an article which appeared on the 11th of March in the German-Austrian daily paper, and which indicates the fear that this plebiscite would open the way for a democratization of Austria, the creation of a people's front, and consequently, later, a Bolshevist tendency. This will show that the Austrian National Socialists were conscious of the fact that they were a minority.
Q Now we come to the memorable 11th of March, 1938. When did you, as the Chief of the Executive, learn that German troops had marched into Austria? eventful day. The feeling of time was completely lost during those hours. I only know that in the evening hours a report was submitted to me showing that German troops had crossed the border, a report which could not be verified, however, but which was supplemented by the fact that upsetting troop movements were taking place near the Austrian border.
Q Did not Seyss-Inquart, after Schuschnigg's resignation, say on the radio -- in order to avoid chaos -- that he was asking the population to remain quiet, since he was still Minister of the Interior and Security? resignation he, Seyss-Inquart, had given instructions, sent telegrams and put through telephone calls, or given any other news regarding the seizure of power? the critical moment, which was a very placid one. As I have already said earlier, he did in fact give more the impression of a man who was led rather than a man who was leading. There were clear indications that he felt awkward.
Q Didn't you yourself, in the afternoon or evening, have an offer from President Miklas to become Federal Chancellor?
A Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg called me in the early afternoon, and he stated to me that there had been an ultimatum from Germany -- that is to say, Hitler -- and that the ultimatum would no longer be satisfied with a postponement of the plebiscite, but was demanding Schuschnigg's resignation. Then Schuschnigg said that he personally was ready to resign, but that he could not expect from his officials that Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Chancellor.
He had a question to put to me, he said, and that was whether I was prepared to take over the Chancellor's office. He said that was in agreement with the President, who, a few moments later, made the same offer to me. Hitler's eyes, mean nothing other than a declaration of war. As Secretary of State for Matters of Public Security I was at the head of the group fighting the National Socialist aggression, and therefore I was a personal opponent of Hitler's. Therefore, Had I accepted the Chancellorship, Hitler would have found it a welcome cause to give the order to the troops to march. My acceptance of the Chancellorship, therefore, would have meant the beginning of the fight against the invasion, and such a fight was hopeless, in the face of the tremendous superiority of the German armed forces, compared with the Austria armed forces and Austrian Executive. Secretary of State. Why did you join that Ministry? Matters of Public Security under his government. I accepted the offer, having confidence that Seyss-Inquart would remember the conditions which he had made to the Fuehrer. In other words, that there would be a Chancellor of an independent Austria. Apart from that, I was wishing and hoping that the Executive would remain in my hands, and that, in the event Seyss-Inquart had difficulties in representing the Austrian point of view, there would be some assistance for him through me. In other words, there should be an Austrian enclave around him in the cabinet of the Austrian Chancellor Seyss-Inquart. independence?
A He didn't speak about it in detail. Actually, that was understood to be a matter of course during that conference we had.
Q. When did you leave that cabinet, and why?
A. During the night of the 11th and 12th of March, I took over the task of receiving the Reichsfuehrer SS. Himmler, who had been announced from Berlin at the airdrome, on that occasion did not arrive on his own, but came with an entire entourage. I cannot remember the names of the individual people who introduced themselves to me; that is to say, I could not understand very many of them. But there was one name which I did understand very well, and that was the name of Meissner. Meissner was an Austrian police officer who, on the 25th of July, had joined the National Socialist uprisings, and who had then after his collapse fled to the Reich. Now he came back under Himmler's protection. I could no longer cooperate here. When, therefore, on the 12th, in the morning, I went into the chancellor's building and was received by Glaise Horstenat with the information that Himmler had demanded my resignation, I answered, "He can have that cheaply, because I have already decided on that in the early hours of the morning".
Subsequently I informed Chancellor Dr. Seyss-Inquart that I had had knowledge of the fact that Hitler was demanding my resignation, and that, of course, I had decided to resign. I asked him, therefore, to take official notice of my resignation.
Seyss-Inquart replied, "It is right that Himmler has demanded your resignation but I am not going to have anything dictated to me from outside. At the moment the situation is such that I think it perhaps that you disappear for a few weeks. But then you must come back, because I attach importance to your cooperation."
I had maintained, however, that that would not happen. And the following day, in writing, I handed in my resignation as president of the police and secretary of state, after I had already on the evening of the 12th actually handed the affairs of the office over to Kaltenbrunner, who had been attached to me as a so-called political leader of the executive.
Q. And then you were confined, and you still have not returned to Vienna; is that not right?
A. I beg your pardon?
Q. I said, you were then confined and you still have not gone back to Vienna?
A. First of all, I remained as a prisoner in my official apartment. I was under SS and police guard. Then on the 24th of May, two criminal policemen of the Cassel Gestapo deported me to Cassel, where I was forcibly maintained until the liberation by the Allies.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions of this witness, Mr. President, and perhaps this would be a suitable moment for a recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
(No response)
THE PRESIDENT: The prosecution?
MR. DODD: No questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I now call the next witness, Dr. Friedrich Wimmer.
DR. FRIEDRICH WIMMER, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
A Dr. Friedrich Wimmer.
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, with the witness Skubl I have finished the questions concerning Austria and I shall not proceed to deal with the Netherlands.
BY DR. STEINBAUER: for the internal administration and justice in the Netherlands? justice, education, health, archives, museums and the legislature?
Q Were you not also, at the same time, the deputy of the Reich Commissar?
A In exceptional cases, cases of emergency; not otherwise. with the Reich Commissar? rather completely, are you not? Commissar or wasn't it independently subordinate to the Berlin office? Commissar's office, and as far as decrees and organization was concerned, they were subordinate to the respective offices in the Reich.
Himmler? police, did they have special tasks in the Netherlands?
Q Could you ennumerate these tasks? field was the fight against the resistance movement in the Netherlands; also belonging to their tasks was the establishment, and supervision of concentration camps. Furthermore, removal of Jews from the whole body of the Dutch nation was exclusively their task.
Q Now, we come to internal administration. At the head of the foreign ministries there was one general secretary in each; that is to say, a Dutchman. When they resigned, were they persecuted?
A No. The Reich Commissar had declared to the Dutch general session that if they should feel that decrees or demands of the occupation powers would make it difficult for them, then, without having any fears, they could approach him and explain to him their difficulties, and in that case, if they wanted to, he would let them resign from their office in such a manner that they would 'have to fear no difficulties and no troubles of any kind; and that, also, as far as financial matters were concerned, they could feel sure that they would get their pensions.
Q Did the Reich Commissar also dismiss provincial, commissars? recall two cases - - these exchanges took place only because the provincial commissars died.
Q How was it about the Mayor?
principle, the same could be said as for all other officials in the Netherlands. The mayors in the Netherlands, as in most of the nations, were, not elected to office. They were employed Officials, civil servants, in that sense of the word. They had been appointed by the Queen, even the mayors of the small communities. Since the head of the state was not present in the Netherlands, the Reich Commissar was confronted with the necessity of regulating the appointment and dismissal of mayors and keep up the regulations in that manner. Insofar as the most important positions of the state were concerned, he reserved the right to make appointments, where as in the case of large numbers of appointments of lesser importance, he put that into the hands of the general secretary. conditions were between '40 and'45 concerning the civil servants in the Netherlands, what can you state in that respect ? occupation the majority of the civil servants were in office who had been in office when the German occupation force came into the Netherlands. parties. When and why did that take place ? by the fact that some political parties displayed an attitude which, in critical times, was not bearable for the occupying power Apoart from that, in an occupied territory it is generally impossible to deal with political parties at all. It came about that we received report from our foreign services about conspiracy of various natures, and the Reich Commissar saw the necessity to dissolve the, parties. But as far as the political institutions were concerned, he did not remove the parties as such. The institution of parties still existed. tion to divine the Netherlands into five administrative districts instead of the traditional provinces.
Did Seyss-Inquart do that ? were made, always refused then. He could do that with reason, because the Dutch administration had been conducted at a very high level and the Reich Commissar counted on it. He could do so in the beginning on the basis of many promises; he said the Dutch administration would be loyal to the occupying power. was very close to the National Socialists, the NSB. Did that party gain a leading influence in the administration ?
A : The NSB, as a party, had no influence and gained no influence at all in the administration. Of course the occupying power approached the NSB and consulted the NSB in individual case because each occupying power in history, I believe, as well as in our day, ist not going to approach those parties or groups which have hostile attitudes to the occupying power.
Q Didn't the leader of the NSB, Mussert, try to create a similar situation as it existed in Norway under Quisling; that is to say, that he would become Prime Minister of the Netherlands. again he expressed it; and I can say that by doing so, he brought the Reich Commissar into a very disagreeable situation. The Reich Commissar always rejected it. pressure in religious matters on the population of the occupied territory ? would have reduced the rights of the Netherlanders ?
Q Didn't he sponsor and favor the Dutch Red Cross, although there were cells of the resistance movement in it ?
functions without difficulty, but, as you say, he even favored and sponsored it. As far as the political attitude was concerned, he would have had plenty of reasons to interfere because in the Red Cross illegal radio stations had been found.
Q They were centers of restistance? legislation in the question of citizenship and also in the question of martial law. You were in charge of the Justice Department. What can you say about that, quite briefly? occurred because, from the point of view of warfare and the armed forces especially, they become necessary, for those Dutchmen, from the point of citizenship, who had entered the German Army, wanted to have the assurance of also getting their German citizenship. The Reich Commissar, however, was of the opinion that by acquiring German citizenship they would not have any difficulties in Holland itself, as decreed and that can be found in the respective decrees, that these Dutchmen who acquired German Citizenship should be permitted to keep their Dutch citizenship, so that by doing so they would not lose their own nationality. if soldiers wanted to marry Dutch girls, the approval of parents, and not for political reasons, may have been refused. That approval was of some importance in that connection because the parents, contrary to many other nations, retained this right of approval until the thirtieth year of a daughter.
Q Now I come to another chapter. That is the question of the so-called Standgerichte, military courts. Will you tell us how these military courts were organized and set up and how long and when they were in session. general strike had broken out in Amsterdam and to create a legal basis in the event of similar occurrences in the future, or at least to stop them immediately after they had broken out, and stopthem effectively on the basis of the respective law. can be seen in the decree by the Reich Commissar. It is stated therein. However in order to answer your specific question about the composition of these military courts, I can only say from memory that the president of these courts was a judge, that is to say, a judge who had all the requirements which a judge in the German Reich had to have. these courts were called police courts there was a judge who was the president of the court. collective fines over cities and communities? The largest one, I believe, was the one against Amsterdam on the occasion of the general strike which I have already mentioned. The fines were decreed on the basis of existing decrees, and they were proclaimed by an official memorandum and that by the police. you mentioned the words "General strike" -- were used when actions of a larger group, a community, had occurred, and not actions of individuals. were committed by a large part of the citizens of the community in question.
Q I believe we can conclude that chapter. However, you didn't tell me how long the so-called military courts were in session.
A They were in session as long as that decree provided. It was two weeks, 14 days, and that was the only time that martial law had been imposed in Holland by the Reich Commissar, that is, if you do not consider the state of emergency after the invasion as such.
client. That is the accusation that contrary to international law he had hostages shot or participated in some way in their execution. yesterday were put to my client by the Prosecution. One is a statement by General of the Air Force Christiansen, of the 20th of February, 1946, and the other one is also an interrogation with the Higher Police official Dr. Schoengart, F-886. questions. Take your time -- I remind you of your oath -- and answer these questions as far as you can do it in good faith.
Have you read it?
Q Witness, I will help you. Are you through? sabotage in Rotterdam, hostages were shot?
Q Why were these hostages shot? On whose orders? what that dealt with. It was an explosion and an attempt on a vacation train of the armed forces. In that affair, the armed forces approached the Reich Commissar and that -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing): That isn't an answer to the question. The question was: Who gave the order?
THE WITNESS: The order for what? BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q What did the Reich Commissar have to do with it? You have read here what Christiansen is accusing him of in that connection.
customary that in important matters the two offices, that is, the Commander of the armed Forces and the Reich Commissar, got together and discussed these things. determined manner, had demanded that an example should be made so that such cases might be prevented in the future. On the part of the armed forces it was stated that they would know of hardly any other means than the shooting of a considerable number of hostages. do remember, the figure was around 50. dispense with such action against hostages only if the assurance could be given by the police that perhaps on the basis of material which the police had in their hands there was a chance of finding the people who committed that attempt, and they might be brought to punishment by the German court, that is to say, by the court of the armed forces.
period, the resistance in the Netherlands began to organize in increasing measure, and that there was a notable increase in sabotage and other acts hostile to the occupational forces. I also recall that it was pointed out that if the armed forces and police would have been present in larger numbers than was actually the case, it would not have been necessary to take a severe step of that kind. The forces at that time, at the disposal of the Netherlands were very small, and in case of an increase in the resistance movement, the position of the armed forces in the Netherlands would have been severely damaged.
Q. Witness, I shall put several questions to that we can go ahead. and reported that because of those attempts of explosions, he had to shoot hostages.
A. Yes.
Q. It is known to you that there was a Reich decree stating that hostages in Reich occupied, territory should not be tried by the Court but turned over to the Police, do you remember that ?
A. I don't think that that was the case at that time. Especially if you refer to the so called "Nacht Und Nebel" ("Night and Fog") decree which, in my recollection, is of a later date. We remember, however, that on order was mentioned at that time but I believe that order was one which was given only exclusively for the military sector. At any rate, I don't know about the wording of that order.
Q. Is it known to you that the Reich Commissar used his influence to see that the number you mentioned, 50 -- in reality, it was only 25 --, that that number was also to be reduced to 5 ?
A. That is known to me.
Q. And that he succeeded ?
A. And that he succeeded.
Q. And that he particularly succeeded in that fathers of families were not executed ?
Q. That concludes one case. I put to you another case. That is the case of the attempt made on the life of the Higher SS and Police Leader, Rauter where, in fact, more than 150 persons were executed as hostages. Did you road that ?
A. In part.
Q. Please read it all then.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, why is it necessary for the witness to read the whole document ? You can put the facts to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Witness, at that time, it was demanded that as a reprisal for the attempt on the Police and SS Leader, hostages should be shot.
A. Yes.
Q. Who ordered that and who carried it out ?
A. I knew of the case and I know it from the report of Brigadefuehrer Schoengart, who was, at that time, the chief of the Security Police, he had approached me to find out what his functions were because Rauter could not be in office and he had to send a proclamation and had to give his official title. On that occasion he told me the whole story, and he also told me that he had talked to Berlin, to find out what they would consider necessary as reprisals for the attempt on Rauter. From there the demand was made to execute a large and considerable number of hostages. He mentioned a figure to me which was something like 500, at any rate, not below 500, then he also told me that he had talked to the Reich Commissar and told him about the demand from Berlin.
Q. Would you be more specific please, Berlin is very large.
A. That was the Reichsfuehrer SS. Of course, it is quite clear that when it is concerned with one of the Higher Leaders of the Police and SS, one had to approach the Reichsfuehrer SS personally, and not his office. He also told me he approached the Reich Commissar for that, and that the Reich Commissar who, as such, was not competent to deal with, that matter, had asked him to tell the Reichsfuehrer Himmler. He wanted to suggest to him not to carry out such a large number of executions.
everything was done by telephone thereupon. Of course, the Reichsfuehrer agreed to reduce the number and, I believe, on the basis of several telephone conversations back and forth, in the end a number of about 200 or 150, I cannot say that exactly today, was decided upon. Schoengart that request would not have been put that certainly, the number demanded originally by Berlin would have lost their lives, so that one can say justifiably in this case, that the Reich Commissioner saved the lives of several hundred Netherlanders. caught at random in the streets or were they people who had already been sentenced ?
Brigadefuehrer Schoengart told me during that case. Of course, I have no reason to assume that at that time he did not tell me the truth. He told me that only such persons would be taken who already had been sentenced, so that it was only an execution which would have taken place later, and if that number was not sufficient, then it might happen that others might be used who in case they had been put before a court, would probably be sentenced to death anyway. happened to the hostages who, in the way of reprisals regarding the Dutch East Indies, were taken as hostages and sent to Buchenwald. some time -- and I don't recall how long that was -- when complaints came about the treatment of them, brought back into the Netherlands until the majority was released. As I remember it, not all at one time, but gradually. on account of serious sabotage attempts, was that ordered by the Reich Commissar the armed forces, and the armed forces treated the incident.... The order was given by the Commander of the armed forces, and if I remember correctly, the Reich Commissar and I were informed about the incident after the execution had taken place. the so-called enemies of the State. the Bible Research Group was confiscated. I should like to ask you, so that there will be no mistake, whether it was only the property of the organizations that was destroyed, or was it the property of members? That is assuming, for instance, not only property of Free Mason lodges, but also property of members. organizations, never to individuals. If property of individuals was destroyed, then it was an abuse of the officials who did it. I cannot remember any of it anyway.
Who was responsible for the treatment of the Jewish question? Who was competent? beginning, with the Police.
the name of Seyss-Inquart and which show interference with the liberties of the Jews. Can you remember when that legislation against the Jews started and in what form?
A The development is briefly stated as follows: SeyssInquart was confronted with the thought of dealing with the Jewish question in the Netherlands. At first he rejected it, and in one of the first discussions, it was ordered that this question should not be treated. Berlin to deal with the Jewish problem because, on the occasion of various movements and actions which were mentioned, as conspiracies, Jews had participated in a relatively large number. a longer time, the Jews, who naturally because of the treatment the had undergone were no friends of the Germans and could not be, that those Jews, if the war were to last longer could become dangerous and that, therefore, they should be considered as enemies, not in the formal sense but practically so. although in the conference he pointed out that he could not help doing so because he could not assume the responsibility. of the Reich Commissar--at first the only task undertaken was to register the property of the Jews, then to prevent German domestic servants being in Jewish households. There were quite a number of reports, and then when Berlin was more insistent in that question, the Reich Commissar finally decided to decree a registration of all Jews. It was pointed out particularly that one had to know, at least, where the Jews were because only in that manner could security and control on the part of the police be made possible. been carried out in the Reich at that time.
Then there was more pressure. I do not know whether that was Heydrich at that time who did it or whether he was at that time in the Netherlands. I have never seen him. I know only that on two occasions at least he visited the Reich Commissar in the Netherlands in 1942, there was pressure in the direction of solving that problem The Reich Commissar at first believed that he could fulfill these demands by bringing the Jews together in one place in the Netherlands where they could be more easily supervised and watched, and that is how the thought arose that in Amsterdam, one, two or three district of the city should be used to house the Jews there, which was also connected with the necessity to resettle a considerable number of non-Jewish residents of the Netherlands because one could not solve their problem otherwise at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: All this evidence that the witness is giving is all in the decree and has already been given by the defendant, has it not? What is the difference?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes THE PRESIDENT:
What is the point of it?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I only wanted to say one thing, and that is that on such an important question I wanted to have confirmation briefly by the witness.
THE WITNESS: I haven't much more to say. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q All right, I shall summarize. It is correct that the Jews were put together in a Ghetto in Amsterdam? the Jews? as it was possible under existing conditions, to get more humane methods in the evacuation of the Jews?
