Q Well, if you haven't seen these posters, will you please look at one of them.
We are going to show it to you right now.
THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, he didn't say he hadn't seen it. He said it was put up without his knowledge.
GENERAL RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I am going to come back to this, but I should like to determine that these were the red posters which were mentioned by Frank in his diary, andI should like to submit this poster under No. USSR-489.
I should like to readit into the record; it is very short and it won't take much time. The text is as follows:
"In spite of repeated serious warnings, a number of Czech intellectuals, in collaboration with arrogant circles abroad, are trying to upset peace and order by committing major or minor acts of resistance. It could be determined that the ringleaders of these resistance acts are especially to be found in the Czech high schools. Since, on the 28th of October and 15th of November, these elements have been mishandling individual Germans, the Czech high schools were closed for the duration of three years, nine of the perpetrators were shot, and a number of the accomplices arrested." BY GENERAL RAGINSKY:
Q You state here that you never signed such a document, or let's call it a warning.
A Yes. I explained yesterday or the day before how this originated, and that it was compiled when I was absent. Hermann Frank of the 26th of November which can be found on pages 46 and 47 of the Russian text and the English text. Karl Hermann Frank, giving evidence regarding this poster, the text of which I have just read into the record, stated:
"This document was dated the 17th of November 1939 and was signed by von Neurath who did not speak against shootings of the students."
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to something connected with this document.
The document is neither dated nor is it signed, at least not the copy I have. It does not make it at all clear from whom the document originates, and I should like to take this opportunity to protest against the reading of this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, isn't there a certificate about the document?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Not my copy.
THE PRESIDENT: Well-
GENERAL RAGINSKY: Mr. President, will you permit me to explain this misunderstanding. Dr. Luedinghausen has the full text of the USSR document. The English text was also submitted to the Tribunal, and the certificate regarding this reportis included therein. There was also the interrogation. We shall only read the document which the defense counsel has. document to the defense counsel, and it would be very easy to determine that there is a certificate regarding the authenticity of these statement which is dated the 17th of November 1939.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: May I only say this. When I received the indictment from Colonel Ecer of the Czech delegation, the document had no additions, didnot have an appendix except the actual text. I then made another attempt to get them, because such appendices had been referred to, whereupon I received only an enclosure which was headed "No. 2". I received the other in the same condition as the one which I have here.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, will you wait a minute Will you kindly tell us what document it is you are referring to?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: It is USSR 60.
THE PRESIDENT: USSR 60 -- well, that is the Czech report which is about this thick (indicating) in German and then there are references contained therein, references to certain enclosures and these enclosures, I repeat, were not made available to me and I made efforts to get them but I only received one, which is not iden tical with this document and which I received much later and in the same condition as that which I hold in my hand now, that is to say without a heading, without a signature and without a date and most certainly without any certificate as to when, where and by whom this supposed statement of Frank's was taken down.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us hear what General Raginsky has got to say about it. cate identifying that document and what is being supplied to us is merely a copy, which may not have the date and may not have the certificate on it, but which is the same as the document which is certified.
Is that what you said, General Raginsky?
GENERAL RAGINSKY: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you not show Dr. von Leudinghausen the certificate and the document which is certified?
GENERAL RAGINSKY: It is quite correct, Mr. President. This certificate can be found on page 44 of the Russian text in the appendix to document USSR 60 and it is signed by Seer and Colonel General Novack. This certificate was submitted, in due course, by us to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to take up the time of the Tribunal about this particular document? It seems to me we are was ing a lot of time.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: After all, it is important. I cannot find out whether this is a true copy. I am entitled to that, it is my privilege, my right.
THE PRESIDENT: I was asking General Raginsky whether he wanted to persist in the use of the document. Is it worth while? I do not know what the document is or what it says.
GENERAL RAGINSKY: Mr. President, this document is extremely important and I think it should be submitted because it has already been submitted to the Tribunal a few months ago. This is document USSR 60, which was accepted by the Tribunal as evidence several months ago and I really do not understand the statements by Dr. von Luedinghausen.
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not show Dr. von Luedinghausen that there is a certificate which applies to the document which you put in his hand?
GENERAL RAGINSKY: Yes, certainly Mr. President. I am holding in my hand the Russian text. I can show him the Russian text so that he could be convinced. The original document has been submitted to the Tribunal and is in the possession of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, is there not a German translation of the certificate and does not the certificate identify the document? Is there a German translation of the certificate?
GENERAL RAGINSKY: Just at the moment I do not have it but during the intermission I shall be glad to produce the German text of the certificate.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, the Tribunal is told that this document was put in before and the certificate of General Ecer was put in at the same time, certifying that this document is a part of the Czech report. In those circumstances, the Tribunal will allow the document to be used.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, then I have another objection to the use of this document. tion records or affidavits from witnesses are presented, they are entitled to call these witnesses for the purpose of examining them. The former Secretary of State, Frank, who has made this statement, is, however, no longer alive as is known and I therefore object for that reason too, against the use of this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, this document was offered and accepted in evidence during the lifetime of this man, K. H. Frank. That is one reason for accepting it. was admitted under that Article and there is no such rule as you have stated, that the defense are entitled to cross-examine every person who makes an affidavit. It is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Tribunal and therefore that objection is rejected
GENERAL RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to hold you an longer on this matter but I wanted to show that this was an unnecessary delay as Dr. von Luedinghausen used the document himself to introduce some extracts from the testimony of Frank. Frank. This document, I repeat, is in connection with the warning which we just demonstrated to this Tribunal, dated 17 November, 192 and was signed by von Neurath, who did not raise his voice either against the shooting of the students nor as to those students who were to be sent to concentration camps and he did not really request any changes in this legislation. BY GENERAL RAGINSKY:
Q Did you hear the testimony, defendant?
Q Do you deny this?
A But most definitely, most emphatically. I did not have any possibility whatever to do so because I was not in Prague and therefore I could neither have knowledge of nor could I have signed it or passed on it.
Q Very well. You still insist in stating that the police never informed you regarding the arrests which were made and other police measures which were taken? Do you state that firmly? they informed me afterwards. My information usually came from Czech sources.
police regularly reported to you regarding the important events which took place. plans. Possibly they might have told me afterwards if I had from Czech sources what news there was and then I would make inquiries from the police.
Q Very well. I am going to read an extract from the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank, dated 7 March, 1946. This testimony was submitted by me to the Tribunal yesterday and it was partially read by me already.
Frank states:
"The Reich Protector, von Neurath, regularly received reports on the most important events in the Protectorate which had some bearing to the Security Police from me, as well as from the State Secretary and from the head of the Security Police. For example, von Neurath received information about a certain demonstration in Sudetenland in November 1939 both from me and from the head of the Security Police. This definite case dealt with Hitler's direct orders demanding the shooting of all the ringleaders, insofar as this concerned the execution of students. The number of ringleader was to be fixed by the Prague Gestapo and the Reich Protector was to be informed of this. In this definite case the name of the ring leaders was left to the State Police, and was subject to the approval of the Reich Protector. Reich Protector von Neurath signed the official dispatch informing of the execution of these students, thereby approving this action.
"If this had not met with his approval and had he wished to revise it as for instance, making it less severe, which he had the right to do, then I should have had to adhere to his decision."
Now, do you wish to deny these statements? in Prague at all.
might have made these statements you have read. It does not give the date, but I think you just said it was on 7 April when he made this statement. That is a few days before his execution, is it not
GENERAL RAGINSKY: I should like the Tribunal to note that the defendant consciously perverts the fact when he says that this statement was made on April 7. It was made on March 7, not April 7 BY GENERAL RAGINSKY: Well, let us leave this question.
AAll right, then, 7 March instead of 7 April. I said 7 April because I did not see the date at the top. But as I have already told you three times, I could not know about it because I was not there.
Q. You are not very clear as to the number of students who were shot.
I am afraid that you were not very exact on the number. I am afraid that your memory did not serve you rightly.
A. I can not remember what I said yesterday, but I am sure that I did not make a mistake, unless there were one or two that I did not know about.
Q. I should like to remind you that in reply to a question by Sir David, who submitted document 3857-PS, in regard to the closing of the higher institutions of learning -
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go over Sir David's cross-examination again? Surely we have said that we do not want to yo over the same subject twice.
MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to go back to the very same thing, and I do not want to repeat the questions put by Sir David. I only wanted to establish the truth. The defendant stated yesterday that in the document which was submitted by sir David there was a mistake -that in Prague there existed only two institutions of higher learning and that there could not have been arrested 1,2000 students, and that consequently it was incorrect. But the question was not merely about the closing of two Prague universities, but, on the basis of the order 17 November 1939, there were closed the Czech universities in Prague, the Czech universities in Bruenn, the Czech Higher Techinical School in Bruenn.
THE PRESIDENT: We heard all this yesterday, and we do not want to hear it again. We heard, all about the closing of the university in Prague.
MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY: Very well, Mr. President. I am not going to delay you further on that, but I just wanted to state that not two universtieis were closed, but ten higher institutions of learning. to the defendant.
BY MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY:
Q. You received special awards from Hitler, as is evident from the documents, and as you yourself stated. For instance, you received on 22 September 1942, the special award, the Iron Cross for Special Service.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely we went into this yesterday, did we not, in Sir David's cross-examination, or in the examination in chief; I forgot which. I think it was the examination in chief. All those decorations which were given the defendant.
MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to revert to those orders and awards, but I should like to ask the defendant, for what special services did you receive the Iron Cross?
THE PRESIDENT: All right, ask him that.
THE WITNESS: Unfortunately, I cannot tell you. I cannot tell you what sort of achievements I had. The award of this order of merit was carried out generally to all higher officials who were active at the time.
BY MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY:
Q Very well, I am not going to insist that you reply. I just wanted to state here that you receive this award in 1942 after the mass terror was introduced into the Protectorate. terror. this question. various articles about you were published in many newspapers. I am not going to submit to the Tribunal all these papers or quote these articles, but I should like to read a few excerpts from the newspaper "Fraenkischer Kourier" of 2 February 1943. We shall submit to you one of the copies of this so that you can follow me as I read this document into the record.
MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY: This newspaper is being submitted to the Tribunal under number USSR 495. BY MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY:
Q In connection with your anniversary, it was stated:
"The most important events in the field of foreign policy after Hitler's coming to power in which Baron von Neurath played a most important role as Reich Foreign-Minister and with which his name will always be connected are: Germany's leaving the Geneva Disarmament Conference on 14 October 1933 and Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations one week after the re-uniting of the Saar to Germany, the declaration of the military sovereignty of the Reich, and the denouncing of the Locarno act immediately after the conclusion of the Franco-Sovier Military act.
"Reich-Minister and Reich Protector Baron von Neurath was repeatedly decorated by the Fuehrer for outstanding services to the German nation and Reich. Among other awards he was decorated with the Golden party Badge of Honor, received the rank of SS-Gruppenfuehrer, was Cavalier of the Adler Order German and the Treudienst Gold Badge of Honor, which marked 40 years of diplomatic service.
"In appreciation of his outstanding services in the field of military effort in the post of Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, the Fuehrer decorated him with the Military Cross, First Class."
Are the facts correctly stated in this article? by some journalist or other, I would have been ex traordinarily busy. These statements are the opinion of a journalist and nothing more.
THE PRESIDENT: That was not the question. The question was whether they were correctly stated, as a matter of fact. You can answer that.
THE WITNESS: Yes-No.
THE PRESIDENT: Which do you mean-Yes or No?
THE WITNESS: The decorations are correctly stated. Apart from that, it is not correct.
MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY: I have no further questions to put.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Luedinghausen, do you wish to re-examine?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for defendant von Neurath):
Mr. President, yesterday afternoon, I was under the impression and felt that Baron von Neurath was very tired and very strained through the previous examination and that he was no longer in a position to do justice fully to the questions which were put to him. This, after all, is not surprising, if you consider that Herr von Neurath is in his 74th year of life and that, apart from that, he is suffering from a fairly serious heart disease. I feel obliged, therefore, to refer back to various points ofthe cross examination of yesterday and put a few questions to him. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, you have stated that because of the excesses of the SA and other radical circles in 1933 and later, you often protested to Hitler. What was the reason for that? Why did you go to Hitler direct, and why did you not raise your objections during the meetings of the Cabinet, which were still taking place during that period? contradiction and that he was not accessible to any objections if these were raised in a larger circle of persons, because he would then always develop the complex that he was facing some sort ofopposition against which he had to defend himself. It was different, however, when you were alone with him. Then, at least during the earlier years, he was accessible to reasonable argument, and he would allow many qualifications of radical measures to be achieved. seen the affidavit of Geist where he talks about excesses, that there was a meeting of the Cabinet, during which the repitition of such affairs was strongly protested by various ministers, including non-Nazi ministers. Hitler was most receptive to these objections, and he stated that such excesses would not be allowed to recur. Shortly afterwards he made a speech during which he gave the corresponding assurances publicly. From then until June 1934 no furtheroutrages or excesses took place. boycott, which lasted twenty-four hours.
A Yes, that was done by request of Dr. Goebbels, but actual measures of force and outrage did not take place on that occasion.
It was confined merely to boycotting. nection was the result of intervention jointly by von Papen and myself to Hitler and Hindenburg. A perfectly correct description of this episode is contained, as I remember, in an article of the time in the American periodical Time of April 1933, which is contained in my document book.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, it was presented in my document book Number 1 under Number 9. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: and so on and so forth, Sir David yesterday referred to the arrest Of the well-known author von Ossietski. Can you remember that this von Ossietski had previously been sentenced by a German court--before the seizure of power--for a lengthy term of imprisonment?
A Yes, I remembered that afterwards. I do remember that Herr von Ossietski had been sentenced before the seizure of power. I can not remember under which government that was done, but he was sentenced by a Reich court for treason. He had received a lengthy penitentiary sentence, but he had not yet served that sentence, and that was the reason why he was again arrested. report of letter submitted by the Prosecution yesterday which was compiled by Ministerial Director Koepke on 31 May 1934, which is GB 668. Did you consider that in this report of Koepke's and the information contained therein there was proof for the inclusion of the Foreign Office in the subversive activities of the Austrian Nazis?
A No, not at all. This was a report which Ministerial Director Koepke made to me about a visit by Mr. Waechter, whom he described as a responsible Austrian individual. This Mr. Waechter was trying to establish contact with the Foreign Office and with Hitler to draw attention to the dangers arising from the increasing radicalism of the Austrian Nazis. The head of the Political Department, Koepke, identifies himself with Waechter regarding the apprehensions , and he had agreed that in that respect he would furnish a report.
was different from Koepke's. In order to draw attention of Hitler to the matter, I passed this report on to Hitler. the treatment of the Czech problem by you and Frank yesterday. This is document 3859-PS. You had submitted it to the Chief of the Reich Chancellory to prepare your oral report to Hitler. Was the report written by Frank identical to the matter raised in the Frederick document of 15 October? document. That memorandum you said,was based on plans of the SS, Party circles, and the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube district, regarding a deportation of Czechs to eastern territories. You went on to say that in order to stop those plans, which you described as nonsensical, Frank had written this memorandum in which a less radical solution was recommended, which was, in fact, approved by Hitler later on up to a certain point, and that in reality nothing happened, which was what you intended, and that the idea of assimilation had in practice been buried. Is that right?
A Yes, that is true. This entire affair and the origin of the memorandum is very difficult to explain. It can only be understood from the entire interior political development. The efforts of the Gauleiter of the surrounding districts were towards partitioning the protectorate, and had advanced rather far. They had all submitted memorand to Hitler. All these memorana were proposing the radical solution of the whole problem. That meant, in ether words, that it had to be feared that Hitler would agree to the wishes of the Gauleiter.
In order to stop him, I had to submit proposals about which 26 June M LJG 6-1 I myself had said that they were impracticable.
I did it, first of all, with the thought that later on I could have them buried. of those memoranda. I myself did not write the memoranda; that was done by my office, but, I must say, on the strength of directives which I submitted. It was merely a tactical maneuver to get at Hitler, because I was afraid that he would follow the radical su gestions made by Himmler. What I did in fact achieve was that Hitler gave a strict order--which is what I had demanded--to the effect that all these plans were no longer to be discussed, but that only the so-called assimilation remained in operation, which could only be carried out over a period of many years. In fact, nothing whatever happened, and that was exactly what I was aiming at. which was issued to the German authorities in the Protectorate, regarding the treatment to be given to the German-Czech problem publicly. That is document 3862 , dated the 27th of June, 1941. discussion you had with Hitler about it? I said so yesterday, because in the following year agitation suddenly began again towards such Germanization and partitioning of the Protectorate. I objected to that end, once the question was decided, I prohibited it from being reopened. Chief of the Security Police, addressed to Secretary of State Frank, dated 21 July 1943, that is to say, after you had resigned. From that document the prosecution are attempting to draw the conclusion that you, following a decree dated the 5th of May 1939, had considered the leader of the SA and Security Police 26 June M LJG 6-2 in Prague to be your political expert and had appointed him in this manner.
In what way did he actually act in that respect? Was he active at all?
A We, he was not; that is just it. The reminding letter, dated July 1943, will show you that he never became active.
MAJOR GENERAL RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to state here that the question was incorrectly put. This document is not dated in the year 1943 or 1942 , but it is dated the 21st of July, 1939. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: which were introduced yesterday by the prosecution, and which were proposals submitted by various departments and heads of departments of your administration regarding manpower and employment of the students who became unemployed through the closing down of the Czech universities? a proposal from an official which never even reached me, as my Undersecretary of State had turned it down before it get to me. Just how I could possibly be hold responsible for the contents of a draft submitted by a small official I cannot understand. German-Austrian agreement dated the 11th of July, 1936. As is mentioned in a previously submitted report from Dr. Rainer, which the prosecution have submitted and which was addressed to Buerckel--I refer to document PS-812--is it correct that Hitler, immediately after the signing of that agreement, had personally stated to Dr. Rainer and the Austrian Nazi Leader Globocnik that this agreement of the 11th of July, 1936, was signed with perfectly honest and upright intentions by him, that the Austrian National Socialists too should, under all 26 June M LJG 6- 3 circumstances, adhere strictly to this agreement, and that they were to conduct themselves accordingly during their contact with the Austrian Government?
A Yes, that is correct. As I think I said to you yesterday, I believe I can also remember that Rainer actually confirmed it here when he was a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: One last question, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: H e answered these questions perfectly clearly, according to his view, yesterday.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I am actually through, Mr. President. I have only one more question in conclusion of the entire examination of my client. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: again end again. They accused you of the fact that although you, in your own words, did not agree with the Nazi regime and its methods, and although you considered many of the things that were done despicable, in spite of all this you did not resign, but you continued in the government. Will you please explain that to us once more? my promise to Hindenburg to enter into the government and to remain there as long as I possibly could, and that I would attempt to steer a peaceful and moderate course for the German Government and to save Germany from any conflagration. That was my order and my task, and nothing else. It wasn't only this promise of mine to Hindenburg, it was also my duty, and because of my feeling of responsibility towards the German Nation, that I should save the German Nation from a war as long as possible. the cause of my disregarding any personal wishes of my own, which were certainly quite different.
Unfortunately, my power and my influence as Foreign 26 June M LJG 6-4 Minister did not reach far enough for no to prevent disastrous and immoral actions in any other spheres, for instance, in internal politics, although I did try in many cases, and last, but not least, the Jewish question.
stand by my post, and that I should not resign even if, in other spheres where I had no influence, matters occurred which hurt me deeply and hurt deeply my opinion. ception, or a different attitude than I. I have experienced similar attacks when, in 1919, after the first revolution, I entered the Social Democrat Cabinet and placed myself at their disposal. There too the most serious attacks were written against me. told me.
A Yes, of course I have. It isn't easy to belong to a government whose tendencies you do not agree with, and for which one then finds himself held responsible later on.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, with that I have completed my reexamination. If I may make a suggestion, perhaps we could adjourn now and I could then commence to examine my witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have some questions to ask?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I ask permission for my client to be absent from the session this afternoon and tomorrow, because I have important questions to discuss with him.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant von Ribbentrop?
DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. HORN: Thank you.
DR. THOMA: (Counsel for the defendant Rosenberg): Mr. President, yesterday afternoon General Raginsky asked whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath's foreign policy. The interpreter just told me that she translated it wrongly. They translated it "whether Ribbentrop interfered in Neurath's policy". This question has not been translated yet; therefore, I ask permission to ask Neurath whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath's foreign policy.
THE WITNESS: No, in no way. I never talked to Rosenberg about politics.
DR. THOMA: Then I ask that the record be corrected correspondingly. It should not say "whether Ribbentrop interfered in Neurath's policies", but "whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath's policies".
THE PRESIDENT: The record will be corrected. BY THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Justice Biddle):
Q. I want to ask you just a very few questions. You will remember that the Baroness von Ritter said that after the 5th of November 1937, you recognized -- I want to read it exactly: "When Mr. von Neurath had to recognize for the first time from Hitler's statement on November 5 1937, that the latter wanted to achieve his political aims by using force toward neighboring states, this shook him so severely mentally that he suffered several severe heart attacks. That is a correct description is it not, of what you then recognized?
A. (Nods head) Q. Now, you stated that you spoke immediately after that meeting to General Beck and General von Fritsch.
Do you remember?
A. Yes.
Q. And I think you said to Sir David that you did not speak to the defendant Goering. What I am asking you now is whether you spoke of what Hitler had said to anyone else during the next two or three months. Did you speak to anyone in the Foreign Office?
Q And with when else from the Foreign Office?
A No one. The condition had been laid down by Hitler that silence should be preserved about the whole meeting; and for that reason I did not speak with my assistants about it. They know nothing of it. They had learned nothing of it from the military men.
Q. Did you speak to the defendant Papen when you saw him next?
A. No. I believe I did not see him at all at that time.
Q. And did you discuss it with anybody else before your resignation?
A. No.
Q. Now, I have only one other question. You recognized, did you not, that Himmler would use methods which you would not approve of; is that right?
A. Yes, but only gradually, not from the beginning.
Q. That is just what I wanted to know. When did you first realize that? When did you first begin, just as well as you could tell? About when did you realize what sort of man Himmler was?
A. That was very difficult to realize, because Himmler was line Janus; he had two faces. The real opinion was not easy to see.
Q. I am not asking you what he was like. If you would just try to remember, you certainly realized that at some time. Did you know it in 1937? You knew in 1937 or 1930? Certainly in 1950, did you not?