On the other hand, special emphasis was laid on the exemption from payment of these costs in case of prisoners who were confined to a concentration camp on the basis of an order for protective custody or who were arrested by the police for preventive detention. For this reason the Reich Minister of Finance also demanded that the administration of the concentration camps pay, at least in part, for the expenses incurred by these camps from the proceeds of the prisoners' work.
IV.
As almost every law, the statute dated 8 August 1945 of the International Military Tribunal and Control Council Law No. 10 contain "normative elements of the facts of the case," these being of such a nature that the establishment of the punishable facts of the case, in each separate event, can be arrived at only by means of a decision based on the personal valuation of the judge. In Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, for instance, mention is made of "enslavement, forcible displacement and other inhuman wrongs perpetrated on the civilian population", without specifying in detail the elements of facts of the case requisite for the justified assumption of a war crime or a crime against humanity. I also refer to Paragraph 1 of my statement where I have already commented on these problems.
No special proof is necessary for answering the question under what supposition the terms "enslavement", "slave-labor" are legitimate, comprising a judicial decision based on personal valuation and that this cannot be established without due regard to actual practice not only in Germany, but also in other countries. In this connection the fact cannot be overlooked that, after Germany's military collapse, millions of German prisoners of war were not only forced to work in mines and elsewhere under different and extremely hard conditions, but that many thousands of Germans were moved to the Soviet Union and that this occurred as a result of a joint resolution by the chiefs of govern Court No. II, Case No. 4.ment of Great Britain, the United States and the USSR, taken at the conference of Yalta in February 1945 and laid down in a secret report.
Under figure 2 of this secret report provision is made for "German reparations to be exacted in triple form as follows:
"a) Within 2 years after the capitulation of Germany or following the cessation of organized resistance, total dismantling of national property within and outside Germany....
b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period of time to be settled after the termination of war.
c) Allocation of German labor."
In the interpretation of Control Council Law No. 10 and in judging the defendant Oswald POHL's attitude, the Court will have to take into account this practice, actually carried out, that German labor is used as payment for reparations.
In the interpretation of the regulations pertaining to Control Council Law No. 10 and of the statute for the International Military Tribunal further consideration will have to be given to Article X of ordinance No. 7 of the Military Government for Germany (US). In it, it is laid down that admissions of the International Military Tribunal concerning case No. 1 (Goering et al.) can be taken as evidence of facts only, failing new and essential proof to the contrary. This regulation, however, will have to be valid, in its proper application, not only with regard to the establishment of facts but also when interpreting the law itself. The contents of the secret report signed in February 1945 at the conference of Yalta by the three Great Powers had not been made public when the International Military Tribunal pronounced the judgment and, consequently, could not be applied to the interpretation of the Statute by this Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the Yalta agreement that you refer to been introduced in evidence here, this secret agreement?
DR. SEIDL: Your Honor, the text of this secret additional report of the Yalta conference has been published in all papers inside and Court No. II, Case No. 4.outside Germany some months ago.
This happened in connection with the accusations raised against the Soviet Union that German labor had been forcibly deported. From the point of view of the fact that this report had been published, I did not introduce it as evidence into this trial; but if the Court thinks this should be done and thinks that the text of the record should be in evidence, I should be grateful for the opportunity of making up for this omission. I have the text of this report here at my disposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Never mind introducing anything further. Just go ahead.
Page 1
5.) "The hearing of evidence has proved that the order dated 3 March 1942, issued by the Reichsfuehrer SS, charging the defendant Oswald Pohl with the unified direction of the prisoners' labor allocation was in direct connected with the development of the war events. After the collapse of the German offensive in Russia in the winter of 1941-42, which had led the German troops to the gates of Moscow, it had become evident that Germany would have to count on a long war and that in this war the entire existence of the nation was at stake. Germany was opposed by a whole world of enemies backed by an enormous war-potential, and the Government of the Reich would have seriously neglected their duty in omitting to take all measures necessary for averting this danger. One of these measures was the mobilization of all the labor available.
THE PRESIDENT: Including slaves.
DR. SEIDL: Including the mobilization of all labor of which they were available in the German territory.
THE PRESIDENT: No matter where you got it, or how you got it.
DR. SEIDL: If they were in concentration camps, then they were subject for the reasons I have quoted, for compulsory labor allocation.
THE PRESIDENT: No matter how they got there.
DR. SEIDL: If they had come to a concentration camp for reasons of the Gestapo, for instance, because they constituted a danger for the occupation forces in occupied territory, then in my opinion the administration was justified in having these inmates included in the labor process.
THE PRESIDENT: Your whole argument, Dr. Seidl, is a justification then of the enslavement of Jews and enforced labor of Jews in concentration camps. You are justifying it. You think it was right?
DR. SEIDL: If your Honor, please, I have to defend the defendant Pohl.
THE PRESIDENT: You are making an argument, and I want to know what your position is in making the argument. Do you justify it, and claim it was right?
DR. SEIDL: I claim that it has been justified if the inmates for reasons of the security Police had been committed to concentration camps. Whether in certain individual cases these requisites had been fulfilled of not, the defendant Pohl was not in a position to investigate, he had to rely on the fact that those inmates who were in concentration camps had been sent there for good reasons by the Security Police.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not the point that you were discussing. You are saying that as long as the Jews were in concentration camps it was legitimate and lawful to force them to work, no matter how they got there. Go ahead, I don't mean to distract you, or to interrupt you. Go ahead with your argument. I am sorry.
DR. SEIDL: Let us investigate the legal deductions resulting from this position of the German Wehrmacht and the German war-economy-above all in view of the supposition of a state-emergency. The question of a state of emergency and the special case of self-defense, was regulated in nearly all criminal laws, applicable only to individual circumstances. The individual, under certain conditions, may count on immunity from punishment, if he "acted forced by his own personal exigency or that of another." It has, however, been acknowledged in jurisdiction and judicial literature that a collective body, the "state" may also find itself in a state of exigency and that interventions intended to avert this exigency and actually averting it, may become exempt from punishment.
1.) First the question arose, whether the conception of the individual's self-defense could be amplified to that of a state-emergency in the sense of legal defense in favor of the state and the community of people. This question, on the whole, has been answered in the affirmative.
2.) The same that applies to self-defense also applies to a state of emergency, such as judicially expressed, for instance, in Article 54 of the German Penal Code, and also classified in nearly all modern systems of criminal procedure.
Also these regulations are, first of all, designed for individual circumstances. But, from this conception, literature and legal administration arrive at the basic acceptance of a state-emergency with adequate effect. In view of the version in which the conception of emergency is generally expressed in penal codes, the justified extension of these regulations to the State is, after all, only a transmission of fundamental ideas. If the idea of an emergency is extended to the State and if an individual is given power to intervene for the purpose of eliminating such an emergency, a valuation of objective assets and values is involved, as it also arises in a general state of emergency and in the provisions with regard to an individual state of emergency. This must necessarily lead to the result that for the individual, if conceding such actions to him, the guilt not only is removed "but that his action has become "justified". In other words; the so-called state-emergency is a reason for exculpation even if admitted only in the corresponding application to the current judicial conception of an emergency-state.
But what is mean by "transmission" of fundamental ideas to cases of state-emergency? Whether a state-emergency is due to anybody's guilt or not, whether, for instance, the last war has been a "war of aggression" is evidently of no importance here. Merely the existence of an emergency is decisive. The limitations of individual interests are, in a general way, replaced by the vital interests of the community and the state.
Summing up, we can therefore define the so-called state-emergency as an emergency not to be obviated in any other way with regard to vital interests of the state and the community. Admitting an action within its implications, not only calls for acceptance of an exculpatory cause but for the establishment of a genuine cause for justification. Which are the consequences from this legal state of affairs for the case of the defendant Oswald POHL?
1.) In March 1942 and in the following years the war situation developed in such a way that it involved a "real", i.e. an immediate pressing danger to the vital interests of the state as a power conducting the war. An increase in was production could only be achieved by an increased employment of new labor, in view of the fact that the Wehrmacht has raised its troop requirements.
2.) The conception of a State Emergency presupposes that the action which is the subject of the indictments aimed at the removal of the danger. By this is meant the objective purpose of the act and not the subjective purpose of the person acting. It remains to be discussed whether the uniform direction of the labor allocation of prisoners was a suitable means for averting the danger threatening the state. In any case, this question must be answered in the affirmative without further proof being required.
3.) In the end it may not have been possible to remove the State Emergency "by another method". According to the result of the hearing of evidence there can be no doubt that no other way existed. In view of these facts and their legal consequences the behavior of the defendant Oswald POHL appears to be justified even if the court, contrary to my conviction, should come to the conclusion that the employment of concentration came prisoners for war economy constitutes a state of facts punishable by law. This cause for preclusion of injustice would also be applicable if the court should regard the working conditions (working hours) as constituting a state of facts punishable by law. An exception would then only exist if in a single concrete case the defendant POHL were to be held responsible personally. The hearing of evidence has however offered no proof of such an exception. For the rest I refer to the limits of the criminal responsibility of the defendant POHL in his capacity as Chief of the WVHA, Economic Administrative Main Office, in my exposition at the conclusion of this evaluation of evidence.
Besides the general state of emergency already mentioned, a special state of war emergency is recognized in the literature of international law. According to this "actions are also permitted which, in self-defense and in a state of emergency, are contrary to the articles of war and which in themselves would thus also infringe on international law." According to international law, however, self-defense and emergency are different to "military was necessity" (war reason), which alone still cannot justify the violation of the articles of war. Emergency and Way Necessity are, however, different conceptions. According to general principles the emergency, in which the existence and power of development (self-preservation and self-development) of the threatened state were at stake, justified the violation of every rule of international law, consequently also the legal maxims of the articles of war, a fact recognized by the internal law of every civilized state. When applying the terms self-defense and emergency, recognized by penal law and international law, the illegality of the violations committed are precluded if the state found itself in a situation which could not be relieved by any other means and which jeopardized its existence.
The German Reich undoubtedly found itself in such a position after the collapse of the Winter offensive in Russia 1941 to 1942 and after the defeat at El Alamein. The material superiority of Germany's enemy made itself over more strongly felt as war went on and there was no longer any question, that with the acceptance of unconditional surrender demanded, the foundations of the existence of the whole nations were also threatened at the same time.
VII.
In this connection also a few remarks regarding the employment of Prisoners of War seem to be called for. The pertinent regulations are to be found in Article 61 of the Hague Convention of Land-Warfare dated 18 October 1907 (Appendix to IV Convention dealing with the laws and customs of Land warfare), and in Article 31 of the Geneva Convention dealing with the treatment of Prisoners of War dated 27 July 1929.
In Article 6 of the Hague Convention regarding Land Warfare dated 18 October 1907 regarding the question of employing prisoners of war, it states among other things: "The work done by prisoners of war must in no way .... be connected with war enterprises."
Article 31 of the Geneva Convention dated 27 July 1929 reads as follows:
"Work to be performed by prisoners of war must not be directly connected with war operations. It is especially prohibited to use prisoners for manufacturing and transporting arms or munitions of any kind or for transporting material intended for the combatant units."
1.) The Geneva Convention of the year 1929 regarding prisoners of war, which has been ratified by Germany, is to supplement and replace the regulations of the Hague Convention regarding Land Warfare of 1907 or 1899.
In relation to such states, who did not ratify the Geneva Convention the Hague Convention of Land Warfare of 1907 or 1899 is applicable if these states are bound by one of the two versions.
The Geneva Convention of 1929, which does not contain any so-called clause providing for the participation of all the powers was valid in the second World War in the relationship between Germany and her war opponents at that time, but was not valid formally as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, by whom it was not ratified. The Hague Convention regarding Land Warfare was neither formally nor even generally binding for the Soviet Union in the second World War. This warfare regulation contains a clause providing for the participation of all the powers and in the second world war the following belligerent states were not bound by it: Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Yugo-Slavia. It is doubtful whether the Hague Convention regarding Land-Warfare of 1899 was formally valid during the second world war.
This question is however of no practical importance, because neither in the first nor in the second world war did nay of the belligerent powers refer to the lack of binding force of the Hague Convention regarding Land-Warfare.
It must therefore be granted that the regulations contained in the second Hague Convention of Land-Warfare of 1907 are valid in international law by force of custom. Therefore this appears justified too, because - a sit is commonly acknowledged - the Hague Convention regarding Land-Warfare codified mainly the prescriptive law valid under international law even before the. Similar statements may also be made with reference to the Geneva Convention of 1929 concerning Prisoners of War. In the main it gives an accurate definition of the regulations contained in the Hague Convention of Land-Warfare regarding prisoners of war. Furthermore it contains a few extensions as well as restrictions of this warfare regulation. A striking example for the restrictions is constituted by the insertion of the word "direct" infront of the word "relation". It must be assumed that here it is likewise only a case of the codification of the proscriptive international law; this law resulted from the experiences gained during the time after 1907, especially from the growth of the idea of total war and of economic war.
In this connection it appears worthy of note that already before the conclusion of the Geneva Convention of 1929 concerning Prisoners of War the demand has not infrequently been made that direct relation ship to the war should serve as a prerequisite for prohibiting the employment of Prisoners of War. Thus for example in its "Manual des Lois de la Guerre sur terre" which was composed in 1880 and which has become a classic, the "institute de Droit International" already provided the following regulations for the employment of prisoners of war, viz: "They may be employed on public utilities which have no direct relation to operations carried on in the theatre of war."
If this is so, then on the strength of the prescriptive law, article 31 of the Geneva Convention concerning Prisoners of War, also applied to Soviet Russia during the second World war.
The literature of international law including the official War Manual as well as the British Manual of Military Law 1929, 1936 edition, or the US Basic Field Manual 1940 edition in the same way as the Geneva Commission Minutes 1929, do not serve as any useful guide for the interpretation of article 31 of the Geneva Convention concerning Prisoners of War.
However, the authoritative American work by W. Winthrop: Military Law and Precedents, 2. Ed. Washington Gvt. Printing Office 1920 on page 792 contains the following noteworthy statements: "Also they (the prisoners of war) may not be compelled to participate in military operations or to perform labor or do service of a military character."
The meaning of the regulation in question must be elucidated from the text itself.
II.
2.) Article 31 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 regarding Prisoners of War prohibits two ways in which prisoners of war may be employed, namely:
a) to employ them for transporting arms and munition, as well as material which is intended for the combat units. The demand that these articles must be intended for combat units refers to all articles described herewith. Apart from arms and munition it covers in particular articles of equipment, fuel, telephone installations, cars, motorcycles, wagons, horses, beds, blankets, perhaps also food supplies although the latter is doubtful. The trend of thought appears to be that prisoners of war are not to be asked to appear at the front and there to supply the combat units in the front line with material which may directly or indirectly enable or facilitate their fight against the people of the prisoners of war. It is important that the transport must be intended for the combat units. Accordingly 17.
Sept.47 23&24 9-A AEH Gallagher (Kurtz) Transport for the occupying forces or the home army is not forbidden b)Moreover the employment of prisoners of war for work which is directly connected with war operations is prohibited.
From this formulation it follows immediately that not every employment of prisoners of war in war or armament industry is forbidden. By war operations armament here operations performed by the combat units but not the activity of occupation authorities or forces. As the only example for this type of forbidden work, the manufacture of arms and ammunition of every kind, including those for land, air and sea warfare is mentioned. Article 23 prohibits the manufacture and transportation of arms and ammunition, in the case of other material merely the transportation. Ev** from this statement one is already inclined to conclude that the manufacture of means of transport, such as cars, railway-trucks and aircraft, ships and so forth cannot be listed under the heading labor which, according to article 31, is forbidden, even if these articles are going directly to the combat units.
THE PRESIDENT: But you would not say that it was true as to U-boats and tanks, would you.
DR.SEIDL: Your Honor if this applies to U-boats and tanks this question can not be answered in this general way. If then spare parts or parts of U-boats are being manufactured, I am then inclined to accept this vies, but I should take the vies that the manufacturing of U-boats, the assemlicy of U-boats, are not covered by the Hague Convention of 1929.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
DR. SEIDL: According to general opinion, the digging of trenches and fortifications at the front are also listed as forbidden occupation One must not include here the building of barracks for soldiers, field hospitals, air-raid shelters and so forth. If minitions is the only example which is mentioned uder forbidden activities in connection with production, then this example indicates the meaning which the mentioned under forbidden activities in connection with production, then this example indicates the meaning which the convention attaches to labor in direct connection with war operations.
War operations means combat. Prisoners of war are not be required to manufacture the means by which the soldier at the front places his people "hors de combat". Chief examples apart from arms and ammunition are such things as flame-throwers, smoke screening apparatus and so on. This does not, however, include the manufacture of articles which make it easier for the soldier to carry on the fight, or which are necessary for his existence, such as food-stuffs, articles of clothing, binoculars, telephone apparatus, flashlights, maps and other such things. I believe these statements are for the court personally to decide. That is as far as I can judge.
The word "direct" is closely connected to the word "exclusive". At any rate, under this heading such products are to be understood which are specially intended for carrying out war operations, not however those which, apart from this, serve other purposes such as wires, railway sleepers, rockets, gas-masks and again binoculars, flashlights, etc.
Furthermore, only a product which directly serves the operation of war can be used in combat, as such. The manufacture of semi-finished goods or of articles which can be used for assembling war materials such as for example screws, armored plates, wires, nails, does not fall under the category of labor prohibited under article 31. On the other hand, finished products such as U-boat compression tanks and torpedo firing tubes, etc, which only have to be mounted, belong to this category.
One is led to this interpretation all the more, if one takes into account the generally recognized legal principle "in dubic pro reo", according to which every incriminating provision is to be construed in favor of the defendant.
A strict interpretation of Article 31 also seems appropriate, because - in times of total warfare - all employment of PoWs may in the end inevitably be regarded as prohibited by Article 31.
No matter whether a PoW is employed for road repairs, in stone quarries, in horticulture, in factories making civilian clothes and the like it will always be in the interest of the war, and even if only for the reason that by his activity another worker is made available for active service for defense.
The hearing of evidence did not prove that the defendant Oswald POHL was responsible for employing PoWs under conditions, which represented a violation of the regulations of the Hague Convention relating to Land Warfare and of the Geneva Convention referred to. Anyhow it could not be proved that the defendant POHL had issued an order to this effect. In this connection I should like to refer to the affidavit given by Gerhard MAURER, from which it becomes evident that records and reports concerning the employment of prisoners were submitted to the defendant POHL, which simply showed the professional groups and the type of profession, but did not admit of any conclusion being drawn regarding nationality, the reason for the protective custody and other concomitant circumstances.
In judging these facts it has to be borne in mind that, in principle, the administration of PoW camps rested with the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) and that the Economic and Administrative Main Office had nothing to do with it. If, in spite of it, there were deviations from this rule in exceptional cases, it was not done in agreement with the WVHA, Economic and Administrative Main Office. The treatment of questions arising therefrom was exclusively an affair of the OKW and the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service, of the SD, namely, the RSHA.
If, in spite of this, the Tribunal should find the responsibility of the defendant Oswald POHL in connection with the employment of PoWs as being established under conditions which would at the same time represent a violation of the regulations of the Hague Convention regarding Land Warfare of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1929, then the illegality, in view of the war-emergency already mentioned, would be inadmissible.
VIII.
As is shown by the hearing of the evidence no serious objections can be raised against the assumption that the prisoners are obliged to work. In view of the special conditions due to the war, the illegality of the attitude of the defendant POHL would be inadmissible, even if such an obligation for work had not existed namely, for the reasons of (national emergency, war emergency).
Whatever the position may be: the defendant himself at any rate was convinced of the legality of this employment and never doubted its legality.
At the beginning of my assessment of evidence, I already proved in detail that a conviction for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity within the sense of Art. II, section 1b and c of the Control Council Law No. 10, these comments are in paragraph 1 of my plea, is only possible if intentional violation can be proved. Whether such an intention existed has also to be judged by German law as I have already mentioned.
According to section 59, paragraph 1 of the Reich Penal Code, the German law stipulates that a crime can only be classified as intentional, if it is committed with full knowledge of all circumstances in connection with the acts punishable under the law. The erroneous assumption of an actual justification to act at the same time precludes the intention to commit a crime; this is in accordance with the administration of justice which was established long before the National Socialist era, and which was practised by the German Supreme Court in a case where this assumption is based upon an error outside penal law. "An error outside penal law may be classified as equivalent to a factual error; it eliminates all intention."
It is a fact that the assumption of the legality of the allocation for labor of concentration camp inmates represents an assumption outside penal law, and that therefore and error in this respect constitutes an error outside penal law. Such an assumption is to be dealt with under administrative law, but in any case not under penal law.
In judging this question it would be completely wrong to refer to the provisions in Article II section 4b of the Control Council Law No. 10. In accordance with it, the defendant is not exempted from responsibility if he "acted by order of his government or one of his superiors."
This is not the point in investigating the present problem. It is not an "order" which is to eliminate the intention, but an "error" of a certain type. This regulation of Control Council Law No. 10 mentioned above therefore does not apply to the present case and cannot be applied here.
Besides I refer to my explanations later on in regard to the exculpatory cause: "Actions by order".
No. IX
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute, Dr. Seidl, we will take a ten minute break here.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. SEIDL: During the hearing of evidence the "Special Staff Kammler" (Sonderstaf Kammler) has been repeatedly dealt with. It appears necessary to make a few remarks in reference to the position of this Special Staff and its construction projects within the scheme for the labor allocation of prisoners:
As from the beginning of 1943 Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler concerned himself more and more with the armament industry. The reason for this was evidently not an official commission by the Fuehrer, but his realization that by increasing the war potential the prerequisites for a victorious termination of the war had first to be established. In this respect his close personal relations to Armament Minister Speer were a great help to him; later on he worked closely together with him.
The Special Staff Kammler originated from this personal relationship between Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler and Armament Minister Speer.
S Obergruppenfuehrer Kammler was commissioner with special tasks in connection with war economy when, after the loss of the 6th Army at Stalingrad and the subsequent military development it became apparent that an increase in production could no longer be expected unless certain production programs were placed under the control of one person or at least a small staff.
When Kammler participated in the Jaeger program in spring 1943 he performed the first task which was assigned to him. In agreement with Armament Minister Speer, he was to establish the pre-requisites for an increase in the production of the armament industries. Right from the beginning this task was more in line with a special commission and had no connection whatsoever with office Group C of the Economic and Administrative Main Office.
This "Special task" grew from month to month. When more and more of the armament plants were destroyed through the daily increasing airattacks, the most important of these plants were to be transferred underground as speedily as possible. After Peenemuende - the seat of the V-weapon development center - had been destroyed, and the development of the V-weapons come to a standstill, Kammler was again commissioned to establish the necessary pre-requisites in respect of material and organization, for the continuation of this work.
The result of this increase in the scope of the tasks was that Obergruppenfuehrer Kammler as Chief of Office Group C came to the fore less frequently - in this connection the cancellation of certain construction projects, caused by the conditions of war, may have played a part - and that finally in the fall of 1943 he was subordinated directly and personally to Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler himself as "Chief of the Special Staff (Kammler)". He transferred his office to an administrative building away from the WVHA and left at the WVHA itself only SS-Standartenfuehrer Prof. Schleiff as his permanent deputy. All the available personnel of office Group C left the WVHA and was transferred to the "Special Staff" Kammler.
This personnel of the Special Staff Kammler was supplemented by members detailed by the Luftwaffe, the Army and the Navy.
The Special Staff received its orders from:
1.) Reich Air Ministry namely as far as its was concerned (Jaeger program.)
2.) Armament Ministry (re-establishment of armament industry under and above ground)
3.) Supreme Command of Armed Forces with reference to the V-weapons. In accomplishing these tasks, Kammler and his Special Staff availed themselves of an organization of its own, which had no connection with the Economic and Administrative Main Office. Distributed all over the Reich there were about 5 S-Inspectorates (Special inspectorates), which were the supreme authorities for the so-called Operational Staffs. In this way "Special Staff Kammler" developed into an organization, distributed all over the Reich and entirely independent from the Economic and Administrative Main Office. Therefore the responsibility for all the work of the Special Staff rested exclusively with its Chief, Obergruppenfuehrer Kammler, and the supreme Reich authorities to which he was directly subordinated namely the Reich Air Ministry, the Armament Ministry and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
Therefore the activities (construction projects) of this Special Staff cannot be regarded as being those of the Economic and Administrative Main Office (Office Group C) respectively. The construction projects included amongst others:
1.) the reestablishment of about 15 large plants above ground.
2.) the reestablishment of about 10 large subterranean plants.
3.) Mittelwerk (Dora) Nordhausen
4.) Laura Ohrdruf the so-called Fuehrer Headquarters.
The requisitioning of prisoners as workers for these construction projects was effected by the Special Staff in the same way as by the big armament firms, i.e. by an application from the competent ministries to the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps at Oranienburg. The total number of prisoners employed by "Special Staff Kammler" amounted to approximately 170,000.
Direct responsibility for the working conditions in connection with these construction projects rests neither with the Economic and Administrative Main Office nor with its chief, Oswald Pohl. On the contrary, the limits of responsibility are the same as in the case of any other employment of prisoners in the armament industry arranged for and sanctioned by the Office Group D.
6. Spoliation and seizure of property in the occupied territories is what is dealt with now. I would appreciate it if the Tribunal would take judicial notice of what is contained here, and I shall now turn to the next number which is No. 7 on page 74 of the English, and that is the medical experiments. I have examined this question in all details and due to the time that is at my disposal, however, I would appreciate it if the Tribunal would also take judicial notice of the medical experiments. These medical experiments are on Page 74 of my final plea in the English.
Now, as far as No. 8 is concerned, as far as the operations 13 and 14, euthanasia are concerned, and which is on Page 95, I believe I shall skip that too, and I shall turn to No. 9 of the draft of my final plea, which deals the so-called Reinhardt Action. The deliberations start on page 97 and I shall read those now.
(9) "Reinhardt Action".
During the hearing of the evidence the prosecution has submitted documents from the document book XVIII and XIX with the intention of showing that the Economic and Administrative Main Office and its Chief, Obergruppenfuehrer Oswald Pohl, participated in the measures which were comprised under the collective name "Final solution of the Jewish problem" and apparently aimed at the extermination of the Jews in Europe.