THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal does not think that this matter can be gone into in extreme detail like this.
Q. Witness, perhaps you can be very brief about this and tell us what you did to alleviate conditions.
A. I really concluded it. I gave Secretary Hirschfeld all authority, including transportation, and this man, although hesitantly and reluctantly, re-established traffic -- and he will confirm that I supported him in every possible way. Food supplies were brought into Holland. But many weeks had passed in vain. Then, in my sector of influence, I provided additional allotments, about which Witness Von Der Wense and, I believe, the witness Schwobel can give you information in their interrogatories. The affidavit of Witness von der Wense will be shown.
DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Now, I should like to submit a document, an affidavit deposed by the witness von der Wense. It has just arrived but it has been translated, and I believe either this afternoon or tomorrow morning the translation will be available to the Tribunal. I shall now submit the original. I do not believe it necessary to read this comprehensive document. This affidavit very comprehensively and extensively covers the food situation in this period of time.
THE WITNESS: May I also call your attention to the fact that the Dutch Government -
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of it?
DR. STEINBAUER: No. 105.
THE WITNESS: -- that the Dtuch Government changed the figure from 50,000 deaths to 25,000. They made that correction. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Now I shall turn to the last period of your activity as Reichs Commissar. I should like to ask you, when did you realize that the military resistance in the Netherlands was in vain?
A. That we had to count on the possibility that Germany could not win the war is shown from my letter to the Fuehrer, addressed to him in the year 1939. The fear that things would work out that way arose at the time of Stalingrad.
Of course from then on we had to count on that possibility, and in time I feared this.
We know through a statement which Reichsminister Speer gave me on the 1st of April 1945 -
Q. 1945?
A. Yes, April 1945. Up until that time I did not want to believe this, but with the throat of an unconditional surrender and occupation, we naturally were worried about the results and the outcome. Speer at that time told me that the war, for Germany, would end in a relatively short period of time because armament could not keep pace, and he estimated possible two to three months at the most.
Q. When you realized this fact, what did you do, in practice?
A. I made the decision to end the occupation of the Dutch territories and not carrying out my duties to the Reich. I went to General Secretary Hirschfeld and we discussed this problem. We arrived at the decision to get in touch with our confidential agents in the Hague -- which was illegal for us to do. We tried to get to negotiate with them on the basis that the Allied troops should not advance against Holland, so that any further destruction would not come about; that the Allies would take over the feeding of the Dutch population and that we would wait for the end of the war. This was the counter-proposal that we made to the Dutch
Q. Wasn't this something that you undertook on your own in contrast -
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of this?
Q. What was the date of this?
A. This conversation with General Secretary Hirschfeld took place on the 2d of April 1945. Then there was a little delay and on the 30th of April we had a conversation with Lt. General Burdell-Smith. I did not ask for authority in Berlin for this; rather, I carried it out on my own. I did not contact Berlin because I did not want to meet with a refusal or prohibition.
I only undertook it on my own hook. General Blaskowitz, the Commander of the Netherlands, was very much afraid.
He called me to him even during the night, for his superiors had asked him just what the matter was. Nevertheless, I was determined to carry through this matter, for to me it seemed the only reasonable stop that I could take. I told him that I would assume all responsibility. On the 30th of April this conference actually did take place and the result that I had desired materialized. We dispensed with the military defense of Holland.
Q. Then what did you, personally, do?
A. Grand Admiral Doenitz, as head of the State, called me to him at Flensburg. I took a quick boat across the North Sea and told him, and the Grand Admiral will confirm me as my witness. I rescinded the demolition decree and tried everythin to return to the Netherlands. I embarked and I was arrested at Hamburg.
Q. Just why did you want to return to the Netherlands?
A. First of all, I wanted to take care of my co-workers; in the second place, I always was of the opinion that I should be hold responsible for my administration there; and, finally, I was of the opinion that we were in the first row in the hours of triumph and we can lay claim to be in the first row in the time of misery and disaster as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have concluded my examination in chief of the witness.
BY DR. KARL HAENSEL (Counsel for the SS):
Q Did you belong to the SS?
A I had an honorary position in the General SS. As such I was not a regular member of the General SS, but for ideological reasons and for purposes of information I was very much interested in the SS.
Q Did you have any function in the SS, or did you just have a title?
A De Jure, I had only the title. In a political connection, as far as the Netherlands was concerned, Itried to influence the Waffen SS, the Security Police and so on in a certain way, and in April of 1945 I believe I can say de facto that I was the first SS fuehrer in the Netherland organization, or werethere contradictions and divergences in the organization itself? Internally there was a great difference between two factions. One wanted the SS to be just a political training unit. Obergruppenfuehrer Eismeier belonged to this school. The other faction wanted to make a state executive organ out of the SS. Heydrich belonged to this group. At first Himmler vacillated, but later he went completely to the camp of Heydrich. executive powers.
Q Can you determine that as to time? In what period did this thought die out?
A I believe the beginnings were evident in the year 1938. With gigantic steps, this started at the time of theeastern campaign.
Q Wasn't it from the year 1939 onwards that the General SS made little or no appearance, but rather the executive groups or the Waffen SS remained after that time? and put them into his executive organizations. The Allgemeine SS, the General SS, did not exist for me, anyway, after that time. leadership, that he had any knowledge of this at all, or did he expect anything of that kind at all?
A I do not believe that the SS man knew this, but there were many SS men who felt very uncomfortable, who remained with their formation only because they felt it was their duty.
Q You said in your interrogation that a decree of Heydrich's caused you to transport Jews from Holland. Did you see a decree from Hitler to Heydrich? I would not have been satisfied with Heydrich alone. this decree?
Q Was it in writing?
Q And what did the decree say? over to him completely for all areas.
Q And when wasthis? '41? '40? When was it? I believe that was in the year 1942.
Q Wasn't it 1941? 1942 doesn't seem right.
A Perhaps he showed me the decree later. I do not know the date of the decree.
Q This decree you said, was rather general; it could be interpreted one way or another, is that right? It was a general decree? was to carry through the evacuation, and at that time I wasn't quite sure whether that was to be a final solution. It was possible. The most extreme case was that the Jews would be gathered in camps, and after the end of the war, would be settled somewhere.
Q I beg your pardon, Witness. The most extreme case would be that the Jews would be destroyed, and that took place. at the time.
Q And according to the words of the decree, you could picture it?
Q. Now, the question is : Was there the possibility that Heydrich could go beyond the decree of Hitler and did so? Was there the possibility that Hitler would not want the things that Heydrich later on did?
A. I cannot testify to that.
Q. Did you talk with Hitler before 1943?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think the witness can tell what the possibility was that Heydrich would do, any better than we can. He can't give evidence about that sort of thing.
DR. HAENSEL: Yes. BY DR. HAENSEL:
Q. Then, before 1943 did you discuss these problems with Hitler?
A. On occasion I was present when Hitler discussed these problems. It was always along this line, to eliminate the Jews from the German territory and to send them into foreign countries.
Q. But no one ever talked about destruction of the Jews?
A. Never. BY DR. SERVATIUS (Counsel for the defendant Sauckel):
Q. Witness, did Sauckel cause raids in the Netherlands and did he have churches surrounded?
A. He couldn't do that. I wouldn't have tolerated that, and he didn't ask to have that done.
Q. Did Sauckel have anything to do with the action of the Army in 1944?
A. No, he didn't know anything about that. When he heard about it, one of his men arrived so that he could recruit skilled workers, but this actually did not take place, for the Wehrmacht sort these men into the Reich right away.
Q. Referring to the regular worker transports to Germany, in connection with the recruitment carried out by Sauckel, were they effected under normal conditions, or could you determine whether there were excesses and abuses?
A. Whether it was voluntary or compulsory labor, transport conditions were always normal. The same favilities were used by the people as were used by regular Dutch traffic. They were accompanied by people from a certain office.
There were 2,600 who were arrested, but all the others were taken into camps as designated by Sauckel.
Q. Did Sauckel concern himself with the transporting of Jews?
A. Not at all.
Q. Do you know what the working conditions were for the workers who came from Holland to Germany?
A. I knew them fundamentally. They were the same conditions as applied to workers in the Reich. But difficulties arose. First of all, the leaders of industry in the Reich asserted that the Dutch people had been recruited under false pretenses to a certain degree, that is, thatthey did not comply with requirements. Secondly, these labor contracts had a certain duration and the industry leaders wanted to have the Dutch people remain in the Reich for a longer period. notbe observed in the Reich, no matter what the difficulties would be on the part of the Reich.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW):
Q. Witness, I wanted to put one question to you regarding the floodings. What did you, your office, or the Commander in Chief of the West undertake in order to prevent the flooding of all of Holland?
A. I am not quite clear as to the question. There were two dangers. Ono was that of blowing up, and the pumping stations couldn't do any good here, but it was prevented. The second danger was the lack of coal and the lack of oil. We tried, as long as possinle, to bring coal to the pumping stations, and this coal was of utmost importance, especially to the Wehrmacht, and we received less and less coal. We had our pumping stations work overtime so there would be no more flooding than necessary. and the deputy of the Dutch Government in England with whom I spoke later, to whom I sent my expert, said that from the expert point of view our flooding measures were not objectionable.
Q. Now, a second point. In answer to a question from your attorney, you said that you intervened against the destruction in the harbor of Rotterdam. With whom did you intervene? What person?
A. Defense Commander-in-Chief, General Christiansen, who took my side immediately.
Q. Then you agreed completely? Right away you achieved understanding?
A. Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: (Counsel for Defendant Speer).
Q. Witness, you mentioned yesterday the S-industries. Can you tell me when these industries were established in Holland, the Sperr-Betriebe industries, and what result applied to labor; that is, the transporation of workers from Holland to Germany? what was the result?
A. I believe the Speer Betriebe, the S-industries, were established during 1943, if I remember correctly, in the second half of 1943. The workers in the industries were protected. Therefore, the recruiting of Netherlands workers into the Reich was prevented in part, and altogether in part.
Q. So that the S-industries could produce and be active, were materials brought from Germany into Holland, especially coal?
A. I believe all raw materials, with the exception of coal. Goal was brought in from Limberg.
Q. You mentioned yesterday the Organization Todt. Do you know how far this Organization Todt worked on fortifications along the coast, and used local construction work, and just how much of the work was done by these local concerns?
A. I believe that the contracts for overwhelming number of work projects which was established in Holland were given to local concerns. This is tru of Holland; and Holland construction concerns carried out work in Belgium and in Northern France. These concerns brought their workers along with them. until the middle of 1942, were actively working in Belgium or Northern France. These were workers who had not come into these countries through the channel of regular recruitment.
Q. Very well. Can you tell us what results this had on the recruitment of local labor, just generally?
A. The local workers, naturally, preferred to go into the S-industries, for they were more certain of not being transported into the Reich. And while they were with the "O.T", they received special food rations.
Q. Witness, when in August or September 1944, because of enemy bombings the production in Holland was hampered, and in some places stopped, what measures were taken in order to protect the unemployed workers of the S-industries?
A. We had three possibilities: first of all, to bring the workers into the Reich; secondly, to dismiss there workers and to have them draw unemployment benefits; and thirdly, to retain these workers and to pay them their wages without workin, or working less. Speer that the third possibility was chosen. The workers in those industries received their pay, and I took care that the entrpreneurs would be compensated for wages which they paid out to those workers.
Q. Witness, you mentioned a discussion which you had on the 1st of April 1945, with co-defendant Speer. Can you tell us what the original purpose of this concerence, or discussion was?
A. For my part, I mentioned already that I wanted to talk with Speer about the decree of the "scorched earth". But Minister Speer also had a purpose for the conversation. He, for his part, wanted us to transport potatoes from North Holland into the Ruhr region, so that coal could be brought into the Netherlands. And in connection with the potato situation in North Holland, this would have been quite possible. But the traffic situation was such that we could not carry out this plan.
Q. Did Speer tell you about precautionary measures for the securing of food supplies?
A. Minister Speer told me that behind the Ruhr area he had stored transports of food, and in this way these cars were not at the disposal of the armament industry.
He thought that if the Ruhr area would be flooded, he would have food supplies to draw on.
DR. FLAESHSNER: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Does Counsel for the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? I am sorry, Dr. Kunoscok, did you have something to say?
DR. KUBOSCHOK: (Counsel for the Defendant von Papen) The Defendant Kaltenbrunner has asked me as one of the Defense Counsel who is closest to him to state that he had discussed with his attorneys a number of questions which he would like to put to Seyss-Inquart. I tried, to reach Dr. Kaufmann; and at present, in the course of this afternoon, I do not think it will be possible for us to reach him. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner asked for permission to have these questions asked of Seyss-Inquart tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will expect some explanation from Dr. Kaufmann as to why he is not here to cross-examine. He must have known that the time was about to arrive for him to cross-examine. But the Tribunal will assent to the suggestion that these questions may be put at a later date, tomorrow, if possible.
DR. KUBOSCHOK: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, do Counsel for the Prosecution wish to cross examine? BY M. DEBENEST:
Q. Defendant, you have studied law, and you have even told us that you obtained the diploma of doctor of law from the Viennese faculty in 1917?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. You were a lawyer from 1929 to 1938, on the 12th of February, at which date you became Minister for Home Affairs?
A. Beginning with the year 1921.
Q. I see; 1921. Very well, if you wish. Was not the majority of the people who would come to see you made up of Jews?
A. Not in a large measure. But there were some among them.
Q. Yes. Nevertheless, you told us yesterday that you had been an anti-semite since world War I.
A. My clients know that quite well. The office was known as such.
Q. Yes. But you did not object to accepting money of Jews.
A. It did not prevent the Jews from asking for my aid, either.
Q. Very well. You belonged to the Catholic religion, did you not?
A. How do you mean that?
Q. I am asking you whether you were a Catholic.
A. I was a member; that is, I belonged to the Catholic Church.
Q. Yes. And were you not equally a member of an association of Catholic fraternities while you were a student?
A. Never did I belong to any student organization or fraternity, either Catholic, or any other.
Q. Very well. You were appointed Reich Commissar for Holland by a decree of Hitler dated the 18th of May 1940; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You directives, when they reached the Netherlands, as you stated yesterday, were to maintain Dutch supremacy, and the independence of the Netherlands, and to establish an economic liaison between Holland and Germany; you added that these directives were never modified afterwards by the Fuehrer is that exact?
A I didn't quite understand one word, and that was the word referring to the economic liaison. directives to carry out. First, to maintain the Dutch independence, and secondly to establish an economic liaison between Holland and Germany, is that right? close economic relationship between Holland and Germany was to be brought about by economic progress in the long run, not to mention war necessities. of giving Holland a preferred political decree to the Dutch people, is that right?
A Well, I would not put it that way. It was my intention to further National Socialist politics, not to decree it, but to foster and further it.
Q Yes, I see. And was it also your intention not to introduce but to impose it?
Q Well, I am going to have shown to you a document, No. 997-PS. This document has already been submitted by the Prosecution under No. USA-708, and yesterday by the Defense. Will you kindly turn to page 7 and 8 of the German text? It is page 7 of the French text, at the paragraph "Measures." Page 7 of the French text. This document, as you will note, is a report which you yourself made.
Q "In this state of things, it was necessary to do away, to eliminate the influence of Winkelmann, which was done in the following manner. The general secretaries were informed that they would only receive orders from the Reich Secretary. The position of General Secretaries was kept by the same people, who were obliged to consider that it was almost impossible to find Dutch people to replace them, and who would be willing to take over the administration. In the Parties of the Reich, there were hardly people qualified to do this, but it seemed necessary, form a political point of view, that a certain number of measures in the National Economic Measures be political measures as well, and that they be made known to the Dutch nation with the signature of the General Secretary of this country."
to keep the General Secretaries, it is only because you needed them in order to impose and force certain measures upon the Dutch nation? Is that right?
A Yes, but how are you connecting politics with this? This is a matter of administration.
Q Not so far as I know. It seems as if we see two questions here, the economic question and the political question. question is mentioned, not political. And there is a difference, you know.
"But it seemed necessary, from a political point of view . . ."
Is that "political" or "police" which we see here?
A Just a moment, please. Yes, that's correct. But you don't mean politics in a sense of party politics, but rather, in a treatment of the Dutch persons where they were to turn to National Socialism. That's a matter of complete inducement. policy? at all, but that was part of my task. National Socialists? existence of the German people, and this battle was led by the people of the National Socialist party. But we were not interested in the carrying through of the 25 points of a Party policy, but rather, the carrying through of our fight for existence and that, I think, is what is concerned here. helped by 4 General Commissaires,who were Wimmer in Administration, Fischbueck in Finance and Economy, Rauter for Public Security, and Schmidt for Special Cases. The General Commissaire for Public Security , Rauter, was directly subordinate to you, wasn't he?
A The 4 General Commissaires were immediately subordinate to me. Rauter, in so far as he was the General Commissaire for the Security system, not in that he was the chief of the German police.
and to do that, you set up the two assemblies which existed there, and by the same decree, you limited and restricted the powers of the State Counsellor to the jurisdictional field. that way. of the Netherlands, and to do this, you issued a decree on 24 August 1940 which enabled you to appoint the President of the Dutch Bank. effect, yes.
Q Very well. When you arrived inHolland, Mr. Tripp was the President of the Dutch Bank and also General Secretary for the Treasury?
Q Very well. You had him replaced, and for what reason?
A Mr. Tripp, in the carrying through of the closing and currency limitations, did not want to cooperate. I put it to him that he could resign if he did not follow my measures or did not want to cooperate with me.
Q And with whom did you replace him?
A Mr. Rost von Tonningen.
Q How long did you know Mr. Rost von Tonningen?
A I do not believe I knew him. I knew him by name -- he seemed to have a capacity to have done the same function in Vienna for the League of Nations.
Q Since when did you know his name? but I do not know the exact date. you?
Q Was not Mr. Rost van Tonningen a member of the Dutch National Socialist Party?
Q Was it for this reason that you appointed him? represented our views. a few moments ago, 997-PS, page 5 of the German text and page 5 of the French text. This is what you say about Mr. Rose van Tonningen:
"Corresponds perfectly to all the ideological requirements, adjusted to the Germanic idea and to National Socialism, speaks very well and is extremely energetic. He does not find his strength in himself but needs the support of other people." Tonningen had any particular qualifications as far as finance goes. their capacities but, rather, their political position. I did not say that Mr. Messer was a well known or renowned engineer and so forth. I described only their political opinions and attitudes.
Q Thank you. Therefore, you set up in the Netherlands a civil government, a German civil government. functionaries who had those functions which ordinarily ministers would have. Some functions, however, had been delegated to the general commissars and secretaries, but these secretaries did not represent the ministry or government.
I mentioned yesterday that I took over the government. they not? they were not what you could call the supreme dignitaries of the states. These gentlemen were in England. government in order to carry on the duties of a government in the place of the government? England had I do not know. I assumed that they remained in order to direct administration in a technical way. In a complete occupation of a country, the occupying power must determine just how the government is to be carried on. in an occupied country was in conformity with international conventions?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I object to this question. In my opinion, it is a question which should be resolved by the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question may be asked. The defendant has already given his views of international law in his examination in chief. BY M. DEBENEST:
A May I please have the question repeated? an occupied country is in conformity with international convention?
Q And why? for the administration of this country, and, therefore, a responsible leadership had to be established in this country by Germany.
Q Very well. You, yourself, by the way, created the GeneralSecretariat, and more particularly, a secretariat for Information and Arts?
Q Yes, that is it.
Q And whom did you put at the head of this Secretariat?
A I believe first Professor Kudewagen. He was a member of the Dutch National Socialist Party. most part, of members of this party? dividually. was there as a counselor?
A The Dutch SS?
Q Yes, that is he. He was a consultant for national education and national development. for what?
A Yes, but I did not know him. I consider it possible, but I did not know him. I do not believe that he was there as an SS man in that capacity, but I believe that he was there for some special reason. the provincial assemblies; why?
A I can not say the dissolution of the administration. It was only certain representatives whom I eliminated. Not only did I keep the administration itself, but I increased their functions.
Q You even eliminated all the mayors of the most important districts? the authority of the occupying country. The Buergomaster of Amsterdam did not prevent the general strike but, rather, he fostered it. or at least a certain number of them?
A The mayors whom I eliminated were those who through an active, hostile demeanor, became unbearable to me.
On the whole, their political attitude was of complete indifference to me. Up to the year 1945 I kept this gentleman whose name I did not get as mayor, even though he was a very bitter enemy of National Socialism and a bitter enemy of us Germans.
Q Very well. Through whom did you replace all these mayors? took place with the agreement of Mr. Fredericks, the General Secretary for the Interior, who wasput at my disposal by the Dutch authorities. There were National Socialists; there were those who were not National Socialists. For instance, the brother of the Provincial Commissar of the Dutch people was a convinced and determined enemy of National Socialism and of Germany, and he was made mayor of one of theDutch cities.
Q But you are not exactly answering my question. I am asking you to tell me by whom you replaced all the mayors whom you eliminated.
Q Who--Who replaced than? Who replaced them? Were they members of the NSB? political men, and in part they were members of political trends which were absolutely against National Socialism and against Germany. In time there were more and more NSB people, for non-NSB people did not put themselves at our disposal any longer, and that was thegreatest success of the Dutch resistance movement--that they give us complete political resistance and they carried on work of significance in this direction. which led you to put a great number of NSB people in all important positions?
A No, that thought would be too daring for me. The Dutch resistance movement only induced the population not to work with the occupying power at all, so that outside of the NSB people there was no one who wanted to work with us.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
(A recesswas taken until 1400 hours) (The Tribunal reconvened at 1400 hours, 11 June 1946) BY M. DEBENEST:
Q. Defendant, you installed, in the larger towns and in the provinces of the low countries, agents who were directly subordinated to you and to whom you gave full powers. Were those agents not members of the NSDAP ?
A. Will you please tell me what you mean by "agents" ? I had German representatives in the provinces and in the larger cities. Do you mean the German or the Dutch ones?
Q. No; I meant to speak of the Beauftragte.
A. They were Germans, and I assume that all were members of the NSDAP. I don't know for certain, but it is quite possible and I believe that was the ease.
Q. Well then, in order to refresh your memory, will you plea, so take document 997-PS, which I caused to be handed you this morning ? I refer to page 9, in the French or German text.
M. DEBENEST: I would like to tell the Tribunal that I gave them an incorrect reference this morning. The document was submitted not under the number USA 708, but RF 122. BY M. DEBENEST:
Q. At the top of page 9 it states:
"The delegates are working, with very essential administrative and independent powers, for the provinces. The creation of these posts was a target because it was, first of all, necessary to examine the situation. It has now been admitted that it was less a question of administrative officers than of men who had had political experience. Thereafter, Reichsleiter Bormann, on Hess'staff, was requested, as were others, for men, most of whom would come from the Party, some of whom were already on their way, who could be installed in their functions in the provinces with very short delay".