Q. Well, at the time you were negotiating were you poli-
tically independant?
A. Absolutely.
DR. HORN: Thank you; no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further examination by members of the Defense? BY DR. LATERNSER (counsel for the General Staff and OKW):
Q. I have only one question, Witness: During the numerous negotiations which you heard, were there German officers there? Did high military leaders participate actively at any time?
A. Never.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the others of Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions?
(No further examination here by Defendants' Counsel) CROSS EXAMINATION BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q. Mr. Dahlorus, will you tell me whether I got all of your last answer to Dr. Stahmer correctly? Did you say that "I then realized that it was on the 26th of September, that his, Goering's aim, had been to split Poland and grab and occupy Poland with the consent of Great Britain?" Is that right?
A. Yes, it is correct, but I should like to say it was the German Government's, including Goering's, aim.
Q. The German Government. I am grateful. Now, I want you to tell the Tribunal quite shortly why you didn't realize that aim earlier.
DR. STAHMER: As far as I understand the answer of the witness, he said in answer to my question that that was Hitler's opinion of Goering. The witness has not spoken -
THE PRESIDENT: I think you are right in that, but the witness has now corrected it to say it was the German Government. You will be able to re-examine.
Q. Now, I just want to explain to the Tribunal -- and listen to the question I put to you -- why you didn't understand at that time. Your original object in seeing Goering at the beginning of July was to inform him that British public opinion had hardened and wouldn't stand another act of aggression, isn't that right?
Q The reason you went to Goering is shown in page 6 of your book, if you've got the English version.
Q And, Mr. Dahlerus, I want you to be absolutely sure that when I quote your book I don't take anything out of its context. Just before the break on page 8 you say this:
"The essence of National Socialism was bellicose and aggressive and completely devoid of all moral scruples in its dealings with other nations. Hitler thirs ed after conquest. It was said that Goering had energetically striven for a peaceful solution of the Munich crisis and this had lessened his popularity with the German Government."
That was the reason you went to Goering? that the British Government were bluffing over Danzig and Poland. convince Goering that according to British public opinion the British Government wasn't bluffing, is that right? the page--where you describe the end of your conversation with the Defendant Goering in the train before the meeting at the beginning of August. Do you remember?
Q Goering explained what his aim was. And if you look at the second line " This was a mutual agreement regarding the holding of an Anglo-German conference." And note the next words, Mr. Dahlerus "with plenipotentiary representatives from both Governments." One matter which Goering had always made clear was that he would demand the return of Danzig and certain rights over the Corridor -- the polish Corridor -- isn't that right?
territory could, if necessary, be ceded to Germany, didn't he? and he asked you to go to London. One of the points he wanted you to stress was that he and the German Government thought that there had been a great improvement in their military situation because of the German-Soviet Treaty.
A That's correct. then look at the top of page 36: "The reason was his disbelief that the German Foreign Office would be able or willing to establish a sufficiently close contact with the British Foreign Office."
later on he rang you up at 11.30 before your departure? didn't tell you that day. He didn't tell you, did he, that two days before, on the 22nd of august, at obersalzburg, Hitler had told him and other German leaders that he -- Hitler -- had decided in the spring that a conflict with Poland was bound to come. He didn't tell you that, did he? of April or the 23rd of may, or the 22nd of August. of August --as you have told us, you never heard of the Fall Weiss prepared in April, but I want to get it quite clear about the other one, GB-75 the 23rd of May. He never told you that Hitler had said to him on that day that Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. "It is a question of expanding our living space in the East." And I think he also didn't tell you that Hitler said on that day, "Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive." He never mentioned to you about isolating Poland. to see M.Lipski, the Polish Ambassador.
Q He didn't tell you, as I understand you, that he was going to inform M. Lipski that the main obstacle to any diminution of the tension between the two countries was Poland's alliance with Great Britain. He didn't tell you that, did he?
Q That is GB-39, PS-72, page 119. Do that while he was asking you to go to England to deal with one side of the matter he was dealing with Mr. Lipski on the other. I just want to got clear the situation on the 24th Did he tell you that the decision had been made to attack Poland on he morning of the 26th?
A. No, in no way whatsoever.
Q. Now, you asked to go for those general purposes, as I put them to you. You know now, Mr. Dahlerus, that on the next day our "note verbale" was given to Sir Nevil Henderson by Hitler, on the 26th.
A. Yes.
Q. And that note, as distinguished from what was said to you later on, said in general terms that the Polish question must be solved, so that the effect of the plans as they stood on the evening of the 24th when Goering rang you up, was that you were going off in the morning with the expression of a general desire for a peaceful solution, the "note verbale" was to be given to Sir Nevil Henderson on the afternoon of the 25th and at that time the plan was that Poland would be attacked on the morning of the 26th when you had delivered your message and Sir Nevil had sent out the "note verbale". That was the position?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, did Goering ever tell you why the plan of attack; neither that it was changed.
Q. He didn't tell you that -- and this Document PC-90, GB 64 -- I quote Goering's own words: "On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland" -- that was the 25th -- "the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him whether this was just temporary or for good. He said, "No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.' So then I asked him, 'Do you think that it will be any different within four or five days?" Goering never told you that at the time you were being sent to London all that was wanted was to eliminate British intervention?
A. Not at all.
Q. Well, now, I just want you to take again, quite shortly -- you went and came back with Lord Halifax's letter. I want to make this quite clear, Mr. Dahlerus: Throughout Lord Halifax made it clear that Great Britain was going to stand by her obligations to Poland, did he not?
A. Yes.
Q. And then on the 27th of August, the night of the 26th, 27th, at 12:30 midnight, you had this interview with Hitler. Now, to you, Mr. Dahlerus, Hitler for the first time made it clear that his terms were that Great Britain should help Germany in securing Danzig and the Corridor.
A. Yes.
Q. Not "rights in the Corridor, " but "the Corridor". Do you remember when you told Mr. Chamberlain that he was caught between praise and that given Mr. Mr. Henderson?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, I am not going to go through it all again, but I just want you to help me from your own book, which you say was carefully and objectively written, as to the state of mind of the rulers of Germany at that time. Now, would you first of all look with regard to Hitler on page 47? That is the passage you hove already told the Tribunal about, when he was shouting, "Dann werde ich U-Boote Bauen, U-Boote, U-Boote," to begin with?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, just let me put it to you -- it is quite short -- how you described it at the time, and you tell me if it is right. "If there should be a war, he said, 'Dann werde ich U-Bootc Bauen, U-Boote, U-Boote,' and raised his voice each time?"
A. Yes.
The voice became more indistinct and finally one couldn't follow him at all.
Then he pulled himself together, raised his voice as though addressing a Flugzeuge, und werde meine Feinde vernichten" and then you go on to say, "Just then he seemed more like a phantom from a story book than a real person. I stared at him in amazement and turned to see how Goering reacte, but he didn't turn a hair."
Now would you mind turning to page 53? There is one sentence before the bit I read on page 47. I just want to get that clear. You say, "His voice became blurred and his behavior was that of a completely abnormal person," Will you turn to page 53?
I want youto tell the Tribunal your impression of the way he treated the defendant Goering. The Tribunal has heard a great deal about the relations between them. At the bottom of the page you say that:
"From the very beginning of our conversation I had resented his manner toward Goering, his most intimate friend raid comrade from the years of struggle His desire to dominate was explicable, but to require such obsequious humility as Goering now exhibited from his closest collaborator seemed to me excessively repellant and unprepossessing."
Will you just turn over to page 54, the fifth line from the end?
"I realized that I was dealing with a person who could not be considered normal."
That was your considered view, wasn't it, Mr. Dahlerus? to deal with the Foreign Minister of Germany according to the impressions you formed. Generally, I think you got the impression that von Ribbentro p was doing everything he could to interrupt and spoil your endeavors?
Q But according to Goering, he went farther than that. Will you look at page 76? This is, you remember, when you were just saying goodbye to Goering on, I think, your last visit to London after he had drawn the map, which I will come to in a moment. Did you say this?
"Before we parted he again went over the German standpoint, saying finally that if we never met again he would like to take the opportunity of thanking me for what I have done and for my tireless energy in the cause of peace.
I was somewhat surprised by this farewell and could not help replying that in all probability we should meet again soon.
"His expression changed and he said solemnly, "Perhaps. But certain people are doing what they can to prevent you getting out of this alive."
That was said seriously and solemnly, Mr. Dahlerus?
Q And yougo on:
"At a meeting in October of the same year Goering told me that Ribbentrop had tried to arrange for my plane to crash. Hence Goering's solemn*mien when he bid me farewell."
A He mentioned Ribbontrop's name one minute beforehand, and then when he spoke about the plane crashing he said the name "he." I assume it was Ribbontrop.
I want you just toturn to page 100; I want to correct a few things. This is a description of the 1st of September,in the afternoon of the day on which Poland had been attacked,'and you saw the defendant Goering, I think, in the Air Ministry or at one of his offices. Do you see this just before the second break?"
"To him," that is, to Goering, "everything was lined up according to a plan which nothing could upset. Finally he ca**d in the Secretaries of State, Koerner and Witzbach, gave them a long harrangue, and presented each of them with a sword of honor, which he hoped they would carry gloriously through the war. It was as if all these people were in some crazy state of intoxication."
Are these your words?
Q That was your impression? Of course you mean that they were mentally intoxicated with the idea of war?
abnormal, the Reichsmarshal, or the Fieldmarshal, as he was then, was in a crazy state of intoxication, and according to the defendant Goering, the Foreign Minister was a would-be murderer who wanted to sabotage your plane?
A (The witness nodded) On the weekend of the 26th and 27th of August you went to England.
You have told me that you didn't know about the calling off of the attack on the morning of the 26th, and you didn't know that the intention of Hitler was to eliminate English intervention. You didn't know those points, so you went back to England on the 27th with those fuller terms, and the English answer was that while they maintained their obligations, they hoped and recommended that the German and polish governments might begin negotiations between them..... selves with regard to the point?
Q And that was the answer that you brought back.
had at breakfast time with Goering, I think in his train or in headquarters, on the 29th of August. You will find it at page 65 of the book, if you want to refresh your memory. At that time, didn't Goering try and convince you that the return of Danzig and the Corridor would make no difference to Poland's military situation? Germany was in a position to defeat the Poles anyhow, whether they had the Corrido or whether they hadn't?
f? Yes. were given to Sir Nevile Henderson. That was at 1915 hours, 7:15 in the evening, on the 29th of August, so the meeting went on for some time. Do you remember that meeting? difficulty arose over the demand for a plenipotentiary to be back in 24 hours, as you have explained. gone very badly, and then, at 11:30, you saw Goering and Goering said much the sane as Sir George Ogilvy Forbes as to how the meeting had gone. Henderson had characterized or implied that this demand that the plenipotentiary should come within 24 hours was equivalent to an ultimatum. terms?
A Yes.
Q -- you see the facsimile. Have you a copy?
Q Well, if you will just look at it. Now, it is in German. If you follow the German, I want just to read the bits which Goering has underlined, and I will read it in English and you check to see that I have get the right piece:
"For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish state. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this emissary on Wednesday, 30 August 1939.
The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves, and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator." before the bit about the sending of the plenipotentiary. associating himself with the importance of that point. night of the 29th, the defendant Goering made a great tirade against the Poles. the Fuehrer was preparing what I think in English is a "Magnanimous offer." in a portion of the bits of Poland. That is also in the preface to your book.
Now, there are two points about what he hedged in. In fact, it was much more than had been taken from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. Secondly, it was entirely different from what was cabled over by the defendant von Ribbentrop to Sir Nevile Henderson the next night.
A That's right.
Q And, Mr. Dahlerus, I don't think I can put it better than in your own words, if you will turn to page 75. Is this how you record it in your book, the second break?
"This map, a reproduction of which is given in this book, is extrawith which the decisions in this question were reached. I had the map with me when I left for London a few hours later, but it turned out that the boundaries drawn up on it differed very considerably from those given in the well-known Project Ribbentrop, presented at top speed to Henderson on the night between the 30th and 31st of August."
Q And than you go on to describe what it showed. Well, it showed this quite clearly, that 24 hours before that was cabled over to Sir Neville Henderson, the German Government had never seriously considered what portion of the Corridor they were going to claim, and what portion they weren't going to claim Is that so? Goering was putting an entirely different thing to you the night before, wasn't he? 27th. Yes, it was only the small *---*, and they extended the claims according to this last plan. you, what you were said to announce, that a magnanimous offer was coming, was actually an extension of claims, and equally, actually, quite different from what was suggested the next night.
by the defendant Ribbentrop. place on the 31st of August. You will find it a * page 84 -- no, I'm sorry, it is at page 87. It is the interview when Sir George Ogilvy Forbes gave you an account of what M. Lipski had said. I want you just to tell me this: You did meet M. Lipski, didn't you?
Q And, of course, -- obviously, the same could be said of everyone; I am sure of yourself -- M. Lipski was suffering from considerable strain in that most critical time?
Q Very nervous. And didn't Sir George Forbes tell you that M. Lipski made his opinion quite clear that the German offer was a breach of Polish sovereignty, and that in his view Poland and France and England must stand firm and show a united front, and that Poland, if left alone, would fight and die alone? That was M. Lipski's mood, wasn't it, at the time? tails, but there is a considerable and significant difference between the Polish version of the telegram of instructions to M. Lipski and the version which the defendant Goering showed you? saw Goering at 8 o'cloack, and would it be a correct description of the way in which he broke the fact that he had attacked Poland by saying that it was very gradual and slow, almost walking backwards, the way in which he broke the news to you that the attack had taken place? contact with the Foreign Office and informed somebody that according to the information I had received, the Poles had attacked, and they naturally wondered what was happening to me when I gave that information. Poland, and then you had a further interview with Hitler. There is just one point I want you to clarify.
I don't think you told the Tribunal about the time he said he would fight for ten years.
Look at page 98.
Q You see there, "Saying, 'Will ich zehn Jahre kaempfen,' he brandished his fist and bent down so that it nearly touched the floor." interview. and then I shall leave your book. September 2?
Q Now, you say this:
"To my surprise he was more inclined to listen to the viewpoints which I maintained. To my surprise he was, for as soon as we had sat down in his private drawing room car, he told me that there was talk of a mediation sponsored by Mussoline. Mussolini was said to be fervently trying to stop the war, and especially to prevent it from spreading."
The next sentence is:
"Goering said that he wanted to inaugurate a new Munich."
I don't want to put it unfairly, and therefore I ask you, Mr. Dahlerus, is the "he" in that sentence -- does it refer to Goering or to Mussolini?
Q You think it refers to Mussolini. That is what I suspected, and therefore I won't trouble you further about it except to ask you this: the points on this matter, and on these facts that I have put to you and with which you will agree, are they the basis of your opinion that the aim of the German Government, including Goering, was to split Poland and Great Britain and to occupy Poland with the consent of Great Britain?
A Well, if I had known the facts I heard later --
DR. STAHMER: I believe that this question goes too far, and I would like to put this question. It is a general question about the government and quite a number of persons, and besided it is an utterance of opinions and not facts about which the witness is asked.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The question is, are these facts the basis of your opinion?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is perfectly proper question and arises directly out of the examination in chief.
Q Mr. Dahlerus, you were answering. I had asked you are these facts-
DR. SAUTER (Counsel for the defendant Funk): Then I should like to ask, Mr. President, to take care that it will be clarified what is understood under the term "German government", which the Prosecutor has repeatedly mentioned. The German Government consists of a whole number of ministers, and if one speaks here continuously of the "German government" without saying who personally is meant by that term, then the impression must be made that each one of the ministers was responsible and had taken part in these negotiations, although in fact he might not have known about it. I am counsel for one of these ministers, who has not known anything about thesenegotiations, and therefore I am interested that the Prosecutor may be kind enough to explain what is meant by that term "the German government". That is to say, whether the Minister of Economics, Funk, is also included or whether it refers only to two or three other gentlemen.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I -
THE PRESIDENT: We do not agree at with what Dr. Sauter has said. We have already heard the defendant Goering at considerable length about what the government consisted of, and it will be upon the defendant's counsel, when the time comes to argue the case, to argue that the government did not include the members whom they represent.
Defendant's counsel do not seem to understand that what they call clarification is a matter than can be done in re-examination. Dr. Stahmer wil have the opportunity of re-examination, and he can ask any questions that arise out of the cross-examination.
Q I will put it, Mr. Dahlerus, in this way: Are these facts which you have heard and agreed with this afternoon, are they the basis of the view whic you put in that question which you answered to Dr. Stahmer?
A Yes. At the time when I thought I could usefully make something to prevent a new war, I could definitely prove that nothing was undone by His Majesty's Government to prevent it, but had I known what I know today, I would have realized that my efforts could not possibly succeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, there is one other point. I ask Your Lordship's indulgence. Dr. Stahmer asked for the names of these English industrialists. My Lord, I am very anxious as representative of the British government, that there should be no concealment about thematter at all, and I should ask, with all humility, that Your Lordship allow me to ask Mr. Dahlerus to give those names.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, if you wish to. wife's estate in Schleswig-Holstein?
A Shall I read them off or hand them in?
A The Honorable Charles McLarn, S. W. Rossen, A. Holden, Sir Robert Renig, Bryon S. Mountain, C. F. Spencer, T. Menceford.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Proseduticn wish to examine?
Do you not wish, Dr. Stahmer, to re-examine?
DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I would like to put a question. May I ask without being misunderstood, why this morning these names could not be read when Dr. Stahmer asked for them?
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you ask that question? What has it to do with the case of von Ribbentrop?
DR. HORN: This morning the witness Dahlerus was also approved for the defendant von Ribbentrop, and I had agreed with Dr. Stahmer about some question and I was interested in these questions; also, the question of the members that is, the names of the people who had been there.
THE PRESIDENT: The reason why the names were not given this morning was because we wished to got on with this trial, and we thought that the names of these gentlemen were irrelevant. But as Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe asked that they might be introduced in order that there could be no suggestion of concealment, the Tribunal *as allowed them to be given.
DR. HORN: Thank you. BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Mr. Dahlerus, you said this morning that on 23 August you were call by telephone by Goering in Stockholm and he had told you that the situation had become serious and that, therefore , he would like to talk to you. Has he also told you for what reasons he considered the situation at that moment as serious. Then you came to Berlin on the 24th, spoke at once with Goering. A that time did Goering tell you what had made the situation more serious in the meantime?
Q What did he tell you about the danger? In what did he seem to see danger of the situation? and that there was no indication that it would be solved made the situation serious. He also said that it altogether depended on the British attitude an initiative if a solution would be found. their object the solution of the Polish question? according to my notes, you said at that time you had been of the opinion that Hitler's plans were not quite clear and this afternoon you spoke of Goering. What is the reason for that difference in your answers? Government worked in close collaboration.
Q You concluded that then? Then you said before if you had known what you knew today, then you would not have intervened. What caused that change in your opinion? as published.
Q What facts do you refer to? August.
Q You have no further facts, have you?
Q And these points which are your further objections or doubts? October 1939, and a number of declarations made since.
correctly, which should have been brought about through Ribbontrop. Wil you tell us? was Ribbentrop, because his name had just been mentioned about a minute before.
Q I have one more question. What about the map of Poland which allegedly had been shown to you by Goering?
Q And what was the explanation given to you? and not Polos. offer and that map? discussed and various proposals had been made before the final definite proposal was submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire; and the Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1535 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, you will continue your cross-examination now.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have assumed, your Honor, that since Goering's testimony was suspended in order to hear Dahlerus, on the ground that it changed some of his examination, Dr. Stahmer would complete any direct examination he may have on this subject with the witness before I finished cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, yes. Dr. Stahmer, will you ask any questions of the Defendant Goering that you wish to as*, arising out of the evidence of the witness Dahlerus.
DR. STAHNER: I can ask those questions now only after I have spoken with him, and I, therefore, consider it advisable that Justice Jackson should continue his cross-examination so that I can also settle such questions that arise then at the same time.