
Q. I want to ask you just a very few questions. You will remember that the Baroness von Ritter said that after the 5th of November 1937, you recognized -- I want to read it exactly: "When Mr. von Neurath had to recognize for the first time from Hitler's statement on November 5 1937, that the latter wanted to achieve his political aims by using force toward neighboring states, this shook him so severely mentally that he suffered several severe heart attacks. That is a correct description is it not, of what you then recognized?
A. (Nods head) Q. Now, you stated that you spoke immediately after that meeting to General Beck and General von Fritsch.
Do you remember?
A. Yes.
Q. And I think you said to Sir David that you did not speak to the defendant Goering. What I am asking you now is whether you spoke of what Hitler had said to anyone else during the next two or three months. Did you speak to anyone in the Foreign Office?
Q And with when else from the Foreign Office?
A No one. The condition had been laid down by Hitler that silence should be preserved about the whole meeting; and for that reason I did not speak with my assistants about it. They know nothing of it. They had learned nothing of it from the military men.
Q. Did you speak to the defendant Papen when you saw him next?
A. No. I believe I did not see him at all at that time.
Q. And did you discuss it with anybody else before your resignation?
A. No.
Q. Now, I have only one other question. You recognized, did you not, that Himmler would use methods which you would not approve of; is that right?
A. Yes, but only gradually, not from the beginning.
Q. That is just what I wanted to know. When did you first realize that? When did you first begin, just as well as you could tell? About when did you realize what sort of man Himmler was?
A. That was very difficult to realize, because Himmler was line Janus; he had two faces. The real opinion was not easy to see.
Q. I am not asking you what he was like. If you would just try to remember, you certainly realized that at some time. Did you know it in 1937? You knew in 1937 or 1930? Certainly in 1950, did you not?
Q I do not want a specific date. My point is that you knew it before you went to the protectorate; you knew what Himmler was before you went to the protectorate, of course? There is no question about that, is there?
THE TRIBUNAL (MR. JUSTICE BIDDLE): That is all. BY THE TRIBUNAL (GENERAL NIKITCHENKO): yourself openly against the policy of the Hitlerite Government? agreement with the policy of Hitler's Government, either on separate questions or taken as a whole, as well. Is that true? your disagreement with Hitler's policy?
Q In what manner was it, then? I am asking you about your public statements, either in the press or while addressing any meeting?
A No. It was no longer possible to have it appear in the press, or to hold a meeting. It was out of the question. I could only speak to Hitler personally, or, at the beginning, in the cabinet, in protest against this policy. There was no freedom of the press any longer, any more than in Russia. No meeting was possible.
Q I am not asking you about Russia; I am asking you about your expressing your views. In other words, you never expressed them. And in that way, nobody in Germany could know, or did know, about the fact that you were not in agreement with the policy on the part of Hitler's government? but not by articles and not in meetings. Otherwise, I always expressed it clearly.
sonally to Hitler. You mentioned it only to Hitler personally?
A No; I said it to everyone who would listen, but not at public meetings, in speeches, or in articles. I was not able to.
Q And you remained within the government? You were a member of the government in spite of the fact that you were not in agreement with the government's policy; is that so?
Q In order to counteract his policy?
Q Do you know the results of such counteracting?
Q What were the results of your counteracting Hitler's government's policy? were against the joining of Germany, and Austria?
Q The German government joined Austria to Germany; is that so? last moment Hitler did that.
Q You were against the seizing of Czechoslovakia? sidered, as mentioned, you, of course, expressed your opinion against it, did you not?
Q You were against the attack on Poland?
A I repeat, I was not a member of the government. I learned of it only at the last moment.
A Yes, indeed. I wanted it just the opposite; I wanted cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Q And still Germany attacked the Soviet Union?
about your political opposition then and your disagreement with his policy; that is correct, is it not?
A He knew that very well. I resigned in 1938 for that reason.
Q Yes. And you know how Hitler made short work of his political opposition?
considered yourself as being in opposition, nothing happened; that is true, isn't it? sidered yourself to be a member of the opposition, nothing of the kind happened?
Q And couldn't you tell us whether Sir Neville Henderson, in his book, "The Failure of a Mission", expressed the facts concerning you personally correctly or otherwise? Do you consider that Sir Neville Henderson expressed the facts correctly concerning you personally; does he express them correctly? once three or four years ago. I can't remember what he said about me. I heard some excerpts from it here but I can't say what he writes about me. presented by your defense counsel in his document book?
Q Here, now, for instance, is what is expressed in his excerpts; so far as you are concerned is it correctornot? ship in the party? He writes that "Baron von Neurath himself remained in the regime of Hindenburg, and he was not a member of the Nazi Party."
Q And further on he informs us that "he (Neurath) became a member of the Party later."
A I also explained how that happened. In 1937 I receiveda Golden Party Insignia. member of the Nazi Party later, as Sir Neville Henderson states?
Q So this particular part is not correct, then?
A I received the Golden Party Insignia with Hitler's statement that that involved no obligations towards the Party.
Q We heard it in such a way that in Sir Neville Henderson's statements, nothing is true as far as your person is concerned?
A I said I became a member. I can't remember what Sir Neville Henderson wrote about my person. I didn't quite understand your explanation which was given by you to Sir Neville Henderson and later to your own defense counsel. Now, in forwarding Frank's memorandum, in the letter addressed to Lammers, you wrote that you considered this memorandum absolutely correct, Is that true?
A Yes, that is true. I would like to give the reasons.
Q You already explained thereasons before. I just wanted to establish the fact that you really wrote this.
A The reason why I wrote this to Lammers, I did not tell here. The reason why I wrote to Lammers to this effect, was that he was the one who submitted these memoranda to the Fuehrer, and I, and then I had to write to the same effect. BY THE PRESIDENT: lates to the document letter that you wrote on the 31st of August 1940. That is the letter which General Nikitchenko has just referred to; you remember that? agreed with the memorandum which your Secretary of State Frank had drawn up independently of you. He said that "Germanization provides for the changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs; and secondly, the expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich or special treatment for these and all destructive elements." My question is: What did you understand by "special treatment"? idea of the term "special treatment" that has developed here during the trial. As to this attitude of Frank represented in the report, I did not agree with it at all. I only had the intention of frustrating this whole affair, of sidetracking it.
The content of these reports was only in-
tended in Hitler's language, or in the language of Himmler and others to present this to Hitler to dissuade him from it.
Q Wasn't it misleading to write to Herr Lammers with the view that it should be put forward to Hitler, saying that you fully agreed with the memorandum with which you did not agree?
A Mr. President, as things were, I could not write to Lammers. I didn't intend to carry out what it says. I had to write to Lammers, I agree with it. Afterwards, in personal talk before the session which was brought up here with Frank and Luekner, I reported to Hitler and explained to him -
Q Then your answer is that you don't know what was meant by "special treatment"? You remember when you were called on the 11th of March, 1938, at the time of the Anschlusswith Austria, and you wrote the letter of the 12th of March, 1938, in answer to the memorandum which you received from the British Government through Sir Neville Henderson. You knew Sir Neville Henderson, quite well, didn't you?
Q And in that letter you said this: "It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development; especially the assertion which was spread Later by the former chancellor that the German government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum is pure invention. According to the ultimatum, he had to appoint a proposed candidate as chancellor and form a cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect." And then you go on to say what you allege was the truth of the matter. You know, now, don't you, that your statements in that letter were entirely untrue?
A It didn't come through.
Q Have you heard any part of the question that I was putting to you?
Q It is a pity that you didn't say so earlier. Do youremember the 11th of March 1938 and being called in to represent the Foreign Office, and you have told me just now that you knew Sir Neville Henderson quite well?
March 1938? in that Letter wereuntrue?
A Untrue, yes; they are presented incorrectly. true? later.
Q That is not an answer to my question. I said! What steps did you take to find out whether the statement was correct?
A The statement which Hitler gave me I assumed to be true. I could not investigate it. of what the British government had stated?
A I had no other knowledge of the events. I could only say what I knew.
Q. You had the letter, the protest from the British Government, had you not?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew Sir Neville Henderson perfectly well?
A. Yes.
Q. And you then wrote this letter contradicting the statements which had been made on behalf of the British Government, that is right, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And you took no steps to check the facts which had benn stated to you by Hitler? Will you answer that, please?
A. Yes. Your Lordship, how was I to do that? There was no one else who knew about it; only what Hitler had reported to me to tell the Foreign Office. The draft of this note was drawn up by the Foreign Office according to the information which I had received from Hitler. I had no opportunity to clear the matter up.
Q. There were all the other persons who were concerned with the matter when you could have communicated with, but your statement is that you did nothing?
A. I can only repeat that I had no opportunity to attain other information. No one know about it aside from Hitler.
Q. Are you telling the Tribunal that Goering didn't know about it?
A. Perhaps Goering know about it.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all. The Defendant can return to the dock.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I ask permission to call the first witness, the former Ministerialdirektor, and head of the political section in the foreign ministry, Dr. Koepke. follows:s BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Eill you state your full name, please?
A. Gerhard Koepke.
Q. Will you repeat the oath after me: speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Dr. Koepke, how long have youknown Mr. von Neurath?
A. I have known Mr. von Neurath for over forty years. His career is well known. Therefore, I need only indicate that as Vice Consul in London, the Legation Consul in the Foreign Office, and later when Mr. von Neurath became Minister in 1932, until I left in '35, we worked together. In the meantime, Mr. von Neurath was in Copenhagen, Rome, London, and for sometime at his home, and finally in Prague. We not only occasionally when he was in Berlin, and we kept up a comparatively lively correspondence as old friends. I myself was employed in the Foreign Office during the whole period. From '21 on I was head of the Legal Department, and from 1923 I was Director of the political so-called Western Section, which I directed until I left the service. I resigned voluntarily at the end of 1935.
Q. What do you know about the basic attitude of Mr. von Neurath on domestic and foreign policy on a large scale?
A. Concerning politics, Mr. von Neurath was close to the conservative circles but he was never a member of the Conservative Party. From this basic conservative attitude and also because of his outstanding character traits of loyalty to duty and reliability, he had the confidence of Reich President von Hindenburg, and returned it without interruption until the letter's death. Mr. von Hindenburg esteemed von Neurath as a moderate, reliable dip,omat. Hon of other political parties also had confidence in von Neurath. I shall mention only the later Reichspresident, Ebert, who recalled Neurath to office at one time.
Q. What do you know about von Neurath's appointment as Reich foreign Minister in the summer of '32?
A. The appointment of Mr. von Neurath as Reich Foreign Minister was based on a personal wish of President von Mindenburg. Neurath did not become Foreign Minister within the Papen cabinet, but became Foreign Minister at the special request of Reichspresident von Hindenburg.