The literature of international law including the official War Manual as well as the British Manual of Military Law 1929, 1936 edition, or the US Basic Field Manual 1940 edition in the same way as the Geneva Commission Minutes 1929, do not serve as any useful guide for the interpretation of article 31 of the Geneva Convention concerning Prisoners of War.
However, the authoritative American work by W. Winthrop: Military Law and Precedents, 2. Ed. Washington Gvt. Printing Office 1920 on page 792 contains the following noteworthy statements: "Also they (the prisoners of war) may not be compelled to participate in military operations or to perform labor or do service of a military character."
The meaning of the regulation in question must be elucidated from the text itself.
II.
2.) Article 31 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 regarding Prisoners of War prohibits two ways in which prisoners of war may be employed, namely:
a) to employ them for transporting arms and munition, as well as material which is intended for the combat units. The demand that these articles must be intended for combat units refers to all articles described herewith. Apart from arms and munition it covers in particular articles of equipment, fuel, telephone installations, cars, motorcycles, wagons, horses, beds, blankets, perhaps also food supplies although the latter is doubtful. The trend of thought appears to be that prisoners of war are not to be asked to appear at the front and there to supply the combat units in the front line with material which may directly or indirectly enable or facilitate their fight against the people of the prisoners of war. It is important that the transport must be intended for the combat units. Accordingly 17.
Sept.47 23&24 9-A AEH Gallagher (Kurtz) Transport for the occupying forces or the home army is not forbidden b)Moreover the employment of prisoners of war for work which is directly connected with war operations is prohibited.
From this formulation it follows immediately that not every employment of prisoners of war in war or armament industry is forbidden. By war operations armament here operations performed by the combat units but not the activity of occupation authorities or forces. As the only example for this type of forbidden work, the manufacture of arms and ammunition of every kind, including those for land, air and sea warfare is mentioned. Article 23 prohibits the manufacture and transportation of arms and ammunition, in the case of other material merely the transportation. Ev** from this statement one is already inclined to conclude that the manufacture of means of transport, such as cars, railway-trucks and aircraft, ships and so forth cannot be listed under the heading labor which, according to article 31, is forbidden, even if these articles are going directly to the combat units.
THE PRESIDENT: But you would not say that it was true as to U-boats and tanks, would you.
DR.SEIDL: Your Honor if this applies to U-boats and tanks this question can not be answered in this general way. If then spare parts or parts of U-boats are being manufactured, I am then inclined to accept this vies, but I should take the vies that the manufacturing of U-boats, the assemlicy of U-boats, are not covered by the Hague Convention of 1929.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
DR. SEIDL: According to general opinion, the digging of trenches and fortifications at the front are also listed as forbidden occupation One must not include here the building of barracks for soldiers, field hospitals, air-raid shelters and so forth. If minitions is the only example which is mentioned uder forbidden activities in connection with production, then this example indicates the meaning which the mentioned under forbidden activities in connection with production, then this example indicates the meaning which the convention attaches to labor in direct connection with war operations.
War operations means combat. Prisoners of war are not be required to manufacture the means by which the soldier at the front places his people "hors de combat". Chief examples apart from arms and ammunition are such things as flame-throwers, smoke screening apparatus and so on. This does not, however, include the manufacture of articles which make it easier for the soldier to carry on the fight, or which are necessary for his existence, such as food-stuffs, articles of clothing, binoculars, telephone apparatus, flashlights, maps and other such things. I believe these statements are for the court personally to decide. That is as far as I can judge.
The word "direct" is closely connected to the word "exclusive". At any rate, under this heading such products are to be understood which are specially intended for carrying out war operations, not however those which, apart from this, serve other purposes such as wires, railway sleepers, rockets, gas-masks and again binoculars, flashlights, etc.
Furthermore, only a product which directly serves the operation of war can be used in combat, as such. The manufacture of semi-finished goods or of articles which can be used for assembling war materials such as for example screws, armored plates, wires, nails, does not fall under the category of labor prohibited under article 31. On the other hand, finished products such as U-boat compression tanks and torpedo firing tubes, etc, which only have to be mounted, belong to this category.
One is led to this interpretation all the more, if one takes into account the generally recognized legal principle "in dubic pro reo", according to which every incriminating provision is to be construed in favor of the defendant.
A strict interpretation of Article 31 also seems appropriate, because - in times of total warfare - all employment of PoWs may in the end inevitably be regarded as prohibited by Article 31.
No matter whether a PoW is employed for road repairs, in stone quarries, in horticulture, in factories making civilian clothes and the like it will always be in the interest of the war, and even if only for the reason that by his activity another worker is made available for active service for defense.
The hearing of evidence did not prove that the defendant Oswald POHL was responsible for employing PoWs under conditions, which represented a violation of the regulations of the Hague Convention relating to Land Warfare and of the Geneva Convention referred to. Anyhow it could not be proved that the defendant POHL had issued an order to this effect. In this connection I should like to refer to the affidavit given by Gerhard MAURER, from which it becomes evident that records and reports concerning the employment of prisoners were submitted to the defendant POHL, which simply showed the professional groups and the type of profession, but did not admit of any conclusion being drawn regarding nationality, the reason for the protective custody and other concomitant circumstances.
In judging these facts it has to be borne in mind that, in principle, the administration of PoW camps rested with the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) and that the Economic and Administrative Main Office had nothing to do with it. If, in spite of it, there were deviations from this rule in exceptional cases, it was not done in agreement with the WVHA, Economic and Administrative Main Office. The treatment of questions arising therefrom was exclusively an affair of the OKW and the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service, of the SD, namely, the RSHA.
If, in spite of this, the Tribunal should find the responsibility of the defendant Oswald POHL in connection with the employment of PoWs as being established under conditions which would at the same time represent a violation of the regulations of the Hague Convention regarding Land Warfare of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1929, then the illegality, in view of the war-emergency already mentioned, would be inadmissible.
VIII.
As is shown by the hearing of the evidence no serious objections can be raised against the assumption that the prisoners are obliged to work. In view of the special conditions due to the war, the illegality of the attitude of the defendant POHL would be inadmissible, even if such an obligation for work had not existed namely, for the reasons of (national emergency, war emergency).
Whatever the position may be: the defendant himself at any rate was convinced of the legality of this employment and never doubted its legality.
At the beginning of my assessment of evidence, I already proved in detail that a conviction for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity within the sense of Art. II, section 1b and c of the Control Council Law No. 10, these comments are in paragraph 1 of my plea, is only possible if intentional violation can be proved. Whether such an intention existed has also to be judged by German law as I have already mentioned.
According to section 59, paragraph 1 of the Reich Penal Code, the German law stipulates that a crime can only be classified as intentional, if it is committed with full knowledge of all circumstances in connection with the acts punishable under the law. The erroneous assumption of an actual justification to act at the same time precludes the intention to commit a crime; this is in accordance with the administration of justice which was established long before the National Socialist era, and which was practised by the German Supreme Court in a case where this assumption is based upon an error outside penal law. "An error outside penal law may be classified as equivalent to a factual error; it eliminates all intention."
It is a fact that the assumption of the legality of the allocation for labor of concentration camp inmates represents an assumption outside penal law, and that therefore and error in this respect constitutes an error outside penal law. Such an assumption is to be dealt with under administrative law, but in any case not under penal law.
In judging this question it would be completely wrong to refer to the provisions in Article II section 4b of the Control Council Law No. 10. In accordance with it, the defendant is not exempted from responsibility if he "acted by order of his government or one of his superiors."
This is not the point in investigating the present problem. It is not an "order" which is to eliminate the intention, but an "error" of a certain type. This regulation of Control Council Law No. 10 mentioned above therefore does not apply to the present case and cannot be applied here.
Besides I refer to my explanations later on in regard to the exculpatory cause: "Actions by order".
No. IX
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute, Dr. Seidl, we will take a ten minute break here.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. SEIDL: During the hearing of evidence the "Special Staff Kammler" (Sonderstaf Kammler) has been repeatedly dealt with. It appears necessary to make a few remarks in reference to the position of this Special Staff and its construction projects within the scheme for the labor allocation of prisoners:
As from the beginning of 1943 Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler concerned himself more and more with the armament industry. The reason for this was evidently not an official commission by the Fuehrer, but his realization that by increasing the war potential the prerequisites for a victorious termination of the war had first to be established. In this respect his close personal relations to Armament Minister Speer were a great help to him; later on he worked closely together with him.
The Special Staff Kammler originated from this personal relationship between Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler and Armament Minister Speer.
S Obergruppenfuehrer Kammler was commissioner with special tasks in connection with war economy when, after the loss of the 6th Army at Stalingrad and the subsequent military development it became apparent that an increase in production could no longer be expected unless certain production programs were placed under the control of one person or at least a small staff.
When Kammler participated in the Jaeger program in spring 1943 he performed the first task which was assigned to him. In agreement with Armament Minister Speer, he was to establish the pre-requisites for an increase in the production of the armament industries. Right from the beginning this task was more in line with a special commission and had no connection whatsoever with office Group C of the Economic and Administrative Main Office.
This "Special task" grew from month to month. When more and more of the armament plants were destroyed through the daily increasing airattacks, the most important of these plants were to be transferred underground as speedily as possible. After Peenemuende - the seat of the V-weapon development center - had been destroyed, and the development of the V-weapons come to a standstill, Kammler was again commissioned to establish the necessary pre-requisites in respect of material and organization, for the continuation of this work.
The result of this increase in the scope of the tasks was that Obergruppenfuehrer Kammler as Chief of Office Group C came to the fore less frequently - in this connection the cancellation of certain construction projects, caused by the conditions of war, may have played a part - and that finally in the fall of 1943 he was subordinated directly and personally to Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler himself as "Chief of the Special Staff (Kammler)". He transferred his office to an administrative building away from the WVHA and left at the WVHA itself only SS-Standartenfuehrer Prof. Schleiff as his permanent deputy. All the available personnel of office Group C left the WVHA and was transferred to the "Special Staff" Kammler.
This personnel of the Special Staff Kammler was supplemented by members detailed by the Luftwaffe, the Army and the Navy.
The Special Staff received its orders from:
1.) Reich Air Ministry namely as far as its was concerned (Jaeger program.)
2.) Armament Ministry (re-establishment of armament industry under and above ground)
3.) Supreme Command of Armed Forces with reference to the V-weapons. In accomplishing these tasks, Kammler and his Special Staff availed themselves of an organization of its own, which had no connection with the Economic and Administrative Main Office. Distributed all over the Reich there were about 5 S-Inspectorates (Special inspectorates), which were the supreme authorities for the so-called Operational Staffs. In this way "Special Staff Kammler" developed into an organization, distributed all over the Reich and entirely independent from the Economic and Administrative Main Office. Therefore the responsibility for all the work of the Special Staff rested exclusively with its Chief, Obergruppenfuehrer Kammler, and the supreme Reich authorities to which he was directly subordinated namely the Reich Air Ministry, the Armament Ministry and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
Therefore the activities (construction projects) of this Special Staff cannot be regarded as being those of the Economic and Administrative Main Office (Office Group C) respectively. The construction projects included amongst others:
1.) the reestablishment of about 15 large plants above ground.
2.) the reestablishment of about 10 large subterranean plants.
3.) Mittelwerk (Dora) Nordhausen
4.) Laura Ohrdruf the so-called Fuehrer Headquarters.
The requisitioning of prisoners as workers for these construction projects was effected by the Special Staff in the same way as by the big armament firms, i.e. by an application from the competent ministries to the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps at Oranienburg. The total number of prisoners employed by "Special Staff Kammler" amounted to approximately 170,000.
Direct responsibility for the working conditions in connection with these construction projects rests neither with the Economic and Administrative Main Office nor with its chief, Oswald Pohl. On the contrary, the limits of responsibility are the same as in the case of any other employment of prisoners in the armament industry arranged for and sanctioned by the Office Group D.
6. Spoliation and seizure of property in the occupied territories is what is dealt with now. I would appreciate it if the Tribunal would take judicial notice of what is contained here, and I shall now turn to the next number which is No. 7 on page 74 of the English, and that is the medical experiments. I have examined this question in all details and due to the time that is at my disposal, however, I would appreciate it if the Tribunal would also take judicial notice of the medical experiments. These medical experiments are on Page 74 of my final plea in the English.
Now, as far as No. 8 is concerned, as far as the operations 13 and 14, euthanasia are concerned, and which is on Page 95, I believe I shall skip that too, and I shall turn to No. 9 of the draft of my final plea, which deals the so-called Reinhardt Action. The deliberations start on page 97 and I shall read those now.
(9) "Reinhardt Action".
During the hearing of the evidence the prosecution has submitted documents from the document book XVIII and XIX with the intention of showing that the Economic and Administrative Main Office and its Chief, Obergruppenfuehrer Oswald Pohl, participated in the measures which were comprised under the collective name "Final solution of the Jewish problem" and apparently aimed at the extermination of the Jews in Europe.
The prosecution itself apparently does not wish to assert that the Economic and Administrative Main Office and its Chief participated directly in carrying out these measures. At all events, the documents submitted by the prosecution do not permit of such a conclusion. Considering that the Economic and Administrative Main Office itself did not possess any executive instruments such a direct participation would have been impossible. For the rest the evidence in the trial of Hermann Goering and associates before the International Military Tribunal has made it abundantly clear that the so-called "Final Solution of the Jewish Problem" had been carried into effect on direct orders from Hitler and Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler, by the SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Rudolf Hoess at Auschwitz respectively Birkenau and the SS-Gruppenfuehrer Globocnik in the neighborhood of Lublin.
In this connection I would refer to the statement of Rudolf Hoess, made on 15 April 1946 before the International Military Tribunal (page 7797 of the German transcript), which I submitted in this trial as exhibit Oswald Pohl No. 1.
It is apparent from this statement, which the prosecution did not contest, that Rudolf Hoess, in the summer of 1941, had been ordered to Berlin to take personal orders from the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and that the latter gave him orders to make preparations for the so-called "Final Solution of the Jewish Problem". Hoess, in addition, stated that Himmler had enjoined the strictest secrecy upon him, that the planned operation was to be treated as a "Top Secret" matter and that he had even not been permitted to give his immediate superior, the Inspector of the Concentration Camps, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Gluecks, any information.
The evidence given before the International Military Tribunal furthermore proved also that the camps established by the SS and Police leader Globocnik in the district Lublin, had nothing directly to do with the Economic and Administrative Main Office and that the measures put into effect in these camps in the course of the so-called "Final Solution of the Jewish problem" were exclusively the concern of the Security Police, the Security Service and the instruments of the Kriminalkommissar Wirth.
For details I refer to the statement of the witness Dr. Georg Konrad Morgen, made on 7 August 1946 before the International Military Tribunal (page 14846 of the German transcript-) copy of which I submitted as exhibit Oswald Pohl No. 2. This was repeatedly mentioned in this Tribunal.
The evidence before the International Military Tribunal has further clearly shown that the deportation of the Jews to Auschwitz-Birkenau and to the Lublin District was exclusively carried out by officials of the department IV B 4 A of the Reich Security Main Office. This was the department of the Secret State Police which was in charge of Jewish affairs. Chief of this department was SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann who had been assigned this task by a direct order from Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler. The evidence has therefore unequivocally shown that the circle of persons charged with the so-called "Final Solution of the Jewish Problem" was strictly limited and very small, and that the Economic and Administrative Main Office had nothing to do with the actual execution of these tasks at any time.
The documents submitted by the Prosecution at this trial confirm the evidence before the International Military Tribunal. Together with the statements of the defendant Oswald Pohl and of several other defendants, the following facts can be regarded as the outcome of the evidence at this trial:
1.) As exhibit 459 the Prosecution has submitted a letter from Reich Marshal Goering to the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich, dated 31 July 1941. (document No. 710-PS). The text of this letter reads as follows:
"In addition to the task already assigned to you in the decree of 24 January 1939, to find the best possible solution of the Jewish problem in the form of emigration or evacuation in accordance with the actual situation, I herewith commission you to make all the necessary organizational, practical and technical arrangements for a total solution of the Jewish problem in the German sphere of influence in Europe....."
The Prosecution has not submitted the decree of 24 January 1939 which is referred to in Goering's letter of 31 July 1941. In view of the fact that this decree was issued before the war, it is practically certain that its contents had nothing to do with the measures which were later known under the name "Final Solution of the Jewish Problem". This is also shown by the contents of the urgent letter addressed on 21 September 1939 by the Chief of the Security Police to the chiefs of all "Einsatzgruppen" of the Security Police, which deals with the Jewish problem in the occupied territories, (Document No. 3363-PS, Prosecution Exhibit 458). In Paragraph III of this urgent letter it is stated among other things: "All necessary measures are on principle always to be taken in closest contact and collaboration with the German civil administration and the local military authorities...."
Copied of this urgent letter were sent to the Army High Command, the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan (attention State Secretary Neumann), the Ministry of the Interior (attention State Secretary Stuckart), the Reich Ministry of Economies (attention State Secretary Landfried), and to the chiefs of the civil administration of the occupied territory. Neither the Economic and Administrative Main Office nor its Chief, Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl, were informed of these instructions.
2.) At the end of July 1942 the defendant Oswald POHL was informed by Reichsfuehrer SS HIMMLER that he had come to an agreement with the Reich Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, FUNK, and with the Reich Minister of Finance, Graf SCHWERIN-KROSIGK, whereby "all the assets which in the course of measures taken by the police were obtained in the occupied Eastern territory, should be delivered to the Reich by way of the Reichsbank. He - the defendant POHL - should make the necessary arrangements in agreement with the Reichsbank." The Reichsfuehrer-SS, however, gave no explanation or details of the assets involved, nor did he say from which group of people they were obtained. Some days after receiving this order, the defendant Oswald POHL rank up the Vice President of the Reichsbank, Emil PUHL, to ask him whether he had already been informed by his President, FUNK. He affirmed this and asked POHL to come to see him for a verbal discussion. On one of the next days POHL actually went to the Reichsbank. The conversation with Vice President PUHL lasted only a short time. The result was that each one was to nominate a commissioner from his colleagues, who in turn was to discuss all further details and supervise the execution. PUHL, too, was no better informed of the origin and the amount of the incoming assets than the defendant Oswald POHL himself.
After his conversation with the Vice President of the Reichsbank, PUHL, the defendant Oswald POHL discussed the matter with his deputy in office and Chief of Office A, Obergruppenfuehrer August FRANK. Both of them agreed to commission the specialist of Office A II, Hauptsturmfuehrer MELLMER, with the execution of this task. He received the order from the defendant POHL that each delivery arriving at the Economic and Administrative Main Office should be forwarded immediately to the Reichsbank.
POHL expressly forbade him to bring those deliveries or part of them into the Economic and Administrative Main Office, to open them or concern himself with them in any other way. His activity was to be limited to personally forwarding each incoming delivery to the specialist nominated by the Vice President of the Reichsbank, PUHL. This instruction, issued by the Defendant POHL, was necessary because the order of the Reichsfuehrer-SS expressly restricted the participation of the Economic and Administrative Main Office to the forwarding of the incoming assets to the Reichsbank, and also because the Economic and Administrative Main Office did not dispose in its offices of adequate safe installations.
For these reasons the actual value was never assessed at the Economic and Administrative Main Office. The defendant Oswald POHL never saw such a delivery, neither closed nor open. The number of the consignments received also remained unknown to him to the last.
In the course of time he learned about the composition of the consignment as regards coined and uncoined foregin exchange, as Hauptsturmfuehrer MELLMER came to see him from time to time, at irregular intervals of 6 - 8 weeks, and reported to him on what the Reichsbank had paid into the account "Max Heiliger" in favor of the General Cash Department of the Reich Treasury (Reichshauptkasse). MELLMER had received these figures from the Reichsbank. He only made a note of them with the object of having figures at his disposal for a possible report to Reichsfuehrer-SS HIMMLER. A bookkeeping record, i.e. a ledger entry of the assets, was not kept by the Economic and Administrative Main Office. The defendant Oswald POHL was only informed of the actual total amount which the deliveries to the Reichsbank had reached, as far as the monetary value had been fixed by realization of these deliveries and had been paid-in at the General Cash Department of the Reich Treasury in favor of the Reich.
In other words: Hauptsturmfuehrer MELLER informed the Defendant POHL from time to time of the balance of the account "Max Heiliger". This name for the account must have been agreed upon by Hauptsturmfuehrer MELLMER and the Reichsbank or the General Cash Department of the Reich Treasury, and it was obviously a cover name.
The delivery to the Reichsbank was a final one. There was neither a settling of accounts with the Economic and Administrative Main Office, nor any entry or deposit in its favor. With the arrival and the delivery of the consignment to the Reichsbank, the Economic and Administrative Main Office and its chief Oswald POHL considered the collection by the Reich - represented by the Reich Minister of Finance as complete.
A closer investigation of the procedure by which the Reichsbank "realized" the assets received, as far as they did not consist of coins, is therefore not necessary.
According to the evidence submitted, these "MELLMER consignments" reached the Reichsbank from August 1942 onwards at quite irregular intervals which did not become known to the defendant Oswald POHL. The participation of the Economic and Administrative Main Office in the forwarding of these consignments was limited to the actions which I have described.
3.) About the middle of September 1942 the Economic and Administrative Main Office received a letter from SS- and Police Leader, Gruppenfuehrer GLOBOCNIK, attached to which was the draft of an order by Reichsfuehrer-SS HIMMLER. GLOBOCNIK wrote something like this: in consequence of the evacuation of the Jewish population from the towns of the Generalgouvernement, ordered by the Reichsfuehrer-SS, considerable amounts of valuables are being obtained (foreign currency, jewels, coins, precious stones and other things). The Reichsfuehrer has ordered that the Economic and Administrative Main Office should issue this draft as an economic order.
The draft of HIMMLER's order which included the principles of and the directions for the whole procedure, had the handwritten remark by HIMMLER: "To be issued by the Economic and Administrative Main Office and to be extended to Auschwitz. Property of thieves, hoarders and receivers of stolen goods."
This draft of HIMMLER's order served as basis for working out the instructions issued by the Economic and Administrative Main Office on 26 September 1942 regarding the "realization of property in connection with the resettlement and the evacuation of Jews" which was submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit 472 (document No. 724). It was discussed by the defendant POHL and August FRANK, SS-Brigadefuehrer at that time, and then worked out and signed by FRANK. Those instructions were sent to the chief of the Lublin SS headquarters and to the administration chief of the Auschwitz concentration camp, but not to any military offices not to any offices of the Security Police or the Security Service, in particular not to the SS- and Police Leader for Lublin or to the commandant of a particular concentration camp. This fact proves that it was a question of the economic realization of already existing valuables, and not of obtaining these valuables, possibly by seizure.
4.) By teletype of 20 or 21 October 1942, addressed to Ooergruppenfuehrer POHL and to the Lublin concentration camp, the Reichsfuehrer SS ordered that shoes and working clothes had to be surrendered for 10,000 Volksdeutsche (document NO-606, Prosecution exhibit 151). A further directive issued by HIMMLER, on October 1942 to Obergruppenfuehrer POHL and to Obergruppenfuehrer LORENZ in his capacity as chief of the Main Office "Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle" ordered the delivery of "Household articles and clothing from the stores at Lublin and Auschwitz" to a series of groups of Volksdeutsche at Christmas 1942.
5.) A written report was submitted to Reichsfuehrer-SS HIMMLER on 6 February 1943 on the execution of those directives. This report "on eht use made up to date of second-hand textile goods obtained owing to the resettlement of Jews" was submitted by the Prosecution as exhibit 479 (document NO-1257). It was drafted by the chief of Office B, SS-Gruppenfuehrer LOERNER, and the copy submitted by the Prosecution bears the typewritten signature of the defendant Oswald POHL. The defendant Oswald POHL has no doubt that he saw this report at that time.
The appendix to this report contains the allocation, according to quantity, to the individual consignees named by HIMMLER. It was a question of 825 freight cars, 405 of which contained rags and second-hand materials which had been sent to the Reich Ministry of Economies. One freight car of woman's hair (3000 kilos) apparently came, according to the explanation given by the defendant POHL, from the Lublin concentration camp, because generally the hair of women from the Eastern territories, in particular that of gypsies, was cut off upon their delivery to the camps.
6.) In June 1943 the SS-auditor of Cracow, Standartenfuehrer SCHOLLIN, reported to the defendant POHL in Berlin. He complained that the SS- and Police Leader for Lublin, SSGruppenfuehrer GLOBOCNIK, prevented him from making the due examination of the payment department of the SS Lublin headquarters, which was one of the duties of the Cracow SS-auditor. The payment department was an independent office of the Waffen-SS and was not I say not subordinated to the SS- and Police Leader for Lublin, but to the SSauditor at Cracow.
As a result of the complaint made by Staddartenfuehrer SCHOLLIN, the defendant POHL sent the chief of Office A IV, Obersturmbannfuehrer VOGT, to Lublin to make the examination of the payment department as prescribed by the Reich Treasury regulations; he sent the Office Chief VOGT himself and not any subordinated specialist because the personal relations between the defendant Oswald POHL and the SSand Police Leader for Lublin, Gruppenfuehrer GLOBOCNIK, were very strained, and because he was afraid that GLOBOCNIK would again prevent any commissioner of lower rank from making the examination.
VOGT received from the defendant POHL the order to carry out the legally compulsory examination of the paying department of the Lublin headquarters. VOGT returned from Lublin to Berlin after about 8 days. About 2 or 3 days later - it may have been the end of June 1943 - VOGT reported to POHL and submitted to him a brief written report. On account of his findings on the spot, VOGT himself had broken off the examination, returning to Berlin. From this report of VOGT's, the defendant Oswald POHL then learned for the first time that Gruppenfuehrer GLOBOCNIK carried out the order, given him by Reichsfuehrer-SS HIMMLER, for resettling the Jews, under the name of "Operation REINHARDT". Without having previously asked for the approval of the defendant Oswald POHL, he had appointed the Sturmbannfuehrer WIPPERN for the financial side of this action. Now the defendant Oswald POHL became aware why Gruppenfuehrer GLOBOCNIK had refused to release Sturmbannfuehrer WIPPERN for a front-line unit, though WIPPERN was in no way subordinated to him, and why, also without POHL's knowledge, GLOBOCNIK had addressed himself to HIMMLER with the subject of achieving that WIPPERN could remain at Lublin.
7.) On 22 September 1943, Reichsfuehrer-SS HIMMLER sent a letter to the defendant Oswald POHL and to SS-Gruppenfuehrer GLOBOCNIK with the order "that GLOBOCNIK will take charge of the clearing of the account REINHARDT 1 before 31 December 1943 and will then hand over the matter to POHL or to the commissioner of whom I am yet to be informed." (document NO-3034, Prosecution exhibit 485). GLOBOCNIK himself informed HIMMLER by letter on 4 November 1943 (document NO-3034, Prosecution exhibit 485) that on 19 October 1943 he had concluded Operation REINHARDT and dissolved all the camps. However, his statement in this letter that he had handed over the labor camps to SSObergruppenfuehrer POHL, is incorrect. The transfer of these labor camps only took place in January 1944. At that time POHL had not received a copy of this letter of GLOBOCNIK's to HIMMLER, which GLOBOCNIK had already sent from his office as Higher SS and Police Leader in the Zone of Operation Adriatic Coast Territory, neither had he been informed of its contents in any other way.
3. In a letter dated 5 January 1944 Globocnik submitted to the Reichsfuehrer from Triest the report regarding the economic winding up of Operation Reinhardt (document NO064, prosecution exhibit 486), Globocnik complained in this report that "up to now Obergruppenfuehrer POHL had not had time to carry out the transfer". Pohl at that time - that is January 1944 - received a copy of this report.
The defendant Oswald Pohl participated in none of the discussions which must have taken place between Himmler and Globocnik about this operation. Neither of them at any time, either before or after, enlightened him - verbally or in writing - as to the true events.