A Certainly not, for that wasn't the case, and if any assertions or claims like that were being made abroad, they certainly weren't true. of the interpreter Paul Schmidt.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is page 68 of Document Book 12-A, and it is page 65 or 66 of the German version, paragraph 4.
Q (Continuing): Now, just let me read you paragraphs 4 and 5, as to what Herr Paul Schmidt says:
"4. The attempted putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfus on 25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the Foreign Office because these events discredited Germany in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi methods both in foreign and in domestic policy. This concern over the repercussions of the attempted putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence in leading to the FranceSoviet Consultative Pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis."
Defendant, let's take that. In these three points, is it correct as Herr Schmidt says, that the attempted putsch and the murder of Dollfuss seriously disturbed the career personnel in the Foreign Office?
but I was personally disquieted, as well.
Q And taking the last sentence:
"This concern (that is the disturbance by the Putsch) over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes (blood purges and the Putsch) were of influence in loading to the France-Soviet consultative pact of December 5, 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning." recognising that the blood purge and the Putsch had alarmed France and the Soviet Union as to the position of Germany and led to the consultative pact? Schmidt.
Q No, with respect to you, defendant, it is not. What interpreter Schmidt is saying is that that was the opinion of your experienced staff in the Foreign Office and that is what I am putting to you. Is he not right in saying that your experienced staff were concerned that these events had had their effect on the consultative pact? heeded as a warning by the Nazis?
"The announcement in March of the establishment of a German Air Force and of the introduction of conscription was followed on 2 May, 1935, by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the Foreign office regarded this as a further very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy but the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude towards the Western Powers, declaring that they were not going t o be intimidated. At this time, the career officials at least expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler."
Now, just let us take that. Do you agree that the career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded the France-Soviet pact as "a further serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy"?
A I do not know in the name of whose personnel Mr. Schmidt is making statements, in whose name he is making these statements. But I, at any event, did not say anything to the effect that my career personnel expressed opinions to this effect.
Q Well, here is Herr Schmidt saying:
"The career officials, at least, expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath." That is you. though he was an interpreter for a great deal of the time, are you saying that Herr Schmidt is not stating what is accurate when he says that your personnel, officials, expressed their concern to you?
A Quite exclusively and completely. How could Mr. Schmidt know, who was only an insignificant official at that time, what my career personnel and officials told me and on the other hand, how could Schmidt judge this? And beyond that I should like to add that Schmidt said here, before this Court, that this affidavit or whatever this may be, was submitted to him after he had just recovered from a serious illness and that he personally did not have exact knowledge of the contents. that I put these paragraphs to Herr Schmidt and he agreed with them when he was giving evidence before this Tribunal. We will read paragraph six because I want to ask you about the end.
"The re-entry of the German military forces into the Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A German communique of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed that the French-Soviet pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the Covenant of the League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the background statements in Main Kampf offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhoneland was decided upon.
I personally knew about it and discussed it approximately two or three weeks before it occurred.
Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning the risk of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in government circles consulted by Hitler who felt confident that the Rhinland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from England and France. Neurath's position throughout this period was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath that in the general run of old school diplomats, whom he (Hitler) tended to hold In disrespect". about and discussed the march into the Rhineland some two or three weeks before it occurred, how much before it occureed had you discussed it?
A. Mr. Schmidt must have been clairvoyant and a soothsayer for two or three weeks in advance I even did not know anything about it. I heard this decision only one week in advance and if it says here that in the Foreign Office it was generally common knowledge that I was the only one in the government circles consulted by Hitler who was confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France, I, of course, was right.
Q. But is it true that you were the only person in government circles be thought that it could be occupied without interference by Britain and France? Is that true?
A. I am not in a position to say that, whether I was the only one, but at any rate, I had that conviction, based on my knowledge of international conditions.
Q. So that at any rate, whatever the militations of Herr Paul Schmidt, he know what your position was quite accurately. Was he not right about it in the last sentence, that your position throughout the period was one which would make Hitler look to you rather than to the rest, the other officials of pre-Nazi diplomacy and foreign affairs, because you were the person who was encouraging him?
Is that not the position?
A. I did not encourage him in any way, but I described the situation as I saw it, and the fact that I was right, that is a matter of proof.
Q. Well now, I just want you to deal with one other point, which is really 1936, but we will deal with it as I have been dealing with Austria. to the description of the Austrian treaty, the treaty between the Reich and Austria of the 11th of July as being a subterfuge or a facade. That Is right, is it not, you objected very strongly to that view? Gauleiters of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. to carry on the struggle at the same time as the treaty was signed?
A. No, I do not know anything about that.
Q. just let me remind you. I do not want to put anything that seems unfair.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is document book 12, page 97.
This is the report of Dr. Rainer, whom the Tribunal has had the advantage of seeing, and if you will look at the end of one paragraph it says:
"The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons (that is defendant SeyssInquart and Colonel Glaise-Horstenau). Papen mentioned GlaiseHorstenau to the Fuehrer as being the trusted person".
Now, the next paragraph:
"At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the pa rty--" THE PRESIDENT: Sir David -SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you say 97 of document book 12?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I did, My Lord, yes. Yes, My Lord, it is the third paragraph, and begins -- "it that time--" THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see it, SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If your Lordship pleases:
"At that time, the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the party in Austria, in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National Socialists should do". THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was another "At that time" that we were looking at. Could you five us some other indication?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : My Lord, it is in the middle.
THE PRESIDENT : It is on 98 in ours.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : I am so sorry, My Lord. The paging must be different, I beg Your Lordship's pardon. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE :
"At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the Party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National-Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor --"
"--became his successor and leader of the Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Dr. Radnor and Globocnik visited the Fuehrer at the Obersalzburg, where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler." supervised the conclusion of this treaty, that he intended to give the illegal Gauleiters instructions as to how to carry on the fight ? Didn't he tell you that ? same Mr. Rainer who appeared here as a witness-- who stated that Hitler has summoned him and told him and other Gauleiters that in the future they were to observe the agreement of 1936, and that is the fact that I remember, and this matter that you just quoted is not mentioned in the document that you put before me.
Q It is not mentioned. What is mentioned is the political instructions for carrying out the fight and the organizational instructions from Globocnik. At any rate, you knew nothing about that ? made sincerely if you do not know the instructions that are given to the illegal Party in Austria by Hitler, is it not ?
A Yes, Yes, of course.
Q Well, now, just let's deal with one or two oil or points. I would just like you look at what Mr. Messersmith says at the end of 1935. You remember this statement-- I will give you the reference in a moment--that :
"Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are diplomats of the old school. They are in fact, servile instruments of the regime, and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sew discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime."
Now, can you tell us up to the date on which Mr. Messersmith wrote that-on 10 October 1935-- of a single instruction of Hitler's that you had not carried out ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : My Lord, I am sorry; I mislaid the reference. It is Document Book 12, page 106. That is the reference to it. BY SIR DAVID MARWELL-FYFE :
Q You see, Mr. Messersmith is there saying that you and the defendant von Papen and von Mackensen are servile instruments of the regime. Now, I am just asking you whether you could tell us up to the date that Mr. Messersmith wrote, on 10 October 1935, any instructions of Hitler's that you had refused to carry out. the number of times I objected to Hitler and contradicted Hitler, and I talked about Messersmith's affidavit and its significance.
Q Defendant, I will put it this way : Up to 10 October 1935, what did you tell the Tribunal was themost serious thing that Hitler has ordered you to do and you had refused to carry out ? What was the most serious--the one that mattered most ?
AAt this moment, that is a question that I can not answer. How do you expect me to remember what the most serious question was that I opposed and fought ? I fought many, many things. not trouble you with it anymore.
A Please give me examples. It is rather hard to make a statement and a claim without giving me the possibility of refuting any claims.
American diplomat put. I would like to ask you about Mr. Bullitt's report, with which I gather you agree.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : My Lord, that is L-150, and it is at page 72 of the document book 12.
THE PRESIDENT : Yes, it is 74.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : Yes, it is 74. I am sorry My Lord. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE :
Q Now, it is the second paragraph there. After saying that he had a talk with you, he says :
"Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until"the Rhineland had been digested". He explained that by that he meant that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. "As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France can not enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop."
Q You agree you said that ?
A Yes, yes. Certainly, yesterday or the day before I testified in detail about what that was to mean.
Q I would like to see if you agree with the meaning I suggest. That is that as soon as you had got your fortifications in sufficiently good order on your Western Frontier, you would proceed to try and secure an anschluss with Austria and to get back the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. Isn't that what it means ? I want to say by the statement and I express myself to the effect that these countries, particularly Czechoslovakia and France, would change their policy as regards Germany, especially if they saw they could not march through Germany at will.
Q You appreciate, defendant, what I an putting to you ? I think I made it quite clear-- that at the time that you were facing the Western Powers with the remilitarization of Germany and the Rhineland--that is in 1935 and 1936--you were then giving assurances to Austria, which Hitler did in May 1935, and you made this treaty in 1936.
As soon as you had digested your first steps, you then turned against Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. I an suggesting, you see, that you were talking the exact truth and prophysizing with a Cassandra-like accuracy. That is what I am suggesting--that you knew very well that these intentions were there.
A Not at all. Not at all. Not at all. That is an assumption on your part, and it has no "backing at all. There is no proof for it at all. point before we proceed to 1937. support the Nazi attitude toward the Christian churches, of oppressing the churches. I have understood you correctly, have I not ? repression of the Church. Would you just look at document 3758-PS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : My Lord, that will become GB 516. My Lord, Your Lordship will find it in document book 12-A, page 81. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : diary of the Reich Ministry of Justice :
"The Reich Foreign Minister sent over, with a personal note for confidential information, a letter from Cardinal State Secretary Pacelli--" That is the Present Pope. "-- to the German Ambassador in the Vatican, in which he (Pacelli) presses for an act of pardon for Chief Curate Seelmayer. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, remarks to this that after the heavy attacks on the German Administration of Justice by the Holy See in the note of 21 January, there is no reason in his opinion to show any deference to the Vatican. He recommends it, however, since, because of foreign policy reasons, it is valuable not to let cool off the good personal relations with Pacelli."
personal interest in the fate of Father Seelmayer, or were you concerned with showing a firm front to the Vatican and not losing your good relations with Cardinal Pacelli ?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the document is just being submitted to me now; I have had no opportunity to look this document over or to check into it.
I do not know that up until this time, in this proceeding, there has been any question about a diary of the Reich Minister of Justice. Therefore, I am not in a position to judge how the Reich Minister of Justice could have made this entry in his diary. form a complete picture. The same is true of the defendant; he cannot draw any conclusion or significance from it.
Therefore, I must object to the admissibility of this; I have to protest against this question being put and the document being used.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: This is a perfectly good captured document. It is a copy of the original diary of the Reich Minister of Justice, and it is therefore admissible against the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: DR. von Luedinghausen, you can see the original document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, actually, I am just told, by my American colleagues that this diary has been used before, that extracts were put in in the case against the defendant von Schirach.
THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I have no misgivings-
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I can't understand a word, Mr. President. I am sorry, I could not understand a word. I can hear new.
THE PRESIDENT: When you make an objection, you should see that the instrument is in order.
What I said was that you can see the original document. I am told now that the original document has been used before, and that therefore there is nothing to prevent its being used in cross-examination. It is a captured document, and you can see the original.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I did not know that, Mr. President. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Minister of Justice shows no concern for the individual priest about whom the complaint had been made; it is merely concerned with your relations with the Vatican and with Cardinal Pacelli, as he then was. Is that typical of your interference?
Is this typical of your interferences for the sake of ill-
treated priests? it ispictured in this excerpt hero, according to the notice, I said that we had no reason to show any special deference for the then State Secretary, rather, the Pope had attacked German justice, and for foreign political reasons I did not want to dampen our connections with Pacelli.
I can't quite see what conclusions you wish to draw from this.
Q Well, I don't want to trespass on the ground of my Soviet colleagues, but you know that the Czech report accuses you, with complete impartiality as far as sect is concerned, of your government ill-treating the Catholics, Protestants, Czech National Church and even the Greek Church in Czechoslovakia. You know that all those churches suffered during your protectorate. Do you agree that all these churches suffered under your protectorate?
A No, not at all; not at all.
Q All right, I won't go into the details, but I an suggesting to you that your care about the various religious confessions did not go very deep. prove.
Q Well, I would just like to put one thing. You remember telling the Tribunal this morning of the excellentterms that you were on with the Archbishop of Prague?
bishop.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: My Lord, this is a copy, but General Ecer assures me that he can get the original from the Czech Government files. I only received it a half hour ago. General Ecer, who is here from Czechoslovakia, says that he can vouch for the original.
Q (Continuing) Defendant, I would like you to look at it. Is that a letter which you received from the Archbishop?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is D-920, and it will be GB-517.
Q (Continuing) "Your Excellency, very esteemed Herr Protector of the Reich:
"Your last letter has filled me with such sorrow because I was to learn from it that not even you, Your Excellency, want to believe me that I fell unconscious and had to call the Professor of the University, Dr Tirasek, who remained at my bedside for an hour. He will come again today, together with a specialist for internal diseases." And then he gives his name.
"Your Excellency may be convinced that I shall always do what I can to please you. Pray, however, have mercy on me and do not ask me to act against the laws of the Church.
"With the greatest esteem, "Karl Kardinal Kaspar, brines Archbishop."
Do you remember that?
A I cannot say just what this document is referring to. I have no idea at all; it doesn't say. I cannot say to what it refers.
Q You can't remember this occasion when the Prince Archbishop wrote to you and told you the effect, the illness that he had suffered from and beseeched you not to ask him to do something against the laws of the Church? It doesn't remain in your mind at all, does it?
A No, no,; I don't know that. occurrences in 1937. You remember you dealt with your speech yesterday-
I think it was to the German Academy of Law. You remember the speech, in August of 1937? I can give you a reference. Would you like to look at it?
A No. Please tell me where I was supposed to have made this speech.
Q Don't you remember? I will put it to you if you like. It is the speech of the 29th of August, 1937, and I will give you the reference in one moment.
What I wanted to ask you was this. You said: "The unity of racial and national will created through Nazism with unprecedented elan has made possible a foreign policy through which the bonds of the Versailles Treaty were slashed."
What did you mean by "the unity of racial will produced by Nazism? more so thatn before. However, I really can't tell you at this time what I meant on that day. Apart from that, however, I just established and set down a fact in this speech.
Q Now tell me this. That was in August of 1937. You have told the Tribunal the effect that the words of Hitler, on the 5th of November, 1937, had upon you, and your counsel has put in the statement by Baroness von Ritter. After these words-
A (interposing) In November? discuss them among the people who had been present at the Hoszback interview?
25 June A LJG 15-1b
AA t Berchtesgaden? That is a mistake. This confer ence took place at Berlin rather than Berchtesgaden.
Q I didn't say Berchtesgaden; I said at the Hoszbach conference. We call it the Hoszbach conference because he took the minutes.
A I see. I have already testified with whom I spoke, Colonel-General von Fritsch, and with the then Chief of the General Staff, General Beck. I also testified that at that time we agreed to fight jointly against this tendency which Hitler had shown on this occasion.
Q Did you speck about it to Hitler?
A Yes. I testified to that in detail yesterday, that I only bad occasion to speak with Hitler on the 14th or 15th of January, because he had left Berlin and I couldn't see him before he left. That was the reason why I asked for my resignation at that time; that was the reason.
Q Did you speak about it to Goering and Raeder? secret Cabinet Council to which you were appointed after you left the Foreign Office. meeting on the 5th of November?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: M y Lord, it is page 81 in the English document book 12, and page 95 of the German document book.
Q(Continuing) It is only the first two sentences, defendant:
"The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance that its detailed discussion would certainly, in other states, take place before the Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet because of its importance."
Then, if you will look at the people who were there: There 25 June A LJG 15-2b is the fuehrer; the Minister for War; the three Commanders-inChief; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Hitler had wanted to discuss Austria before the same Council, the same limited number of people. Just lot us see who would have taken the places of the people who were there. Instead of von Blomberg and von Fritsch, you would have had the defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, and von Brauchitsch as Commander-inChief, would you not? their positions; the defendant von Ribbentrop had taken yours; and you were the President of the Secret Cabinet Council. Lammers was Secretary of the Cabinet, and Goebbels had become more important as Minister of Propaganda. people were that formed the Secret Cabinet Council.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Your Lordship will find that on page 8 of document book 12; and it is page 7 of the German document book.
Q Now, do you see who they are? There is the defendant von Ribbentrop, the defendant Goering, the Fuehrer's deputy, Hess, Dr. Goebbels, the Chief of the Reich Treasury, Lammers, von Brauchitsch, Raeder, and Keitel. You are saying, if I understand you, that this secret council had no real existence at all. Is that your case? matic information as president of the secret cabinet council?
Q Oh, didn't you?
Q Well, let us just have a look at this. Would you look at Document 3954 PS?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is Page 129 in Document Book 12-A. It will be CB 518. from Dr. Lammers to you:
"In conformity with your request, I have had the sum of RM 10, connection with the obtaining of diplomatic information, handed to Amtsrat Koeppen.
"I enclose the draft of a certificate showing how the money was used, with the request to send me the certificate after execution, at the latest by the end of the financial year". that at the end of March, which was toward the end of the financial year, you signed a certificate saying:
"I have received 'Ten thousand Reichmarks' from the Reich Chancellery for special outlay entailed in obtaining diplomatic information." for obtaining diplomatic information?
A Yes, I can tell you that. That is an expression used at the request of Lammers who had the Reich Treasury under his jurisdiction, so that I could meet the expenses of my office; that is, for one typist and for one secretary.
And in order to justify myself, because I had no special department, Lammers suggested that I use this expression. There was a letter -
Q That is all right. I am going to refer to the other letters. But why was it necessary that the expenses of your one secretary and one typist should not be audited?
DIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, the pages are 134 and 135.
THE WITNESS: I just said that. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Lammers:
"In my bureau there is a need to incur special expenses, to audit which it does not appear to me advisable."
Why wasn't it advisable to audit the expenses for your typist and secretary?
AAt the moment, I cannot tell you that. But at any rate, I did not use any moneys for diplomatic information; but these expenses mentioned here are office expenses purely and simply, in the letter which you have submitted to me.
A Please, may I finish my statement? ten by the secretary, in which he says -- No, this is not the lette I thought it was. say it was office expenses. Would you look at 3958 PS?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that will be GB 519. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: on the ordinary budget, the letter of 8 April 1942 to you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the book?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, yes; I am so sorry. It is 140. I beg your lordship's pardon. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q That is a letter to you which says:
"The Reich Minister for Finance has agreed that the budgetary needs announced by you for the financial year 1942 be shown in Single Plan 1.
"I therefore have no objections to having the necessary expen diture granted -- even before the establishment of Single Plan 1 -within the limits of those amounts, namely:
"for personal administrative expenditure up to 28,500 RM "for official administrative expenditure up to 25,500 RM "Total 54,000 RM". during the same period for which you were getting these additional sums.
So I am suggesting to you that these sums of 10,000 marks which you got every now and then were not for office expenditure, and I would like you to tell the Tribunal what they really were for. for I do not know.
Q They are your letters, and you got the money. Can't you tell the Tribunal what you got it for?
A No, at the moment I cannot tell you. But perhaps I can tell you later.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord. Dr. von Luedinghausen makes the point that the letter I put was in 1939. Of course, there were other letters. I have not troubled the Tribunal with each one, but there is another letter in which there is a reference to a payment on the 9th of May, 1941, and, of course, another reference to a payment on the 30th of June, 1943.
My Lord, these are Pages 133 and 134. I am sorry; I did not give the details. Perhaps I ought to have indicated that.
THE PRESIDENT: The letter on Page 137, which may have some bearing, is a letter from the man signed "K", from the man who made the previous applications?