Q I am not suggesting that. I am merely trying to show that you yourself used language in refusing Seyss-Inquart that indecated that you did not think he was truthful or faithful or decent. Isn't that so ? demand. There was a difference which arose from the fact that I was a friend of the Chancellor. where you testified under oath before the Court, and you remember telling the judge down there that Seyss-Inquart participated in the violent removal of Schuschnigg.
A Yes. Yes, I stated that I would not belong to a government run by Seyss-Inquart since that was, after all, partly responsible for the removal of Schuschnigg's government and since I was a friend of Schuschnigg I could not participate in such a government. and as he had been in the closest association with the Nazis, and having had your experience at Berchtesgaden, are you serious wehen you tell the Tribunal that you really thought -- you really believed Seyss-Inquart when he said he wanted to maintain some independence for Austria ?
A I doubted it at the time. I doubted Seyss-Inquart. What went on in his head, I can not tell you.
Q I am not asking you for that. I am asking you what went on in your head. about Seyss-Inquart not too many years ago ? took place.
turned to the events of 11 March 1938. Papen at the time used very serious, critical words on the procedure of those days with reference to Seyss-Inquart because he had done nothing for the independence of Austria and he said that he had not served German interests either. He wanted to state his criticism, and I had the impression that he was against the forced solution against the solution by means of force, which had always happened what it was that von Papen said about Seyss-Inquart -- and this was 1943, wasn't it, not 1940 ? It was when you were in Turkey and so was von Papen ? A: Yes.
Q: Now, maybe I can help you a little if you have forgotten. Didn't von Papen say that he would not shake hands with Seyss-Inquart ? A: Yes, he said that. He said that some time after the Anschluss he had refused to shake hands with him, and he referred to his behavior in 1938. Q: And he said his behavior was utterly impossible? Isn't that the language that von Papen used about Seyss-Inquart or some of the language? A: He did speak like that. Q: What were the other things that he said ? You have told down there in Vienna that von Papen used the harshest language imaginable in describing Seyss-Inquart and his conduct in March 1938. I think that is of some interst to the Tribunal, and I wish you would tell us exactly what it was. It is only three years ago that you and von Papen had this conversation, and you have not told us very much about it. A: He spoke in very violent terms. He passed a judgment in which he wanted to express that Seyss-Inquart had not protected the Austrians and that he had done nothing to protect the faith of Austria or safeguard the character and interests of Austria. That was Papen's basic thought, and his second thought was that the German interests had not been served by this either, and what he meant was that justified interests of the German Reich had been made to look wrong in the eyes of the World and that the foreign political interests of the Reich had been damaged. That was the principal thought in that conversation, and I think he made similar remarks during other conversations with other people. Q: All right. I am afraid I have passed on from Berchtesgaden and have omitted something that is probably of some importance. Do you remember some time-- I guess not long before you broke up your session there -- Hitler turning to von Papen and saying,"von Papen, you made it possible for me to be Chancellor, and I shall never forget it ."
Did you hear Hitler say that to von Papen that day at Berchtesgaden ? A: Yes, some such remark in some such form was made. Q: What did von Papen say ? A: That I can no longer tell you, I can not remember. Q: He said, "Yes, my Fuehrer," or something like that, didn't he ? A: Yes, I assume so, because upon being addressed like that he had to answer. Q: He certainly did not deny it, did he ? A: I don't assume he did,but I can not remember the answer. I can only remember the question. Q: The night in Vienna when the SS and the SA people were climbing in the windows and doors of the Chancellory, did Seyss -Inquart do anything to have then excluded A: Not to my knowledge. I don't know; I was on the other side. Q: Yes. It was a very tense situation, as we know. As a matter of fact, you were fearful that some harm would be done to Schuschnigg, weren't you ? A: The situation was tense. Q: How did you and Schuschnigg go home that night from the Chancellory ? A: We left in three cars -- the Chancellor in one, the President in the other, and I was in the third.The departure was organized or escorted by SS men who were present. Q: Schuschnigg was not taken home in Seyss-Inquart's private automobile by Seyss-Inquart; he was taken home by the SS; is that so ? A: No, they departed in a car together. I heard myself how Seyss-Inquart told the Chancellor he would take him home. Whether it was the Chancellor's car or Seyss-Inquart's car, I don't know, but at any rate they travelled in the same car. Q: Escorted by the SS ?
A No, not as far as I can tell you. I don't know whether there were SS in the Chancellor's car, but the SS only escorted the actual departure from the house, and there was nobody on the car or my car, of the President's car after that, after we had left the house, I mean.
Q That is not what you told the Court in Vienna. Down there you said, "Dr. Schuschnigg and I were driven home, escorted by the SS." the Ballhaus Platz. There were about 40 SS men present who conducted the departure from there. Whether some one remained in the car after that, I don't know.
Q All right. You probably can help us clean up one other question. When Seyss-Inquart made his radio speech, he was not actually a member of the Government, was he, or was he? The Chancellor had resigned in the hours of the afternoon, and the President had first of all not accepted the resignation, so, therefore, he was still Chancellor and Seyss was still a Minister. Whether later on the resignation was accepted that I don't know. Some say that the President had asked the Chancellor to continue in charge. Seyss-Inquart and others think that that was not the case. Only the head of the state himself can answer that question for you. at one document, and perhaps you can tell us whether or not you have seen it before.
MR. DODD: It is 4015-PS. It becomes USA 891. BY MR. DODD: Schuschnigg as the Federal Chancellor, but all other members of the federal government, as well as all Secretaries of State, of their respective offices, and that is March 11.
when he made this radio speech? That is our understanding of it.
Q That shows, does it not, that Seyss-Inquart was hot in office Is that so? question because I worked with the Federal President for a long time.
Q Just tell us exactly -- is that true or not? Is our understanding correct?
A It need not necessarily be that. In practice such documents sometimes go out days later because red tape slows then up. One would have to investigate therefore, when this was actually, in practice, carried out. I assume that it was not prepared until long after the 11th of March.
Q Was Seyss-Inquart frequently using the term "Trojan Horse" in the days preceding events of March 12? Was that a common expression of his? leader, and by that he wanted we testify to his loyalty, and he wanted to explain that it was not his task to open the back door to National Socialism.
Q Do you think he protested too much?
AAgainst what? three times from Zernatto.
MR. DODD: That is all.
BY DR. STEINBAUER: ness. Didn't Seyss-Inquart also post guards ?
Q At What time did that happen ? I mean, the actual resignation of Schuschnigg the new government was the time. I assume that it took place between nine and ten o'clock, since the President was having serious negotiations about the choice of a new Chancellor, and I think the former Chancellor, Dr. Ender, had been include in the debate.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions for this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now call the wit ness Police President Dr. Skubl.
MICHAEL SKUBL, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please ?
"Will you repeat this oath after me: and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Mr. Witness, which functions have you carried out in the Austrian Republic State for Matters of Public Security. Apart from that, I was the Inspector General of the Austrian Executive.
Q Were you called to these offices at the suggestion of Dr. Dollfuss, which instructions he gave before he died ?
A Dr. Dollfuss -- the day before he was murdered, on the 24th of July -- had appointed me as Inspector General of the Police. I had enjoyed his full confidence
Q Can one, therefore, describe you as having had Dr. Schuschnigg's confidence as well ? city as Secretary of State and Inspector General ?
A Yes. When Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister of the Interior and of Security, I joined him as Secretary of State. Consequently, I came under him initially, whereas until that time I had been subordinated directly to the Chancellor as Chief of Security. Seyss-Inquart, practically speaking ? legal movements ? curity, it was, of course, one of my leading tasks to fight against illegal movements, and particularly to fight against National Socialist aggression. Inquart and the July 1934 matter ? I mean, when Dollfuss was murdered.
Q What was his attitude towards National Socialism ?
A Dr. Seyss-Inquart confessed that he was a National Socialist. However, as far as I know, the so-called 120 or 150 percent National Socialists -- that is to say, the leaders of the illegal movement -- did not consider him to be a 100 per cent National Socialist. He was, however, considered to be an very suitable person to be used on the chess board of the National Socialist movement as a chessman, a very suitable chessman. a person who was leading ?
terior ?
A There were no disturbances; it was a perfectly harmonious, agreeable way of working.
Q Did he exercise any influence upon the police ? Did he, for instance, call National Socialists into the corps of the police ?
A No; that happened in no case. Chancellor Schuschnigg ? he was, of course, my supreme superior. It was a matter of course, therefore, the I would regularly, and upon being called specially, report to the Chancellor and take instructions from him. Hitler. Question: Was that an official journey, or was it kept secret ?
Q How did you come to that conclusion ?
A It had been announced. I knew about the journey; and Chancellor Schuschnigg so far as I knew, knew about the journey. It was pretty obvious that in his capacity as liaison man between the Austrian Government and the Reich he would have to have an opportunity to speak to Hitler. discussions with the Fuehrer ?
A Yes. Upon his return I met Seyss-Inquart at the station, and I asked him he the conferences with Hitler had proceeded. Seyss-Inquart, still being fresh under the Impression of the meeting and discussions, informed me of what he had stated to the Fuehrer. I still remember the inividual points exactly. Seyss-Inquart told the Reich Chancellor as follows:
"High Riech Chancellor: I am an Austrian Minister, and as such I am bound and I have sworn an oath of allegiance to the Austrian Constitution. I have sworn an oath, therefore, to Austria's independence and unity. Secondly, I am an active catholic, and therefore I could not join or follow a course which might lead to a cultural battle. Thirdly, I come from a country where totalitarian regimes are out of the question."
of the illegal NSDAP ?
A Yes. As far as is known to me, on the 21st of February Klausner was appointed Couty Leader.
Q When Dr. Schuschnigg announced the plebiscite did he order any special measures of security ? National Socialists, not only on the National Socialists in Austria, bur also the National Socialists in the Reich. There was feverish activity, therefore, and considerable safeguarding measures had to be introduced. lists were afraid that in the event of a plebiscite the would suffer a terrible defeat. The slogans for the plebiscite would have been accepted predominantly by the Austrian population.
an article which appeared on the 11th of March in the German-Austrian daily paper, and which indicates the fear that this plebiscite would open the way for a democratization of Austria, the creation of a people's front, and consequently, later, a Bolshevist tendency. This will show that the Austrian National Socialists were conscious of the fact that they were a minority.
Q Now we come to the memorable 11th of March, 1938. When did you, as the Chief of the Executive, learn that German troops had marched into Austria? eventful day. The feeling of time was completely lost during those hours. I only know that in the evening hours a report was submitted to me showing that German troops had crossed the border, a report which could not be verified, however, but which was supplemented by the fact that upsetting troop movements were taking place near the Austrian border.
Q Did not Seyss-Inquart, after Schuschnigg's resignation, say on the radio -- in order to avoid chaos -- that he was asking the population to remain quiet, since he was still Minister of the Interior and Security? resignation he, Seyss-Inquart, had given instructions, sent telegrams and put through telephone calls, or given any other news regarding the seizure of power? the critical moment, which was a very placid one. As I have already said earlier, he did in fact give more the impression of a man who was led rather than a man who was leading. There were clear indications that he felt awkward.
Q Didn't you yourself, in the afternoon or evening, have an offer from President Miklas to become Federal Chancellor?
A Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg called me in the early afternoon, and he stated to me that there had been an ultimatum from Germany -- that is to say, Hitler -- and that the ultimatum would no longer be satisfied with a postponement of the plebiscite, but was demanding Schuschnigg's resignation. Then Schuschnigg said that he personally was ready to resign, but that he could not expect from his officials that Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Chancellor.
He had a question to put to me, he said, and that was whether I was prepared to take over the Chancellor's office. He said that was in agreement with the President, who, a few moments later, made the same offer to me. Hitler's eyes, mean nothing other than a declaration of war. As Secretary of State for Matters of Public Security I was at the head of the group fighting the National Socialist aggression, and therefore I was a personal opponent of Hitler's. Therefore, Had I accepted the Chancellorship, Hitler would have found it a welcome cause to give the order to the troops to march. My acceptance of the Chancellorship, therefore, would have meant the beginning of the fight against the invasion, and such a fight was hopeless, in the face of the tremendous superiority of the German armed forces, compared with the Austria armed forces and Austrian Executive. Secretary of State. Why did you join that Ministry? Matters of Public Security under his government. I accepted the offer, having confidence that Seyss-Inquart would remember the conditions which he had made to the Fuehrer. In other words, that there would be a Chancellor of an independent Austria. Apart from that, I was wishing and hoping that the Executive would remain in my hands, and that, in the event Seyss-Inquart had difficulties in representing the Austrian point of view, there would be some assistance for him through me. In other words, there should be an Austrian enclave around him in the cabinet of the Austrian Chancellor Seyss-Inquart. independence?
A He didn't speak about it in detail. Actually, that was understood to be a matter of course during that conference we had.
Q. When did you leave that cabinet, and why?
A. During the night of the 11th and 12th of March, I took over the task of receiving the Reichsfuehrer SS. Himmler, who had been announced from Berlin at the airdrome, on that occasion did not arrive on his own, but came with an entire entourage. I cannot remember the names of the individual people who introduced themselves to me; that is to say, I could not understand very many of them. But there was one name which I did understand very well, and that was the name of Meissner. Meissner was an Austrian police officer who, on the 25th of July, had joined the National Socialist uprisings, and who had then after his collapse fled to the Reich. Now he came back under Himmler's protection. I could no longer cooperate here. When, therefore, on the 12th, in the morning, I went into the chancellor's building and was received by Glaise Horstenat with the information that Himmler had demanded my resignation, I answered, "He can have that cheaply, because I have already decided on that in the early hours of the morning".
Subsequently I informed Chancellor Dr. Seyss-Inquart that I had had knowledge of the fact that Hitler was demanding my resignation, and that, of course, I had decided to resign. I asked him, therefore, to take official notice of my resignation.
Seyss-Inquart replied, "It is right that Himmler has demanded your resignation but I am not going to have anything dictated to me from outside. At the moment the situation is such that I think it perhaps that you disappear for a few weeks. But then you must come back, because I attach importance to your cooperation."
I had maintained, however, that that would not happen. And the following day, in writing, I handed in my resignation as president of the police and secretary of state, after I had already on the evening of the 12th actually handed the affairs of the office over to Kaltenbrunner, who had been attached to me as a so-called political leader of the executive.
Q. And then you were confined, and you still have not returned to Vienna; is that not right?
A. I beg your pardon?
Q. I said, you were then confined and you still have not gone back to Vienna?
A. First of all, I remained as a prisoner in my official apartment. I was under SS and police guard. Then on the 24th of May, two criminal policemen of the Cassel Gestapo deported me to Cassel, where I was forcibly maintained until the liberation by the Allies.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions of this witness, Mr. President, and perhaps this would be a suitable moment for a recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
(No response)
THE PRESIDENT: The prosecution?
MR. DODD: No questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I now call the next witness, Dr. Friedrich Wimmer.
DR. FRIEDRICH WIMMER, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
A Dr. Friedrich Wimmer.
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, with the witness Skubl I have finished the questions concerning Austria and I shall not proceed to deal with the Netherlands.
BY DR. STEINBAUER: for the internal administration and justice in the Netherlands? justice, education, health, archives, museums and the legislature?
Q Were you not also, at the same time, the deputy of the Reich Commissar?
A In exceptional cases, cases of emergency; not otherwise. with the Reich Commissar? rather completely, are you not? Commissar or wasn't it independently subordinate to the Berlin office? Commissar's office, and as far as decrees and organization was concerned, they were subordinate to the respective offices in the Reich.
Himmler? police, did they have special tasks in the Netherlands?
Q Could you ennumerate these tasks? field was the fight against the resistance movement in the Netherlands; also belonging to their tasks was the establishment, and supervision of concentration camps. Furthermore, removal of Jews from the whole body of the Dutch nation was exclusively their task.
Q Now, we come to internal administration. At the head of the foreign ministries there was one general secretary in each; that is to say, a Dutchman. When they resigned, were they persecuted?
A No. The Reich Commissar had declared to the Dutch general session that if they should feel that decrees or demands of the occupation powers would make it difficult for them, then, without having any fears, they could approach him and explain to him their difficulties, and in that case, if they wanted to, he would let them resign from their office in such a manner that they would 'have to fear no difficulties and no troubles of any kind; and that, also, as far as financial matters were concerned, they could feel sure that they would get their pensions.
Q Did the Reich Commissar also dismiss provincial, commissars? recall two cases - - these exchanges took place only because the provincial commissars died.
Q How was it about the Mayor?
principle, the same could be said as for all other officials in the Netherlands. The mayors in the Netherlands, as in most of the nations, were, not elected to office. They were employed Officials, civil servants, in that sense of the word. They had been appointed by the Queen, even the mayors of the small communities. Since the head of the state was not present in the Netherlands, the Reich Commissar was confronted with the necessity of regulating the appointment and dismissal of mayors and keep up the regulations in that manner. Insofar as the most important positions of the state were concerned, he reserved the right to make appointments, where as in the case of large numbers of appointments of lesser importance, he put that into the hands of the general secretary. conditions were between '40 and'45 concerning the civil servants in the Netherlands, what can you state in that respect ? occupation the majority of the civil servants were in office who had been in office when the German occupation force came into the Netherlands. parties. When and why did that take place ? by the fact that some political parties displayed an attitude which, in critical times, was not bearable for the occupying power Apoart from that, in an occupied territory it is generally impossible to deal with political parties at all. It came about that we received report from our foreign services about conspiracy of various natures, and the Reich Commissar saw the necessity to dissolve the, parties. But as far as the political institutions were concerned, he did not remove the parties as such. The institution of parties still existed. tion to divine the Netherlands into five administrative districts instead of the traditional provinces.
Did Seyss-Inquart do that ? were made, always refused then. He could do that with reason, because the Dutch administration had been conducted at a very high level and the Reich Commissar counted on it. He could do so in the beginning on the basis of many promises; he said the Dutch administration would be loyal to the occupying power. was very close to the National Socialists, the NSB. Did that party gain a leading influence in the administration ?
A : The NSB, as a party, had no influence and gained no influence at all in the administration. Of course the occupying power approached the NSB and consulted the NSB in individual case because each occupying power in history, I believe, as well as in our day, ist not going to approach those parties or groups which have hostile attitudes to the occupying power.
Q Didn't the leader of the NSB, Mussert, try to create a similar situation as it existed in Norway under Quisling; that is to say, that he would become Prime Minister of the Netherlands. again he expressed it; and I can say that by doing so, he brought the Reich Commissar into a very disagreeable situation. The Reich Commissar always rejected it. pressure in religious matters on the population of the occupied territory ? would have reduced the rights of the Netherlanders ?
Q Didn't he sponsor and favor the Dutch Red Cross, although there were cells of the resistance movement in it ?
functions without difficulty, but, as you say, he even favored and sponsored it. As far as the political attitude was concerned, he would have had plenty of reasons to interfere because in the Red Cross illegal radio stations had been found.
Q They were centers of restistance? legislation in the question of citizenship and also in the question of martial law. You were in charge of the Justice Department. What can you say about that, quite briefly? occurred because, from the point of view of warfare and the armed forces especially, they become necessary, for those Dutchmen, from the point of citizenship, who had entered the German Army, wanted to have the assurance of also getting their German citizenship. The Reich Commissar, however, was of the opinion that by acquiring German citizenship they would not have any difficulties in Holland itself, as decreed and that can be found in the respective decrees, that these Dutchmen who acquired German Citizenship should be permitted to keep their Dutch citizenship, so that by doing so they would not lose their own nationality. if soldiers wanted to marry Dutch girls, the approval of parents, and not for political reasons, may have been refused. That approval was of some importance in that connection because the parents, contrary to many other nations, retained this right of approval until the thirtieth year of a daughter.
Q Now I come to another chapter. That is the question of the so-called Standgerichte, military courts. Will you tell us how these military courts were organized and set up and how long and when they were in session. general strike had broken out in Amsterdam and to create a legal basis in the event of similar occurrences in the future, or at least to stop them immediately after they had broken out, and stopthem effectively on the basis of the respective law. can be seen in the decree by the Reich Commissar. It is stated therein. However in order to answer your specific question about the composition of these military courts, I can only say from memory that the president of these courts was a judge, that is to say, a judge who had all the requirements which a judge in the German Reich had to have. these courts were called police courts there was a judge who was the president of the court. collective fines over cities and communities? The largest one, I believe, was the one against Amsterdam on the occasion of the general strike which I have already mentioned. The fines were decreed on the basis of existing decrees, and they were proclaimed by an official memorandum and that by the police. you mentioned the words "General strike" -- were used when actions of a larger group, a community, had occurred, and not actions of individuals. were committed by a large part of the citizens of the community in question.
Q I believe we can conclude that chapter. However, you didn't tell me how long the so-called military courts were in session.
A They were in session as long as that decree provided. It was two weeks, 14 days, and that was the only time that martial law had been imposed in Holland by the Reich Commissar, that is, if you do not consider the state of emergency after the invasion as such.