A more detailed examination of its specific strategical nature in this case will confirm this allegation. Accordingly, under no circumstances can partisan warfare still be considered a permissible kind of warfare, not even by an only analogous application of the rules of war. The USSR here acted according to the principles adopted in 1918 and taken over from the atmosphere of civil war in which they had proved their effiency in an in glorious way. to know translated into practice is briefly recapitulated as follows: Military operations are subject to no obligations established by international law. Any means which injures the enemy is permissible. An object of particular importance is the disorganization of the troops by all means and through utilization of the entire population. The organization of partisan bands therefore is determined solely by the purpose to be served at any time. In the first place, bands existed carrying weapons openly and for which the most part were composed of elements wanting to evade the discipline of the regular army, e.g. released convicts and forced larorers who were frequently under the command of notorious prostitutes. In this category also the undisguised robber gangs came socalled "Machno". Large groups of the population were forcibly bound to perform scounting service for these partisan bands, to feed and to hide the partisans, and finally to serve as leaders and agents. Behind the front-lines active soldiers were parachuted from planes who were supposed to terrorize the population in the territories occupied by the Germans, to force them to intelligence and scouting service, and to instigate assaults and murers of individual German soldiers. It was their duty to force the population to carry out the Stalin order dated 3 July 1941 in which it says: "The war against Fascist Germany cannot be considered an ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies, it is at the same time the great war of the entire Soviet people against the Fascist German troops.....
5 Feb 1948_M_MSD_9_3_Hoxsie (Hildesheimer) In the occupied territories intolerable conditions must be created for the enemy and his accomplices, their every step must be doggedly followed, they must be destroyed and their acts must be thwarted. "And in this way the so-called "Vernichtungs-Battallione" (Destruction Batallions) came into being, of which the tribuanl has heard again and again from the testimonies of the defendants, and the activities of which made up a great part of the defensive assignments of the defendants. forcing of the entire population of the hinterland into the service of the resistance movement - as was actually experienced by the defendants and described by them on the witness stand. Not only men, but also women and children were drawn into the net of the organization under coercion and forced to carry on acts of scouting and intelligence work. For this reason, total war was conducted by the Soviet Union from the very beginning through the compulsory, in disriminate use of other parts of the population. This corresponds to the picture shown by the excerpts from the "Russian Encyclopedia" in (Ohlendorf Document II a, No. 42.) There it speaks about the fact that "the Partisan is not only a fighter, but also a political agitator, an organizer of the masses" (Page 4 of Ohlendorf Document No. 42.) It is his taks to "create a hatred of national indignation" and not only to call on the adult mases of the population but also women, old men and boys." (Page 6.) The Partisan war must "take on savage and manifeld forms." It must "join the revolutionary struggle of the exploited classes against their exploiters as well the struggle of the people against interventionist troops". In these case "the acts of armed units from the local population took on a particularly audacious and bitter character." was possible in the history of European warfare. Not only does it transgress the modified laws of international law, consciously unrecognized by the Soviet Union, but to the same extent transgresses all the unwritten customs of the conduct of war of civilized nations. The defendants have offered numerous examples in this connection.
The organized and extensive compulsory utilization of women and children, the poisoning of wells, the spreading of typhoid fever bacillae, the destruction of the harvest and the burning of entire cities are symptoms of a type of fighting which could in no way be countered with the weapons of the former European conduct of war. In this connection we see the peculiarities of the extensive virgin land, the immensity and expanse of Russian territory. Under these conditions security measures had to be taken which are unknown in the war conditions in the West and which do not permit of generalization. In many cases the liquidation of the male population of Partisan villages was found necessary, and often it was imperative to eliminate the instigators and "wire-pullers" of a cunning and cowardly conducted "war"., qualities recognized instinctively by the German soldier. The conclusion to recognize or at least suspect as such instigators certain classes or niveaus of the population is particularly evident under the conditions of such a total war. The Soviet doctrine as well holds no divergent point of view when it experminates the bourgeoisie and those opposed to its ideology, and does this in its own country and those nations under its domination without benefit of trial. occupied himself with the foundamentals of political events, and who not only was familiar with the theoritical writings of Communism but experienced the direct perilous threat to Germany of Communism and followed its practice in Finland and the Baltic countries, never entertained doubts for one minute that the Bolschewist leadership would not observe the rules and customs of international law and laws of war in the inpending war and possible defeat of German. Therefore it was self-evident to him that Germany as well could not observe these rules towards the Soviet Union, for this would have meant an unjustifiable disadvantage against thes adversary who was intent on his destruction.
of the German text, the prosecution attempts to tie up the attitude of Ohlendorf concerning the killing of civilians in the Soviet Union without benefit of trial and the affirmation of Ohlendorf daring the crossexamination of the prosecution that the killing of civilians in the occupied territories was regarded as pure and simple murder . However, such an interpretation, following the clear statements of Ohlendorf concerning the conduct of war according to international law of the Soviets, which he regarded as a state of emergency so far as Germany was concerned, is neither feasible, nor can such an interpretation be inferred from the connection of the passage from the cross-examination as quoted by the prosecution. For this question from Ohlendorf's point of view is not tied up with the questions concerning the killing of civilians in Russia. After all, "he did not admit anything", but rather he answered, without hesitation, with "of course", or "yes". It was clear to him that the prosecutor was questioning him for the purpose of collecting evidence against him with respect to his conduct in the Soviet Union. However, according to his own firm conviction that the German measures in Russia, including the ordered killing of civilians, should be held to be outside of every consideration of international law and beyond every recognition of the otherwise customary rules of war since the party of the second part, who would represent the prequisite for its consideration, is looking Ohlendorf cannot consider these questions of the prosecutor as being pertinent to the Soviet Union. He was able to hold this opinion for all the more reason that the two questions which proceed that quoted by the prosecution refer concretely to International Law and Conventions of War, which the Soviet Union never considered binding upon it.
The three questions and answers were as follows:
"Q: Have you ever heard of the Geneva Convention?
"A: Of course.
Q Have you ever heard of the Hague Convention? in the organization which was subject to Military Law, were you not aware that the killing of civilians in the occupied territories without benefit of trial was regarded as pure murder and nothing else according to International law as well as according to the Law and Customs of War?
A Yes. I have again brought those points before the High Tribunal in order thereby to illustrate what prerequisites bespeak the assumption of a mistaken belief of a state of emergency and self-defense on the mistaken belief of being attacked with respect to the defendant OHLENDORF and his co-defendants. This is a question of subjective prerequisites which can be induced at all only by objective conditions. The complete lack of any inhibitions with which the USSR conducted "total" war from the very beginning, and in particular the Partisan war which was fought with complete disregard of the laws of war, and their collective measures which were carried, out by the Soviet government in their intervention before 1940, also induced Germany to regard certain groups of the Russian population as a potential danger spot, and which had to be eliminated for the safety of the fighting troops. justified on the basis of the conditions described above need not be further discussed. However, one point must be examined, namely to what extent such measures were subjectively conceivable to the defendants, In this question the point must be discussed as to what the relationship of Bolschevism and Jewry was according to the ideology of National Socialism and also according to the personal conception of the defendants. I may forego a detailed description of the development of the NationalSocialist ideology in this respect. but its psychological effects upon the defendants must be considered.
defendants before the outbreak of war had conjured up a picture of the collaboration of Russian Jewry and Bolschevism, which was then confirmed in the course of their assignment in Russia. last decades by the historical-sociological research of Russia that the percentage of the Jewish population in political, cultural, and scientific key positions within the Soviet Union is unusually high. This is not based on German research but on data supplied by Russians and Jews. It is shown that the number of Jews in official positions amounts on the average to about 20%. In Party offices, this percentage was considerably larger, e.g. the Ministry for Foreign Trade with its offices abroad was a Jewish domain to a particularly great degree. The same applies for the Ministries of the Interior, for State Security, and for the great number of economic Ministries. The percentage of Jews within the army in the so-called political administration is particularly large. This percentage in higher top positions reaches 65%. These and similar facts made up a part of the daily reading matter in the German press many years before the war and thereby also formed a part of the convictions of the defendants. majority of offices, in particular the higher offices which enjoyed no great popularity among the great masses of people, such as the economic officials, and above all the Political Police (N.K.W.D.) were actually occupied to a high decree by Jews. In this connection it must be remarked that for these reasons, though it is true, conditions varied according to regions, an mistakable anti-Semitism became evidente in all parts of Russia. And finally it was learned quite soon that the Jews played a particularly important part in the resistance movement and especially in the underground organizations of the Partisan movement. This assertion is substantiated by such scenes as Jews going to their death with cries of STALIN on their lips and singing the Internationale.
Under these conditions one must see in the Jew the leader of the resistance and sabotage. This situation gave rise to the psychological prerequisites already mentioned for the fact that the liquidation order was accepted as a necessity conditioned by the war, about which the individual could think ashe pleased, which however in the framework of general events had to be recognized and carried out.
In its opening statement (page 5) the prosecution devoted only one section to the line of thought, which, according to its interpretation, forms the ideological basis of the case in chief, namely the "Nazi doctrine of master race and inferior races." At the opening it stated that this "Nazi ideology" was devoid of any humanitarianism and represented ruthless materialism. The defendants fell complete victims to this doctrine. They despised members of other races and this extremely criminal way of thinking led them to commit their deeds. The High Tribunal will recallthat on the witness stand OHLENDORF stated quite rightly that there existed no uniform interpretation of the racial question in the Third Reich at all, that rather these problems were viewed by the most diverse leading functionaries in the most diverse way. National Socialist literature as well was full of contradictions. I remember the books of Prof. GUENTHER and Prof. KLAUS. For this very reason it is misleading to wish to explain the obediency of the defendants to the order under discussion by the falsely stated "Nazi doctrine of master race and inferior races." As far as the particular case of the defendant OHLENDORF is concerned, I believe that the High Tribunal itself has gained an entirely different personal impression of OHLENDORF than that which the Prosecution has attempted to convey, OHLENDORF's entire life and pursuits were directed to ward the correcting of the aberrations and abuses of the conceptions of individual influential National Socialists and to abolish them in their effects. I wish to refer to my statements just made with respect to membership in criminal Court,2, Case 9 organizations.
The very humanitarian thinking of OHLENDORF in opposition to the cynical, autocratic and ruthless nature of LEY, BORMANN, GOEBBELS, KOCH, HIMMLER and HEYDRICH was the motivating factor that induced OHLENDORF to stand in constant opposition to these men. His conception of the state and his opinions concerning folk and race were diametrically opposed to these which individual authoritative leaders of the Third Reich proclaimed and in fact attempted to translate into action.
In this respect the High Tribunal stated quite clearly (see page 5038 of the German transcript):
".....whatever can be brought forth to show that his character excludes criminal intent is certainly of material importance."
Therefore, I may summarize: OHLENDORF strove for a constitutional state in which power was bound by constitution and law. OHLENDORF's conceptions concerning people and race were in sharp contrast to these which in this connection were actually translated into action. OHLENDORF sharply rejected the measures taken against the Jews during the years before the assumption of power and was not in agreement with the radical racial conceptions of the NSDAP. Remaining consistently loyal to his opinions, OHLENDORF went so far as to intervene personally through a minority statute for the Jews living in Germany. Beyond that he represented the principle of "Equality of all citizens before the law" and "Independence of the Judge." avail, to bring about an independent legal procedure in the pronouncing of protective custody within the framework of the Security Police, an attempt motivated by these his thoughts and his concern for the preservation of legal security in national life.
In the field of culture and education (OHLENDORF was constantly at odds with the authoritative offices in the Party and State, and stood up for freedom of the sciences and for a natural, healty education of German youth, just as he stood up in the field of economics for the independence of industry.
friends and even by his ideological adversaries is actually in contradiction to that man which the prosecution wishes to make of him. To characterize this man simply as a thousandfold murderer, whom one deems it necessary to deprive of any feeling of conscience or morals appears as a crass contradiction to the description of a disinterested observer. For this reason Frau Dr. KLEIN acknowledges in her affidavit already mentioned: "Following my confinement in prison I never saw Herr OHLENDORF again and heard nothing from him for many years. Then when I saw in the press the hints concerning his activitiesin the East, I was deeply shaken. I must admit that it is difficult for me in this connection to write about Herr (HLENDORF. Nevertheless, I consider it my duty to describe truthfully his conduct and nature based on my acquaintanceship with him. It was never clear to me from the press, neither can I believe that a man who conducted himself so courageously and tolerantly could have committed such unworthy acts. Whatever may have induced him not to refuse to carry out orders of a questionable nature, whatever that might have been, his fate in my opinion is tragic." a result of the purest desires, and because of his constant struggle against power and despotism, has come to this stage of finding himself in the prisoner's dock. obtaining for himself a limited basis as manager of the Reich Group Trade for the execution of oppositional thinking against the system of a LEY, BORMANN, HIMMLER and HEYDRICH, must be done away with for that reason and falls victim to the diabolical rule of National Socialist rulers, what indeed is the reason for OHLENDORF's transfer to his assignment in the East? The somewhat more independent attitude which OHLENDORF had achieved through tenacious efforts presents an untenable situation which HEYDRICH and others cannot permit.
Therefore, OHLENDORF must leave Berlin. The reason for his assignment for the anthroposophies made it possible to punish him by transferring him and in this assignment either to crush him morally through his conduct and thus deprive him of any power to resist or in the event of open insubordination stand him before the firing-squad. result of the danger which arose in the East and the familure of all the to-level authorities and of the Whermacht to act against the National Socialist hierrachy, the only constructive opponent of the system of power which had arisen only had the opportunity during his period of assignment to restrict and limit the extent of the Fuehrer order through supplementary orders and to obviate atrocities and, insofar as it was possible, to act in a positive manner. OHLENDORF completely exhausted this possibility. East, who opposed KOCH's and THOMAS' policy of power in the Ukraine, be considered a criminal because he acted in this way during his activity as Chief of the Einsatzgruppen? your pronouncement of judgment.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Gawlik.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Gawlik.
DR. GAWLIK: Gawlik for Naumann.
Your Honors, gentlemen of the Tribunal. The defendant Naumann is charged with responsibility for the killing of persons within the sphere of Einsatzgruppe B by units of Einsatzgruppe B in the occupied Russian territories. The Prosecution deduces Neumann's responsibility for these killings from the fact that Naumann was Chief of this Einsatzgruppe. justify the charge raised against Naumann. could only be held responsible for acts falling within the period of his actual leadership of the Einsatzgruppe. Naumann was not Chief of Einsatzgruppe B at the start of the Russian campaign. Rather did he take charge of Einsatzgruppe B only several months after the start of the Russian campaign. Also for these reasons he cannot, therefore, be held responsible for all executions which, according to the indictment, are supposed to have been committed by members of the Einsatzgruppe B. B on 1 Nov. 1941 and from this deduced his responsibility for executions which from that time on were carried out by units of Einsatzgruppe B. To prove this the Prosecution has submitted the following operational situation reports:
1.) of 14 Nov. 1941
2.) of 19 Dec. 1941
3.) of 22 Dec. 1941
4.) of 21 April 1942 gruppe B. However, it is incorrect to place these executions, except for those mentioned in the last document, within the period during which Naumann was Chief of Einsatzgruppe B.
this results quite obviously from the document itself. The exact dates of the executions are given in this report. All executions have taken place between 9 and 23 of October 1941. It therefore is impossible to connect Naumann in any way with these executions, for according to the Prosecution's own claim they have taken place at a time when Naumann did not yet lead the Einsatzgruppe. its trial brief. of 19 and 22 December 1941 within the sphere of Einsatzgruppe B do not fall within the period in which Naumann was Chief of the Einsatzgruppe. Naumann cannot be held responsible for these executions either.
The Operational Situation Report of 19 Dec. 1941 does not give any date at all for the executions mentioned there. The Operational Situation Report of 22 Dec. 1941 mentions the 18, and 21 November 1941 as only indication for the occurrences in Russia reported there. From this it follows necessarily that executions mentioned in the Operational Situation Report of 19 Dec. 1941 must have taken place prior to 18 November 1941. As these documents show, especially the report of 22 Dec. 1941, a period of more than one month on the average lies between the occurrences reported and their appearing in the Operational Situation Report, which was compiled at the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin. This becomes comprehensible by realizing the road which the reports had to travel before appearing in the Operational Situation Reports. As the evidence has shown (Record 832 and 829 of the German, pages 825 and 823 of the English) the road usually was such that at first the partial Commando concerned made up a report on the individual occurrences, which at the next best opportunity was transmitted to the competent Commando Leader, who compiled the reports of the partial Commandos for transmission to the Einsatzgruppe. On the basis of these reports the Einsatzgruppe prepared a compiled report for the whole group in order to transmit same to the Reichs Security Main Office, where the Operational Situation Reports, presented here now as documents ,were finally drafted on the basis of these compiled reports.
Considering the vast distances in the Russian area and the poor communications there, it becomes entirely understandable that much time elapsed before the reported occurrences appeared in the Operational Situation Reports issued by the Reichs Security Main Office. No transmission by radio was possible because of the size of these reports which contained among other matters long discourses on economic, cultural and other conditions. the reports of 19 and 22 December 1941 must have taken place prior to 21 of November. One could charge Naumann with responsibility for these executions only, if the allegation of the Prosecution would be correct that Naumann took over the Command of Einsatzgruppe B already on 1 November 1941. However, this allegation of the Prosecution is incorrect. The Prosecution, to be sure, bases this allegation on a personnel questionnaire filled out by Naumann in the year 1943, submitted in evidence as Doc. No. 2970, Exh. 113, Doc. Book III B, page 4 English and German. In this questionnaire Naumann filled in the date of his commissioning and not the date when he actually took over the Einsatzgruppe B. The time of commissioning did net, however, coincide with the time Naumann actually took over the leadership of Einsatzgruppe B. In regard to Naumann's criminal responsibility, however, only the time is relevant at which he actually took command of Einsatzgruppe B. questionnaire, filled in merely the date of the commissioning order, since at the time of handing in the questionnaire in 1943 it was irrelevant when the actual transfer of command took place. The time of the commissioning order was fixed and known to the personnel department of the Reichs Security Main Office.
from the date of actually assuming of command. Often there is a longer interval between both dates. So the appointment of Naumann as Inspector of the Security Police and the SD Nuernberg is dated 19 May 1944 which becomes evident from Document No. 2970, Exh. 113 Book III 3, page 16 German, Record P. 2079 Engl.). However, Naumann did not start service before 9 June 1944 (Record p. 860 German, 850 English). In addition the Prosecution bases its claim on the Operational Situation Report of 12 Nov. 1941, Doc. Book II C, page 23 German, page 20 English, Doc. No. 2830, Exh. 72), because there Naumann is listed in the register of Military Posts and communications as Chief of Einsatzgruppe B. To this it must be said at first that this document does not contain any report by Einsatzgruppe B at all. that the persons listed therein could be responsible for whatever occurrences are mentioned in the report; for these registers were not compiled on the basis of reports received from Russia, but independently by Office I of the Reichs Security Main Office in Berlin on the basis of personnel records there on file. This becomes evident on page 815 German, 808 English record. These personnel files contained only the date of the commissioning order, but no information concerning the actual begin of service on the basis of the commission. Thus it is to be explained why Naumann in the Military Posts reports compiled by the RSHA appeared as Chief of Einsatzgruppe B beginning 1 November 1941 automatically on the basis of the commissioning order of the same date, Which Office I of the RSHA issued and therefore knew, although the time of the actual start of service was relevant, which Office I did not know. Post reports did not correspond to the actual personnel situation with the Einsatzgruppen.
So in the Military Post register of the Operational Situation Report No. 126 of 29 Oct. 1941 (Doc. Book I, page 31, Doc. No. 4134, Exh. 7) the co-defendant Rasch is referred to as leader of Einsatzgruppe B, -
THE PRESIDENT: Now, I would suggest that when you refer to a document it is enough to indicate what report it is with the number, without reading the page number, Document Book, Exhibit Number, and so on, because that appears in your written summation and it will be enough merely to refer to the report by number. Don't you think that will be all right?
DR. GAWLIK: I would like you to rule, Your Honor, that it also appears in the record, however, because if I do not read it, it does not appear in the record, because the German court reporters have no copy of my plea. I didn't understand why that is because the English have been obtained, but there have been no German copies made. The German copies only will have to be copied, and the English on es have to be translated.
THE PRESIDENT: I cannot believe that the German reporters will not be furnished with the German text of your summation. Is the Secretary General informed about this? Certainly the German reporters should have a copy of the German speech.
SECRETARY GENERAL: I have not received any German copies at all,
DR. GAWLIK: I quite agree with Your Honor, if it can be secured that German copies are being made -- I am not sure they are made at all and whether or not only English copies are being made and if the German court reporters receive the English copies so that they can get them themselves, then it is no longer necessary, only for that reason I read the numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed as you were reading before, and at recess time the Secretary General will obtain the necess ary information and transmit it to the Tribunal.
DR. GAWLIK -- however Rasch, as the evidence has disclosed, never did lead this Einsatzgruppe, for Naumann took over command of this Einsatzgruppe directly from N ebe, who at the start of the Russian campaign had been Chief of the Einsatzgruppe.
This can be seen still clearer from the Operational Situation Report No. 129 of 5 November 1941. Also in the Military Post register of this report Rasch still is listed as Chief of Einsatzgruppe B. If the opinion of the Prosecution were correct, then logically, it should have made Rasch also responsible for executions within the sphere of Einsatzgruppe B. But it did not do that, obviously in the conviction that the Military Post register was incorrect to that extent. To the same extent the Prosecution itself has admitted the unreliability of the Military Post registers contained in the operational situation reports.
But the presentation of evidence has shown other errors of this kind, which do not directly affect the defendant Naumann, to be sure, but which also show that the records of the base camp can't be given any value as evidence. In this way, Strauch is mentioned as Commander of the Sipo and the SD as early as February 1942, in the report of the RSHA dated 6 September 1943, although the evidence has shown that he didn't begin to serve in that capacity until 22 March, 1942. As proof of further errors of this sort, I refer to the statements of Steimle record, Braune, Haensch, Ott, and Schulz as well as Naumann. in command of Einsatzgruppe B since as early as 1 November 1941, cannot be considered as conclusive, on account of the documents presented for that purpose. the further taking of evidence, because this has shown beyond, doubt that Naumann did not assume command of Einsatzgruppe B until the end of November, probably not until 30, November 1941. given a detailed description of his appointment to Chief of the Einsatzgruppe. In this he showed convincingly that Streckenbach informed him by telephone in Berlin on 1 November 1941 about his appointment as Commander of an Einsatzgruppe. At the same time he had been told, however, that it had not been decided yet whether he would take over the command of Einsatzgruppe B. or C. Einsatzgruppe B. he then left Berlin on the 20th or 21st of November, 1941. After his arrival in Smolensk his predecessor Nebe continued to command the Einsatzgruppe for about one week and only then turned it over to him, so that he only assumed his duties as commander of the Einsatzgruppe on about the 30th of November 1941. During his examination on the witness stand, in direct as well as in cross examination, Naumann designated 30 November 1941 as about the day he began his duties and was also able to give valid reasons to support this date.
These are the same facts that Naumann has already declared to the Prosecution in his affidavit of 27 June 1947. These declarations are especially important because Naumann made them at a time when he could not have known the contents of the Operational Situation Reports with which he is charged, and therefore also could not know what importance would be attached to this date in this trial. evidence which was presented later. The Operational Situation Report of 5 November 1941 which has already been mentioned in a different connection, speaks for the correctness of these statements. the beginning of this document it can be seen that Rasch is mentioned as the Commander of Einsatzgruppe B, who, as has already been shown, has never been in Smolensk. From this must be concluded that it could not yet have been dtermined on 5 November 1941 that Naumann was to take over Einsatzgruppe B, for in that case Rasch would not have been mentioned as the leader of Einsatzgruppe B.
However, Naumann's statements are confirmed by Klingelhoefer. Klingelhoefer was already a member of Einsatzgruppe B when Naumann took over command. Klingelhoefer was able to say definitely on the witness stand that he saw Naumann in Smolensk for the first time between the 20th and 25th of November 1941 and that Nebe was still in Smolensk at that time. Klingelhoefer has exact information about these dates because he went on leave shortly afterwards, on 2 December 1941 to be exact; and remembers the beginning and the end of his leave very well. The end of the leave was the first Christmas holiday. Klingelhoefer can remember the beginning and end of his leave with certainty.
Steimle has also confirmed Naumann's statements; he also was a member of Einsatzgruppe B before Naumann assumed command. As Steimle said on the witness stand, he met Naumann for the first time on 25 November or 2 or 3 days earlier. In the case of Steimle's statement, however, it must be taken into consideration that he figured this date out long after the event and did not have such exact clues to go on as Klingelhoefer had, so that, as he admits himself, the meeting with Naumann referred to before could also have been a few days later.
Steimle has stated himself that he is unable to give an exact date. Exhibit 176, in this document Naumann told the defendant Klingelhoefer, before the beginning of this trial, while in the local prison, not to let himself be bluffed during the interrogations and to be careful. Furthermore, Naumann gave in this document the content of the interrogations he had had up to that time. This document also contains the information that Naumann only took over his job at the end of November. attempted to influence Klingelhoefer to state, contrary to the truth, that he (Naumann) only assumed command of Einsatzgruppe B at the end of November 1941.
This conclusion is incorrect for the following reasons:
1) As already brought out, the document was made some time before the beginning of this trial. At this time Naumann knew nothing as yet, about the documents which the Prosecution has presented in this trial. In particular he did not yet know of the Operational Situation Reports of 19 and 22 December 1941. For this reason he could not yet know at the time that the date he assumed command could be decisive.
2. The Prosecution has not brought proof of any kind that the far reaching statements in this document are incorrect in any particular. This, however, would be the presupposition for the assumption that the information concerning when he took over his duties was incorrect. The contents of this document correspond, moreover, completely with the evidence that has been heard. This shows that Naumann could not have attempted, with this document, to induce Klingelhoefer to make a false statement.
Under these conditions it must be regarded as proved that Naumann did not assume command of Einsatzgruppe B until the end of November 1941. Under no circumstances has it been proved that he was the responsible Commander of Einsatzgruppe B as early as the 1st of November 1941. But the evidence is particularly.not sufficient to show, beyond doubt, that Naumann had already assumed his duties in Smolensk on 1 November. According to all the recognized principles of the trial procedures of all the recognized principles of the trial procedures of all civilized nations, which are also in effect here, according to the decisions of these Military Tribunals, the declarations of Naumann concerning the date he assumed his duties in Russia cannot be considered as refuted, in view of these doubts. which were reported in the documents presented by the Prosecution as happening before the end Of November 1941.
Therefore, the executions reported in documents NO2824, exh. 62, book II B, pg. 30, and NO 2833, exh. 114, cannot be charged to Naumann. 1942, which was presented by the Proseuction in Doc. bk II, B. pg. 52 German pg. 60 English and which contains the references to the executions from 6 to 30 March, falls within the time that Naumann was Commander of the Einsatzgruppe.
To be sure, this document has been admitted as evidence. This admission as evidence, however, does not relieve the Court of the obligation of examining the value of this Operational Situation Report as evidence. It is true that according to Ordinance No. 7 the Military Tribunals are not bound to any rules governing the taking of evidence. By this, however, it was obviously not meant that the Military Tribunal can set itself above well established rules of taking evidence, well established rules which alone are a guaranty for an investigation of the truth, and with it for a just decision.