Q When did you become a full-time employee of the SD?
A That was in November 1936 after my second exam on law. I became then chief of Department II/2 in the SD Main Section South West.
Q What were your tasks in this department? German domestic sphere. It was not a security police task nor an information service but reports about German domestic spheres, as has been testified to in detail in the witness stand here by Herr Ohlendorf. My personal duties as department chief consisted mainly in choosing experts, and to train them. Section South West within the main framework of the SD--did they have to deal with getting information or with central evaluation?
A Neither the one nor the other. For the task of the information service was up to the SD sections, and the task of the central evaluation was up to the SD Main Office in Berlin. This main section was, therefore, an intermediate instant between the SD sectors on the one hand and the central office in Berlin on the other hand. They had to be passed on orders from Berlin to the subordinates offices, had to check the reports of the subordinated offices, and had to forward those reports.
Q During that time were you only active in the SD?
A No. As I indicated before, throughout these years of 1937 and 1938 I was simultaneously a civil servant in the inner state administration and simultaneously I had a part-time job in the Reichs Students' Association which can be explained by the fact that my superior in the SD, Dr. Schoel in 1936 also became Reich Leader of the Students Associations and these two functions were both dealt with by him.
Q What plans did you have at the time for your future? Inner Administration, a plan, which my superior in the SD, Dr. Schoel also approved of.
Q Did your activity change owing to the outbreak of the war?
as through the order of the chief of the security police of the SD at the outbreak of war all SD main sections were dissolved. Previously I had been chief of the inland department with this main sector. My task after the outbreak of the War was to dissolve the SD Main Section as far as organization and personnel was concerned.
Q How long did you hold this function?
Q What task were you given after that? the Reich. Office of the Reich?
Naturalization of German immigrants from Estonia and Latvia who according to international agreements between Germany on the one hand and Latvia and Estonia on the other hand, in the fall of 1939, had voluntarily emigrated from Estonia and Latvia. A directive provided for the appointment of experts from six different Reich sectors who worked independently in their own fields. My task consisted of dealing with the technical and organizational aspects of the directives issued by these experts.
Q Was the Central Immigration Office part of the SD?
A No. It was a special agency of the Interior Administration of the Reich. Its foundation had been ordered by a decree in the Reich Ministerial Gazette of the Interior Administration issued by the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
Q When did you become a referant in Office I?
Q What were your main tasks as referant in Office I? training of the Security Police and the SD. The most important part of this was to find new directives for the career and the training of the so-called executive service of the security police and the SD. To be brief May I refer to what Herr Schulz has testified in the witness stand about this executive service? Immigration Office, did you have the possibility to look into the affairs of other offices of the RSHA? Central Office?
Q Upon joining the SD, were you at the same time taken into the SS?
A Yes. At the request of my chief in the SD, Dr. Scheel, I was taken into the SS in January 1936 within the SD; I did not belong to the General SS or the Waffen SS.
in connection with Count III of the Indictment where you are charged with membership in the SD and the SS I just want to conclude those points which are connected with the questions of your activity in the SD and the question of your involuntary membership in the SD during the war. How long were you in the Eastern assignment?
Q What was your next assignment? of the commander of the security police and the SD in Verona in Italy. which you were in charge? al and economic spheres in that part of Italy which was occupied by German troops at the time. In order to give a picture of this activity, could you give us some examples of such reports? in the fall of 1943, whether the German economic leadership and particularly the armament industry should discontinue an important part of the northern Italian industrial production and deport the experts to Germany. In accordance with the feeling prevalent among the population of Northern Italy, Department III of which I was in charge at the time was very much in favor of continuing the Northern Italian industry to as great an extent as possible and to let the skilled workers remain in their regular factories in the industrial cities in Northern Italy as far as possible and continue to work there instead of sending them to Germany. Such reports went to Office III of the RSHA in Berlin whose job it was to come to conclusions about this, and they also were sent to the German plenopotentiary in Italy, to Ambassador Rahn.
Another example of questions which were acute in Italy, particularly in the fall of 1943, were questions of food supplies. At the time we pointed out to the competent German authorities that the Italian food situation was endangered and we made suggestions how the situation night he relieved and improved, suggestions which were made to us by the population. have any functions or auxiliary functions in connection with the secret state police? orders which are mentioned in the IMT verdict against Gestapo and SD?
Q How long did you carry on this function? RSHA as Chief of Department VI A.
Q When did you actually start this work? charge? Office VI, special training, office and files of Office VI, also the cultural information service and the Central Office of Office VI. an information organ of the Gestapo, the secret state police? information about any order or measure which is mentioned in the IMT verdict against the secret state police and the SD?
A No, I did not get information on this. May I add to the question that I was not Chief of Department VI, but Chief of Depart ment VI A. thing about any order or measures which are mentioned in the IMT verdict against the secret state police and the SD; you never heard about such in any of your positions from the beginning to the end of the war except for those orders with which you were concerned in the so-called Eastern assignment, is that right?
war is part of the indictment; were you a voluntary member of the SD during that time?
A No. The membership in the SD throughout the war was not voluntary; since the outbreak of war, leaving the SD was prohibited and, therefore, practically impossible. The entire full-time personnel of the SD was considered, after September 1939, as essential war work and was subject to military law, within the jurisdiction of the SS and police. compulsory?
Q Yes there a possibility for you to volunteer for the army? but nevertheless I tried this repeatedly in a hap-hazard manner about seven times in all between 1941 and 1945.
Q At which agencies?
AAt the agencies competent for this in Office I of the RSHA. In March 1941 I made a written application to the Chief of Office I, Streckenbach, in which I urgently requested transfer to the army.
Q What happened after that?
Q What did you do after that?
When I was granted this after a few weeks, I asked Streckenbach during a discussion lasting half an hour that he grant my application. He explained to me that the shortage of personnel in the RSHA was so great that nobody could be released, and he was very unfriendly when I left him because I was so insistent.
Q Was there another agency where you could have applied?
A No. As Office Chief I, Streckenbach was the only one competent for this. 1940 or 1941? I had been in the hospital for many months and during that time I was completely unfit for war service. At the beginning of the war the results of this illness were still so strong that I was fit for duty in an office but not for regular war service. I, therefore, did not actually have the possibility to volunteer for the army already then. service? your fitness? At the beginning of the winter 1940-41, I decided to do everything in order to eliminate the consdquences of my illness in order to restore my ability to do front-line service and thus to make it possible to join to the army and therefore to be able to leave the RSHA.
My first watering cure in the spring of 1940 was unsuccessful. With the permission of Office Chief I, Streckenbach, in February 1941 and March 1941, I made another cure for the special purpose of restoring my fitness to do front-line duty and thus to be able to join the army. Immediately after that, as I already explained, I asked Streckenbach for my release to join the Army. That is, at first, I wanted to take my basic military training and then go to the front as a private. I want to emphasize here that I did not know anything else at the time, except that the Germans had planned to attack England, as was announced in 1940. The Russian campaign was not mentioned, at least not to me at the time.
Q In 1941 and later, in spite of Streckenbach's refusal, did you continue to make attempts to go to the Army as a combat soldier? I asked every few months, in talking to the competent personnel chief, whether there could not be a way to release me to join the army; the first time in October, 1941, then again in March, 1942, and then every few months. Also in 1944 I tried again and in 1945, when I was in Office VI of the RSHA, I continued with these attempts, unfortunately unsuccessfully, due to the acute shortage of personnel in the SD.
Q Did you make any other attempts to leave the RSHA?
A Yes. My former SD chief, Dr. Scheel, at the time was still Chief of the Reich Student Association. At the end of 1941 I wrote to him asking whether he could not use me in his Reich Student Association and ask the RSHA that I be released for this. He agreed to this and addressed a letter to the RSHA with the urgent request to release me for an office in the Student Association. The matter dragged on for months, but finally his request was rejected, again due to the great shortage of leaders who were informed about affairs in Office III. war?
A No, there were only orders which one had to obey. I did what I could against my first, second and third order.
did you then try, during the time of the Eastern assignment, to get away from there? was Dr. Gengenbach, who was competent for personnel questions of the domestic SD. As I explained at the beginning, I had belonged to this domestic SD until 1939 and that was my special field. In the years 1941 to 1943, every time I was in Berlin, I visited Dr. Gengenbach and asked him to see to it that I be given another position in the SD service in the Reich which would have nothing to do with the police.
Q When, exactly, was this?
A The first time in October, 1941. That was my first official trip to Berlin from the Eastern assignment and the second time in the fall of 1942. Then about every 3 to 4 months, until finally I came to Verona as Department Chief III within the domestic SD. called Eastern assignment with the Security Police and the SD. When were you ordered to go to the Eastern assignment?
A That was in the first half of the month of June, 1941. I cannot remember the exact date.
Q Did you object to this order? release me for the Army, as I have already explained.
Q What did Streckenbach reply to you?
A He told me a war with Russia was at hand. An assignment by the Security Police and the SD had been provided for this. There was an acute shortage of personnel. He even had to bring people back from the Army, and, therefore, the question of releasing any one for the Army was beyond discussion.
Q Had you been trained for the police?
Q Was there a possibility for you to evade the Eastern assignment?
A No, I was under military law. One could not try more than I had tried with Streckenbach. units assigned to the East?
Q What happened in Pretsch?
A The units were set up and distributed. I was appointed Chief of Sonderkommando I A. As for the details about the time in Pretsch, I would like to refer to what has already been said in detail on the witness stand here, particularly by Herr Ohlendorf. I myself was present during the discussions in the Palais Prinz Albrecht in Berlin and during the speech by Streckenbach which has been mentioned here repeatedly and during which the well-known Fuehrer Order was announced.
Q What rank did you have at the time?
A My rank was that of a Sturmbannfuehrer. That is the same as a major in the Army.
Q What orders did you receive before the Eastern assignment? expected, about the conditions in regard to international law, and other information and instructions which Herr Ohlendorf and Herr Blume have explained in detail on the witness stand here. May I refer to this. Also, Streckenbach personally informed me about the Fuehrer Order, which said that in order to secure the Eastern territory permanently, all Jews, Gypsies, and Communist functionaries were to be eliminated, together with all other elements which might endanger the security. orders to you?
Q What was your reaction to the Fuehrer Order?
think it was possible that such an order was at all thinkable. The contents of the order were so entirely beyond my imagination that I could not imagine a realization of this. In particular, I could not imagine that I myself would be able to do this and, on the other hand, I believed I could not ask my men to do something which I could not do myself.
Q Did you see a way out of the situation?
A No, I saw no way out. For me it was a position of great inner compulsion and a conflict between duty and feelings in the most extreme manner which I could imagine.
Q In what way do you speak of a conflict? and the Supreme Commander, the duty of submission of the individual will to the authority of the State. On the other hand there was the human feeling which revolted against such measures.
Q Why did your feelings revolt against such measures?
A Such feelings in such a situation are very hard to explain. I believe I can express it best when I say that I considered the order inhuman and wrong for social and ethical reasons, that is, because of its inescapable reaction on the community life of our own people and that of others and on the relationship of our people to other peoples.
Q How did you judge the actual correctness of this order? measure by the Chief of State was objectively necessary or not, what his motives were and whether these motives were correct. which you found yourself?
A Open objection would have meant death. Such death, however, would have been a completely senseless martyrdom, senseless because it would not have helped anyone and because it would not have stopped things from going the way they were going.
Q What decision did you make in this compulsive position? as far as it was possible without openly disobeying the order, which would have been senseless. this order completely?
A. At the time, of course, I could not picture this very clearly. On the one hand, I knew now the moment the Fuehrer Order was announced ` that I was to be the leader of the Sonderkommando, that is, a commando which was always to be with the fighting forces at the very front...... Thus it seemed possible to me to a certain extent to evade carrying out this order, On the other hand, I played with the thought that perhaps, owing to enemy activity, it could not be done, or that one could come to a territory where there were hardly any Jews. Also, I had the idea that these orders - for me at least - were inconceivable, that perhaps they might be revoked; that, therefore, the most important thing was, at the moment, to delay carrying it out.
Q. How could you have the idea that Hitler could revoke such a fundamental order?
A. Here, too, my thoughts were not clear, and could not have been clear. These orders were so far beyond my imagination that I simply could not believe that they actually should be carried out. Also, I thought that if one were to start now to carry out this order in the East, this would become known abroad very quickly, and that then the reaction would be so strong from abroad; that, due to this, Hitler would feel forced to change his ideas about this matter. I also thought, for example, that the German diplomats abroad, in carrying out their official duties, would report about such strong reaction abroad if such an order were carried out, and that in this way the German diplomatic circles would be given reasons which would seem so decisive to Hitler, that he would change this order without changing his basic conception about the destruction of Jewery and Communists, in the East in particular.
Q. What did you think about the illegaliby of this order?
A. The illegality of a Fuehere order was out of the question. It corresponded to the German constitutional situation at the time that the Fuehrer was the supreme and unrestricted legislator, that he could legally decree anything which would then have the force of law, and that he was master over life and death.
A Fuehrer decree was the supreme law.
Q. What were you told at the time about the situation in regard to international law concerning the Soviet Union?
A. I was informed that it was the opinion of the Reich government, and also of the command of the Army, that the Soviet Union on its part considered itself outside of international law. It was said that the Soviet Union had expressly declared itself not bound by the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention. Therefore, it was said, Germany was not bound by international law within the entire territory of the Soviet Union.
Q. That wasyour opinion about this Fuehrer decree being contrary to international law?
A. Even if it had been contrary to international law - at home it was binding for us, because according to German opinion at the time and not only at the time, but for decades - or since time immemorial -the citizen is bound by every internal state order which takes precedence over any other obligation. Therefore, an opposition to international law in any measure for the individual citizen was of no relevance.....if an internal law existed it was legal for him.
Q. What communications were made by the official propaganda in Germany in the Fuehrer speech, and by the army command at the time concerning the position of Germany towards the Soviet Union?
A. Here the following announcements were made. The Soviet Union, for ideological reasons alone, had an aggressive attitude on principle, and planned a war against Germany, and even the whole of Europe. German interference would therefore be necessary to ensure the continual existence of Germany and Central Europe. Therefore, Germany was in a state of emergency and there was no other way out.
Q. At the time, did you hear anything about the attitude of the Soviet Union in the areas which the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1940 attacked, or occupied?
A. Yes. We were told that the Soviet Union had violated international law as regards Finnland, the Baltic countries. In the commando of which I was in charge there were about four interpreters - Germans from the Baltic states, from Estonia and Latvia, who until the Spring of 1941 at the request of the Voldsdeutsche Mittelstelle, had been in the Baltic states, and they reported to me already in Schmiedeberg that is a locality near Protzsch where we were- about the actions in the Soviet Union in the Baltic states in 1940 to 1941.
Q. Who was the Einsatzgruppen Chief who was your superior?
A. That was the SS Brigadefuehrer, General Major of the Police, Dr. Stahlecker.
Q. Will you give us a short description of the character of Stahlecker?
A. He was energetic, intelligent, and ambitious. His temperment was sanguine. He was lively; he was jumpy; and unpredictable. As a superior he did not tolerate any open disobedience, but under certain circumstances he allowed arguments with him. He took interest in small matters in carrying out his inspections; but, on the other hand, he had no orderly method of working, and therefore he could not always overlook the entire sphere of his command.
Q. Was Stahlecker decided to have this order carried out to the last degree?
A. Yes, definitely. In particular, he was interested that they would realize in Berlin that he was absolutely obedient concerning this order; and, not only obedient, but a special ambition in carrying this out. This may be based on the fact that Heydrich doubted Stahlecker's obedience and devotion towards Heydrich, In the witness stand it had been expressed repeatedly that Heydrich was a very mistrusting superior, and as far as I could find out from conversations with Stahlecker at the time, Stahlecker was also being distrusted by Heydrich, and Stahlecker seemed to be very worried about this, and he therefore wanted to show Heydrich and Himmler that he was very obedient and completely devoted.
Q. What was the decision point of interest in Stahlecker?
A. The reasons which I just indicated consisted of those four points about which he know that in Berlin Heydrich and Himmler considered them the most important points, namely, first of all, a good relationship with the army as far as possible; secondly, a strict and energetic leadership of the kommandos under his command; thirdly, as quick and through an execution of an order as possible, in particular concerning the Jews; and fourth, aspart of this Fuehrer order, a bitter fight against Communism. Concerning the first point, that as an Einsatzgruppe chief, at the request of Himmler and Heydrich, he was to have a particularly good relationship with the Army, -- this request by his superiors corresponded to hiw own inclinations. In the previous years he had been an enthusiastic reserve officer, and he quite often said at the time, in 1941, that he would much rather remain in his tank battalion as squardron chief than be in charge of this damn Einsatzgruppe.
Q. Did you express your great misgivings concerning the Fuehrer order to Stahlecker?
A. Yes; this happened two or three times, in July and August 1941.
Q. How did Stahlecker react to this?
A. He emphasized energetically that this was a Fuehrer order, and that it could not be changed and could not be discussed.
Q. Was anybody present during those discussions?
A. By perchance my deputy was present in one case, Hauptstrmfuehrer Carstens. By the way he was the only man in my kommnado whom I informed about the existence of this fuehrer order, but I added very confidentially that I would try to do everything to avoid carrying this out as far as my commando was concerned or to delay it. This deputy was the only man in my commando whith whom I had a personal and confidential relationship. He was the only man in my commando whom I had known previously; I knew him from a former office.
Q. How strong was Sonderkommando I-A of which you were in charge?
A. At first when it was set up in Schmiedeberg near Pretzsch there were about one hundred men in it. Of these more than one quarter were drivers. There were five officers in the commando; twenty five police officials. Except for two, none of these had been trained in questions concerning communism, and none of them know the Russian or Estonian language.
Q. What other kommandos belonged to Einsatzgruppe A?
A. Sonderkommando 1-B and Einsatzkommandos 2 and 3.
Q. When did you march to the northeast from Schmiedeberg?
A. On 23rd June, 1941.
Q. How did Stahlecker distribute the competence of the commandos?
A. On 25th June he ordered that Einsatzkommando 2 be competent for Latvia, and that Sonderkommando 1-A, of which I was in charge, belonged to the territory of the 18th Army, and particularly for Estonia at that time.
Q. Tell us what happened when you first reported to AOK 18.
A. On 25th June I met Stahlecker near the German-Lithuanian border. He was with the headquarters of the Army group there, and with the headquarters of the 16th and 18th Armies. There he had discussed our attachment to the army group. The Group had expressed on that occasion that the two Sonderkommandos, 1-A and 1-B, which were assigned to the 16th and 18th Armies, were not to stay in the rear army territ primarily, but with the advanced units of the army.
In any case not only in the rear army territories, but most of all in the combat area. On the basis of this agreement, I had to report to headquarters of the 18th Army in order to discuss everything there. On 26th June I visited the G-2 of 18th Army Headquarters. I reported to the commander in chief, and then visited the counter-intelligence department of the Army Headquarters to whom I wassubordinated in a way, that is, all questions of individual missions of my commando within the army were to be discussed with the counter-intelligence department. The G-2 of the army headquarters was the highest superior of this counterintelligence department. This counter-intelligence department gave me the papers, which were needed and all export information which was needed in order to incorporate us into the army. According to a general agreement between Stahlecker, the Army group Headquarters, and the two armies, it was my mission as soon as possible to reach the city of Riga together with those advance units of the army which would be the first ones to reach Riga.
Q. When did you reach the city of Riga?
A. On 26th June I left Memel and the last headquarters on Reich territory. With a sub-commando I went to the area of Schaulen, and there I was told by the commanding general of an army corps of the army to whom I had been sent by the army headquarters that an advance command of his army corps under the command of Colonel Lasch had already advanced to the Western suburbs of Riga. For that reason, on the 27th June, I left Schaulen with this sub-kommando and with a sub-kommando of the Einsatzkommando 2 which Stahlecker had added to my unit for the march. I left Schaulen via Abaiska toward Riga. The advance unit Lasch of the army at the time was in the western suburbs of the city of Riga. They were fighting very hard and the sane day, the 27th of June, units of the Red army cut them off from contact with the rear. This condition remained from the 27th of June until the 30th June. On 30th June a division came from Mitau.
With them came the Einsatzgruppen Chief, Dr. Stahlecker. On the 1st of July, the city of Riga was captured by this division.
Q. What forces of the security police arrived in Riga on the 1st of July?
A. First of all, Stahlecker himself with a small staff; then twenty men from Einsatzcommando 2, with the deputy leader of that Einsatzcommando 2; that was a criminal director of the state police, and of Einsatzcommando 1-A, about fifteen men under my charge. I beg your pardon, I meant Sonderkommando.
Q. What instructions did Stahlecker give?
A. Stahlecker immediately gave instructions to Einsatzkommando 2, that is, to the deputy leader of this commando, the criminal director just mentioned of the state police, to deal with security tasks in Riga. On 1st and 2nd July a few men of my commando, were to help him temporarily to securematerial in offices and office buildings. I myself was to prepare for the further advance of my commando towards Estonia.
Q. What did Stahlecker do himself during these days?
A. I cannot say in detail because during those days I hardly contacted Stahlecker. In general he dealt with the setting up of Latvian police and Latvian auxilliary police. Stahlecker himself had his headquarters during those days in the Latvian police building. I myself had no office and did not need one because I did not have to carry out any official functions in Riga. Stahlecker himself constantly negotiated in those days with leading Latvian personalities.
Q. Were the ten men in your sub-commando active on security police tasks in Riga?
A. Only insofar as they helped Einsatzkommando 2-A to secure material which was in Soviet offices and which was later to be evaluated for security police tasks.
Q. Did you or your sub-kommando leader carry out security police tasks in Riga?
A. No, that was up to Einsatzkommando 2, insofar as Stahlecker did not do it personally.
Q. During the time between 1 and 3 July, did you give instructions to the deputy commando leader of Einsatzkommando 2?
A. No. I was not entitled to do this. He was not subordinated to me, but he was subordinated to Stahlecker.
THE PRESIDENT: Since you are now going to get into the action in the field, perhaps we might wait until Wednesday morning and then we can start that new subject completely fresh. So that the Tribunal will now be in recess until Wednesday morning -- do you have something?
DR. MANDRY: No, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You are just trying to get out first. 9:30 o'clock. Very well.
(The Tribunal adjourned until Wednesday morning, 0930 hours, 12th November 1947.)