Q (By Dr. Froeschmann) please continue, Witness.
A From the fall of 1941 the direction of the so-called Office W-I and the leadership of the DEST and also Bohemia and Allach, which at that time from the organizational point of view, had been included in the DEST, were in the hands of Opperbeck and myself. In accordance with instructions received from Pohl, we had divided up our fields of work in such a way that Opperbeck took over the porcelain and brick works and I took over the granite works in financial, commercial, and legal respects. In this connection, I would like to state that immediately after the departure of Dr. Salpeter the Bohemia, Allach, and Forbach, which actually did not belong in the DEST, by order of Pohl were included in a group of firms with the DEST.
DR. FROESCHMANN: Your honors, in this connection I refer to Document NO-1261, Exhibit 385, which is contained Document Book XIV on page 34 of the English text where the reorganization of the offices has been mentioned, just as the witness has described to you.
Q (By Dr. Froeschmann) Did Opperbeck remain with the Dest or did he leave also?
A Opperbeck left us in April or May of 1942. In connection with this, Schondorff and Schwarz were appointed Assistant Business Managers, so that now in the DEST we had four business managers, including Dr. Salpeter, who was away at the time.
Q When did Salpeter return?
A He returned, approximately, in the summer of 1943.
Q Did he resume his activity with the DEST?
A No, in a formal sense he remained Business Manager until 1944. However, after his return, he became Chief of the main office in the WVHA. That was Office A-III. For this measure it may have been a decisive factor that Dr. Salpeter and Schondorff were unable to get along with each other.
Q After Opperbeck left just how were the fields of task divided?
A It was done approximately in the following manner. Schondorff, who at the beginning only was the technical director of the brick works, later on was also put in charge of the technical management of the porcelain enterprises and the technical director of the granite works. Schwarz was in charge of the Central Personnel and Contingent and Transportation Office and he also was in charge of the central distribution. I was in charge of the legal department and the auditing department. Later these departments became so small since personnel was conscripted for front line duty that now there were only very small offices and they had been assigned to two experts and their clerks.
Q How was the collaboration between you, Schwartz, and Schondorff?
A My position towards the other two assistant managers was not very easy. Schwarz had a very high party emblem and he was also related to a very high SS leader. Schondorff enjoyed a special privileges, since he had such good connections with Pohl. He knew very well how to exploit the special position which he occupied, especially towards Schwarz, whom apparently he did not like very much. After Dr. Salpeter had been conscripted in the Wehrmacht Schondorff supported his position still more. The fact that Pohl also gave special privileges to technicians made it easier in that field. Also, in fact, his work was more appreciated than mine.
Q Mr. Mummenthey you have just now mentioned the fact that Salpeter wanted to centralize the enterprises while you wanted to have them decentralized. Were you able to realize your ideas, or did you try to realize your ideas after Salpeter had gone to the front?
AAfter Dr. Salpeter left, I occupied myself mainly with decentralizing the enterprises of the DEST as quickly as possible. This work became extremely difficult, since we recieved new instructions constantly, which overlapped in some cases or we would receive orders from Pohl which would deal with one project or another.
To what extent we had to deal with difficulties which arose from orders from above and to what extent this results from Schondorff's influence. I can only assume.
Q Mr. Mummenthey, in the course of the following years, did any further difficulties arise which slowly made it impossible for you to perform any plant work with the DEST?
A In the course of the later years of the war my task became increasingly difficult since we had this connection with the arament industries. As a result of the execution of various industries, we had to negotiate with many other enterprises and other agencies and now we had to discuss the process of manufacturing arament goods and there were constant changes in the program. Then we received certain time limits and frequently we were threatened to be given the penalty of death if we were unable to keep a certain time limit, and then the war situation became increasingly bad as well as the air attacks and the difficulties which arose in the various enterprises as a result of these air attacks.
Q.- Did you also have difficulties with regard to procurement of material?
A.- Yes. We also had these difficulties. Then the Main Administration was bombed out several times and finally had to use a barrack at Oranienburg for its headquarters. Constantly civilian workers were taken away and the reduction in administrative personnel from 170 to 24 employees now really had its effect. For this entire condition which prevailed for years, I only used the expression here that it actually was run like things in a lunatic asylum. Then I looked at all these conditions everywhere which I can say made it impossible for me to carry out any plan to work. This applies particularly to 1944 and the beginning of 1945. However, part of this also arises in 1943. We have to consider all these conditions which prevailed and we must look at them from the point of view, - that the DEST from the time of Ahrens and Salpeter and also through the influence of the general building inspector, the Reich Minister Todt, and the plenipotentiary for the communications system constantly received new assignments as to reconstruction of facilities and construction of new facilities. Now, in the end the DEST included approximately 14 of new facilities. Now, in the end the DEST included approximately 14 enterprises and these enterprises consisted in various parts of many plants.
Q.- Mr. Mummenthey, all these tasks now rested on your shoulders. As a result of this were you still able to regularly visit the plants and to have discussions for hours or for days with the plant managers about conditions which prevailed in the plants. Were you able to get any precise information any more?
A.- No, that was no longer possible. The Main Administration of the DEST which at the same time represented Office W-I as far as its personnel was concerned in the course of time this personnel had been reduced. From 1943, or at the latest from 1944, it only consisted of a very small supervisory staff. The actual work in all cases was only handled by the plants themselves.
The Main Administration only interfered when the plant administration could not handle the matter any further, whenever fundamental questions had to be decided. Then the passing on of news was also a deciding factor. It became increasingly difficult throughout the last few years.
Q.- Mr. Mummenthey, now you have told us about your career in DEST until the end of the War. You have now given us a general outline about that. I am now coming to the subject which has already been dealt with very much in detail in this trial and no clarity has as yet been established. In your position and with your personality I would have you deal with this point - your conception of the term office chief?
THE PRESIDENT: You are going to clarify that, Dr. Froeschmann, are you?
DR. FROESCHMANN: I only want to deal with it very briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: By all means do. It is so confused we have been looking for somebody to clarify it and you are apparently the man.
DR. FROESCHMANN: Yes, your Honor.
BY DR. FROESCHMANN: Mr. Mummenthey, I don't want to hear any explanation from you just what Fohl was thinking of at the time since you can't have much knowledge of that. From you I only want to hear just what you considered you now title Office Chief of W-I to mean. Will you please give us your opinion about that?
In order to do this it will be necessary for you to look at the organizational chart of the WVHA. It has been offered as Prosecution Exhibit No. 111.
Also I would like to point out several mistakes which are contained in this chart. This chart is from the year 1942. At the time Dr. Salpeter was still the office chief in a formal sense because he was only away on detached service to the Wehrmacht and I was only his deputy. Consequently on this chart in the first place Salpeter's name should have appeared and I should have been listed only as his deputy.
In fact I have been listed here as office chief and to that extent this chart is not correct. Under W-I/2 it has been stated: six stone quarries - it should read actually granite works. The Victoria porcelain AG has been listed here. However, it never belonged to the WVHA in any form.
Q.- Do you know the reasons which motivated Pohl to divide the WVHA into various offices?
A.- I don't know the reasons, which causes Pohl in 1942 to organize a group of firms under the WVHA and to give them titles of offices.
Q.- How can you explain the fact that Pohl did that?
A.- I believe that I am not wrong in assuming, that these offices and office chiefs only corresponded to his military concepts which he had gained when still working in the Navy. He was working there with the office of military administration. If Pohl had come into the WVHA in my opinion Pohl might have named the offices in WVHA the way he wished. In the commercial and legal character of the firm nothing would have been changed as a result of that.
As a legal expert I was used to seeing sharply and expressed title in private institutes. As an economic expert I also knew titles for enterprises in economic life. For me it was never understandable just how a private company could be called an office and its manager be called an office chief. Furthermore, my deputizing together with the other business manager this theory of office chief for me alone without the consent of another business manager was not possible to give any legal instructions.
Q.- What was your office designation - what did it mean to you office Chief of Office WI. What did it mean to you?
A.- It was purely functional for me. As Chief of Office W-I I was not in any legal public relationship of the Reich or the Party. I only had a private working contract with DEST-GMBG, with the title of office chief. I did not have any official function and had no civil service function whatsoever.
In the W offices no official titles could be maintained. So-called orders from the chief were instructions from the chief of the Main Office Pohl. I only felt myself tied in so far as Pohl even if he called himself chief of Main Office. In these orders for me he was only the business manager of the holding company DWB. In this connection I would like to point out briefly, and that has been already mentioned, that between the DWB and BEST Bohemia and Allach a so-called corporation contracts existed. According to this the first company I mentioned was a holding company and the last two companies corporations.
Q.- Mr. Mummenthey, we don't have to frame the details of the business interest of the DWB. Since according to the statement of the Tribunal of several gays ago the fact was established that the business companies did not become effective. However, in this connection I would like to ask you did you have any positive opinion with regard to the office chief, or is that possible?
A.- In conclusion I would like to state that everyone of the witness and the defendants here has had a different opinion about the position of W chiefs. It is just like looking through a kaleidoscope where by through a simple mechanical effect, you have a constantly changing picture.
Q.- In conclusion can I say that you were of the opinion that the designation office and office chief was nothing by a purely functional title he thought up himself and took along with him from his former profession. Could I complete the point in saying that if Pohl previously had been director of a circus then probably he would have talked about departments or something similar without this having any effect on the character of DEST?
A.- Yes.
Q.- I have completed the fact of clarity first. I have no further questions in this regard. I am now coming to the actual chapter which refers to the allocation of Inmates of DEST itself.
I am now coming to the foundation, the purpose and economic and legal structure. Mr. Mummenthey when you entered DEST in 1939 did you know the story about the foundation of the development of DEST?
A.- No, not at first.
Q.- Later on did you hear any thing about that and if you did what did you hear?
A.- Later on on one occasion.
THE PRESIDENT: We are all feeling the effect of this terrific heat, and I think we are justified in shorting this afternoon's session in the hope that tomorrow will be a different day. We will recess now until quarter after three, and then we will convene and run until four o'clock and recess for this day.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess until 1515.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. FROESCHMANN (Counsel for defendant Mummenthey):
Q. Witness, please continue in your description about the reasons which led to the establishment of the DEST, as far as you know them?
A. Dr. Salpeter, at some later date, told me when we discussed the credit negotiations with the German Gold Discount Bank about the original and development of the DEST. From the files which I saw later on I learned quite a few interesting facts. I was in a position, therefore, to form an impression which should, on the whole, be correct, even if it is not completely prove able down to the last detail.
Hitler, as everybody should know, was always very interested in architecture. As time went on this inclination became a veritable obsession. As his power grew, his plans grew also. The Reichsautobahnen, the Reich Motor Highways, or large bridges were built such as the one across the Elbe, near Hamburg, the buildings on the Reich Party Rally grounds in Nurnberg, the big stadium in Berlin, and other big cities, and soon this was combined with plans to rebuild certain German cities such as Berlin, Hamburg, Weimar, and others.
Hitler found in Speer, who later on became a Reich Minister, and in Todt, the director of the OT, a willing audience for his plans. These two men complied with Hitler's wishes, and within the scope of the Four Years Plan, they drafted extensive architectural plans. The executions of these plans depended on the available material, of course. The capacities of the existing industries was not sufficient to cover the requirements. The project of the Elbe bridge, near Hamburg, alone would have required at least 240, 000 cubic meters of granite stones, if it could be carried out at all. That requirement was tantamount to the total production of the German granite industry for three years.
The German Brick Natural Stone industry was operating on an obsolete basis. Since 1914 its construction activities had become very small owing to the war and the economic collapse. Most enterprises also lacked capital. Modern big works which could produce adequately did not exist. Speer, who knew what Hitler wanted, probably convinced Himmler that the risk involved in these collosal enterprises was considerable in view of the extra-ordinary requirements of construction materials, and private industry would not be in a position to take over these plans. He suggested that this should be turned into a government project.
This idea probably met Himmler's desire to become powerful. Hoping that the Inspector-General for the Reconstruction of German Cities, Speer, would support him financially, Himmler decided to have brick and granite works established, and by mechanization to increase their capacity beyond all expectations. Himmler was quite aware of the fact that, in order to meet these enormous requirements, Germany did not have enough labor. In his capacity as chief of German police, he, of course, was aware of the fact that in concentration camps there were thousands of inmates who were kept by the Reich without performing any productive work. Therefore, it was a logical thing for him to decide to use these inmates as workers.
As things calmed down politically, inmates, of course, would be reduced in numbers. What would remain would be the criminals and what was known as the "anti-socials."
Q. What do you mean by "anti-socials?"
A. If in my further statements I use that term more frequently, I mean by that people who were loafers by profession and inclination, pimps, notorious drunkards, beggars, tramps; people, in other words, who, according to common practice in Germany, for decades were forcibly detained in workhouses.
But I don't mean by that term the same thing which Himmler and Thierack meant, in Document 654-PS, Exhibit 333, in Document Book 12, on page 14, where reference is made to anti-social elements --
Q. On page 23 of the English document book.
A. I want to emphasize the difference in the concept. By "anti-social elements" we never meant at that time the same thing which the document lays down. I thought that criminals and antisocial elements would remain behind as the political development went on.
A However, even they would have been adequate in normal times if, as a consequence of the mechanization of the plants, the requirements, for workers decreased. The primary idea of increasing production was, therefore, combined with the secondary idea of allocating inmates to this work.
Q You therefore think that from these ideas of Himmler's an order was issued to Pohl to have very highly mechanized plants established?
A I would assume so, yes.
Q. May I interpolate something here? You heard what the witness Bickel said, and we know that in some form or other the SS was linked to these plants. Is it your view that the SS represented the public ownership which Himmler thought of when he wanted to take over these plants?
A I should imagine so.
Q Therefore, the DEST owned its origin to Speer's demands to cover the enormous requirements in building materials for the construction plan and to use inmates was now to create the possibility of realizing these requirements in a productive sense?
A Yes, that is quite correct. But I believe that the use of inmates was regarded only as a temporary measure. Therefore, it would be wrong to assume that the BEST was an enterprise working inmates in the sense that the inmates were being exploited. The purpose really was to cover the requirements for building materials. Allocation of inmates was a temporary means for a certain purpose.
Q Herr Mummenthey, when the contract for this was drawn up was it laid down or even hinted at that labor was to be recruited from inmates?
A No, it was not contained in the contract.
Q. Can you tell this Court something about another decree in the rules of the DAW, according to which this idea is first voiced?
A I believe I have seen something in the Prosecution's documents that the DAW expressed in its regulations an idea of that nature.
Q Please continue.
AAs an economic enterprise the DEST was vitally interested in obtaining and preserving skilled workers and other workers, whereas the RSHA and its subordinate departments, particularly the commandants of the concentration camps, were in all cases quite obviously interested only in the security angle. Therefore, the obvious natural interest of the DEST on the basis of the regulations issued by the Reich Industry of Justice contradicted the practices of the RSHA.
Q Was it, in other words, the case, that the BEST faced the problem of the human beings, so to speak, whereas the RSHA had its problems only in security matters?
A That is quite correct, yes.
Q Therefore, you are really unanimously in agreement with what the witness Bickel has told us in another form?
A Yes.
Q Please continue.
A From this contradiction there developed in the course of years the conflict, as I would like to call it, which became particularly obvious in the plants. I could sketch it as follows: The commandants of concentration camps, as far as Himmler and the tendency of the RSHA were concerned, were pure power politicians. They confined their power not only to the concentration camps themselves but also to the allocation of inmates to enterprises. The climax of that development was reached in Pohl's order of the first of May 1942.
Q This is Document No. NO-1029, which is Exhibit No. 40, Document Book No. II, on page 70, and on page 74 of the English Document Book.
A Pohl has stated in this Court that by this order he wanted to interest the concentration camp commandants in the economic enterprises and interest them in the allocation of inmates from an economic point of view. In actual practice, however, the result of this order was, that the commandants of the individual camps, by their mentality.
regarded themselves more or less as the masters of the enterprises. They called themselves directors of enterprises, and they acted accordingly. By this order, Pohl, as he said, wanted to improve matters. But as things developed they took a very different turn. The influence and the power of these commandants was only increased to the detriment of the local plant managements, and also to the detriment of the main administration of the DEST in Berlin. On the basis of our numerous experiences I always regarded this Pohl order as a definite limitation of our authority. In the course of the numerous complaints and objections which I had to make to all the commandants, they always excused themselves with this order.
Q Now, did the various detachment leaders as far as you know, also adjust themselves to the altitude of the commandants?
A The detachment leaders who were in charge of the labor detachments in the plants should have confined themselves to only guarding the inmates and general security measures. The expert instructions and pragmatic directives were to be left to the civilians, managers, foremen and workers of the plant. However, in line with the attitude taken by their commandants, they kept interfering time and again, although this decreased as time went on, in things which were entirely up to the plant. They issued orders about a type of work they knew nothing about, and in some cases they even wanted to decide how fast a man should work. A super-military tone was used in addressing the inmates and Bickel made a similar statement about the acts of the guards which were a natural result of the altitude maintained by the commandants. Numerous tensions and differences of opinion between the management of the plants of the DEST on the one hand and the commandants on the other hand resulted. This struggle which lasted for about five years, without any exaggeration, completely undermined my health and nervous energy.
Q Now, what about a later period of time when armament production was introduced?
A Just as originally the production of bricks and natural stone was the primary task, the armament production in the interest of Germany became, later on, the most important task by order of Reich Minister Speer, and the head of the Fighter Staff, General Field Marshal Milch.
In that period, the struggle of the DEST for economic matters on the one hand and for political power on the other hand with the commandants continued without a break. In that period of time again the allocation of inmates was only a means to an end. For that time period any reproach that the BEST used inmates is, unjustified in my opinion. If you want to use the term inmates' enterprise at all, then the DEST was far from being the biggest employer of inmates. The German industry had to rely quite generally on that type of labor. The Messerschmitt Works in Augsburg, for instance, employed over 20, 000 inmates. But quite apart from that the DEST, and I shall speak about that in detail later, for economic reasons had a vital interest in speaking up for the inmates. If the camp commandants then followed the very opposite policy, a manager of a plant had to see to it that he did not have too much to do with the camp commandant. In that direction I worked myself.
Q Now, Herr Mummenthey, you have described the development of the DEST. I want to emphasize briefly that you should describe as briefly as possible the financial status of the DEST.
AAlthough the economic basis of this enterprise was very unstable before I joined it, its financing was equally unplanned and haphazard; economic ignorance led to the fact that the Dest was sounded with its little capital of 20,000 Marks, and in the course of the years it was increased to 500,000 Marks and finally to 5,000,000 Marks through various loans. The capital of 20,000 marks was, of course, hopelessly inadequate for the smallest building to be established, for the smallest shack, let alone a large enterprise. Consequently, it became necessary to take up loans.
Q What loans, to speak very briefly, were taken up in the course of the years? Don't go into details here but just give us a brief outline in chronological order.
A In 1939, the Dresdner Bank gave us a loan of 5 million marks at an interest of 5% and the usual provisions. The basis of that loan was a personal guarantee which Himmler gave, and which legally, financially, and practically was without any meanings. As far as the negotiations about this loan were concerned, I did not take part in them myself. I was merely informed that the loan had been granted.
In the same year, 1939, the German Verkehrs Kreditbank gave us a loan of about 1 million with an interest of about 10 percent which was arranged for by the organization Todt. The Deutsche Bank at Berlin in 1939 and 1941 gave us what was called an open loan to the tune of 16 millions in two installments of 8 millions each, the interest being 3 percent; later on it was two and three-quarters and in the end two-and -a-half percent.
The negotiations on behalf of the Dest were carried out by Dr. Salpeter mainly on the basis of extensive material about the purpose of the contract and various planning items and other details of the sort, before the loan was granted. In other words, the bank was fully informed. The Vice-President of the German Reichsbank, Puhl, and a few other gentlemen from the Reichsbank inspected personally a number of plants and expressed their approval of what they had seen.
The City of Hamburg in 1940 granted a loan to the Dest for construction purposes at four percent, in order to construct the Klinker Works in Neuengamme, and in order to rebuild the old Hanseatic town of Hamburg. This was within the scope of a contract to which I shall make brief reference later on. From the capital of the German Gold Discount Bank, the loans of the Dresdner Bank and the Bank in Hamburg were repaid. In 1939 the Inspector General for the Reconstruction of the Reich capital Berlin, gave 10 million marks in order to establish the brick Works at Oranienburg.
During 1939 and later on, a number of directorates of the Reich Motor Highways, the Reichsautobahnen, and also the city of Linz in order to establish the brick works in Frappachkirchen and the GWI granted further loans to the tune of several million marks in order to build up the granite works and the stone processing works at Oranienburg.
They continued to finance the pland and the Hermann Goering Works financed through its foundries in Linz the extension of the testing station at Linz. The loans were in part repaid until the end of the war or they were adjusted otherwise. Finally, we had the negotiations with the Messerschmitt Works and the Montan GMBH in Berlin which was an enterprise of the OKH and they had to carry out armament orders.
They were particularly difficult to handle because over a hundred agencies had to address themselves with orders, requests, and so forth to us. This brief light cast on the financial background of the Dest in 1938 and 1939 shows that capital was far too tight at the time for those big orders to be carried out on a proper commercial basis.
Q Now, did the Dest receive any further support, materially, speaking from a third party?
A Yes. As I said before, the Dest was to cover these enormous requirements for building material. In order to fulfill that task, the Dest was largely supported by the Inspector-General for Construction who earmarked building material, machines, timber and iron for it. It also did the planning for the various plants and consulted them.
Q Now Herr Mummenthey, I do not wish to tax the court's time too heavily, and, therefore, I would like you to tell us briefly of what plants the DEST was comprised and tell us also because somebody said here -- I don't know whether it was the Tribunal itself or some witness -- what the capacity of the DEST was in order to show us what the plans of the DEST really were. Is it correct to say that the DEST on the one hand operated granite works and marble pits and on the other brick works?
A Yes. Before the end of the war, the DEST consisted of about 14 plants including small plants, but they were mainly brick and granite works and other plants which could use building material. From 1938 to 1942, the activity was mainly controlled by the taking over of new enterprises and the extension of the old ones. Numerous difficulties, especially since the outbreak of the war, delayed production considerably. Production was made impossible in fact in some cases as in the case of Oranienburg. The brick works, particularly those at Oranienburg presented technical problems which in some cases were insurmountable.
The most important works were the following: Orianienburg had a capacity, according to plan, of 160 million bricks. The Berstedt plant at Weimar had an annual production of 8 million bricks; the Klinker Works in Neuengamme/Hamburg were to produce between 30 and 140 millions of klinker. The granite works in Flossenbuerg was to produce annually about 20,000 cubic meters of granite stones. The granite works in St. Georgen planned to produce about 20-25,000 cubic meters of processed stones. The granite works at Gross-Rosen, Marburg and Beneschau planned to produce about 40,000 cubic meters of granite stones per year.
Q Were these the most important ones?
A Yes.
Q What about the smaller ones?
A The clay works at Stutthof, Hobbehill, Reimannsfelde with an annual capacity of about 15 million bricks, the gravel works in Auschwitz, the testing station in Linz, the debris-utilization plants in Essen, Duesseldorf, and Hamburg, the stone processing works in Oranienburg of which only the stone depot was established; further there was a plan to establish a big brick works at Dannenkirchen which however was not established.
Q Herr Mummenthey, we heard from the witness Schwarz all the details about the work in the stone pits and the granite works. I don't have to talk about that any more. I only want to ask tou, do tou have to add anything to the testimony of Schwarz?
A No, nothing very important.
Q We can now turn to another chapter which is the brick works.
THE PRESIDENT: We will recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 3 August 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Oswald Pohl, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 August 1947, 0930-1630, Justice Toms, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. 2.
Military Tribunal No. 2 is now in session.
God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the court.
DR. FROESCHMANN(Attorney for Defendant Mummenthey): May it please the Court, in the afternoon of 14 April 1947, we had as a Prosecution witness a man called Josef Krusiak in this Court. He is a German National and resides in Fulda. He was born in Dortmund. He stated at the time that for political reasons he had been committed to a concentration camp. Meanwhile I have received information, according to which Krusiak was committed to a concentration camp for embezzlement and other offenses that, as far as the veracity of the witness is concerned, are of importance. The witness has incriminated the DEST in Mauthausen and, therefore, I would like to ask for permission to submit an extract of the Penal Resister for this witness from the authorities concerned. I am unable to obtain this file from the Prosecution in Dortmund, but with the help of Defense Information Center, the documents can be obtained, if the court gives its permission. I therefore would like to ask the court to make a ruling about that.
THE PRESIDENT: You are entitled to produce that document to impeach the witness, if it's available. Will you have some way of proving the identity of the person in the document -- I mean, of proving that this is the same man?
DR. FROESCHMANN: Yes, I am able to do that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you may have leave to produce the document.