secution and for the defendants -- that it will materially help the Tribunal if counsel would submit translations of their speeches at the time they make them.
DR. NELTE: (Counsel for defendant Keitel). Mr. President, the decision which you have just announced to us has surprised the defense, since they have not been previously heard with reference to this question. This appears to us to be all the more regrettable since the decision is, in practice, against the most elementary rights of the defense because it impedes the possibilities for us to state in court what, in this most important trial, is of importance to the defendants and the problem with which they are confronted. material. If I were to state, without taking into account the other defendant counsel, the case of the defendant Keitel as an example, then you will probabl understand that the material alone which has appeared after the cross-examination puts me in an extremely difficult position. I am sure that applies to a large number of the other defendants' counsel as well.
In my opinion, these matters cannot be dealt with collectively. Consider ing all attempts to see these things collectively and typically, they must, nevertheless, be adjusted to the case of the individual defendants. to me. In practice, it is almost impossible to achieve it so that an apportioning in a manner just to the indicidual defendants could be carried out. announced -- I am not sure whether it was only a suggestion -- should once again be reviewed, with consultation of the defense. Without wanting to speak before the reasonable statement which the entire defense is trying to make, I wish, nevertheless, now, to formally raise objection to the decision limiting the rights of the defense, a limit which exceeds the measure of what is bearable to us.
THE PRESIDENT: Do counsel either for the prosecution or the defense wish to make any other observations to the Tribunal upon this subject?
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to state that I take exception to Dr. Nelte's argument, that it is a violation of an elementary right of these defendants, because in our country I think I am quite right in saying that it is quite common practice for our courts to restrict counsel in the matter of final argument, even when -
THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry, Mr. Dodd, but I am afraid there are three voices, English, French and Russian coming on the wire, on the Russian channel.
(The proceedings suspended temporarily).
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the interpreter thinks it is all right now.
MR. DODD: What I wish to say very briefly is that with respect to Dr. Nelte's argument that a restriction in time with respect to the final argument is a violation of a fundamental right of these defendants, I wanted to call to the Tribunal's attention that in our country it is, I would say, rather common practice for our courts to restrict counsel in time in final argument, even in jury cases where there is much more need for argument, as the Tribunal has pointed out.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other counsel wish to make any other observations?
DR. von LEUDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for the defendant von Neurath): Mr. President, to begin with, I should like to make some remarks regarding the limit imposed upon our time. If we are limited to 14 days, then that means approximately four hours per defendant for our arguments. But, then, in reality, these four hours are not four full hours, since, because of the technical arrangement which has become necessary for this court room, we are forced to speak much more slowly than we would speak during a direct argument or a direct, free discussion. That is to say, of the four hours which remain to us on the average, we must deduct again that time which we lose through having to speak so slowly. speaking, amount to only three hours.
Mr. President, I believe that if you base your considerations on the assumption that in three hours we can deliver our arguments, you are making a miscalculation, and I believe that we are right in saying that during these three hours we cannot possibly produce all the material which is available for every defendant and consider it in such a manner that the case is indeed fulfilling that purpose which it is intended to fulfil.
it seems to be the most important thing to find the truth; but finding the truth not only means the individual's abruptly chosen action. It also means that first of all it must be shown how it happened that that individual's action came about. counsel for the defendant von Neurath, who was the responsible leader of the foreign policy for the Reich until 1938, I want to point out to you that the entire accusations which are alleged against my client are largely and unavoidably due to the circumstances as they developed. In this development of historical matters you will find the explanation for all the actions taken up to the day when my client offered his resignation.
All that I can do is to make that clear to you. I do not subscribe to the individual case of development. Gentlemen, if you take into consideration that in addition to that, I am still dealing with the subject of the activities of my client as a Reich protector, which alone is not altogether as simple as it might appear, you will no doubt grant me that I cannot possibly do that in a period which is tantamount to only three hours. are not before an American court here. I have just attempted to make enquiries about this. There is no information to the effect that in international tribunals, such as, for instance, the Tribunal of the Hague or the courts in Egypt, there has ever been a limitation imposed upon the duration of the speeches of the defense during the presentation of their cases. That is why I beg you to take into consideration that we are not before an American court here, but that this is an international tribunal, and that in this international tribunal, which, after all, goes far beyond the existing arrangements previously made and which goes far beyond the framework of any military tribunal which has up to now dealt with small particles of that tremendous complexity of Germany, never has there been a limitation imposed upon the defense for the stating of their cases.
will allow me to ask you once more to reconsider your decision and not have us give the impression that we are neglecting our duty of presenting our case for our clients by not submitting them in full.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I will only add very little to what my colleague Mr. Dodd has already said. The penal code of our country admits the right of the Tribunal to impose limitations upon both the prosecution and the defense in their final plea. decision of the Tribunal is putting limits on their rights and is unjust, is unfounded. The defense is already submitting evidence now in its case, and has every opportunity to give a complete presentation. I believe that there is no question of justice in limiting this trial.
I therefore uphold the argument of Mr. Dodd, and consider the decision of the Tribunal quite just.
DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for defendant von Papen): Mr. President, will you please permit me to make one brief statement? No legal procedure can be anticipated in the beginning without taking time. That cannot be done at any stage of the trial.
You cannot allocate time at the beginning; and at the beginning, therefore, you cannot limit the time which the taking of evidence will require. Furthermore, as far as the following stages and the length of the statements presented by the defense are concerned, they cannot be forecast, either, and therefore not limited. a defense is included in this proceeding at all --- is that one man who has that professional task and who has at his disposal the corresponding qualities must put before the Tribunal the material that he has found worthy of presentation, from long hours of work and in intimate conversations with his client.
That must, indeed, be done through such an intermediary; and just how far he will have to state his case is something that he as an expert must be able to decide. No man who participates in the proceeding, be he of the Tribunal or be he of the defendants' counsel, can approximately forecast the things that might become necessary and might be essential in this connection.
the case for the prosecution, or during the collection of evidence, or during the case for the defense, for the end of the cases. difficulties. However, only the point of view expressed by the President can be the deciding factor for limiting the proceedings; and he, while directing the proceedings during the case for the prosecution, again and again confined the proceedings to the necessary amount of statements. I cannot understand why a similar procedure should not be suitable during our case. counsel would apply to himself, a suitable limitation on the length of our presentations would occur in any case. But I honestly believe that no one with the exception of a participant, and he only at the end of the entire collection of evidence, can anticipate how much time will be required. It is obvious, therefore, that any limitations imposed on the length of time now should be very carefully considered. If the statement made by the participant this morning is to the effect that our cases should be cut down -- and in this connection we are particularly grateful for the hint regarding the statements referring to the evidence -- then we shall most certainly come to a conclusion without this definite limitation, with respect to the suggestion made by the Tribunal, and limit ourselves as much as we possibly can.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't propose to go fully or at all into the argument which led the Tribunal to making the announcement which I made this morning, but I think it would be desirable for Counsel for the defense, before they make any formal objection to that announcement, to study it. I do desire to say on behalf of the Tribunal that that announcement was not made without consultation both with counsel for the prosecution and counsel for the defense, and that was done in closed session. We heard both the counsel for the prosecution and counsel whom we understood to be representative counsel for the defense, and they made the suggestion which they thought right to us at that time and we fully considered it. We intimated to them that they should draw the attention of their brethren to what passed at that hearing in closed session. Therefore, it is entirely inaccurate to say, as Dr. Nelte did, that the announcement was made without hearing counsel for the defense. will give further consideration to the matter. The suggestion made in the announcement was that the fourteen days, which the Tribunal thought sufficient for the speeches for the defendants, should be apportioned voluntarily among counsel. Those fourteen days are full days and will not be taken up at all by any argument upon the organizations, and until the defendants' counsel has attempted to make that apportionment, it must be obviously impossible for them to know whether they will be able to make their speeches, which are not speeches that are necessarily detailed examinations of the evidence, but are arguments drawing the attention of the Tribunal to the main points which they desire to draw the attention of the Tribunal to, it will not be possible for them to know whether they can make their speeches satisfactorily within the fourteen days. The counsel for the defense ought, therefore, to go into the matter together, as the Tribunal understood they were doing, and see whether they can satisfactorily present their speeches within that time. All the arguments which have been presented to us this morning were fully presented to us by counsel for the defense who appeared before us at the closed session, one of whom has addressed us this morning.
DR. STEINBAUER: Dr. Steinbauer, counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Mr. Witness, in answer to the last question put by the American prosecutor, you have stated that your letter had intended to represent a certain tendency, and I now want to ask you, what tendency was that? activity against Dr. Seyss-Inquart and some other people. They came from dissatisfied elements, radicals in Austria and the Reich. They utilized Dr. Seyss-Inquart's hesitant attitude of the 11th of March, his tendency to the revolutionary line, and the maintaining of the principal points of the agreement between the two states, in order to accuse him of being a separatist.
Q Perhaps, Mr. Witness, you can be a little more brief.
A Right. These attacks seemed to be dangerous because Buerckel Heydrich was behind it. I considered the attacks to be unfair and I worded my report, therefore, to produce arguments and to put the evidence on such facts which would make it possible for the service to understand my argument. that the merits of the party on one side protected Seyss-Inquart's person at the time?
A Yes. That is a good way of expressing it.
Q Now, my second question. In that letter you have mentioned that Seyss-Inquart had taken a letter of ultimatum to Schuschnigg. Have you any recollection to the effect that he had compiled that letter in his office, that he had prepared it?
A Dr. Steinbauer, you mean the letter of ultimatum of the 11th of March? participated in writing it.
the prosecutor, that through the collaboration of Dr. Jury amd Leopold, Seyss-Inquart had become a state councillor, and I want to ask you, did you mean that Dr. Jury and Leopold had a chance of having influence on Schuschnigg?
A No, and that can't be the meaning of it. document to you. It was a speech which you hade made in Thuringia. Do you remember that?
Q Is that speech typical for such a speech in the country? I mean, from the point of view of the propaganda of Goebbels? Was it underlining your merits and making propaganda against the opponent?
A I wouldn't say that. It was a social get-together of the Old Guard on the occasion of the 11th of March, during which there was a certain amount of beer and there was music and I described events rather like a story teller. I spoke for a very long time; in fact, it was the longest speech I ever made. It took more than three hours. I was speaking quite freely by memory. I had no written material, and the record which is obviously available now appears to me not to tally with my statements in every point. effect upon the members of the party rather than to write history?
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you very much. That is enough for me and I have no further questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Dr. Kubuschok, counsel for von Papen BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: occasion you had met von Papen at Garmisch. What did you talk about to von Papen at the time and how did that conversation come about at all?
A Dr. Seyss-Inquart and I had been invited to Garmisch by the Reich Sports Leader. The German-Austrian-Alpine Club was to be disussed. Together with von Tschammer we were watching the bob-sled races at the lake there. We also met von Papen. Herr von Papen, Seyss-Inquart and I then walked back from there to Garmisch, and on that occasion the political situation was discussed and the -
THE PRESIDENT: You don't need to give the details of it. I suppose the poiht of the question is that the conversation was not political. Is that the point of the question?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The conversation was political, but it is a question of the type of political conversation it was. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Perhaps, Witness, you can confine yourself to the facts. The reason that I know that, it was an accidental meeting. When you were coming back from the bob-sled race now, what were you talking about?
A We were talking about the situation in Austria. We talked about the state of affairs regarding the pacification and we talked about any individual point which might be exhaustively interesting during that meeting. Austrian public. Were these matters in keeping with the July contract? you have pointed out that you had talked to others, on the evening of the 8th of March, 1939, invon Papen's apartment. I should like to know whether in this case we are concerned with a pre-arranged meeting or whether that was once more a more or less accidental meeting? have arranged it. The conversation dealt, naturally, with matters in regard to Schuschnigg's plan for the plebescite, whichwas entirely new and most surprising, so that we had to think about it from every point of view and clarify it during debate.
Q What was von Papen's position during that conference? that evening, was acting in a reserved way. I think that he would have considered the outcome of the plebescite as perfectly possible.
Q. For which reason did you think that yes was considered a possible and plausible answer by him ? Was it for practical reasons or was it due to the questions which the Asutrian Government had submitted ?
A. It was with reference to the questions which had been submitted.
Q. Once again, my question is : Did the matters which were discussed arise in any way in a subversive conference, or was it a more or less social gathering during which a political conversation cropped up due to the atmosphere fo the time ?
A. It was an accidental meeting; it was altogether improvised.
Q. Were any resolutions passed ?
A. No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: With the permission of the Tribunal I shall now call the witness Dr. Guido Schmidt.
GUIDO SCHMIDT, a witness, took the stand, and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Will you state your full name.
A. Dr. Guido Schmidt.
Q. Will you repeat this oath after me: pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(the Witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Witness, what positions did you hold in the Austrian Republic ?
A. I was a diplomat by profession under Dr. Seipel. I was taken into the Austrian Foreign Service and for about six years I was a member of the Austrian Legation in Paris. Then I was assigned, to the head of the Austrian State for negotiations with the diplomatic corps.
In 1936, under Dr. Schuschnigg, I became State Secretary, and later Foreign Minister. From that time on, I had no political activity.
Q. Witness, what reasons in foreign politics and economics led to the agreement of the 11th of July 1936 ?
A. At the beginning of 1936, the foreign political situation of Austria had changed to Austria's disadvantage. After the events of 1934, England France and Italy prepared a three-power agreement concerning the maintenance of Austrian independence. Beyond the international obligations which are considered to have existed, the three powers now set up a new guarantee for the maintenance of Austria. was pursued. The collapse of the Streser front as a result of the Abyssinian undertaking of Mussolini, meant for Austria the loss of its only practical international guarantee, and for Chancellor Schuschnigg, the creation of a completely new situation. With this concept of foreign power, Austrian independence rested not only on the shoulders of Italy, but on other shoulders, such as these of England and France. situation in Europe from March 1936 on, from the day on which Adolf Hitler, at the beginning of his surprise politics, occupied the Rhineland without encountering serious resistance from the western powers. the fear that some dry in the Austrian question as well a surprise solution, or, as we later saw, a forced solution, might come. which the agreement was based. Also the closer relation between Rome and Berlin, which began to be felt at this time, was traceable to the sanction policy of the League of Nations. Austria, lying between Italy and Germany, had to expect that one day the Austrian-Italian friendship which had existed since the time of Dollfuss, would fall victim to the closer relationship between Rome and Berlin.
sought a way to improve relations, to restore relations between Austria and the German Reich. on Austria's thoughts in regard to foreign policy. The basic thought was the maintenance of Austrian independence. Austrian foreign policy was furthermore based on the knowledge of the extremely difficult and ticklish geographical situation of this country between two totalitarian states, at the crossing point of ideologies of Europe.
Therefore, it had to be the task of Austrian foreign policy to reach an understanding with her great neighbor, the German Reich. The foreign policy further had to be based on the determination to avoid everything that could lead to a conflict with the German Reich, to avoid everything that could antagonize the Reich, in order to prevent violent action which had to be feared after the 7th of March. determination: to maintain relations with the German Reich, relations which had been unnaturally interrupted. Aside from the reasons of foreign policy, there were also economic considerations. The world economic crisis, because of Austria's rather weak economic constitution, affected Austria very seriously, young state. From the very beginning, all neighboring countries of Austria had carried on an economic policy of chauvinistic self-interest, and in no case had it been possible to reach very close cooperation of all Danube countries. There were individual combinations, such as the Rome Protocol, but the mutual distrust which all had brought from their former homes, and monarchy, continued to exist and obstructed such healthy development. number of attempts to relieve the situation. I will mention them briefly, and begin with the attempt of the government to create a customs union which failed because of the resistance of the League of Nations. In 1932, there was an attempt by France to bring Austria and Hungary into the Little Entente and to reach economic cooperation there. Germany and Italy opposed this. England was also against it. against National Socialism. This also had its effect on the economic life in Austria, because the economy was also used as a battle theme in the internal struggle.
THE PRESIDENT: This is undoubtedly interesting, but it has rather a remote bearing, perhaps, upon the questions which the Tribunal has to decide. I don't know whether the witness has dealt with it sufficiently for your purposes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this presentation of the facts I wanted to show that from the economic and foreign political point of view the situation was such that the role of the defendant was forced into the background, but we can continue with the question. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Witness, will you speak quite briefly.
A. The conclusion?
Q. Yes.
A. The economic relations with the German Reich were broken off, and Austria's struggle for economic existence was put on a very shaky basis. Because of these considerations, and for economic reasons, too, Chancellor Schuschnigg attempted to reach an agreement with the German Reich and to restore economic relations which had been completely broken off, to remove the "1,000 mark blockage", to restore foreign traffic, the flow of economic goods, to silence the complaints which were coming from the provinces in Austria because of the lack of market for agricultural products, grain, cattle and so forth.
Q. Witness, I ask you now: Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart work on preparing or concluding this agreement of July 1936?
A. No. The Chancellor worked with Glaise Horstenau.
THE PRESIDENT: There is a defect in the sound equipment, so we had better adjourn.
(A recess was taken).
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Witness; in the spring of 1937? Seyss-Inquart entered politics, and presumably you met him. in domestic and foreign policy lad to the Wall known meeting of Adolf Hitler and Dr. Schuschnigg in Berchtosgaden.
A This question demands a detailed answer. I ask for permission to be able to express myself in somewhat more detail. situation had become worse. Italy had entered a foreign engagement in Spain in favor of France which reduced its weight in central Europe. What we called "The Watch at the Brenner" had, in affect, ceased to exist, and Germany had more or less a free hand toward Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal has common knowledge of the history of this time. It is not necessary, really, to go into it. BY DR. STEINBAUER: at Obersalzberg at that time.
A Yes. I should like to add, if I am to pass over the historical events, that is how I had to understand the question. The Chancellor accepted the invitation in order to prevent Austria's being reproached for having refused a peaceful attempt to clear up existing differences between Austria and the German Reich. The Chancellor was by no roans optimistic for the reason that the existing differences of opinion were very great and also because of the personality of his associate in the talks. I recall that Schuschnigg before leaving for this meeting told me that he was of the opinion that it might have been better to send Professor Wagner Jaureck, the greatest pshychiatrist of Vienna, in his place, but he believed, in view of the exposed position of Austria, that he had to accept in order to gain time until the international situation should improve in Austria's favor and in order to avoid violent action.
Unfortunately we were right. The fear of a coming attack or of coming difficulties was justified.
We were justified in the fear that Austria would be left entirely alone. The realization of the fact that we were completely deserted was one of the primary reasons, together with considerations of bridging over this difficult period end gaining time. Austria had to take this difficult way in the dark time which was coming in the end of the winter of 1937-1938 in Berchtesgaden until March 1938 without the light of any immediate or prospective assistance. That is how Berchtesgaden came about.
the events at Berchtesgaden?
A Yes. Contrary to press reports, the interested big powers were informed in detail both before and after Berchtesgaden. I gave all the formal material to the head of the political section to whom the diplomatic corps applied first. The Chancellor himself and I gave detailed reports to the accredited foreign representatives in Vienna.
THE PRESIDENT: Forgive my interrupting you, but we do not want the details. You said you informed the foreign powers beforehand and afterwards. That is sufficient. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Now we return to the defendant. Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart take part in these talks in Berchtesgaden? and he went to Adolf Hitler in Berlin. Did he report the contents of his first talk with Adolf Hitler to Schuschnigg? by State Secretary Zernatto, the head of the Fatherland Front, from which I can conclude that a conversation between Minister Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart must have taken place. Schuschnigg also learned of it?
Q Now we will go on again to March. Schuschnigg planned a plebiscite. Do you know whether Schuschnigg informed Seyss-Inquart of this or discussed it with him?
A Yes, Seyss-Inquart was informed of it. I learned that about the 10th of March an agreement between Seyss-Inquart and the Chancellor was reached. The Chancellor told me that Seyss-Inquart had declared himself willing to speak on the radio in favor of the election.
of invasion, did you in your capacity as Foreign Minister, inform the foreign powers of this? I learned of the critical situation only from the ultimatum which demanded a plebiscite on the resignation of the Chancellor---13 March. From then on, there was constant contact with the diplomatic corps in Vienna and later, in the following hours, with all foreign representatives. upon one another. In particular, the demand was made that Schuschnigg should resign. To ministers were assembled, and a member of the government is said to have told Seyss-Inquart the following:
"We now see clearly that the Reich is putting an end to dealings with Austria. It would be best for Seyss-Inquart to take over the office of Chancellor so that the transition can be at least bearable."
Do you remember such a statement?
A No. Only later did I hear of this statement by Minister Glaise Horstenau which contained this request to Seyss-Inquart. speech of Schuschnigg the Fatherland Front, which was directed by him, also had collapsed? tuation. The resignation of the Chancellor was demanded by ultimatum, so that the existence of the Fatherland Front had also fallen away. With the entry of the German troops, National Socialism had become a reality. Developments showed that it did not leave the Fatherland Front any life. his cabinet, and you, witness, were proposed as Foreign minister; is that correct?
A That is correct, I refused. I was requested again and I refused again, and then the reason was asked. Then Seyss told me that he intended, as long as possible, to keep Austria independent, but he was afraid that with his government, with the National Socialist majority, he would encounter difficulties in the West. Therefore, he wanted to have my diplomatic experience and connections retained for the government. to form a broader platform for this government.
Q Did you know the names of such positive Austrians? Did you find any such names in the list?
A There were such names. I have wondered about it myself, but I cannot give any individual names with certainty. the final list? I later learned, a rejected me, and others too, I believe. I think I can remember one name. I believe that he suggested, on behalf of Berlin, that Weber should take over the foreign ministry. Thus, this list was discarded and Seyss no longer tried to dissuade me from my negative position. independent, although under National Socialist leadership?
AAs a witness, I can only say what I know. Opinions are very difficult to express. I have stated what he told me.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions to put to this witness. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (counsel for defendant von Papen): at that time, Mr. Messersmith, Mr. von Papen, at the beginning of his activity in Vienna, is said to have stated that his real task in Vienna was the economic and political incorporation of Southeastern Europe in Germany, that Southeastern Europe was the natural hinterland of Germany.
Did you, witness, ever learn of such a statement?
A No. In view of the close contact which I had with Minister Messersmith before my appointment as a member of the government, and especially later, I would probably have learned of it.
I assume, however, that this question had no special significance, or was not given any special significance at the time, because in first visits between diplomats, as a rule, they usually make a tour do raison of questions which interest both countries, that is, general political questions; nor did I note later that Southeastern Europe's policy vans being carried on from the German Legation.
Q According to Mr. Messersmith, Mr. von Papen is supposed to have said at that time that he was working to weaken and undermine the Austrian Government. Do you believe that Mr. von Papen made such a statement, and, particularly, did he carry on such a policy?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you can't ask him whether he believes that a certain statement was made or not. That is pure speculation; it is not the subject of evidence. Therefore, that question must be withdrawn, and no answer given to it, and it will be struck out.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q I will now ask the witness this: Did the witness Messersmith report such a statement by Mr. von Papen to you? strengthen relations with the Reich by an agreement in July of 1936?