In 1936, under Dr. Schuschnigg, I became State Secretary, and later Foreign Minister. From that time on, I had no political activity.
Q. Witness, what reasons in foreign politics and economics led to the agreement of the 11th of July 1936 ?
A. At the beginning of 1936, the foreign political situation of Austria had changed to Austria's disadvantage. After the events of 1934, England France and Italy prepared a three-power agreement concerning the maintenance of Austrian independence. Beyond the international obligations which are considered to have existed, the three powers now set up a new guarantee for the maintenance of Austria. was pursued. The collapse of the Streser front as a result of the Abyssinian undertaking of Mussolini, meant for Austria the loss of its only practical international guarantee, and for Chancellor Schuschnigg, the creation of a completely new situation. With this concept of foreign power, Austrian independence rested not only on the shoulders of Italy, but on other shoulders, such as these of England and France. situation in Europe from March 1936 on, from the day on which Adolf Hitler, at the beginning of his surprise politics, occupied the Rhineland without encountering serious resistance from the western powers. the fear that some dry in the Austrian question as well a surprise solution, or, as we later saw, a forced solution, might come. which the agreement was based. Also the closer relation between Rome and Berlin, which began to be felt at this time, was traceable to the sanction policy of the League of Nations. Austria, lying between Italy and Germany, had to expect that one day the Austrian-Italian friendship which had existed since the time of Dollfuss, would fall victim to the closer relationship between Rome and Berlin.
sought a way to improve relations, to restore relations between Austria and the German Reich. on Austria's thoughts in regard to foreign policy. The basic thought was the maintenance of Austrian independence. Austrian foreign policy was furthermore based on the knowledge of the extremely difficult and ticklish geographical situation of this country between two totalitarian states, at the crossing point of ideologies of Europe.
Therefore, it had to be the task of Austrian foreign policy to reach an understanding with her great neighbor, the German Reich. The foreign policy further had to be based on the determination to avoid everything that could lead to a conflict with the German Reich, to avoid everything that could antagonize the Reich, in order to prevent violent action which had to be feared after the 7th of March. determination: to maintain relations with the German Reich, relations which had been unnaturally interrupted. Aside from the reasons of foreign policy, there were also economic considerations. The world economic crisis, because of Austria's rather weak economic constitution, affected Austria very seriously, young state. From the very beginning, all neighboring countries of Austria had carried on an economic policy of chauvinistic self-interest, and in no case had it been possible to reach very close cooperation of all Danube countries. There were individual combinations, such as the Rome Protocol, but the mutual distrust which all had brought from their former homes, and monarchy, continued to exist and obstructed such healthy development. number of attempts to relieve the situation. I will mention them briefly, and begin with the attempt of the government to create a customs union which failed because of the resistance of the League of Nations. In 1932, there was an attempt by France to bring Austria and Hungary into the Little Entente and to reach economic cooperation there. Germany and Italy opposed this. England was also against it. against National Socialism. This also had its effect on the economic life in Austria, because the economy was also used as a battle theme in the internal struggle.
THE PRESIDENT: This is undoubtedly interesting, but it has rather a remote bearing, perhaps, upon the questions which the Tribunal has to decide. I don't know whether the witness has dealt with it sufficiently for your purposes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this presentation of the facts I wanted to show that from the economic and foreign political point of view the situation was such that the role of the defendant was forced into the background, but we can continue with the question. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Witness, will you speak quite briefly.
A. The conclusion?
Q. Yes.
A. The economic relations with the German Reich were broken off, and Austria's struggle for economic existence was put on a very shaky basis. Because of these considerations, and for economic reasons, too, Chancellor Schuschnigg attempted to reach an agreement with the German Reich and to restore economic relations which had been completely broken off, to remove the "1,000 mark blockage", to restore foreign traffic, the flow of economic goods, to silence the complaints which were coming from the provinces in Austria because of the lack of market for agricultural products, grain, cattle and so forth.
Q. Witness, I ask you now: Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart work on preparing or concluding this agreement of July 1936?
A. No. The Chancellor worked with Glaise Horstenau.
THE PRESIDENT: There is a defect in the sound equipment, so we had better adjourn.
(A recess was taken).
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Witness; in the spring of 1937? Seyss-Inquart entered politics, and presumably you met him. in domestic and foreign policy lad to the Wall known meeting of Adolf Hitler and Dr. Schuschnigg in Berchtosgaden.
A This question demands a detailed answer. I ask for permission to be able to express myself in somewhat more detail. situation had become worse. Italy had entered a foreign engagement in Spain in favor of France which reduced its weight in central Europe. What we called "The Watch at the Brenner" had, in affect, ceased to exist, and Germany had more or less a free hand toward Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal has common knowledge of the history of this time. It is not necessary, really, to go into it. BY DR. STEINBAUER: at Obersalzberg at that time.
A Yes. I should like to add, if I am to pass over the historical events, that is how I had to understand the question. The Chancellor accepted the invitation in order to prevent Austria's being reproached for having refused a peaceful attempt to clear up existing differences between Austria and the German Reich. The Chancellor was by no roans optimistic for the reason that the existing differences of opinion were very great and also because of the personality of his associate in the talks. I recall that Schuschnigg before leaving for this meeting told me that he was of the opinion that it might have been better to send Professor Wagner Jaureck, the greatest pshychiatrist of Vienna, in his place, but he believed, in view of the exposed position of Austria, that he had to accept in order to gain time until the international situation should improve in Austria's favor and in order to avoid violent action.
Unfortunately we were right. The fear of a coming attack or of coming difficulties was justified.
We were justified in the fear that Austria would be left entirely alone. The realization of the fact that we were completely deserted was one of the primary reasons, together with considerations of bridging over this difficult period end gaining time. Austria had to take this difficult way in the dark time which was coming in the end of the winter of 1937-1938 in Berchtesgaden until March 1938 without the light of any immediate or prospective assistance. That is how Berchtesgaden came about.
the events at Berchtesgaden?
A Yes. Contrary to press reports, the interested big powers were informed in detail both before and after Berchtesgaden. I gave all the formal material to the head of the political section to whom the diplomatic corps applied first. The Chancellor himself and I gave detailed reports to the accredited foreign representatives in Vienna.
THE PRESIDENT: Forgive my interrupting you, but we do not want the details. You said you informed the foreign powers beforehand and afterwards. That is sufficient. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Now we return to the defendant. Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart take part in these talks in Berchtesgaden? and he went to Adolf Hitler in Berlin. Did he report the contents of his first talk with Adolf Hitler to Schuschnigg? by State Secretary Zernatto, the head of the Fatherland Front, from which I can conclude that a conversation between Minister Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart must have taken place. Schuschnigg also learned of it?
Q Now we will go on again to March. Schuschnigg planned a plebiscite. Do you know whether Schuschnigg informed Seyss-Inquart of this or discussed it with him?
A Yes, Seyss-Inquart was informed of it. I learned that about the 10th of March an agreement between Seyss-Inquart and the Chancellor was reached. The Chancellor told me that Seyss-Inquart had declared himself willing to speak on the radio in favor of the election.
of invasion, did you in your capacity as Foreign Minister, inform the foreign powers of this? I learned of the critical situation only from the ultimatum which demanded a plebiscite on the resignation of the Chancellor---13 March. From then on, there was constant contact with the diplomatic corps in Vienna and later, in the following hours, with all foreign representatives. upon one another. In particular, the demand was made that Schuschnigg should resign. To ministers were assembled, and a member of the government is said to have told Seyss-Inquart the following:
"We now see clearly that the Reich is putting an end to dealings with Austria. It would be best for Seyss-Inquart to take over the office of Chancellor so that the transition can be at least bearable."
Do you remember such a statement?
A No. Only later did I hear of this statement by Minister Glaise Horstenau which contained this request to Seyss-Inquart. speech of Schuschnigg the Fatherland Front, which was directed by him, also had collapsed? tuation. The resignation of the Chancellor was demanded by ultimatum, so that the existence of the Fatherland Front had also fallen away. With the entry of the German troops, National Socialism had become a reality. Developments showed that it did not leave the Fatherland Front any life. his cabinet, and you, witness, were proposed as Foreign minister; is that correct?
A That is correct, I refused. I was requested again and I refused again, and then the reason was asked. Then Seyss told me that he intended, as long as possible, to keep Austria independent, but he was afraid that with his government, with the National Socialist majority, he would encounter difficulties in the West. Therefore, he wanted to have my diplomatic experience and connections retained for the government. to form a broader platform for this government.
Q Did you know the names of such positive Austrians? Did you find any such names in the list?
A There were such names. I have wondered about it myself, but I cannot give any individual names with certainty. the final list? I later learned, a rejected me, and others too, I believe. I think I can remember one name. I believe that he suggested, on behalf of Berlin, that Weber should take over the foreign ministry. Thus, this list was discarded and Seyss no longer tried to dissuade me from my negative position. independent, although under National Socialist leadership?
AAs a witness, I can only say what I know. Opinions are very difficult to express. I have stated what he told me.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions to put to this witness. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (counsel for defendant von Papen): at that time, Mr. Messersmith, Mr. von Papen, at the beginning of his activity in Vienna, is said to have stated that his real task in Vienna was the economic and political incorporation of Southeastern Europe in Germany, that Southeastern Europe was the natural hinterland of Germany.
Did you, witness, ever learn of such a statement?
A No. In view of the close contact which I had with Minister Messersmith before my appointment as a member of the government, and especially later, I would probably have learned of it.
I assume, however, that this question had no special significance, or was not given any special significance at the time, because in first visits between diplomats, as a rule, they usually make a tour do raison of questions which interest both countries, that is, general political questions; nor did I note later that Southeastern Europe's policy vans being carried on from the German Legation.
Q According to Mr. Messersmith, Mr. von Papen is supposed to have said at that time that he was working to weaken and undermine the Austrian Government. Do you believe that Mr. von Papen made such a statement, and, particularly, did he carry on such a policy?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you can't ask him whether he believes that a certain statement was made or not. That is pure speculation; it is not the subject of evidence. Therefore, that question must be withdrawn, and no answer given to it, and it will be struck out.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q I will now ask the witness this: Did the witness Messersmith report such a statement by Mr. von Papen to you? strengthen relations with the Reich by an agreement in July of 1936?
A Yes. I have already explained the reasons of practical politics, which were of a foreign political and economic nature. cularly the settlement of the Party question, have a part in deciding this? tension. The Chancellor had to try to find a way out of the difficulty, which he had inherited from Dollfuss, bu cutting down the inner political front.
Q Do you believe that Mr. von Papen concluded the July 1936 treaty with treacherous intent? a serious attampt to create a modus vivendi between Austria and the Reich. That is not changed by the fact that it resulted in a modus mali vivendi. 1936, there was no essential change in the inner political course of the Austrian Government? real cause of the conflict with the Reich, the battle of National Socialism within the country. In the interest of maintaining the independence of the country and cooperation--on the basis of the treaty of the 11th of July--with the German Reich, the leaders of which were National Socialists, there were two fields or two demands which, in the long run, the Austrian Government found to be irreconcilable. ing out this treaty in Vienna, including the German Minister.
Q. On the basis of these conditions, particularly the July agreement, were questions of internal policy, such as technical and personnel questions of the so-called national opposition, the subject of discussions between the chancellor and Mr. von Papen?
A. The situation as just descrived shows that such discussions were unavoidable, and that between the chancellor and the German minister, as well as with the Italian minister, talks on the internal political situation took place. This is, from a general point of view, quite customary. I know of no diplomatic records which do not contain such entries. The chancellor could not have permitted any intervention, in any case. was afrain of "Trojan horses", I might say. That more or less represents the situation in wuch talks between the chancellor and the Germans on the other side.
Q. Was the opposition of Mr. von Papen to the methods of the illegal party clear?
A. Yes. According to the information received by the government, the heads of the illegal party -- that is, Leopold, in particular -- were rejected by von Papen. This was doubtless due to differing political ideas and differing political methods which von Papen on the one hand and the heads of the illegal party on the other hand were determined to pursue.
Q. Did Mr. von Papen, referring to the July agreement, ever take an aggressive attitude in Austrian foreign policy?
A. There existed between Austria and the Reich, not only in cultural and internal political fields, but also in the foreign politicalfield, unbridgeable differences of opinion. I will mention briefly the demands of the Reich. Austria was to leave the League of Nations, which we, referring to the geographical and historical continental position of Austria, rejected. A second point was the Austrians' attitude -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing). Is this at all answering the question that you have put to him?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He is introducing the answer to the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Try and get on with the answer to it, will you? Get the witness on to the answer, rather than the introduction. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. I should like to know whether Mr. von Papen had an opportunity for an agressive intervention in Austrian foreign politics, and in the individual cases mentioned by you, whether he took advantage of this opportunity.
A. I want to say that in spite of the deep, basic differences, this did not occur, and that a minister with a more radical point of view would certainly have had on opportunity and occasion for sharper attitude towards Austria. Not in a single case did we reach an agreement with the German Reich on a joint foreign political action. Von Papen did remind us of that, but that was all. As for aggression, or aggressive activities, I cannot speak in this field.
Q. Did Mr. von Papen in part act as an especially active mediator? I would like to remind you of the case of Pinkafeld.
A. The Pinkafeld incident is an example of the mediating activity which von Papen carried out. On the surface, it was a minor incident, but it led to threats of invasion by Hitler. Von Papen was called to Berlin, and had a great deal of difficulty in persuading Hitler -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing). Witness, if it is convenient to you, it would be more convenient to the Tribunal if you spoke a little faster. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Then the case was cleared up by von Papen without any difficulty?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Mr. von Papen speak to you about the reasons for his being called away on the 4th of February, 1938?
anger, I might say, at his being called away, which in his opinion and also in our opinion had been determined by the events of the 4th of February, 1938, the recall of Fritsche and other generals, and the recall of von Neurath. In his opinion, it would not remain without effect for Austria, either, especially in view of the person of his successor, who was given. At that time, Buerckel or Counsul General Kriebel was proposed. also the chancellor before he left. severe policy against Austria? inevitable. Schuschnigg in the Berchtesgaden talks? negotiations, attempt to weaken Hitler's demands? of demands which was presented, this was not difficult. I believe that he, like many others, endeavored to keep order so as to assure sensible progress of the negotiations. Do you believe that the attitude and the participation of von Papen as a whole in these negotiations had a restraining effect and led to this practical success for you?
A His attitude as a whole was no doubt mediatory. One cannot speak of success at Berchtesgaden as far as the result is concerned; but that is not von Papen's fault.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, do you think you will be able to finish in a few moments?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: consider the final result of Berchtesgaden, but rather the fact that Hitler had a great program of demanding beyond the final results, whether you consider that some very important points were changed in the course of the negotiations. violent because Hitler determined Schuschnigg in his German attitude and that von Papen care to Schuschnigg's aid, and that that improved the original situation for Schuschnigg?
A I was not present for the first hour or two or the talk. I cannot answer the question.
Q My last question is this. Did Mr. von Papen, after the 26th of February, the day on which he took leave of the Federal President, have any official activity in Vienna?
A No; the Vienna location was administered by the charge d'affaires, von Stein, who considered the two protests against the demand plebiscites on the afternoon of the 9th or the morning of the 10th. Von Stein, General Muff, and State Secretary Keppler sent in the ultimatum for getting the resignation of chancellor Schuschnigg to the Austrian President. This shows that Ambassador von Papen was no longer acting.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We shall recess until a quarter past two.
(A recess was taken until 1420 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1415 hours, 13 June 1946)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I have permission to put one more question to Witness Schmidt, a question which I had overlooked putting before the recess ?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Witness, in November, 1937, in the course of measures introduced against the illegal movements, certain materials were confiscated which were given the name "Tafs papers". Is the presence of Herr von Papen referred to in these "Tafs papers" ?
A. As far as I can recollect, with this material which we called the "Tafs plan" a number of documents were discovered one after the other. I think I can remember that in one of these documents Papen was mentioned. An attempt on the life of the German Ambassador to Vienna was to be the cause for interior uprisings in Asutria, which were to be followed by reprisal measures by the government; and then later it was to lead to measures introduced by the German Reich. I can not remember the details of that plan any more.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Dr. von Luedinghausen, counsel for the defendant von Neurath, With permission of the Tribunal, I should now like to put a few questions to this witness. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Dr. Schmidt, when and on what occasion have you met Herr von Neurath ?
A. I met von Neurath in November, 1937, in Berlin where I paid a visit to him.
Q. Can you tell us what attitude von Neurath, as German Foreign Minister had with regard to the relations of the German Reich to Austria ? In particular, can you tell us his views regarding the agreement of the 25th of July 1936 ? I should like to draw your attention to the fact, in this connection, that the prosecution have alleged that von Neurath had made this agreement wilfully deceiving.
A. During the few meetings which I had with von Neurath he has always expressed the view that he was in favor of an independent Asutria. He mentioned that there should be the closest possible cooperation in the foreign politicalm economical and military sectors. Our conversations always stood on the basis created by the 11th of July agreement, and differences of opinion only arose through the various interpretations of the agreement. Neurath, on behalf of the German government, was interested in the best possible activation of the agreement, which, for defensive reasons, we preferred a different interpretation. At any rate, Neurath refused forcible methods and he followed approximately the line of an independent Austria but working closely with Germany.
Q. What was Neurath's opinion regarding the extreme circles of the party in the Reich which, in fact, favored a policy of intervention in Austrian affairs ?
A. As I have already said, methods of force were disliked by Neurath which includes the methods of intervention and the methods of the illegal party in Austria. I believe that, from conversations which I have had with him, I can state that as a certain fact. His complete refusal of the activities and the appearance of Keppler and Weselmeier speak in favor of the same point of view, they having been the preparers of the new development in Austria. The expression which he has used in that connection allow no doubt regarding his point of view.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness.
DR. SEIDL: Dr. Seidl, counsel for Frank and Hess. Mr. President, may I have permission to represent my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, who is absent and put a few questions on behalf of Defendant Goering to the witness ?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. BY DR. SEIDL:
Q. Mr. Witness, you have just stated that in November, 1937, you paid an official visit to Berlin ?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you, on that occasion, talk to the then Field Marshal Goering ?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it correct that even at that time Field Marshal Goering had already told you that the Austrian problem could only be solved by complete union between the two brother peoples ? That is to say, Austria's Anschluss to the Reich. And that he, in turn, would do everything he could to achieve that end ?
A. It wasn't told me in those words. The Reich Marshal did refer to a close cooperation with Austria, but a demand for an Anschluss was not mentioned as far as I can remember. I could add, to illustrate that, that at that time the events of the 25th of July, 1934 were being discussed. I expressed the view that the agreement of July, '36, would put a final line under that development, and Reich Marshal Goering stated that he, mentioning Habicht, would make the originating of this affair -- make them responsible and that he would ban them into some other part of Germany. That remark alone shows that the Anschluss was not mentioned. The Reich Marshal appreciated the development caused by the 11th of July, 1936. That is to say that a full stop had been put at the end of the developments, ending then what one had to describe as a state of war. That was the state of affairs existing to the 11th of July, 1936.
Q. Is it correct that on the morning of the Anschluss, that is to say the morning of the 12th of March, 1938, Goering called you to Berlin, telling you to use an airplane ?
A. No. That was either Monday or Tuesday; that is the 15th or 16th.
Q. When you were in Berlin, did he put the question to you whether you yourself or Schuschnigg had asked for help from foreign powers, military help ?
A. I can not remember having heard that question.
Q. You stated this morning that with the Anschluss National Socialism in Austria had become reality. I now ask you, before the Anschluss, wasn't National Socialism a political reality in Austria ?
A. Yes, certainly a political reality, but I am talking of a political reality in the sense of the final force.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are going a little bit too fast -- well I don't know what it was. Anyhow, you had better repeat it because the interpreters don't seem to have got it.
BY DR. SEIDL: Socialism in Austria had been a reality, and I put this question with reference to the fact that the witness had said this morning that only with the arrival of German troops had Austria found National Socialism a reality.
A By "Political reality" I meant that now National Socialism had got hold of the authority of the state, because until then it had been a prohibited party, which of course, after the agreement of February 12, was allowed within the Fatherland Front and had been asked to cooperate in the political life. the arrival of German troops, which came to the National Socialists.
Q Now, one last questions: After the Anschluss, did you not repeatedly tell the Reichsmarshall that the Fatherland Front, on the occasion of the Anschluss, had collapsed like a house of cards? collapse of the Fatherland Front did, of course, happen when the Chancellor resigned. The Fatherland Front was the collecting point for resistance, and with the 11th of March, resistance had collapsed.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution want to cross examine? BY MR. DODD:
Q Dr. Schmidt, when, for the first time -- if you know-- did the defendant von Papen suggest to Chancellor Schuschnigg that he, Schusnigg, have a meeting with Hitler?
A Late in autumn 1937, possibly November; it may have been December, von Papen made the suggestion for such a meeting. These meetings did not, however, have any concrete results. The official in vitation was brought by von Papen on or abort the 6th or 7th of February, after he had returned from his visit to Hitler. On that day I heard of that invitation. assured Schusnigg that this meeting would be restricted to very well defined lines, and that it would concern itself only with matters that were agreed between Schusnigg and von Papen before the conference took place.
conference, that is, "11th July, Final Removal of Existing Differences" and so on and so forth. That had been agreed between von Papen and Schusnigg. entirely favorable for Austria?
AAssure him? No. But a declaration was given by von Papen to the effect that the situation at the time was favorable. In this connection, von Papen referred to the conditions such as had been created on February 4. following these events, and that for a very cheap price, therefore, a certain success could be scored by the Chancellor. briefly, which, I think, will help us--is this: You and Schusnigg had the impression that advantage would accrue to you and to Austria if you attended this meeting, isn't that so?
A I said earlier that the Chancellor was not optimistic. An improvement on the situation, therefore, was hardly expected, but removal of the existing differences. conversation with a man by the name of Hornbastel, is that so? The ambassador. same evening, you and Schusnigg?
A It is ppssible. During those days, repeated discussions took place.
Q Well, maybe I can help you a little bit. Don't you recall that Zernatto and SEyss-Inquart were drawing up a memorandum of some sort about domestic questions while you and Hornbastel, I believe, or someone else, were preparing a paper or papers on international matters or matters of foreign policy? Does that help you any?
A I'm afraid I haven't understood you. were preparing a memorandum of some sort about the foreign questions, and Sernatto and Seyss-Inquart were preparing papers about domestic affairs.