A Yes.
Q -- you see the facsimile. Have you a copy?
Q Well, if you will just look at it. Now, it is in German. If you follow the German, I want just to read the bits which Goering has underlined, and I will read it in English and you check to see that I have get the right piece:
"For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish state. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this emissary on Wednesday, 30 August 1939.
The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves, and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator." before the bit about the sending of the plenipotentiary. associating himself with the importance of that point. night of the 29th, the defendant Goering made a great tirade against the Poles. the Fuehrer was preparing what I think in English is a "Magnanimous offer." in a portion of the bits of Poland. That is also in the preface to your book.
Now, there are two points about what he hedged in. In fact, it was much more than had been taken from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. Secondly, it was entirely different from what was cabled over by the defendant von Ribbentrop to Sir Nevile Henderson the next night.
A That's right.
Q And, Mr. Dahlerus, I don't think I can put it better than in your own words, if you will turn to page 75. Is this how you record it in your book, the second break?
"This map, a reproduction of which is given in this book, is extrawith which the decisions in this question were reached. I had the map with me when I left for London a few hours later, but it turned out that the boundaries drawn up on it differed very considerably from those given in the well-known Project Ribbentrop, presented at top speed to Henderson on the night between the 30th and 31st of August."
Q And than you go on to describe what it showed. Well, it showed this quite clearly, that 24 hours before that was cabled over to Sir Neville Henderson, the German Government had never seriously considered what portion of the Corridor they were going to claim, and what portion they weren't going to claim Is that so? Goering was putting an entirely different thing to you the night before, wasn't he? 27th. Yes, it was only the small *---*, and they extended the claims according to this last plan. you, what you were said to announce, that a magnanimous offer was coming, was actually an extension of claims, and equally, actually, quite different from what was suggested the next night.
by the defendant Ribbentrop. place on the 31st of August. You will find it a * page 84 -- no, I'm sorry, it is at page 87. It is the interview when Sir George Ogilvy Forbes gave you an account of what M. Lipski had said. I want you just to tell me this: You did meet M. Lipski, didn't you?
Q And, of course, -- obviously, the same could be said of everyone; I am sure of yourself -- M. Lipski was suffering from considerable strain in that most critical time?
Q Very nervous. And didn't Sir George Forbes tell you that M. Lipski made his opinion quite clear that the German offer was a breach of Polish sovereignty, and that in his view Poland and France and England must stand firm and show a united front, and that Poland, if left alone, would fight and die alone? That was M. Lipski's mood, wasn't it, at the time? tails, but there is a considerable and significant difference between the Polish version of the telegram of instructions to M. Lipski and the version which the defendant Goering showed you? saw Goering at 8 o'cloack, and would it be a correct description of the way in which he broke the fact that he had attacked Poland by saying that it was very gradual and slow, almost walking backwards, the way in which he broke the news to you that the attack had taken place? contact with the Foreign Office and informed somebody that according to the information I had received, the Poles had attacked, and they naturally wondered what was happening to me when I gave that information. Poland, and then you had a further interview with Hitler. There is just one point I want you to clarify.
I don't think you told the Tribunal about the time he said he would fight for ten years.
Look at page 98.
Q You see there, "Saying, 'Will ich zehn Jahre kaempfen,' he brandished his fist and bent down so that it nearly touched the floor." interview. and then I shall leave your book. September 2?
Q Now, you say this:
"To my surprise he was more inclined to listen to the viewpoints which I maintained. To my surprise he was, for as soon as we had sat down in his private drawing room car, he told me that there was talk of a mediation sponsored by Mussoline. Mussolini was said to be fervently trying to stop the war, and especially to prevent it from spreading."
The next sentence is:
"Goering said that he wanted to inaugurate a new Munich."
I don't want to put it unfairly, and therefore I ask you, Mr. Dahlerus, is the "he" in that sentence -- does it refer to Goering or to Mussolini?
Q You think it refers to Mussolini. That is what I suspected, and therefore I won't trouble you further about it except to ask you this: the points on this matter, and on these facts that I have put to you and with which you will agree, are they the basis of your opinion that the aim of the German Government, including Goering, was to split Poland and Great Britain and to occupy Poland with the consent of Great Britain?
A Well, if I had known the facts I heard later --
DR. STAHMER: I believe that this question goes too far, and I would like to put this question. It is a general question about the government and quite a number of persons, and besided it is an utterance of opinions and not facts about which the witness is asked.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The question is, are these facts the basis of your opinion?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is perfectly proper question and arises directly out of the examination in chief.
Q Mr. Dahlerus, you were answering. I had asked you are these facts-
DR. SAUTER (Counsel for the defendant Funk): Then I should like to ask, Mr. President, to take care that it will be clarified what is understood under the term "German government", which the Prosecutor has repeatedly mentioned. The German Government consists of a whole number of ministers, and if one speaks here continuously of the "German government" without saying who personally is meant by that term, then the impression must be made that each one of the ministers was responsible and had taken part in these negotiations, although in fact he might not have known about it. I am counsel for one of these ministers, who has not known anything about thesenegotiations, and therefore I am interested that the Prosecutor may be kind enough to explain what is meant by that term "the German government". That is to say, whether the Minister of Economics, Funk, is also included or whether it refers only to two or three other gentlemen.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I -
THE PRESIDENT: We do not agree at with what Dr. Sauter has said. We have already heard the defendant Goering at considerable length about what the government consisted of, and it will be upon the defendant's counsel, when the time comes to argue the case, to argue that the government did not include the members whom they represent.
Defendant's counsel do not seem to understand that what they call clarification is a matter than can be done in re-examination. Dr. Stahmer wil have the opportunity of re-examination, and he can ask any questions that arise out of the cross-examination.
Q I will put it, Mr. Dahlerus, in this way: Are these facts which you have heard and agreed with this afternoon, are they the basis of the view whic you put in that question which you answered to Dr. Stahmer?
A Yes. At the time when I thought I could usefully make something to prevent a new war, I could definitely prove that nothing was undone by His Majesty's Government to prevent it, but had I known what I know today, I would have realized that my efforts could not possibly succeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, there is one other point. I ask Your Lordship's indulgence. Dr. Stahmer asked for the names of these English industrialists. My Lord, I am very anxious as representative of the British government, that there should be no concealment about thematter at all, and I should ask, with all humility, that Your Lordship allow me to ask Mr. Dahlerus to give those names.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, if you wish to. wife's estate in Schleswig-Holstein?
A Shall I read them off or hand them in?
A The Honorable Charles McLarn, S. W. Rossen, A. Holden, Sir Robert Renig, Bryon S. Mountain, C. F. Spencer, T. Menceford.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Proseduticn wish to examine?
Do you not wish, Dr. Stahmer, to re-examine?
DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I would like to put a question. May I ask without being misunderstood, why this morning these names could not be read when Dr. Stahmer asked for them?
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you ask that question? What has it to do with the case of von Ribbentrop?
DR. HORN: This morning the witness Dahlerus was also approved for the defendant von Ribbentrop, and I had agreed with Dr. Stahmer about some question and I was interested in these questions; also, the question of the members that is, the names of the people who had been there.
THE PRESIDENT: The reason why the names were not given this morning was because we wished to got on with this trial, and we thought that the names of these gentlemen were irrelevant. But as Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe asked that they might be introduced in order that there could be no suggestion of concealment, the Tribunal *as allowed them to be given.
DR. HORN: Thank you. BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Mr. Dahlerus, you said this morning that on 23 August you were call by telephone by Goering in Stockholm and he had told you that the situation had become serious and that, therefore , he would like to talk to you. Has he also told you for what reasons he considered the situation at that moment as serious. Then you came to Berlin on the 24th, spoke at once with Goering. A that time did Goering tell you what had made the situation more serious in the meantime?
Q What did he tell you about the danger? In what did he seem to see danger of the situation? and that there was no indication that it would be solved made the situation serious. He also said that it altogether depended on the British attitude an initiative if a solution would be found. their object the solution of the Polish question? according to my notes, you said at that time you had been of the opinion that Hitler's plans were not quite clear and this afternoon you spoke of Goering. What is the reason for that difference in your answers? Government worked in close collaboration.
Q You concluded that then? Then you said before if you had known what you knew today, then you would not have intervened. What caused that change in your opinion? as published.
Q What facts do you refer to? August.
Q You have no further facts, have you?
Q And these points which are your further objections or doubts? October 1939, and a number of declarations made since.
correctly, which should have been brought about through Ribbontrop. Wil you tell us? was Ribbentrop, because his name had just been mentioned about a minute before.
Q I have one more question. What about the map of Poland which allegedly had been shown to you by Goering?
Q And what was the explanation given to you? and not Polos. offer and that map? discussed and various proposals had been made before the final definite proposal was submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire; and the Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1535 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, you will continue your cross-examination now.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have assumed, your Honor, that since Goering's testimony was suspended in order to hear Dahlerus, on the ground that it changed some of his examination, Dr. Stahmer would complete any direct examination he may have on this subject with the witness before I finished cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, yes. Dr. Stahmer, will you ask any questions of the Defendant Goering that you wish to as*, arising out of the evidence of the witness Dahlerus.
DR. STAHNER: I can ask those questions now only after I have spoken with him, and I, therefore, consider it advisable that Justice Jackson should continue his cross-examination so that I can also settle such questions that arise then at the same time.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal considers that you ought to be prepared to go on now. It is you who asked for the evidence of Dahlerus to be interposed, and Dahlerus was your witness, not the Prosecution's witness, and, therefore presumably you know what Dahlerus was going to say.
DR.STAHMER: I then ask for the opportunity of discussing the matter with the Defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court has just been adjourned for 10 minutes.
DR. STAHMER: I was not able to settle the matter in that short period of time.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal are of the opinion that you must ask these questions now and go on with the examinati on if you wish to examine the Defendant Goering on these matters, and you must do it now.
DR. STAHMER: Very well.
BY DR. STAHMER:
which is contained in Dahlerus's book. He stated this morning to my question that it was contained therein. I submit this map to you, which is to be found on page 53, and ask for your explanation of it. between Dahlerus, myself, and I believe the Fuehrer was also there, I took a map from the atlas spontaneously and outlined in red, blue and green certain regions, not as regions which we should demand from Poland, but those regions in which Germans lived. Since Dahlerus was of this opinion -- this is to be seen from the fact that on a nearby map he repeated the same markings -- he wrote as follows along side the first part marked as "containing German population", and then "according to Goering, regions containing Polish inhabitant:
He then stated, "Goering's first suggestion for the boundary agrees with the boundary line between German and Polish populations". That was not a suggested boundary, but a limitation between the two populations and was th only authentic suggestion that was made to the Polish Government. a distinction was made between the various populations, German and Polish. I the one area, there is a majority of Germans, and in the other area there are only Poles. Dahlerus was informed of these suggestions as to boundaries that were made in very general terms. mitted to Henderson, and the one which, since I drew it up, and understood it, went telephonically to the Ambassador for it to be examined.
Q Can you please repeat the last sentence? I believe it didn't come through. official suggestion which he, as the leader, the only person justified to ma* such a suggestion, had worked out, and it was also this suggestion that was read by Ambassador Henderson, and since he did not understand it, it was phoned by Dahlerus to Henderson in order that he might study it carefully and that he might be sure that the English Ambassador understood it in its entire There was, as I have always said, an enormous risk, since the Fuehrer had forbidden that this information be made public; I nevertheless decided to do so.
Nevertheless, as far as my actions were concerned, I point again to the notations: "Goering's indication of German population; Goering's indication of Polish population" and that was only made for his use as a means of orientation. him to come immediately to Berlin because in the meantime the situation had become serious. Please clarify this statement and explain this dangerous situation. came clear to me that the tension had reached its peak. The Fuehrer had stated that if a solution of the problem could not be brought about diplomatically, the solution would have to be brought about. At that time, since it was a statement without discussion made before the higher officers who would come into action in case there was a war, I, as senior officer, permitted myself to tell the Fuehrer, that the Wehrmacht would do its duty.
It was a matter of coursem that if the Wehrmacht were called upon it would do its duty.
as soon as possible. It was now a matter of days. The 25th or the 26th had been named as the day of the invasion. I wanted to make a last effort for negotiations. In order to tell the Fuehrer if such negotiations could be undertaken successfully, I hoped to be able to obtain a diplomatic or political solution. Consequently, it was in connection with the Fuehrer's speech on the 22nd that I wanted to call Dahlerus's attention to this matter. I, of course, did not tell him, and there was no good reason why i, as a German soldier, should tell this to a foreigner, and certainly not as an officer. That is the reason why I did not say anything -- the reasons I have recently outlined. top secret military matters, and could never be revealed, nor could we ever let such information come to the attention of the foreigh press. I point out that we had herein the same procedure as every other country in this world has had. these negotiations through the foreigh office? question should be settled peacefully. The work of the foreigh office is an official work. Here it was being worked on anyway according to the policies as set down by the Fuehrer, and I could only make my influence felt by an immediate appeal, and outside official channels. I did not have any official position as regards the foreigh countries, nor was I a foreign minister. matter of formality, but it was the more practical way of achieving something. If I wanted, however, to effect an influence on the Fuehrer, it was only possible to me if I said something to the Fuehrer* the effect that with his official approval it would make it much easier for the bringing about of an official solution. That would go more rapidly.
to take place simultaneously with the official negotiations. This was clear to England? at one or two points touched the official channels that were, at the same time, being presented.
That is to say first, the phase where Ambassador Henderson, instead of returning immediately to Berlin, stayed for one or two days in London in order to speak with the unofficial negotiator, Dahlerus,in order to inform the British Government of just what these unofficial negotiations were, as preparation for the official negotiations would be much better. this was the 28th -- could be taken in the direction of a peaceful solution. I believe this is demonstrated by the fact that the sane attitude was to be found on the part of the English Ambassador, who made a very clear expression of this fact. During these whole negotiations it was not a question, as far as I was concerned, of isolating Poland keeping England out of the quarrel, but it was a question of the Polish Corridor which had come up,to bring about some peaceful settlement on the lines of the Munich Agreement. Those were my effort until the last moment. If it had only been a question of eliminating England from the quarrel, then, firstly, the English diplomacy would have recognized that immediately -- it has enough training. However, it did enter into these negotiations. And, secondly, I would probably have used an entirely different tactic.
It is not that I am reconstructing this in retrospect; I am speaking of exactly what happened in those days -- what I wanted, and what I did. The test mony of what Dahlerus says in his book regarding his talks with the Fuehrer did not by any means take place as he describes them. His attitude in his book is a very subjective one, for the Fuehrer would not have been long a party to such a talk. unessential, but will be emphasized by the Prosecution, namely, that I, in a theatrical way, handed two collaborators swords so that they night take part * the aggressive action. One of these who is said to have received a sword from was my civilian secretary, Koerner. The most I could have given him was a pen. because it was his task to carry out the Four Years plan. The second person to whom I am supposed to have handed a sword was my chief of staff, a minister. director, who also was no soldier, but whose main task during the war was exclusively that of keeping my civilian, not my military, staff in order. For both these matters neither of these gentlemen needed either a sword or encouragement to behave in a military way.
action against Poland on the 26th of August, and that this date was later postponed? negotiations, that must not be forgotten -- if then these negotiations had not led to a clarification of the problem, as a consequence of the general mobilization of Poland, and as a consequence of boundary disputes that had actually taken place -- I remind you of the many thousands of Germans who had fled and had been beaten; in other words, the atmosphere at this time was such that the Fuehrer believed that a solution could only be brought about in a belligerent way. This delay came about precisely because, one, we believed that a diplomatic solution could be found, and then it was for me a matter of course that I shouldincrease my unofficial efforts toward peace, and that is the explanation of the conversations of Dahlerus in Berlin and London that took place so often. the situation was it was described very clearly by Dahlerus. The English Government did not send any ultimatum after the 1st of September, but it sent a note in which it demanded the withdrawal of German troops from Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: Will the interpreter please the Tribunal what the last question asked by Counsel was? Does the shorthand writer know?
(Interpreter repeated the question).
THE PRESIDENT: As far as we have heard we have had no answer to it yet.
DR. STAHMER: I have not understood what is going on, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The question you asked was whether the date of the 26th of August was arranged for the action to take place against Poland and the defendant Goering has been speaking for some considerable time and has not answered that question yet as far as I have heard.
THE WITNESS: I have answered that. Actually the 26th of August was seen by the Fuehrer as the date for the invasion, since he hold it necessary, in view of the situation at that time. It was then possible to persuade him to a postponement in order that further negotiations might be carried on. BY DR. STAHNER:
Q How is to be explained that Hitler's suggestion failed?
A "which suggestion? proposal that was read to the British Ambassador in a note, that is to say, the British Government was informed what demands Germany would make against Poland. This suggestion was not entirely understood and was then unofficially carried on. The British Government was unofficially informed of it and, as previously described, the proposal was carried by Dahlerus to London. It came to naught because the Polish Government did not consent to discuss this proposal. First there was a delay so that there might be a plenipotentiary appointed. Then they waited for an emissary. First of all it was thought that the Polish Ambassador might be this emissary but he, however, declared that he was not justified to conduct any negotiations. Because of that the Fuehrer decided on invasion the next day. This telegram I also sent to the British Ambassador via Dahlerus, the telegram of the Polish Government to its ambassador, in which it forbade him from conducting any negotiations regarding proposals or to make any proposals or to hand in any note on the subject. turned over to Dahlerus so that he could turn it over in turn to Henderson and I told him in addition, despite any scruples I might have had, that it was of extraordinary importance that the British Government should find out as quickly as possible about the intransigeance of the Polish attitude so that it might exercise some influence on the Polish Government to correct this condition.
I thus demonstrated that I knew the secret, I had cracked the Polish diplomatic code and thus endangered Germany with this unique occurrence, in that I should reveal this secret and I can only justify it by my wish to avoid war at the very last moment. I should, therefore, like to read the appendix to the official communique, the message from the Polish Government to the Polish Ambassador. I skip the first part and read only the following:
"..s a particular secret for the Ambassador, he is informed -- conduct official negotiations under no circumstances. In the event that oral or written suggestions are made tell the Reich Government that you have no plenipotentiary powers to respond to thorn and that your power extends only to that of turning over that communication to your government. You can do nothing until you receive further instructions." to do anything in the direction of peace and this telegram which the Fuehrer read also made him very doubtful of the possibility of reaching any peaceful understanding with Poland. of maintaining peace? But I should not like to rely altogether on the evidence of this took but also on what I can say here under oath. It was my firm will to do everything I could to settle this problem peacefully. I did not want war, consequently I did everything I could so far as I possibly could to avoid it. That has nothing to do with what preparations I, as a matter of duty in my capacity as a soldier, was obliged to make. which might possibly have killed Dahlerus. What can you say to this?
he would have to correct himself, that he had not received this absurd news from no, but that there was some confusion on his part because I mentioned Ribbontrop's name in some entirely different context. I had only one concern and that is what I brought his attention to.