think it was possible that such an order was at all thinkable. The contents of the order were so entirely beyond my imagination that I could not imagine a realization of this. In particular, I could not imagine that I myself would be able to do this and, on the other hand, I believed I could not ask my men to do something which I could not do myself.
Q Did you see a way out of the situation?
A No, I saw no way out. For me it was a position of great inner compulsion and a conflict between duty and feelings in the most extreme manner which I could imagine.
Q In what way do you speak of a conflict? and the Supreme Commander, the duty of submission of the individual will to the authority of the State. On the other hand there was the human feeling which revolted against such measures.
Q Why did your feelings revolt against such measures?
A Such feelings in such a situation are very hard to explain. I believe I can express it best when I say that I considered the order inhuman and wrong for social and ethical reasons, that is, because of its inescapable reaction on the community life of our own people and that of others and on the relationship of our people to other peoples.
Q How did you judge the actual correctness of this order? measure by the Chief of State was objectively necessary or not, what his motives were and whether these motives were correct. which you found yourself?
A Open objection would have meant death. Such death, however, would have been a completely senseless martyrdom, senseless because it would not have helped anyone and because it would not have stopped things from going the way they were going.
Q What decision did you make in this compulsive position? as far as it was possible without openly disobeying the order, which would have been senseless. this order completely?
A. At the time, of course, I could not picture this very clearly. On the one hand, I knew now the moment the Fuehrer Order was announced ` that I was to be the leader of the Sonderkommando, that is, a commando which was always to be with the fighting forces at the very front...... Thus it seemed possible to me to a certain extent to evade carrying out this order, On the other hand, I played with the thought that perhaps, owing to enemy activity, it could not be done, or that one could come to a territory where there were hardly any Jews. Also, I had the idea that these orders - for me at least - were inconceivable, that perhaps they might be revoked; that, therefore, the most important thing was, at the moment, to delay carrying it out.
Q. How could you have the idea that Hitler could revoke such a fundamental order?
A. Here, too, my thoughts were not clear, and could not have been clear. These orders were so far beyond my imagination that I simply could not believe that they actually should be carried out. Also, I thought that if one were to start now to carry out this order in the East, this would become known abroad very quickly, and that then the reaction would be so strong from abroad; that, due to this, Hitler would feel forced to change his ideas about this matter. I also thought, for example, that the German diplomats abroad, in carrying out their official duties, would report about such strong reaction abroad if such an order were carried out, and that in this way the German diplomatic circles would be given reasons which would seem so decisive to Hitler, that he would change this order without changing his basic conception about the destruction of Jewery and Communists, in the East in particular.
Q. What did you think about the illegaliby of this order?
A. The illegality of a Fuehere order was out of the question. It corresponded to the German constitutional situation at the time that the Fuehrer was the supreme and unrestricted legislator, that he could legally decree anything which would then have the force of law, and that he was master over life and death.
A Fuehrer decree was the supreme law.
Q. What were you told at the time about the situation in regard to international law concerning the Soviet Union?
A. I was informed that it was the opinion of the Reich government, and also of the command of the Army, that the Soviet Union on its part considered itself outside of international law. It was said that the Soviet Union had expressly declared itself not bound by the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention. Therefore, it was said, Germany was not bound by international law within the entire territory of the Soviet Union.
Q. That wasyour opinion about this Fuehrer decree being contrary to international law?
A. Even if it had been contrary to international law - at home it was binding for us, because according to German opinion at the time and not only at the time, but for decades - or since time immemorial -the citizen is bound by every internal state order which takes precedence over any other obligation. Therefore, an opposition to international law in any measure for the individual citizen was of no relevance.....if an internal law existed it was legal for him.
Q. What communications were made by the official propaganda in Germany in the Fuehrer speech, and by the army command at the time concerning the position of Germany towards the Soviet Union?
A. Here the following announcements were made. The Soviet Union, for ideological reasons alone, had an aggressive attitude on principle, and planned a war against Germany, and even the whole of Europe. German interference would therefore be necessary to ensure the continual existence of Germany and Central Europe. Therefore, Germany was in a state of emergency and there was no other way out.
Q. At the time, did you hear anything about the attitude of the Soviet Union in the areas which the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1940 attacked, or occupied?
A. Yes. We were told that the Soviet Union had violated international law as regards Finnland, the Baltic countries. In the commando of which I was in charge there were about four interpreters - Germans from the Baltic states, from Estonia and Latvia, who until the Spring of 1941 at the request of the Voldsdeutsche Mittelstelle, had been in the Baltic states, and they reported to me already in Schmiedeberg that is a locality near Protzsch where we were- about the actions in the Soviet Union in the Baltic states in 1940 to 1941.
Q. Who was the Einsatzgruppen Chief who was your superior?
A. That was the SS Brigadefuehrer, General Major of the Police, Dr. Stahlecker.
Q. Will you give us a short description of the character of Stahlecker?
A. He was energetic, intelligent, and ambitious. His temperment was sanguine. He was lively; he was jumpy; and unpredictable. As a superior he did not tolerate any open disobedience, but under certain circumstances he allowed arguments with him. He took interest in small matters in carrying out his inspections; but, on the other hand, he had no orderly method of working, and therefore he could not always overlook the entire sphere of his command.
Q. Was Stahlecker decided to have this order carried out to the last degree?
A. Yes, definitely. In particular, he was interested that they would realize in Berlin that he was absolutely obedient concerning this order; and, not only obedient, but a special ambition in carrying this out. This may be based on the fact that Heydrich doubted Stahlecker's obedience and devotion towards Heydrich, In the witness stand it had been expressed repeatedly that Heydrich was a very mistrusting superior, and as far as I could find out from conversations with Stahlecker at the time, Stahlecker was also being distrusted by Heydrich, and Stahlecker seemed to be very worried about this, and he therefore wanted to show Heydrich and Himmler that he was very obedient and completely devoted.
Q. What was the decision point of interest in Stahlecker?
A. The reasons which I just indicated consisted of those four points about which he know that in Berlin Heydrich and Himmler considered them the most important points, namely, first of all, a good relationship with the army as far as possible; secondly, a strict and energetic leadership of the kommandos under his command; thirdly, as quick and through an execution of an order as possible, in particular concerning the Jews; and fourth, aspart of this Fuehrer order, a bitter fight against Communism. Concerning the first point, that as an Einsatzgruppe chief, at the request of Himmler and Heydrich, he was to have a particularly good relationship with the Army, -- this request by his superiors corresponded to hiw own inclinations. In the previous years he had been an enthusiastic reserve officer, and he quite often said at the time, in 1941, that he would much rather remain in his tank battalion as squardron chief than be in charge of this damn Einsatzgruppe.
Q. Did you express your great misgivings concerning the Fuehrer order to Stahlecker?
A. Yes; this happened two or three times, in July and August 1941.
Q. How did Stahlecker react to this?
A. He emphasized energetically that this was a Fuehrer order, and that it could not be changed and could not be discussed.
Q. Was anybody present during those discussions?
A. By perchance my deputy was present in one case, Hauptstrmfuehrer Carstens. By the way he was the only man in my kommnado whom I informed about the existence of this fuehrer order, but I added very confidentially that I would try to do everything to avoid carrying this out as far as my commando was concerned or to delay it. This deputy was the only man in my commando whith whom I had a personal and confidential relationship. He was the only man in my commando whom I had known previously; I knew him from a former office.
Q. How strong was Sonderkommando I-A of which you were in charge?
A. At first when it was set up in Schmiedeberg near Pretzsch there were about one hundred men in it. Of these more than one quarter were drivers. There were five officers in the commando; twenty five police officials. Except for two, none of these had been trained in questions concerning communism, and none of them know the Russian or Estonian language.
Q. What other kommandos belonged to Einsatzgruppe A?
A. Sonderkommando 1-B and Einsatzkommandos 2 and 3.
Q. When did you march to the northeast from Schmiedeberg?
A. On 23rd June, 1941.
Q. How did Stahlecker distribute the competence of the commandos?
A. On 25th June he ordered that Einsatzkommando 2 be competent for Latvia, and that Sonderkommando 1-A, of which I was in charge, belonged to the territory of the 18th Army, and particularly for Estonia at that time.
Q. Tell us what happened when you first reported to AOK 18.
A. On 25th June I met Stahlecker near the German-Lithuanian border. He was with the headquarters of the Army group there, and with the headquarters of the 16th and 18th Armies. There he had discussed our attachment to the army group. The Group had expressed on that occasion that the two Sonderkommandos, 1-A and 1-B, which were assigned to the 16th and 18th Armies, were not to stay in the rear army territ primarily, but with the advanced units of the army.
In any case not only in the rear army territories, but most of all in the combat area. On the basis of this agreement, I had to report to headquarters of the 18th Army in order to discuss everything there. On 26th June I visited the G-2 of 18th Army Headquarters. I reported to the commander in chief, and then visited the counter-intelligence department of the Army Headquarters to whom I wassubordinated in a way, that is, all questions of individual missions of my commando within the army were to be discussed with the counter-intelligence department. The G-2 of the army headquarters was the highest superior of this counterintelligence department. This counter-intelligence department gave me the papers, which were needed and all export information which was needed in order to incorporate us into the army. According to a general agreement between Stahlecker, the Army group Headquarters, and the two armies, it was my mission as soon as possible to reach the city of Riga together with those advance units of the army which would be the first ones to reach Riga.
Q. When did you reach the city of Riga?
A. On 26th June I left Memel and the last headquarters on Reich territory. With a sub-commando I went to the area of Schaulen, and there I was told by the commanding general of an army corps of the army to whom I had been sent by the army headquarters that an advance command of his army corps under the command of Colonel Lasch had already advanced to the Western suburbs of Riga. For that reason, on the 27th June, I left Schaulen with this sub-kommando and with a sub-kommando of the Einsatzkommando 2 which Stahlecker had added to my unit for the march. I left Schaulen via Abaiska toward Riga. The advance unit Lasch of the army at the time was in the western suburbs of the city of Riga. They were fighting very hard and the sane day, the 27th of June, units of the Red army cut them off from contact with the rear. This condition remained from the 27th of June until the 30th June. On 30th June a division came from Mitau.
With them came the Einsatzgruppen Chief, Dr. Stahlecker. On the 1st of July, the city of Riga was captured by this division.
Q. What forces of the security police arrived in Riga on the 1st of July?
A. First of all, Stahlecker himself with a small staff; then twenty men from Einsatzcommando 2, with the deputy leader of that Einsatzcommando 2; that was a criminal director of the state police, and of Einsatzcommando 1-A, about fifteen men under my charge. I beg your pardon, I meant Sonderkommando.
Q. What instructions did Stahlecker give?
A. Stahlecker immediately gave instructions to Einsatzkommando 2, that is, to the deputy leader of this commando, the criminal director just mentioned of the state police, to deal with security tasks in Riga. On 1st and 2nd July a few men of my commando, were to help him temporarily to securematerial in offices and office buildings. I myself was to prepare for the further advance of my commando towards Estonia.
Q. What did Stahlecker do himself during these days?
A. I cannot say in detail because during those days I hardly contacted Stahlecker. In general he dealt with the setting up of Latvian police and Latvian auxilliary police. Stahlecker himself had his headquarters during those days in the Latvian police building. I myself had no office and did not need one because I did not have to carry out any official functions in Riga. Stahlecker himself constantly negotiated in those days with leading Latvian personalities.
Q. Were the ten men in your sub-commando active on security police tasks in Riga?
A. Only insofar as they helped Einsatzkommando 2-A to secure material which was in Soviet offices and which was later to be evaluated for security police tasks.
Q. Did you or your sub-kommando leader carry out security police tasks in Riga?
A. No, that was up to Einsatzkommando 2, insofar as Stahlecker did not do it personally.
Q. During the time between 1 and 3 July, did you give instructions to the deputy commando leader of Einsatzkommando 2?
A. No. I was not entitled to do this. He was not subordinated to me, but he was subordinated to Stahlecker.
THE PRESIDENT: Since you are now going to get into the action in the field, perhaps we might wait until Wednesday morning and then we can start that new subject completely fresh. So that the Tribunal will now be in recess until Wednesday morning -- do you have something?
DR. MANDRY: No, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You are just trying to get out first. 9:30 o'clock. Very well.
(The Tribunal adjourned until Wednesday morning, 0930 hours, 12th November 1947.)
No. II in the matter of the United States of America against
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, The Judges of Military Tribunal II.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed. BY DR. von STEIN:
Q. Witness, we had stopped on your direct examination with the facts that you had arrived in Riga 1 July 1941 together with a subcommando of 15 men of your commando and at the same time with another sub-commando of 20 men of E.K. 2. In order to restore the connection with your direct examination which has already been given, summarize in a few sentences, please, what you answered to the last questions I asked you.
A. On the 1st of July 1941 the Einsatzkommando Chief Stahlecker had arrived in Riga. He had given the order of E.K. 2 to start with the Security Police job in Riga. Some men in my commando were to help them on the first and second of July temporarily in securing material in the buildings. Stahlecker himself during those days was concerned generally in setting up the Latvian Police and Latvian Auxiliary Police. He had his headquarters in the Latvian Police Building and conducted his consultations with the Latvian personalities.
Q. What did you do yourself in those days?
A. I had my commando follow up which had been in Memel so far. That was the last territory on the Reich Territory. I had this order from Stahlecker to proceed to Estonia is quickly as possible for the advance of the Army which had been proceeding very quickly up to that moment was proceeding evidently in the same quick tempo. I had to conduct negotiations with Headquarters of the Army Groups and Army Corps in order to find out what further military position was to be made by the Army and was dependent on these dispositions as to how I was to distribute my sub-commandos as time went on.
These Headquarters of the Army Corps and Divisions were all distributed over the territory in the area of central Latvia and it was a time-consuming task to find all these Headquarters and then to carry on the necessary negotiations with them.
Q. What did you find out during these negotiations?
A. I heard that the 38th Army Corps of the Army was to advance in the direction of Pleskau-Narva. I further learned that an advanced department of the Army under the leadership of General von Zelle was to proceed towardReval as quickly as possible. Other battalions were to proceed toward other southern parts of Estonia.
Q. What measures did you take after that?
A. I formed three sub-commandos. One sub-commando was assigned to the 38th Army Corps which was to advance together with this Army Corps via Pleskau along the eastern shore of the Peipus Lake toward Narva. In order to explain this further may I say that on the map here in the Courtroom the Peipus Lake is that lake which forms the eastern border of Estonia. The town of Pleskau which I mentioned is not listed on that map. It is situated on the southern end of the Peipus Lake about 15 kilometers east of the Estonian border, that is on Russian Territory. The town of Narva is listed here but there is an error on this map. It looks as if the City of Narva is not on Estonian territory but on Russian territory. In reality the City of Narva belongs to Estonia and, therefore, should have been shown on the map about 2 kilimeters left of where it is now listed. A second sub-commando was formed by me for the central Estonian area. That is for the area west of the Peipus Lake. I formed a third sub-commando to have it advance on Reval. This sub-commando was to join with the Advance Unit of the Army under the leadership of General von Zelle which I have mentioned before. I myself took over the leadership of this commando since the Advance Unit of von Zelle hoped to reach Reval in a few days and since Reval, being the capital of Estonia, was the most important objective.
In order to understand the further development may I add that this intention of the Advance Unit of von Zelle to reach Reval within a few days did not succeed but that on the first day after crossing the Latvian-Estonian frontier it met strong enemy resistance and that city of Reval was not actually captured until 28 August, that is one and one-half months later.
Q. When did the three sub-commandos start their march from Reval?
A. 4 June 1941.
Q. What information did you give to your subcommandos leaders about the message you were given in Pretsch?
A. I summarized the ideas to my sub-commando officers which had been given to the Einsatz Group Chiefs and Einsatzkommando leaders during the conferences in Pretsch and in the Prinz Albrecht Palace in Berlin but I did not tell them about the order which was announced by Streckenbach to eliminate the Jews and the Gypsies and to elimate all Communistic functionaries collectively.
Q. Why didn't you tell them that?
A. As I have already said when I described my reaction to the Fuehrer order I had made the decision as far as possible to evade the order for myself and my commandos. It was a logical consequence of this discussion that I would not inform my subordinate officers about the Streckenbach order, or rather that I would not tell them about the Fuehrer order which had been passed on by Streckenbach.
Q. Did you give your subordinate officers any definite instructions about carrying out their missions?
A. Yes, I told them to take all necessary measures in order to secure the area and especially to keep the rear of the fighting troops free in order to secure the fighting line but no collective measures were to be undertaken. Executions were to be carried out only in exceptional cases and only if an individual heavy guilt was established and only after the individual concerned was given a chance to defend himself orally.
Q. Did you give any special instructions about the advance of your commandos through Lithuania and Latvia?
A. Yes, I told them that for Lithuania and Latvia not our commando was responsible but Einsatzkommandos II and III and the subcommando of my commando were, therefore, during their march through Lithuania and Lativa only to carry out these security jobs which were absolutely necessary as immediate measures, that is, only during danger on the march.
Everything further was to be left to Einsatzkommandos II and III.
Q. During your march through Lithuania and Latvia did you yourself order arrests or executions?
A. No, in no case.
Q. Were you a sub-commando officer?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Stein, your question was, "Did he on this march order any arrests or executions" and his answer was "No". Do we understand by this that he arrested no one?
DR. VON STEIN: Your Honor, this was a question for a defeinite period of time only - that march through Lithuania and Latvia. For this period of time the defendant says that he himself ordered no arrests or executions.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. What period of time was that?
DR. VON STEIN: Will you please tell the Tribunal how long this march through Lithuania and Latvia lasted - what period of time was concerned here?
THE WITNESS: This period of time was as far as I am concerned from the 25 or 26 of June until about 5 July.
THE PRESIDENT: We understand that he really had no jurisdiction in those two countries and, therefore, it would not be incumbent on him to take anyone into custody. Is that right?
DR. VON STEIN: Will you please give an explanation to the question of the Tribunal. Was it because there was no judicial competency during that time?
THE WITNESS: No, that wasn't the question which I was asked. I understood it in such a way that I should answer whether I personally during this march through Lithuania and Latvia ordered an arrest or an execution. In the preceding question I have already explained the fact that the sub-commandos or-my commando were, of course, justified.
....
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, please. Now you are going to tell us everything that you have told us before and the question was very simple. You have said that you did not arrest or execute anyone in Lithuania and Latvia. Now the question is, was that because other commandos had been assigned to those two areas? Answer that yes or no.
THE WITNESS: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then was it because you saw nothing which would occasion your arresting or executing anybody?
THE WITNESS: I didn't understand the question.
march you did not have occasion to arrest anybody.
A The reason was as follows: The Einsatz Group Chief, Stahlecker, had ordered from the beginning that Einsatz Commando 2 was competent for Latvia and that my commando, that is to say, the Special Commando I A was to be competent for the area of Estonia primarily and the Eastern territory adjoining that, namely, that of the 18th Army. The advance of the 13th Army through Lithuania and Latvia was very quick. Of course, the subcommandos of my commando, if they had to be at one place during the march for several days, had the duty and the right to take security measures, but I told them right away that we were only to pass through Lithuania and Latvia, and that they were to limit themselves to those jobs which were absolutely necessary for an immediate security of the army rear area, and in this manner it may be explained that during the advance one or two sub-commandos during short stays in individual villages undertook security police missions on the responsibility of the sub-commando leaders, but that I myself because of the rapidity of the advance personally ordered no arrests or executions there.
Q Did any of your sub-commandos perform any executions?
A I don't know of any concrete case. Your Honor, that any of my sub-commandos carried out executions there. One or two of the sub-commandos probably did undertake arrests.
Q Well, now, you say you do not know of any precise case. Your sub-commandos had to report to you, did they not? by wide areas. Between me and my sub-commandos there were no communications for several days.
Q Well, but they eventually did report to you? of the sub-commando leaders, they, of course, reported to me.
Q Well, they eventually had to report to you, did they not?
Q Very well, did they report any executions? they may have not?
A Yes. It is possible that executions took place, but I don't know it concretely, or rather I do not remember. BY DR. VON STEIN: decisions?
A Yes. According to a general order of the Einsatzgruppe Chief Stahlecker, the sub-commando leaders in the entire area of Einsatzgruppe A had basic permission to make independent decisions, and they had full responsibility in individual cases. to pass judgment in individual cases?
A Yes, absolutely. They we re all members of the security service of the security police and SD. They had good experience and good qualifications. ecker's opinion in general was that the indigenous population was to be induced to start measures against the Jews. Did you on your march through Lithuania and Latvia have anything to do with one of these operations?
Q Did any of your subordinates have anything to do with this?
A No. I am convinced that this was not the case, otherwise, I would have found out about it in the course of time.
Q Did Stahlecker give you any special order in reference to Estonia?
A Yes. Not in the form of a compulsive order, that is to say, but he gave me directives which were to be followed, if possible.
Q Did you carry out this directive?
Q Why not? ethical reasons.
Q Did you tell Stahlecker that you did not approve of such measures?
A Yes. In a careful but unmistakable manner I expressed to him that I did not consider this correct. BY PRE PRESIDENT:
Q When was that, please? on the 4th of July.
Q And where was it?
Q And just what did you tell him?
A I cannot remember the wording of it. It is a long time ago, but I told him in a cautious manner that I did not consider it correct.
Q Well, now, don't be so cautious with us. Just tell us what you said. How, you told him in a cautious way that it was not correct but try to construct, if you can, just how you told it to him and use as well as you can remember the phraseology.
Q Well, we don't ask you to remember verbatim, of course, but you do remember that you were very cautious. Well, now, how did you go about this caution - tell us as well as you can remember what you said to Stahlecker on July 4 in Riga. about the following: That through such events public order and public morale would be affected in such a manner....
Q Well, now, just a minute, you say "through such events", what "events"? which I was asked, namely, pogroms of the indigenous population against Jews.
that the pogroms were in order?
AAll right, now, what else?
AAn I to continue with the reasons which I gave him?
A The main thought was as follows: That I thought that such events would affect the public order and morale and that there was grave danger that if such things happened at all and are permitted to happen, it would be very difficult in other respects, too, to keep up public order. Another thought which I also implied cautiously was that the event, especially for the Jews, was inhuman. but I certainly did not use the literal expression "inhuman" when I was specking to Stahlecker because it would not have had any meaning to him at that time since Stahlecker was completely under the influence of the Fuehrer Order. the word? As far as I remember, I could have said it about as follows: If the Fuehrer order would have to be carried out, then this was certainly not the best way of carrying it out - approximately in this manner. merely indicated that a more efficient manner might be found to carry out the fuehrer order.
A No, in no manner. On Friday I have already said that I had the most basic and most severe misgivings about that. to Stahlecker that it was inhumane to do this, that it was against humanity, but you did not use that phrase. You did not couch the ex expression in that rank - now, I would like to know just exactly how you told him that this was an act of inhumanity and not use the word.