You remember that, don't you? weren't you?
Q And why were alarmed? What was the cause of your alarm? What did you fear at the hands of Seyss-Inquart? been used by Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart as the basis for some of the political discussions, appeared to me to be politically useless It was my impression that two men were working here who had the wil to talk but who didn't do justice to the seriousness of the situation. There were descriptions used, such as the Austrian National Socialist conception opposed to National Socialism, but there is no difference. An Austrian National Socialist conception can only be National Socialist. I criticized these matters during our conference. with Hitler and that bad things would result from it for Austria?
By "him" I mean Seyss-Inquart. agreement between Hitler and Seyss-Inquart. found that much of the material that had been discussed between Zernatto and yourself and Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg was the basis for Hitler's demands on Schuschnigg, isn't that so?
Q And weren't you convinced, at least that day, that Seyss-Inquart had been in communication with Hitler some time before you got to Berchtesgaden and had communicated to him these basic demands? conference was a draft which had been prepared by men who knew the conditions, so that a considerable part of Seyss-Inquart's agree ment was based on this program of demands.
The entire program of demands had not been made known to us previously. Berchtesgaden? Reichenau were there for Germany, isn't that so? together in the same railroad coach to Berchtesgaden, did you?
A (Interposing): Whether Papen was in the same coach, that I am not sure of, but he was in the same carriage on the way back.
Q Well, he was on the train, wasn't he, whether he was in the same coach or not? Didn't he get on the train at the border an ride on with you end Schuschnigg?
Q Didn't he meet you at the border? particular conversation that you and Schuschnigg had with von Papen, either right at the time you met him at the border, or in the course of your trip up to Berchtesgaden, when he told you, "Oh, by the way, there are going to be a few generals up here. I hope you won't mind." Do you remember von Papen saying that?
A Well, generals were mentioned, yes. Whether the name Keitel was mentioned, that I can no longer remember, but it was said that he would be there.
Q Well, it was rather casually said, and you didn't have any opportunity to object at all, did you? And up to that time you hadn't known there were to be military men there.
A No, at that time we didn't know.
Q Now, you got to Berchtesgaden at what time of day? Early in the morning or mid-morning?
just what happened there that day. We have heard much testimony about this meeting, and you are the first person on the stand who was there. I guess that's not so -- Keitel was there also. But at any rate, you participated in the discussion. How did the discussion start? Hitler and Schuschnigg. That conversation took place alone, so that neither I or the other gentlemen were present. Later, the individual gentlemen were consulted, and then there were conferences between Hitler and the then Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, during which the program, points which had been pointed out before were discussed. In the course of the conversation, individual demands were ... if you were talking with anybody, or whatwere you doing? tioned, partly in the large hall and partly we sat in the ante-room right outside of the conference room. talking to Hitler? What was going on there? What were you discussing with Ribbentrop, if you were talking to him? I did that partly on my own, and I succeeded in having certain points eliminated we will know the exact sequence of events as they happened. While Hitler and Schuschnigg were in conference, were you just sitting around in an informal conversation or were you in an actual conference with Ribbentrop or with anyone else? program. The political discussion could only take place on the strength of the individual demands which were to be put. those recesses, didn't you have the chance to talk to Schuschnigg? During those few intervals? situation.
of the ultimatum which was presented.
Q Try to tell us what he said if you remember. What did he say about the violence of the language used? That's what we want to know. describing the meeting, and then that the Fuehrer had accused him of not being a German, and had accusedhim of not having followed the German policy which existed even during the time of Hapsburg, and that he was letting the Catholics do too much. Then therewere very serious arguments between Hitler and Schuschnigg personally, during which the Chancellor felt that he personally was being attacked badly. The details of this conference I cannot new remember, but the violence, according to Schuschnigg's description, was very hard.
Q You had luncheon there, I assume, at mid-day or shortly after?
AAfter the conference, on or about 12:00 or 12:30, there was a joint luncheon. There was a perfectly normal tone of conversation because in the meantime the waves had been calmed down.
Q Was Schuschnigg quite a heavy smoker?
A You mean then, or when? not permitted to smoke, and that, you pleaded with Ribbentrop to let him have one cigarette. Now, what about that? Is that so, or is that a story? smoking. That's true. Whether I tried to find a possibility for the Chancellor to be allowed to smoke or whether I actually asked Ribbentrop for permission for the Chancellor to smoke I don't remember, because that detail was not of any importance.
Q Well, alright. Anyhow, at this conference did Schuschnigg tell you that Hitler had told him that Seyss-Inquart would be made Minister of Security of the Government?
A I am afraid I could not understand you. There seems to be some interference.
Q Did Hitler demand that Seyss-Inquart be made Minister of Security?
Q Made by Hitler? the Army? were made. reinstated? mitted to the Universities.
Q And certain discharged officials were to be reinstated to duty also? stated to duty as well?
A That came under the chapter "reprieve action". customs?
Q Now, didn't it occur to you as soon as Schuschnigg heard these demands made on you, that this conference had exceeded the limits that had been placed upon it by Von Papen and Schuschnigg? You knew that right away, didn't you?
A Yes, the program was more far reaching than we expected, that's quite true, but I don't know whether Von Papen knew the questions previously.
A My question was, did you not go to Von Papen and tell him, "This is net what we came here to do" or something like that? Didn't you have any conversation with him during one of these recesses? expected.
Q What did Von Papen say?
Q Didn't he suggest, however, that you agree to Hitlers demands? been achieved, certainly was recommended by von Papen because in his opinion, an agreement should be reached. The Chancellor too gave his personal word, because he did not want to leave without a result being reached. Also, the situation was not to be endangered. Party in Austria, didn't he? Didn't he assure you that he would do that?
Q That he would recall Dr. Tafs and Leopold, the leaders of the Nazi party in Austria?
Q And also, you agreed to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Minister for Security? Wolf into the Austrian Press service?
A They were to be admitted. Fischboek was to be in the Ministry Economy, and Wolf in the Press section. the "Fatherland Front", to absorb them into your own program? Front does not meet with the situation.
Q Hitler told you that you had until December 15 to accept his terms, didn't he? I mean, February 15.
Q And he told you that if you didn't do so, he would use force? February, to march into Austria, and for the last time, he was prepared to postpone it. was going on? Men like the defendant Keitel?
Q Were you and Schuschnigg frightened? Did you think at one time that you were to be taken into custody or that you were to be shot?
thought we may not be allowed to leave.
Q Don't you recall that you and Schuschnigg . . . Didn't Schuschnigg tell you that when Hitler called Keitel in, Schuschnigg thought it would be the end? You remember Schuschnigg telling you that, and you said that you agreed because you were frightened too?
A I am afraid I don't understand you. to Vienna, that he was frightened when Keitel was called in, and that he was afraid that he was going to be shot, and you told Schuschnigg that you were frightened too or words to that effect?
A No, I don't remember that conversation. Shooting was never mentioned because, as I said, we were only afraid that if things didn't go well we might not be allowed to leave.
Q Very well. What was von Papen doing while the generals were moving in and out ? Did he see that as well as you ? difficult to say, after eight years what each individual was doing Were you pretty generally in a group ?
A There were continuous changes. We were not always together. There were various combinations going on all the time.
Q Let me put it to you this way: There wasn't any possibility of von Papen failing to see the generals there that day, was there frame of mind, didn't he ? as the best thing for you and for Schuschnigg, didn't he ? that pressure. He represented the German demands as well, yes, but not in an unpleasant or violent way. Even at that time I mentioned that to the Chancellor.
Q This was the situation, wasn't it: Von Ribbentrop was playing the role of the nice man, while Hitler inside was playing the role of the horrid man, and you and Schuschnigg were being passed back and forth from one to another ? acquainted with the subject very well and that for that reason alone he was keeping back. case, but in any event, isn't it a fact that you were being played off, so to speak, between the nice man, Ribbentrop, and the bad man, Hitler ? the position. We had to discuss the details with Ribbentrop, and Hitler stated that we would now discuss the details amongst us.
Q Could it be that you do not realize it yet ? Are you sure that that was not the situation, or is it only that you have not realized it to this day ?
AAbout what ? maneuvered between the good man and the bad man.
Well, if you don't understand, I don't think we need to go on with it. did you leave Berchtesgaden ?
A The late hours of the evening. I think it was between nine and ten, as far as I remember. quart, during which Zernatto had been informed both by the Chancellor and myself. Later on I joined that conversation, but I had the impression that the greater part of the report had already been completed. Only details were talked about later. told you that he wanted to retain some independence for Austria-some semblance of independence, anyway. Now, you did not believe that, did you, when he told you ?
A Well, of course, I can not say Yes or No to that. I turned him down, and therefore I did not think a great deal about his political coneptions because I did not propose to enter the government, but the demand was such that it had to be regarded as being serious. him down, didn't you ? What did you say about wanting to be truthful and decent ? Schuschnigg, that the laws of decency still applied to me, and that therefore I would resign with him.
Q Didn't you use the language, " I still believe in the rules of truth end decency" ? applicable to me. I went all the way with Chancellor Schuschnigg and I would resign together with him . You would have to know my relations to the Chancellor, and anyone who knew it would know that I could not have acted any differently.
Q I am not suggesting that. I am merely trying to show that you yourself used language in refusing Seyss-Inquart that indecated that you did not think he was truthful or faithful or decent. Isn't that so ? demand. There was a difference which arose from the fact that I was a friend of the Chancellor. where you testified under oath before the Court, and you remember telling the judge down there that Seyss-Inquart participated in the violent removal of Schuschnigg.
A Yes. Yes, I stated that I would not belong to a government run by Seyss-Inquart since that was, after all, partly responsible for the removal of Schuschnigg's government and since I was a friend of Schuschnigg I could not participate in such a government. and as he had been in the closest association with the Nazis, and having had your experience at Berchtesgaden, are you serious wehen you tell the Tribunal that you really thought -- you really believed Seyss-Inquart when he said he wanted to maintain some independence for Austria ?
A I doubted it at the time. I doubted Seyss-Inquart. What went on in his head, I can not tell you.
Q I am not asking you for that. I am asking you what went on in your head. about Seyss-Inquart not too many years ago ? took place.
turned to the events of 11 March 1938. Papen at the time used very serious, critical words on the procedure of those days with reference to Seyss-Inquart because he had done nothing for the independence of Austria and he said that he had not served German interests either. He wanted to state his criticism, and I had the impression that he was against the forced solution against the solution by means of force, which had always happened what it was that von Papen said about Seyss-Inquart -- and this was 1943, wasn't it, not 1940 ? It was when you were in Turkey and so was von Papen ? A: Yes.
Q: Now, maybe I can help you a little if you have forgotten. Didn't von Papen say that he would not shake hands with Seyss-Inquart ? A: Yes, he said that. He said that some time after the Anschluss he had refused to shake hands with him, and he referred to his behavior in 1938. Q: And he said his behavior was utterly impossible? Isn't that the language that von Papen used about Seyss-Inquart or some of the language? A: He did speak like that. Q: What were the other things that he said ? You have told down there in Vienna that von Papen used the harshest language imaginable in describing Seyss-Inquart and his conduct in March 1938. I think that is of some interst to the Tribunal, and I wish you would tell us exactly what it was. It is only three years ago that you and von Papen had this conversation, and you have not told us very much about it. A: He spoke in very violent terms. He passed a judgment in which he wanted to express that Seyss-Inquart had not protected the Austrians and that he had done nothing to protect the faith of Austria or safeguard the character and interests of Austria. That was Papen's basic thought, and his second thought was that the German interests had not been served by this either, and what he meant was that justified interests of the German Reich had been made to look wrong in the eyes of the World and that the foreign political interests of the Reich had been damaged. That was the principal thought in that conversation, and I think he made similar remarks during other conversations with other people. Q: All right. I am afraid I have passed on from Berchtesgaden and have omitted something that is probably of some importance. Do you remember some time-- I guess not long before you broke up your session there -- Hitler turning to von Papen and saying,"von Papen, you made it possible for me to be Chancellor, and I shall never forget it ."
Did you hear Hitler say that to von Papen that day at Berchtesgaden ? A: Yes, some such remark in some such form was made. Q: What did von Papen say ? A: That I can no longer tell you, I can not remember. Q: He said, "Yes, my Fuehrer," or something like that, didn't he ? A: Yes, I assume so, because upon being addressed like that he had to answer. Q: He certainly did not deny it, did he ? A: I don't assume he did,but I can not remember the answer. I can only remember the question. Q: The night in Vienna when the SS and the SA people were climbing in the windows and doors of the Chancellory, did Seyss -Inquart do anything to have then excluded A: Not to my knowledge. I don't know; I was on the other side. Q: Yes. It was a very tense situation, as we know. As a matter of fact, you were fearful that some harm would be done to Schuschnigg, weren't you ? A: The situation was tense. Q: How did you and Schuschnigg go home that night from the Chancellory ? A: We left in three cars -- the Chancellor in one, the President in the other, and I was in the third.The departure was organized or escorted by SS men who were present. Q: Schuschnigg was not taken home in Seyss-Inquart's private automobile by Seyss-Inquart; he was taken home by the SS; is that so ? A: No, they departed in a car together. I heard myself how Seyss-Inquart told the Chancellor he would take him home. Whether it was the Chancellor's car or Seyss-Inquart's car, I don't know, but at any rate they travelled in the same car. Q: Escorted by the SS ?
A No, not as far as I can tell you. I don't know whether there were SS in the Chancellor's car, but the SS only escorted the actual departure from the house, and there was nobody on the car or my car, of the President's car after that, after we had left the house, I mean.
Q That is not what you told the Court in Vienna. Down there you said, "Dr. Schuschnigg and I were driven home, escorted by the SS." the Ballhaus Platz. There were about 40 SS men present who conducted the departure from there. Whether some one remained in the car after that, I don't know.
Q All right. You probably can help us clean up one other question. When Seyss-Inquart made his radio speech, he was not actually a member of the Government, was he, or was he? The Chancellor had resigned in the hours of the afternoon, and the President had first of all not accepted the resignation, so, therefore, he was still Chancellor and Seyss was still a Minister. Whether later on the resignation was accepted that I don't know. Some say that the President had asked the Chancellor to continue in charge. Seyss-Inquart and others think that that was not the case. Only the head of the state himself can answer that question for you. at one document, and perhaps you can tell us whether or not you have seen it before.
MR. DODD: It is 4015-PS. It becomes USA 891. BY MR. DODD: Schuschnigg as the Federal Chancellor, but all other members of the federal government, as well as all Secretaries of State, of their respective offices, and that is March 11.
when he made this radio speech? That is our understanding of it.
Q That shows, does it not, that Seyss-Inquart was hot in office Is that so? question because I worked with the Federal President for a long time.
Q Just tell us exactly -- is that true or not? Is our understanding correct?
A It need not necessarily be that. In practice such documents sometimes go out days later because red tape slows then up. One would have to investigate therefore, when this was actually, in practice, carried out. I assume that it was not prepared until long after the 11th of March.
Q Was Seyss-Inquart frequently using the term "Trojan Horse" in the days preceding events of March 12? Was that a common expression of his? leader, and by that he wanted we testify to his loyalty, and he wanted to explain that it was not his task to open the back door to National Socialism.
Q Do you think he protested too much?
AAgainst what? three times from Zernatto.
MR. DODD: That is all.
BY DR. STEINBAUER: ness. Didn't Seyss-Inquart also post guards ?
Q At What time did that happen ? I mean, the actual resignation of Schuschnigg the new government was the time. I assume that it took place between nine and ten o'clock, since the President was having serious negotiations about the choice of a new Chancellor, and I think the former Chancellor, Dr. Ender, had been include in the debate.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions for this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now call the wit ness Police President Dr. Skubl.
MICHAEL SKUBL, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please ?
"Will you repeat this oath after me: and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Mr. Witness, which functions have you carried out in the Austrian Republic State for Matters of Public Security. Apart from that, I was the Inspector General of the Austrian Executive.
Q Were you called to these offices at the suggestion of Dr. Dollfuss, which instructions he gave before he died ?
A Dr. Dollfuss -- the day before he was murdered, on the 24th of July -- had appointed me as Inspector General of the Police. I had enjoyed his full confidence
Q Can one, therefore, describe you as having had Dr. Schuschnigg's confidence as well ? city as Secretary of State and Inspector General ?
A Yes. When Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister of the Interior and of Security, I joined him as Secretary of State. Consequently, I came under him initially, whereas until that time I had been subordinated directly to the Chancellor as Chief of Security. Seyss-Inquart, practically speaking ? legal movements ? curity, it was, of course, one of my leading tasks to fight against illegal movements, and particularly to fight against National Socialist aggression. Inquart and the July 1934 matter ? I mean, when Dollfuss was murdered.
Q What was his attitude towards National Socialism ?
A Dr. Seyss-Inquart confessed that he was a National Socialist. However, as far as I know, the so-called 120 or 150 percent National Socialists -- that is to say, the leaders of the illegal movement -- did not consider him to be a 100 per cent National Socialist. He was, however, considered to be an very suitable person to be used on the chess board of the National Socialist movement as a chessman, a very suitable chessman. a person who was leading ?
terior ?
A There were no disturbances; it was a perfectly harmonious, agreeable way of working.
Q Did he exercise any influence upon the police ? Did he, for instance, call National Socialists into the corps of the police ?
A No; that happened in no case. Chancellor Schuschnigg ? he was, of course, my supreme superior. It was a matter of course, therefore, the I would regularly, and upon being called specially, report to the Chancellor and take instructions from him. Hitler. Question: Was that an official journey, or was it kept secret ?
Q How did you come to that conclusion ?
A It had been announced. I knew about the journey; and Chancellor Schuschnigg so far as I knew, knew about the journey. It was pretty obvious that in his capacity as liaison man between the Austrian Government and the Reich he would have to have an opportunity to speak to Hitler. discussions with the Fuehrer ?
A Yes. Upon his return I met Seyss-Inquart at the station, and I asked him he the conferences with Hitler had proceeded. Seyss-Inquart, still being fresh under the Impression of the meeting and discussions, informed me of what he had stated to the Fuehrer. I still remember the inividual points exactly. Seyss-Inquart told the Reich Chancellor as follows:
"High Riech Chancellor: I am an Austrian Minister, and as such I am bound and I have sworn an oath of allegiance to the Austrian Constitution. I have sworn an oath, therefore, to Austria's independence and unity. Secondly, I am an active catholic, and therefore I could not join or follow a course which might lead to a cultural battle. Thirdly, I come from a country where totalitarian regimes are out of the question."
of the illegal NSDAP ?
A Yes. As far as is known to me, on the 21st of February Klausner was appointed Couty Leader.
Q When Dr. Schuschnigg announced the plebiscite did he order any special measures of security ? National Socialists, not only on the National Socialists in Austria, bur also the National Socialists in the Reich. There was feverish activity, therefore, and considerable safeguarding measures had to be introduced. lists were afraid that in the event of a plebiscite the would suffer a terrible defeat. The slogans for the plebiscite would have been accepted predominantly by the Austrian population.