instruments over to the SS.
A That is true. Please judge that in connection with my general statements. The SS needed microscopes for its hospitals in general, which had been destroyed by bombings. In the laboratories of the University at Utrecht, there were such microscopes which were not being used. I had the case investigated by my agency, and what seemed dispensable I confiscated. for the Dutch. The Reich wanted to close the Institute at Leyden, which is one of the most famous research institutes in the world. I believe the Soviets and Americans have one especially for atomic experiments. I prevented closing this organization whihc would have meant an irreparable less for the Netherlands. Experiments were carried out by Professor Eisenberg in Leyden. Lymmuiden removed.
A This firm was built up by a German firm after May 1941. The electrical installations of this organization were repeatedly destroyed by the English, not without the aid of the intelligence service of the Dutch resistance movement. In my opinion, there was justification in the Reichmarshall's order that they be moved to the Reich. This was done. Why damages were not paid, I don't understand. I had issued an order that all such demands had to be fully paid, but perhaps the German concern gave back its share. ation means to the Reich. That was the affair of the transport command of the Wehrmacht. Once I took part in confiscating 50,000 bicycles, but there were 4,000,000 bicycles in the Netherlands. This was for the mobilization of troops in the Netherlands proper. collections. in the public museums of Amsterdam, Mortizhaus and so forth were especially protected, but it is possible that loans to these museums belonged to Jewish people who were taken to the Reich within the general frame of confiscating Jewish property.
There was one case. A Krueller foundation existed in the Netherlands which was given to the Netherland States by will. With my aid, three pictures were taken to the Reich from this foundation, for which I later concluded a contract for sale with the authorities in charge of the foundation. I endeavored to replace these pieces for the museum. I procured a Van Gogh and a Corre, and the head of the museum once told me that the new pictures suited the museum better than the old ones. Coast. When the Coast was declared a fortification area, I induced the Dutch authorities to have a new cellar built as Mastrich. The pictures were taken there, always under Dutch administration. No German had anything to do with it. In the fall of 1944, Dr. Goebbels demanded that the pictures be taken to the Reich. I refused this and had reliable guards placed in the cellar by a person from the Dutch Ministry with the necessary powers in order that they would not be turned over to the enemy troops. I was convinced that the Dutch Government in England would see to it that these pictures would remain in the Netherlands.
Q Did you yourself acquire any pictures? two or three small pictures by contemporary artists. As Reichscommissar, I bought pictures by contemporary artists at exhibitions when I liked them and when they seemed worth the price and were offered for sale. Reich, especially to the Hunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna and the Reich Governor's office in Vienna. They were all pictures on the open market, as far as I am informed. Included was a picture ascribed to Vermeer but contested. On the other hand, I acquired an authentic Vermeer for the Dutch State by preventing the sale to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, there is no specific charge against this defendant of having bought pictures.
DR. STEINBAUER: It was mentioned in the Trial Brief. May I continue We will conclude this question.
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want details about it. It is sufficient if he told us that he paid for the pictures. He need not give us details about the pictures.
DR. STEINBAUER: I will go on to the next question. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q I submit to you document RF 136. It describes the confiscation of the property of the Queen of the Netherlands. Pictures and art objects from Jewish fortunes or from enemy fortunes, when ther was reason, were liquidated and sold in the Reich. A very lively free trade developed with the participation of the Dutch art dealers, doubtless supported by the free transfer of currency. RF 136. what do you know about the order for the liquidation of this property
A I myself ordered this liquidation. In the Netherlands, of course, there was an order to confiscate enemy property as in all occupied territories. When we came to the Netherlands, the royal property was only placed under administration, without any steps being taken against it.
After the outbreak of the campaign in the East, in the very first days, the Queen of the Motherland spoke personally on the radio, not only with a very antagonistic attitude but with the definite appeal for active resistance and with serious personal accusations against the Fuehrer. In this state of affairs, the property of any Dutch citizen would have been confiscated. I therefore decided to proceed in this case in the same way in order to prevent further developments, but also in the conviction that I could not make an exception. I myself signed the ord
Q What instructions did you give in the course of the liquidation? I ordered the estates to be turned over to the Motherlands State, I believe with the exception of one house. Also the shares, the archives, everything of historical or artistic value should be selected by a Dutch commission so that the Netherlands State could take it over. The commission included almost everything in its list that was at all possible. I realized that and did not strike out one piece. In particular, I had the historical installations at Joesdisch and Huistenborch turned over in full, although Berlin wanted them placed elsewhere.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that the defendant need make this quite so detailed, Dr. Steinbauer. He has made the point that some of the things were turned over to the Netherlands State.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I ask one brief question? BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Do you know to what extent the property was actually liquidated?
A I had a survey given to me. It was reported to me that three, or at most five, percent of the property was actually liquidated.
and raw materials. Who undertook this confiscation?
A I may refer to my previous statement. In the late summer of 1944 on, this was done primarily by the Feldwirtschaftkommandos, the Field Economic Command. There are individual documents available with notations referring them to me. There were many unauthorized confiscations. People came from the Reich with trucks and began to take away machinery. Together with the Wehrmacht commander and the Higher SS and Police Chief, I ordered that strict measures should be taken against these methods.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to refer to two documents which I submitted but which I shall not read in order to save time. These are documents number 80 and 81, page 205 and 208. The first sentence is interesting. It concerns Wehrmacht matters carried out by the occupation forces. BY DR. STEINBAUER: removal of furniture was clothing from Arnhem was carried out.
A The charge is correct. The situation was as follows: The front was directly south of Arnhem. There were three or four resistance lines built in Arnhem proper. The city had been completely evacuated. It was being shelled. The goods in Arnhem were gradually being ruined in the course of the winter. The Fuehrer ordered at that time through Bormann that textiles, particularly for German families who had suffered bomb damage, should be brought from the Netherlands. probably have been that these things would either have been plundered or would have been rained by the weather or in a battle for Arnhem they might have been burned. Although it was not in my territory but at the front and the executive power lay with the Wehrmacht, I gave my approval that in the circumstances should warrant, consumer articles and textiles should be brought to the Ruhr. I ordered at the same time that the items should be taken for the replacement of damage. I believe that Dr. Wimmer can confirm this.
A I opposed this strongly. When such a case was reported to me, I, through my General Prosecutor, had the order for arrest issued.
Q Now I go on to the next question. How about the blowing up of ports, docks, locks and mines in the Netherlands?
A Such things were blown up at the time when the Netherlands became a theatre of war.
As for port and dock installations or shipyards, the following was decisive: The port of Antwerp fell almost undamaged into the hands of the enemy. I believe that it was of decisive importance for the further development of the offensive. Thereupon the competent military authorities in the Netherlands began a precautionary blowing up of such installations. I know only the fact, not the details. I refused to watch the explosions, but my deputies intervened with the Wehrmacht agencies, and I believe that in Rotterdam half of the installations were not blown up. This is shown by the Netherlands report. I had nothing whatever to do with the matter, aside from what I have just said. up mines as war-important installations. I inquired of Reich Minister Speer, and he issued an order not to blow them up but only to cripple them; that is, to interrupt operations for three or four months. The orders were issued to this effect. I hope that they were not violated.
Q Here in this trial we have heard of an order for "scorched earth". Was it in effect in the Netherlands also?
A I received the "scorched earth" order from Bormann. Without military necessity, all technical installations were to be blown up. That meant, in effect, the destruction of Holland, that is, the Western Netherlands. If explosions were carried out in 14 or 16 places in Hollandm the country would disappear under the water in a few weeks. I did not carry out the order at first. I established contact with Reich Minister Speer. I had a personal meeting with him on 1 April in Oldenburg. Speer told me that the same order had been given in the Reich, but that he was frustrating it, that he now had full authority in this matter, and that he agreed that the order should not be carried out in the Netherlands. It was not carried out.
Q Now, to another chapter. Floods did occur. Did you have anything to do with them? something to do with it.
There were prepared floodings by the Wehrmacht for defense purposes, and battle floodings, whichsuddenly became necessary in the course of battle.
The prepared ones were carried out in close contact with my agency and the Dutch agencies. At their intervention, about half of the area was spared and saved. The flooding was mostly with fresh water so that less damage would be done, and the outer dikes were spared. Commander in Chief of Holland. Veeringer Seepolder was especially mentioned. At that time there was great danger of an air landing, at the demand of the Dutch defense front. I was not actually informed of the battle measures taken; the commander had decided on it overnight.
When, on the 30th of April, I talked to General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, he told us: "What has been flooded so far can be justified in a military sense; if youflood any more now, it is no longer justifiable." without reading it. It shows that these floodings were of a purely military character. of the food supply for the Netherlands population. What measures did you take to maintain the food supply for the Dutch people? difficult question of the whole administration, and I believe, from the special aspects of the case, it was the most difficult in all the occupied territories. there are more than 600, to be fed. The food economy is highly cultivated, dependent upon the import of hundreds of thousands of tons of fodder. Since the occupation and the blockade, that was all gone. The whole food economy had to be changed over to the production of food for immediate human consumption. It was certainly a great achievement of Dutch agriculture that this was successful. However, I may say that my experts aided very effectively, and we got a great deal of support from the Reich.
than in any other occupied territory. The most important thing for me was to maintain this food supply, although the leader, General Director Lauers, and his entire apparatus, were hostile to the Germans. Against the will of the Reich Central Office I received it, because otherwise I would not have been able to hear the responsibility for the nourishment of the people.
Q Did you also deliver food to the Reich? supplied from the Reich, and vegetables were demanded in exchange. The Reich demanded more vegetables and also the delivery of cattle, canned meat, legumes, and a few other things. Vegetables and meat would not have made so much difference, but the legumes were a little difficult. I am convinced that the Dutch food system did as much as it could.
Q What was the situation in the fall of 1944? of 3,000, and then of 2500 calories. In 1944 we had 1800 calories. Experience today shows what that meant. At about the time that the first British airborne divisions were landed at Arnhem, on order of the Dutch Government in England a general strike of Dutch railroads began and it was carried out almost completely. At the same time, these ships in internal waters disappeared. It was not a strike, but it amounted to the same thing. Wehrmacht were greatly endangered. Ther German Wehrmacht began to confiscate ships and, in effect, interrupted all traffic. I established contact with it, and it said that if the railroad strike should stop it would not have to proceed rigorously. I reported this to General Secretary Hirschfeld and General Director Lauers. They achieved no results, and I had to consider how I could restore shipping. I discussed it with the Wehrmacht, and I suggested that I give them two or three weeks' time in which they could secure their necessary shipping space. Of about two million tons available, they needed 450,000 tons. Also, during this time I would forbid all ship traffic, because the Wehrmacht was confiscating all ships anyhow. I permitted traffic of small ships in Holland.
THE PRESIDENT: How is all this relevant to the charges made against the defendant?
DR. STEINBAUER: The Netherlands report, which the prosecution mentioned, states in great detail that the defendant, as Reich Commissar, is responsible for the famine which began in September of 1944, until the spring of 1945, and for the great mortality, especially of children, because, on the occasion of the shipping and railroad strike, he prohibited the import of food. That is one of the most serious charges made against him. I have asked for witnesses on this subject, and perhaps I might cut it short now so that the witnesses may speak about it.
THE WITNESS: I must ask to be allowed to comment on this matter. This is the charge which seems the most serious to me.
DR. STEINBAUER: Perhaps we can have a brief recess now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
(A recess was taken.)
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. In the Government Report it is asserted that at that time 50,000 Dutch people died of starvation and, therefore, I should like to ask you what reason did you have for establishing this traffic embargo at that time?
A. I believe I have already set up and stated my reasons. The traffic situation was such that the Wehrmacht had to assure its shipping space, and as long as it did that there was no ship traffic possible. I wanted to limit the SState to as short a period of time as possible, so that afterward, assured ship traffic would be made possible and the food supply of Holland could be assured in a regular and orderly manner. In practice, traffic was not interrupted through my embargo, but rather -I believe witnesses will confirm me in this -- that the fact of the confiscation of ships was the cause. Of course, naturally, I asked myself whether the Dutch food supply would be endangered, and I said to myself that the Dutch people themselves were responsible for being in this state of emergency, that they had brought it about themselves, and of course that the military interests of the Reich were equally important. I told myself, further, if in the next half of October I can reinstate an orderly ship traffic then, in my opinion, I shall have two months' time in which to take care of the food supply for the Dutch people. Then I can bring over one hundred fifty to two hundred, thousand tons of food supplies and that will be sufficient to establish rations of 1400 to 1800 callories. I believe I can recollect that between the 15th and 20th of October, I gave the order to reinstate ship traffic.
Q. And what did you do in this direction?
A. Ship traffic was not reinstated because the Dutch traffic authorities, for the most part, had disappeared, perhaps because they were afraid that they would be made responsible for the general railway strike. For weeks on end we tried unsuccessfully, and at the end I talked with General Secretary Hirschfeld and gave him complete authority.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal does not think that this matter can be gone into in extreme detail like this.
Q. Witness, perhaps you can be very brief about this and tell us what you did to alleviate conditions.
A. I really concluded it. I gave Secretary Hirschfeld all authority, including transportation, and this man, although hesitantly and reluctantly, re-established traffic -- and he will confirm that I supported him in every possible way. Food supplies were brought into Holland. But many weeks had passed in vain. Then, in my sector of influence, I provided additional allotments, about which Witness Von Der Wense and, I believe, the witness Schwobel can give you information in their interrogatories. The affidavit of Witness von der Wense will be shown.
DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Now, I should like to submit a document, an affidavit deposed by the witness von der Wense. It has just arrived but it has been translated, and I believe either this afternoon or tomorrow morning the translation will be available to the Tribunal. I shall now submit the original. I do not believe it necessary to read this comprehensive document. This affidavit very comprehensively and extensively covers the food situation in this period of time.
THE WITNESS: May I also call your attention to the fact that the Dutch Government -
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of it?
DR. STEINBAUER: No. 105.
THE WITNESS: -- that the Dtuch Government changed the figure from 50,000 deaths to 25,000. They made that correction. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Now I shall turn to the last period of your activity as Reichs Commissar. I should like to ask you, when did you realize that the military resistance in the Netherlands was in vain?
A. That we had to count on the possibility that Germany could not win the war is shown from my letter to the Fuehrer, addressed to him in the year 1939. The fear that things would work out that way arose at the time of Stalingrad.
Of course from then on we had to count on that possibility, and in time I feared this.
We know through a statement which Reichsminister Speer gave me on the 1st of April 1945 -
Q. 1945?
A. Yes, April 1945. Up until that time I did not want to believe this, but with the throat of an unconditional surrender and occupation, we naturally were worried about the results and the outcome. Speer at that time told me that the war, for Germany, would end in a relatively short period of time because armament could not keep pace, and he estimated possible two to three months at the most.
Q. When you realized this fact, what did you do, in practice?
A. I made the decision to end the occupation of the Dutch territories and not carrying out my duties to the Reich. I went to General Secretary Hirschfeld and we discussed this problem. We arrived at the decision to get in touch with our confidential agents in the Hague -- which was illegal for us to do. We tried to get to negotiate with them on the basis that the Allied troops should not advance against Holland, so that any further destruction would not come about; that the Allies would take over the feeding of the Dutch population and that we would wait for the end of the war. This was the counter-proposal that we made to the Dutch
Q. Wasn't this something that you undertook on your own in contrast -
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of this?
Q. What was the date of this?
A. This conversation with General Secretary Hirschfeld took place on the 2d of April 1945. Then there was a little delay and on the 30th of April we had a conversation with Lt. General Burdell-Smith. I did not ask for authority in Berlin for this; rather, I carried it out on my own. I did not contact Berlin because I did not want to meet with a refusal or prohibition.
I only undertook it on my own hook. General Blaskowitz, the Commander of the Netherlands, was very much afraid.
He called me to him even during the night, for his superiors had asked him just what the matter was. Nevertheless, I was determined to carry through this matter, for to me it seemed the only reasonable stop that I could take. I told him that I would assume all responsibility. On the 30th of April this conference actually did take place and the result that I had desired materialized. We dispensed with the military defense of Holland.
Q. Then what did you, personally, do?
A. Grand Admiral Doenitz, as head of the State, called me to him at Flensburg. I took a quick boat across the North Sea and told him, and the Grand Admiral will confirm me as my witness. I rescinded the demolition decree and tried everythin to return to the Netherlands. I embarked and I was arrested at Hamburg.
Q. Just why did you want to return to the Netherlands?
A. First of all, I wanted to take care of my co-workers; in the second place, I always was of the opinion that I should be hold responsible for my administration there; and, finally, I was of the opinion that we were in the first row in the hours of triumph and we can lay claim to be in the first row in the time of misery and disaster as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have concluded my examination in chief of the witness.
BY DR. KARL HAENSEL (Counsel for the SS):
Q Did you belong to the SS?
A I had an honorary position in the General SS. As such I was not a regular member of the General SS, but for ideological reasons and for purposes of information I was very much interested in the SS.
Q Did you have any function in the SS, or did you just have a title?
A De Jure, I had only the title. In a political connection, as far as the Netherlands was concerned, Itried to influence the Waffen SS, the Security Police and so on in a certain way, and in April of 1945 I believe I can say de facto that I was the first SS fuehrer in the Netherland organization, or werethere contradictions and divergences in the organization itself? Internally there was a great difference between two factions. One wanted the SS to be just a political training unit. Obergruppenfuehrer Eismeier belonged to this school. The other faction wanted to make a state executive organ out of the SS. Heydrich belonged to this group. At first Himmler vacillated, but later he went completely to the camp of Heydrich. executive powers.
Q Can you determine that as to time? In what period did this thought die out?
A I believe the beginnings were evident in the year 1938. With gigantic steps, this started at the time of theeastern campaign.
Q Wasn't it from the year 1939 onwards that the General SS made little or no appearance, but rather the executive groups or the Waffen SS remained after that time? and put them into his executive organizations. The Allgemeine SS, the General SS, did not exist for me, anyway, after that time. leadership, that he had any knowledge of this at all, or did he expect anything of that kind at all?
A I do not believe that the SS man knew this, but there were many SS men who felt very uncomfortable, who remained with their formation only because they felt it was their duty.
Q You said in your interrogation that a decree of Heydrich's caused you to transport Jews from Holland. Did you see a decree from Hitler to Heydrich? I would not have been satisfied with Heydrich alone. this decree?
Q Was it in writing?
Q And what did the decree say? over to him completely for all areas.
Q And when wasthis? '41? '40? When was it? I believe that was in the year 1942.
Q Wasn't it 1941? 1942 doesn't seem right.
A Perhaps he showed me the decree later. I do not know the date of the decree.
Q This decree you said, was rather general; it could be interpreted one way or another, is that right? It was a general decree? was to carry through the evacuation, and at that time I wasn't quite sure whether that was to be a final solution. It was possible. The most extreme case was that the Jews would be gathered in camps, and after the end of the war, would be settled somewhere.
Q I beg your pardon, Witness. The most extreme case would be that the Jews would be destroyed, and that took place. at the time.
Q And according to the words of the decree, you could picture it?
Q. Now, the question is : Was there the possibility that Heydrich could go beyond the decree of Hitler and did so? Was there the possibility that Hitler would not want the things that Heydrich later on did?
A. I cannot testify to that.
Q. Did you talk with Hitler before 1943?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think the witness can tell what the possibility was that Heydrich would do, any better than we can. He can't give evidence about that sort of thing.
DR. HAENSEL: Yes. BY DR. HAENSEL:
Q. Then, before 1943 did you discuss these problems with Hitler?
A. On occasion I was present when Hitler discussed these problems. It was always along this line, to eliminate the Jews from the German territory and to send them into foreign countries.
Q. But no one ever talked about destruction of the Jews?
A. Never. BY DR. SERVATIUS (Counsel for the defendant Sauckel):
Q. Witness, did Sauckel cause raids in the Netherlands and did he have churches surrounded?
A. He couldn't do that. I wouldn't have tolerated that, and he didn't ask to have that done.
Q. Did Sauckel have anything to do with the action of the Army in 1944?
A. No, he didn't know anything about that. When he heard about it, one of his men arrived so that he could recruit skilled workers, but this actually did not take place, for the Wehrmacht sort these men into the Reich right away.
Q. Referring to the regular worker transports to Germany, in connection with the recruitment carried out by Sauckel, were they effected under normal conditions, or could you determine whether there were excesses and abuses?
A. Whether it was voluntary or compulsory labor, transport conditions were always normal. The same favilities were used by the people as were used by regular Dutch traffic. They were accompanied by people from a certain office.
There were 2,600 who were arrested, but all the others were taken into camps as designated by Sauckel.
Q. Did Sauckel concern himself with the transporting of Jews?
A. Not at all.
Q. Do you know what the working conditions were for the workers who came from Holland to Germany?
A. I knew them fundamentally. They were the same conditions as applied to workers in the Reich. But difficulties arose. First of all, the leaders of industry in the Reich asserted that the Dutch people had been recruited under false pretenses to a certain degree, that is, thatthey did not comply with requirements. Secondly, these labor contracts had a certain duration and the industry leaders wanted to have the Dutch people remain in the Reich for a longer period. notbe observed in the Reich, no matter what the difficulties would be on the part of the Reich.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW):
Q. Witness, I wanted to put one question to you regarding the floodings. What did you, your office, or the Commander in Chief of the West undertake in order to prevent the flooding of all of Holland?
A. I am not quite clear as to the question. There were two dangers. Ono was that of blowing up, and the pumping stations couldn't do any good here, but it was prevented. The second danger was the lack of coal and the lack of oil. We tried, as long as possinle, to bring coal to the pumping stations, and this coal was of utmost importance, especially to the Wehrmacht, and we received less and less coal. We had our pumping stations work overtime so there would be no more flooding than necessary. and the deputy of the Dutch Government in England with whom I spoke later, to whom I sent my expert, said that from the expert point of view our flooding measures were not objectionable.
Q. Now, a second point. In answer to a question from your attorney, you said that you intervened against the destruction in the harbor of Rotterdam. With whom did you intervene? What person?
A. Defense Commander-in-Chief, General Christiansen, who took my side immediately.
Q. Then you agreed completely? Right away you achieved understanding?
A. Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: (Counsel for Defendant Speer).
Q. Witness, you mentioned yesterday the S-industries. Can you tell me when these industries were established in Holland, the Sperr-Betriebe industries, and what result applied to labor; that is, the transporation of workers from Holland to Germany? what was the result?
A. I believe the Speer Betriebe, the S-industries, were established during 1943, if I remember correctly, in the second half of 1943. The workers in the industries were protected. Therefore, the recruiting of Netherlands workers into the Reich was prevented in part, and altogether in part.
Q. So that the S-industries could produce and be active, were materials brought from Germany into Holland, especially coal?
A. I believe all raw materials, with the exception of coal. Goal was brought in from Limberg.
Q. You mentioned yesterday the Organization Todt. Do you know how far this Organization Todt worked on fortifications along the coast, and used local construction work, and just how much of the work was done by these local concerns?
A. I believe that the contracts for overwhelming number of work projects which was established in Holland were given to local concerns. This is tru of Holland; and Holland construction concerns carried out work in Belgium and in Northern France. These concerns brought their workers along with them. until the middle of 1942, were actively working in Belgium or Northern France. These were workers who had not come into these countries through the channel of regular recruitment.
Q. Very well. Can you tell us what results this had on the recruitment of local labor, just generally?
A. The local workers, naturally, preferred to go into the S-industries, for they were more certain of not being transported into the Reich. And while they were with the "O.T", they received special food rations.
Q. Witness, when in August or September 1944, because of enemy bombings the production in Holland was hampered, and in some places stopped, what measures were taken in order to protect the unemployed workers of the S-industries?
A. We had three possibilities: first of all, to bring the workers into the Reich; secondly, to dismiss there workers and to have them draw unemployment benefits; and thirdly, to retain these workers and to pay them their wages without workin, or working less. Speer that the third possibility was chosen. The workers in those industries received their pay, and I took care that the entrpreneurs would be compensated for wages which they paid out to those workers.
Q. Witness, you mentioned a discussion which you had on the 1st of April 1945, with co-defendant Speer. Can you tell us what the original purpose of this concerence, or discussion was?
A. For my part, I mentioned already that I wanted to talk with Speer about the decree of the "scorched earth". But Minister Speer also had a purpose for the conversation. He, for his part, wanted us to transport potatoes from North Holland into the Ruhr region, so that coal could be brought into the Netherlands. And in connection with the potato situation in North Holland, this would have been quite possible. But the traffic situation was such that we could not carry out this plan.
Q. Did Speer tell you about precautionary measures for the securing of food supplies?
A. Minister Speer told me that behind the Ruhr area he had stored transports of food, and in this way these cars were not at the disposal of the armament industry.