THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Gawlik.
DR. GAWLIK: Gawlik for Naumann.
Your Honors, gentlemen of the Tribunal. The defendant Naumann is charged with responsibility for the killing of persons within the sphere of Einsatzgruppe B by units of Einsatzgruppe B in the occupied Russian territories. The Prosecution deduces Neumann's responsibility for these killings from the fact that Naumann was Chief of this Einsatzgruppe. justify the charge raised against Naumann. could only be held responsible for acts falling within the period of his actual leadership of the Einsatzgruppe. Naumann was not Chief of Einsatzgruppe B at the start of the Russian campaign. Rather did he take charge of Einsatzgruppe B only several months after the start of the Russian campaign. Also for these reasons he cannot, therefore, be held responsible for all executions which, according to the indictment, are supposed to have been committed by members of the Einsatzgruppe B. B on 1 Nov. 1941 and from this deduced his responsibility for executions which from that time on were carried out by units of Einsatzgruppe B. To prove this the Prosecution has submitted the following operational situation reports:
1.) of 14 Nov. 1941
2.) of 19 Dec. 1941
3.) of 22 Dec. 1941
4.) of 21 April 1942 gruppe B. However, it is incorrect to place these executions, except for those mentioned in the last document, within the period during which Naumann was Chief of Einsatzgruppe B.
this results quite obviously from the document itself. The exact dates of the executions are given in this report. All executions have taken place between 9 and 23 of October 1941. It therefore is impossible to connect Naumann in any way with these executions, for according to the Prosecution's own claim they have taken place at a time when Naumann did not yet lead the Einsatzgruppe. its trial brief. of 19 and 22 December 1941 within the sphere of Einsatzgruppe B do not fall within the period in which Naumann was Chief of the Einsatzgruppe. Naumann cannot be held responsible for these executions either.
The Operational Situation Report of 19 Dec. 1941 does not give any date at all for the executions mentioned there. The Operational Situation Report of 22 Dec. 1941 mentions the 18, and 21 November 1941 as only indication for the occurrences in Russia reported there. From this it follows necessarily that executions mentioned in the Operational Situation Report of 19 Dec. 1941 must have taken place prior to 18 November 1941. As these documents show, especially the report of 22 Dec. 1941, a period of more than one month on the average lies between the occurrences reported and their appearing in the Operational Situation Report, which was compiled at the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin. This becomes comprehensible by realizing the road which the reports had to travel before appearing in the Operational Situation Reports. As the evidence has shown (Record 832 and 829 of the German, pages 825 and 823 of the English) the road usually was such that at first the partial Commando concerned made up a report on the individual occurrences, which at the next best opportunity was transmitted to the competent Commando Leader, who compiled the reports of the partial Commandos for transmission to the Einsatzgruppe. On the basis of these reports the Einsatzgruppe prepared a compiled report for the whole group in order to transmit same to the Reichs Security Main Office, where the Operational Situation Reports, presented here now as documents ,were finally drafted on the basis of these compiled reports.
Considering the vast distances in the Russian area and the poor communications there, it becomes entirely understandable that much time elapsed before the reported occurrences appeared in the Operational Situation Reports issued by the Reichs Security Main Office. No transmission by radio was possible because of the size of these reports which contained among other matters long discourses on economic, cultural and other conditions. the reports of 19 and 22 December 1941 must have taken place prior to 21 of November. One could charge Naumann with responsibility for these executions only, if the allegation of the Prosecution would be correct that Naumann took over the Command of Einsatzgruppe B already on 1 November 1941. However, this allegation of the Prosecution is incorrect. The Prosecution, to be sure, bases this allegation on a personnel questionnaire filled out by Naumann in the year 1943, submitted in evidence as Doc. No. 2970, Exh. 113, Doc. Book III B, page 4 English and German. In this questionnaire Naumann filled in the date of his commissioning and not the date when he actually took over the Einsatzgruppe B. The time of commissioning did net, however, coincide with the time Naumann actually took over the leadership of Einsatzgruppe B. In regard to Naumann's criminal responsibility, however, only the time is relevant at which he actually took command of Einsatzgruppe B. questionnaire, filled in merely the date of the commissioning order, since at the time of handing in the questionnaire in 1943 it was irrelevant when the actual transfer of command took place. The time of the commissioning order was fixed and known to the personnel department of the Reichs Security Main Office.
from the date of actually assuming of command. Often there is a longer interval between both dates. So the appointment of Naumann as Inspector of the Security Police and the SD Nuernberg is dated 19 May 1944 which becomes evident from Document No. 2970, Exh. 113 Book III 3, page 16 German, Record P. 2079 Engl.). However, Naumann did not start service before 9 June 1944 (Record p. 860 German, 850 English). In addition the Prosecution bases its claim on the Operational Situation Report of 12 Nov. 1941, Doc. Book II C, page 23 German, page 20 English, Doc. No. 2830, Exh. 72), because there Naumann is listed in the register of Military Posts and communications as Chief of Einsatzgruppe B. To this it must be said at first that this document does not contain any report by Einsatzgruppe B at all. that the persons listed therein could be responsible for whatever occurrences are mentioned in the report; for these registers were not compiled on the basis of reports received from Russia, but independently by Office I of the Reichs Security Main Office in Berlin on the basis of personnel records there on file. This becomes evident on page 815 German, 808 English record. These personnel files contained only the date of the commissioning order, but no information concerning the actual begin of service on the basis of the commission. Thus it is to be explained why Naumann in the Military Posts reports compiled by the RSHA appeared as Chief of Einsatzgruppe B beginning 1 November 1941 automatically on the basis of the commissioning order of the same date, Which Office I of the RSHA issued and therefore knew, although the time of the actual start of service was relevant, which Office I did not know. Post reports did not correspond to the actual personnel situation with the Einsatzgruppen.
So in the Military Post register of the Operational Situation Report No. 126 of 29 Oct. 1941 (Doc. Book I, page 31, Doc. No. 4134, Exh. 7) the co-defendant Rasch is referred to as leader of Einsatzgruppe B, -
THE PRESIDENT: Now, I would suggest that when you refer to a document it is enough to indicate what report it is with the number, without reading the page number, Document Book, Exhibit Number, and so on, because that appears in your written summation and it will be enough merely to refer to the report by number. Don't you think that will be all right?
DR. GAWLIK: I would like you to rule, Your Honor, that it also appears in the record, however, because if I do not read it, it does not appear in the record, because the German court reporters have no copy of my plea. I didn't understand why that is because the English have been obtained, but there have been no German copies made. The German copies only will have to be copied, and the English on es have to be translated.
THE PRESIDENT: I cannot believe that the German reporters will not be furnished with the German text of your summation. Is the Secretary General informed about this? Certainly the German reporters should have a copy of the German speech.
SECRETARY GENERAL: I have not received any German copies at all,
DR. GAWLIK: I quite agree with Your Honor, if it can be secured that German copies are being made -- I am not sure they are made at all and whether or not only English copies are being made and if the German court reporters receive the English copies so that they can get them themselves, then it is no longer necessary, only for that reason I read the numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed as you were reading before, and at recess time the Secretary General will obtain the necess ary information and transmit it to the Tribunal.
DR. GAWLIK -- however Rasch, as the evidence has disclosed, never did lead this Einsatzgruppe, for Naumann took over command of this Einsatzgruppe directly from N ebe, who at the start of the Russian campaign had been Chief of the Einsatzgruppe.
This can be seen still clearer from the Operational Situation Report No. 129 of 5 November 1941. Also in the Military Post register of this report Rasch still is listed as Chief of Einsatzgruppe B. If the opinion of the Prosecution were correct, then logically, it should have made Rasch also responsible for executions within the sphere of Einsatzgruppe B. But it did not do that, obviously in the conviction that the Military Post register was incorrect to that extent. To the same extent the Prosecution itself has admitted the unreliability of the Military Post registers contained in the operational situation reports.
But the presentation of evidence has shown other errors of this kind, which do not directly affect the defendant Naumann, to be sure, but which also show that the records of the base camp can't be given any value as evidence. In this way, Strauch is mentioned as Commander of the Sipo and the SD as early as February 1942, in the report of the RSHA dated 6 September 1943, although the evidence has shown that he didn't begin to serve in that capacity until 22 March, 1942. As proof of further errors of this sort, I refer to the statements of Steimle record, Braune, Haensch, Ott, and Schulz as well as Naumann. in command of Einsatzgruppe B since as early as 1 November 1941, cannot be considered as conclusive, on account of the documents presented for that purpose. the further taking of evidence, because this has shown beyond, doubt that Naumann did not assume command of Einsatzgruppe B until the end of November, probably not until 30, November 1941. given a detailed description of his appointment to Chief of the Einsatzgruppe. In this he showed convincingly that Streckenbach informed him by telephone in Berlin on 1 November 1941 about his appointment as Commander of an Einsatzgruppe. At the same time he had been told, however, that it had not been decided yet whether he would take over the command of Einsatzgruppe B. or C. Einsatzgruppe B. he then left Berlin on the 20th or 21st of November, 1941. After his arrival in Smolensk his predecessor Nebe continued to command the Einsatzgruppe for about one week and only then turned it over to him, so that he only assumed his duties as commander of the Einsatzgruppe on about the 30th of November 1941. During his examination on the witness stand, in direct as well as in cross examination, Naumann designated 30 November 1941 as about the day he began his duties and was also able to give valid reasons to support this date.
These are the same facts that Naumann has already declared to the Prosecution in his affidavit of 27 June 1947. These declarations are especially important because Naumann made them at a time when he could not have known the contents of the Operational Situation Reports with which he is charged, and therefore also could not know what importance would be attached to this date in this trial. evidence which was presented later. The Operational Situation Report of 5 November 1941 which has already been mentioned in a different connection, speaks for the correctness of these statements. the beginning of this document it can be seen that Rasch is mentioned as the Commander of Einsatzgruppe B, who, as has already been shown, has never been in Smolensk. From this must be concluded that it could not yet have been dtermined on 5 November 1941 that Naumann was to take over Einsatzgruppe B, for in that case Rasch would not have been mentioned as the leader of Einsatzgruppe B.
However, Naumann's statements are confirmed by Klingelhoefer. Klingelhoefer was already a member of Einsatzgruppe B when Naumann took over command. Klingelhoefer was able to say definitely on the witness stand that he saw Naumann in Smolensk for the first time between the 20th and 25th of November 1941 and that Nebe was still in Smolensk at that time. Klingelhoefer has exact information about these dates because he went on leave shortly afterwards, on 2 December 1941 to be exact; and remembers the beginning and the end of his leave very well. The end of the leave was the first Christmas holiday. Klingelhoefer can remember the beginning and end of his leave with certainty.
Steimle has also confirmed Naumann's statements; he also was a member of Einsatzgruppe B before Naumann assumed command. As Steimle said on the witness stand, he met Naumann for the first time on 25 November or 2 or 3 days earlier. In the case of Steimle's statement, however, it must be taken into consideration that he figured this date out long after the event and did not have such exact clues to go on as Klingelhoefer had, so that, as he admits himself, the meeting with Naumann referred to before could also have been a few days later.
Steimle has stated himself that he is unable to give an exact date. Exhibit 176, in this document Naumann told the defendant Klingelhoefer, before the beginning of this trial, while in the local prison, not to let himself be bluffed during the interrogations and to be careful. Furthermore, Naumann gave in this document the content of the interrogations he had had up to that time. This document also contains the information that Naumann only took over his job at the end of November. attempted to influence Klingelhoefer to state, contrary to the truth, that he (Naumann) only assumed command of Einsatzgruppe B at the end of November 1941.
This conclusion is incorrect for the following reasons:
1) As already brought out, the document was made some time before the beginning of this trial. At this time Naumann knew nothing as yet, about the documents which the Prosecution has presented in this trial. In particular he did not yet know of the Operational Situation Reports of 19 and 22 December 1941. For this reason he could not yet know at the time that the date he assumed command could be decisive.
2. The Prosecution has not brought proof of any kind that the far reaching statements in this document are incorrect in any particular. This, however, would be the presupposition for the assumption that the information concerning when he took over his duties was incorrect. The contents of this document correspond, moreover, completely with the evidence that has been heard. This shows that Naumann could not have attempted, with this document, to induce Klingelhoefer to make a false statement.
Under these conditions it must be regarded as proved that Naumann did not assume command of Einsatzgruppe B until the end of November 1941. Under no circumstances has it been proved that he was the responsible Commander of Einsatzgruppe B as early as the 1st of November 1941. But the evidence is particularly.not sufficient to show, beyond doubt, that Naumann had already assumed his duties in Smolensk on 1 November. According to all the recognized principles of the trial procedures of all the recognized principles of the trial procedures of all civilized nations, which are also in effect here, according to the decisions of these Military Tribunals, the declarations of Naumann concerning the date he assumed his duties in Russia cannot be considered as refuted, in view of these doubts. which were reported in the documents presented by the Prosecution as happening before the end Of November 1941.
Therefore, the executions reported in documents NO2824, exh. 62, book II B, pg. 30, and NO 2833, exh. 114, cannot be charged to Naumann. 1942, which was presented by the Proseuction in Doc. bk II, B. pg. 52 German pg. 60 English and which contains the references to the executions from 6 to 30 March, falls within the time that Naumann was Commander of the Einsatzgruppe.
To be sure, this document has been admitted as evidence. This admission as evidence, however, does not relieve the Court of the obligation of examining the value of this Operational Situation Report as evidence. It is true that according to Ordinance No. 7 the Military Tribunals are not bound to any rules governing the taking of evidence. By this, however, it was obviously not meant that the Military Tribunal can set itself above well established rules of taking evidence, well established rules which alone are a guaranty for an investigation of the truth, and with it for a just decision.
This was also expressed by Military Tribunal IV in the recent verdict against Flick et al on page 7 of this verdict.
1. This single document, which comes into consideration as evidence against Naumann insofar as executions within the territory of Einsatzgruppe B are mentioned therein, contains the following violations of the basic rules for the taking of evidence, which must be considered as well established and therefore must be observed if the truth is to be arrived at. observations of the author of the document. The author of this document belonged neither to the staff of Einsatzgruppe B nor to a Sonderkommando or Einsatzkommando. He was not even in Russia, but compiled the document in the document in Berlin, for, as I have already mentioned the Operational Situation Reports were prepared, in the form in which they are presented here, by members of Office IV of the RSHA in Berlin. It is not known from what records this document has been compiled. Furthermore, the identity of the author is not known, so that there is no knowledge about whether it was a reliable person who had compiled the operational Situation Reports with the requisite care. were made by persons who were reporting on things they had themselves observed. According to the evidence taken, this is even improbable. Therefore it is a matter of hearsay evidence, which is inadmissible according to the rules for taking evidence in all civilized countries, becaue hearsay evidence contains so many false sources that a just decision cannot be founded on it. Hearsay evidence itself is inadmissable according to all the recognized rules for the taking of evidence. But as we must assume, in this document it is a matter of hearsay evidence of the third, fourth or even a higher degree. Furthermore, the document is not signed.
according to the recognized rules of court procedure, and this by a witness who will be faced by the defendant and who then also states specirically under oath, where the document was found. This condition has also not been fulfilled. It is therefore more than doubtful whether the facts reported in the Operational Situation Reports have actually occurred. and a claim to a procedure in which all rules of the law of procedure are adhered to. It is in no way intended to disclaim the assertion that executions were carried out by the Einsatz and Sonderkommandos subordinate to the Einsatzgruppe while Naumann was Chief of Einsatzgruppe B. The defendant Naumann has not discalaimed this assertion during his interrogation as a witness. But on account of the explained violations against recognized rules of procedure the offered document does not give proof of the fact that executions were carried out to the extent stated in the Operational Situation Report, especially under the circumstances stated there. It can rather he merely considered as proven that executions took place in which the number of executed persons and the detailed circumstances have not been ascertained. Especially the numbers of executions appear much too high. This is shown by the fact that during the period covered by the report in the sphere of influence of Einsatzgruppe B, the Fuehrer order had been carried out for quite some time already under Nebe, the predecessor of Naumann as testified to by the defendants Blume and Steimle. It appears therefore as absolutely believable if Ott for instance, who in March 1941 was Commander of Sonderkommando 7b with Einsatzgruppe B, declares, that at the time he took over Sonderkommando 7b there was no further action to register any Jews. Operational Situation Report dated 21 April 1943 while in the witness stand. The soundness of the reasoning given in this respect is not to be rejected offhand.
Also Ohlendorf and Nosske have doubted the reporting. Worth mentioning in this respect is that Ohlendorf too, declared while in the witness stand, execution of Jews and Communists happened in the first part of the Campaign more often than in the year 1942. As evidence to the fact that the numbers mentioned in the Operational Situation Reports do not have an absolute value as evidence, reference may finally he made yet to the Affidavit of Fumy who is very well acquainted with the matter as he collaborated in the compilation of the Operational Situation Report, and who due to his own observations is best able to judge whether these reports are reliable. If Naumann states therefore in the witness stand, that according to its form the compilation of the Operational Situation Report dated 21 April 1942 is not at all familiar, then this appears credible? for this form originates obviously not from the report of the Einsatzgruppe B. In its rebuttal the Prosecution has offered as proff for the numbers mentioned in the Operational Situation Report dated 21 April 1942 regarding executions carried out, the documents USSR 48 and 56, Exh. No. 234 and 235.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, do you think that this might be a good place in which to suspend for the luncheon recess?
DR. GAWLIK: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess until 1:45.
(A recess was taken.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1345 hours, 5 February 1948.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, I want to make just a short announcement. We are informed by the Translation Section that the final summation plea in behalf of the Defendant Bluem has not yet been received there. Some word should be gotten to counsel for Blume to see to it that he immediately hands in his manuscript.
DR. GAWLIK (Attorney for the Defendant Naumann): Your Honor, as a preresentative for Dr. Aschenauer, I ask that you permit the Defendant Ohlendorf to be excused from tomorrow's session, because he is to be interrogated by Mr. Wolf.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Ohlendorf will be excused from attendance in court tomorrow.
DR. GAWLIK: Before the recess I was discussing the report of the 21st of April, 1942. I shall continue my final plea: numbers listed in the Operational Situation Report, dated 21 April 1942, regarding executions carried out, the documents USSR 48 and 56. the documents were offered. First of all I point to the fact that the text of both documents corresponds in part word for word. The numbers mentioned also correspond exactly. Both documents are obviously parts of the same record. The contents of the documents have no connection at all with the acts of Naumann. There reference is rather made to how many dead were found in the mass-graves. The samll percentage of cases, that death was due to the gun shot wounds. The cause of death is unknown otherwise. One should not overlook the fact, that the less immediate vicinity of Smolensk in which the graves were found, was twice within two years the theatre of stubborn fighting. If one assumes that, in so far as gunshot wounds were the cause of death, these were due to executions, which is also not an established fact, then the further question arises, by whom and on whose orders these excutions took place.
I would also briefly like to mention in this respect that the victims of Katyn for instances were also mentioned in these reports, those, who according to German reports have always been designated as victims of executions carried out by Russian agencies. It has not been ascertained to this day who actually carried out these executions. Before the International Military Tribunal this question has also not been cleared despite the fact that three witnesses of the Russian Prosecution and three witnesses of the German defense have been interrogated in this respect. the mentioned documents are absolutely without value as proof of the act incriminating Naumann, I would like to mention addition that Naumann was active in Smolensk only during part of the period in which, according to the reports, the demise of the bodies found would fall. Besides, any connection between the crimes mentioned in the reports and Naumann's activity is missing. None of the persons mentioned in the reports with the exception of Naumann, was a member of the Einsatzgruppe Units. What Naumann is supposed to have done is also not mentioned in the reports. by the film offered by the Prosecution as evidence. That is why I objected at the time against the acceptance of the film as evidence and the Tribuanl sustained this objection too. Exhibits 234 and 235 have therefore no value at all as evidence in the proceedings against Naumann and are thus eliminated as evidence. mentioned by me, it has only insignificant value as evidence. Dure to statements made by Naumann it may only be considered as proven, that the Einsatzkommandos under his command carried out executions due to the Fuehrer order. No evidence has been offered in ragard to date, place, and detailed circumstances.
In evaluating this case from a criminal point of view, I took as a basis the legal principles already laid down by Military Tribunal II in the case against Milch, Naumann is, according to the principles laid down by this Tribunal, only criminally liable for the executions carried out by units of his group, if the following questions can be answered positively beyond any reasonable doubt:
1. Did the defendant Naumann take part in the executions personally?
2. Have these been carried out at his direction or order?
3. Had Naumann previous knowledge of the executions before they were carried out?
4. If this proves to be correct, did he have the power and opportunity to have them stopped?
5. If this also proves to be correct, did he fail to act and did he become thereby particeps criminis and accomplice?
As for 1: nor did he personally take part in any executions. The Prosecution has neither maintained this, nor offered any proof to this effect. It has especially not offered any proof to the effect that Naumann killed the persons mentioned in Document NO 3276, Exh. 66 (Volume II B, Page 66). It is shown by the Operational Situation Report that these persons were executed by the Einsatz and Sonderkommandos. This becomes evident also from the statements made by Naumann on the witness stand (Protocol Page 820 and 834 German, Page 814 and 128 English) according to which the Einsatzgruppe itself, i.e. the Staff, did not carry out any executions. stand, at least for the time when Naumann was Chief of the Einsatzgruppe (Protocol Page 4015 German Page 3950 English).
As for 2: orders to put these executions into effect.
In particular, Naumann did not pass on the (Fuehrer (rder) to the units under his command. As has been shown already, the executions were not carried out by the Einsatzgruppe itself, i.e. by the Group Staff, during the time when Naumann was Chief of the Einsatzgruppe. If, therefore, Naumann had given them to the Sonder-and Einsatz-Kommandos. But even to them Naumann did not give any execution orders, nor did he pass on to them the Fuehrer Order.
Of course, the Prosecution concludes from Naumann's position as Chief of the Einsatzgruppe that Naumann must have given such orders. Hosever, they were unable to prove this. Naumann, when in the witness box being directly examined and cross-examined, again and again asserted that he had given no such orders. (Transcript pages 834/35, 879, 880, 883, 887, 901 of the German verson; pages 828/29, 869, 871, 875, 889 of the English version.) The additionally adduced evidence only corroborated these statements of Naumann. of the ever having received from Naumann an order for execution or to the effect that the Fuehrer Order had been conveyed to him by Naumann. In particular was this affirmed by the co-defendants Steimel, Ott, and Klingelhoefer who held responsible positions in the Einsatz-and Sonder-Kommandos under the Command of the Einsatzgruppe B. If Naumann had given orders for execution or had passed on the Fuehrer Order these witnesses would have had to know it by all means, in particular Ott, who assumed his duties in Russia after Naumann was there. None of these witnesses, however, has confirmed this. Steimle, for instance, gave evidence that, indeed, he had discussed the Fuehrer Order with Naumann, but that Naumann had never given him any orders. In the cross-examination, too, Steimle stood by these his statements inspite of the fact that the Prosecution tried with all means at their disposal to shake the witness and extract from him a statement according to which Naumann was the one who gave or transmitted to him the Execution Order (Transcript pages 2073-2075, 2080-2085 of the German version, pages 2027-2029, 2034-2039 of the English version). Ott, too, repeatedly declared on the witness stand under direct and cross examination that he had never received from Naumann an order for execution, also he never had received from him the order that the Sender-Kommando 7 B under his command was to take stricter measures.
Ott particularly declared having heard only thrigh his predicessor Rausch about the existence of this order which Naumann had not even mentioned to him when introducing him to his duties (Transcript pages 3776-3778, 3828-3830, 3762/63, 3834/35 of the German version, pages 3715-17, 3766-3768, 3701/02,3370/71 of the English version.) These statements of Ott appear to us credible above all for the particular reason that they tally with the statements he made when he was subject to interrogation by Wartenberg. At that particular time Naumann had not yet been arrested and it was generally believed that Naumann was dead (Transcript page 3772 German, page 3711 English version.) he never had received any execution orders from Naumann (Transcript p. 3947 German, page 3884 English.) as they come from co-defendants who cannot count on being exonerated by such declarations. To doubt the credibility of those statements there is all the less cause for the simple reason that the Fuehrer Order was known to the Einsatz- and Sonder-Kommandos already a long time before Naumann took up duties in Russia. The evidence of the case in Chief shows beyond a doubt that the Fuehrer Order was issued not only to the Chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen, but also to the Leaders of the Einsatz- and Sonder-Kommandos already before the beginning of the Russian campaign and had since then existed continuously within the units of the Einsatzgruppen. (Transcript Naumann pages 819,823, 867, 883, 901, 906 German version, pages 813, 815/16,856 871, 889, 893 English version; Ohlendorf p. 524, 533; Blume p. 1811-12; Ott p.
3844 German, p. 3762 English; Jost p. 1273, 1198). Naumann was also advised of the existence of this order within the units under his command when he took up his duties in Russia. (Transcript p. 823, 864-65, German; 815/16, k54 English.) There was no occasion whatever for Naumann himself, therefore, to issue orders for execution, nor to transmit the Fuehrer Order again to the units under his command. dated 24 April 1947 (Dec. B. II B, p. 57, Doc. No. 2993, Exh. 67) that Naumann, himself, issued orders for executions. However, in this affidavit Ott only stated that Naumann gave the order to deposit the valuables, taken from the victims, with the Einsatzgruppe. Naumann *---* 24 April 1947 by declaring that this order did not originate with Naumann, but with his predecessor Nebe (Transcript p. 3802, 3803 German, p. 3740/41 English.) Moreover, it is incomprehensible how one can deduce from such an order, had it been given, that this constitutes an order to effect executions. Quite to the contrary, this statement would clearly elucidate that the issue of this order pre-supposes that the Fuehrer Order was already in existence. This statement permits therefore only the deduction that Naumann's assertions as to the existence of the Fuehrer Order before his taking over of office are correct; for, if the existence of the Fuehrer Order before his taking over of office are correct; for, if the existence of the exeuction orders had not been assumed to be known by the subordinated units, the order in the question would have been altogether senseless. manner of execution. (Transcript p. 881 German, 870 English. In particular, he did not order the carrying out of executions by means of gas vans. The evidence obtained does not indicate that gas vans were used by Einsatzgruppe B for the purpose of executions. Naumann denied it, in the witness box, as well as at the time he gave his affidavit before the beginning of the trail (Doc.
Book III B, p. 1, Doc. No. 4150, Exh. 112). To be sure, he admitted the temporary presence of such vans in the territory of his Group. His statement that he had never requisitioned these vans, but that they were, in June 1942, put at his disposal by the Reich Main Security Office without his having anything to do with it, could not be refuted in any way. No witness testified, and no document showed that these gas vans were used for the intended purpose by units of the Einsatzgruppe B. Rather were these gas vans, as shown by the evidence, surrendered to other units after relatively short time (Transcript p. 825/26, 877/78 German, 818/19, 866 English.) Reports. If the Einsatzgruppe B had used gas vans reports would exist about it which the Prosecution would have introduced. for the vans because at the time of their arrival executions were hardly possible any more (Transcript p.877 German, p. 865, English.). This being the case, one cannot hold Naumann criminally responsible for the temporary presence of the vans in the territory of the Einsatzgruppe B. confronted the Defendant Naumann during cross-examination with Document NO 5444, Exh. 175. This deals with an incident on the estate of Wessokoje. This occurrence, however, is not a Count of the charge, and Naumann, therefore, could not be convicted of it, even if it were substantiated by proof. give any order to kill the 3 persons named in this document. (Transcript p. 883/884, 886/88 German, p. 872/73; 875/76 English.) proven guilty, because this document biolates, above all, several well founded rules of evidence which, under the principles of American procedural law, prejudice the admission of this document as evidence.